Salvation, knowledge and faith : a Christian theological enquiry based on the soteriology of Emil Brunner by Hey, John A.
D1=G1E9@?# <?@H=5475 1?4 619E8/ 1 38C9DE91?
E85@=@7931= 5?BF9CI 21D54 @? E85 D@E5C9@=@7I @6 5>9=
2CF??5C
;WQV 8N`
1 EQNZRZ D\KUR[[NM OWY [QN 4NPYNN WO AQ4
J[ [QN
FVR]NYZR[` WO D[% 1VMYN^Z
(.-+
6\TT UN[JMJ[J OWY [QRZ R[NU RZ J]JRTJKTN RV
CNZNJYLQ0D[1VMYN^Z/6\TTEN_[
J[/
Q[[X/&&YNZNJYLQ$YNXWZR[WY`%Z[$JVMYN^Z%JL%\S&
ATNJZN \ZN [QRZ RMNV[RORNY [W LR[N WY TRVS [W [QRZ R[NU/
Q[[X/&&QMT%QJVMTN%VN[&('')*&),--
EQRZ R[NU RZ XYW[NL[NM K` WYRPRVJT LWX`YRPQ[
SALVATION, KNOWLEDGE, AND FAITH: 
A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL ENQUIRY BASED ON THE 
SOTERIOLOGY OF EMIL BRENNER 
by 
John Hey 
Thesis submitted for Ph. D. Degree 
University of St. Andrews - 1983 
ý(", i1 
: ý, ýlýrf 
ý;: ýýýý . W, j,,, 1,; ýN 4ý 

Synopsis 
This study examines the nature of, the relationship between 
salvation, knowledge and faith in the specific'context of 
Christian theology. It seeks to establish an epistemological 
basis for the Christian message of salvation in a culture which 
since the time of the Enlightenment has been highly sceptical 
of religious claims. 
This study begins with a critique of the theology of 
Emil Brunner. It accepts two of his theological premises; that 
human reason and philosophy cannot prove the truth of salvation, 
and that the salvation of which Christianity speaks does not 
address humanity like a bolt from the blue as some. groundless 
revelation but on the basis of a point of contact between man 
and God, which allows humanity to recognise the salvific event. 
The distinction Brunner draws between 'personal' knowledge as 
an encounter between subjects, and 'objective' knowledge which 
is the construct of human reason enables him to speak of revelation 
in an unusual and original way. According to this thesis Christian 
revelation is at the same time rationally and 'personally' 
comprehensible, and yet not capable of being deduced or 
verified by human reason. 
However closer investigation reveals that Brunner's 
exposition of the incarnation as the 'personal' self-revelation 
of God within history is not coherent in itself. His 
understanding of both the 'personal'. and the 'historical' is 
not so much derived from a natural understanding of personality 
and history, but rather from a use of those terms as defined by, 
an understanding of revelation which contains implicit within it 
the groundlessness and the 'alien' nature of revelation which, 
he sought to avoid. 
It is the contention of this thesis that in spite of Brunner's 
failure it is possible to use his basic categories of the 
'historical' and the 'personal' to speak of salvation as the, 
confirmation within history of human 'personal' worth. This 
worth is ultimately indescribable and inexplicable in the 
categories of a contingent and finite world, and, as such, is 
open to a transcendent confirmation and validation. The Christian 
tradition, itself rooted in the tradition of Judaism, bears 
witness, like Judaism, to the experience of such a 'personal' 
validation and vindication. In this sense, therefore, the 
resurrection of Jesus, while offering no historical'proof of the 
truth' on account of its essentially 'personal' nature, can be 
seen as a legitimate epistemological basis for an understanding 
of salvation, which still preserves the primacy of faith. However 
the focus upon the category of salvation, and salvation as an 
epistemological touchstone, reveals that the resurrection of Jesus 
confirms not so much the traditional distinctive Christological 
ontology, but rather a more all-embracing ontology of the gracious 
transcendence of love itself which resists the narrow and 
distinctive definitions of orthodoxy. In fact an epistemologically 
valid ontology of faith's activity in love allows the traditional 
ontologies of Christology, Soteriology and the Trinity to be seen 
as peripheral to a contemporary articulation of the Christian 
message of salvation on account of their dubious epistemological 
foundations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1, Nature or Study 
This study divides itself into two parts. ''It'consists of an 
exposition and critique of Emil Brunner's doctrine of salvation, and 
an attempt to clarify and modify the concepts of the 'historical' and 
the 'personal' which are central to his thinking. This latter part' 
seeks td do two things'. First of all, from Brunner's concern with 
the historical dimension of revelation, it examines the relationship 
between the specifically' historical nature of Christian faith and the 
claims made in the New Testament concerning'the resurrection of Jesus. 
The focus here is upon the nature and the legitimacy of the historical 
claims, and with the subsequent proclamation and articulation of the 
divinity of Jesus. -Secondly, from Brunner's stress on the 'personal' 
nature of revelation, I shall discuss how an understanding of the 
'personal' might be seen to relate to the transcendent, the historical 
and the concept of salvation. It will be my contention that it is 
both possible and legitimate to speak of the transcendent via our 
apprehension of personal worth in the context of our historical' 
experience, and in-the context of the historical experience of the New 
Testament. 
Already from 
.u 
description of the content thero begins to emerge 
something of the purpose of the study. The basic objective is to 
discuss the problems and possibility of restating the Christian message 
of salvation. At heart there is an apologetic concern. Hy aim is to 
raise and recpond-to the question which aska'whether it is intelligible 
to speak of knowledge of God and human salvation. It is a search for 
a theological epistemology by means of the pursuit of a particular line 
of. argument. 
ý- 
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There , is, therefore a double focus. On the one hand it relates 
specifically to the theology of Emil Brunner, but on the other to the 
broader and more tantalising question of whether and how it is possible 
to "reconnect religion with modernity". 
' In the case of this study 
the focus in specifically upon Christianity although the wider issue 
is entertained. What is being offered is neither a systematic and 
comprehensive critique of Brunner's theology, nor a scholarly overview 
of recent trends in epistemology. It is rather an argument, which 
attempts to highlight the insights of Brunner's epistemology and 
discuss its weaknesses in the belief that his discussion of the nature 
of 'personal' knowledge can act as the basis for the exploration of a 
contemporary theological epistemology. This study cannot hope, in 
the space here, to set out such an epistemology in detail. All that 
is offered is the preliminary and preparatory groundwork. 
2. Something of a History 
First of all however, it is necessary to explain the reason for the 
juxtaposition of a discussion of Brunner! a theology with-the concern for 
articulating the basis of a theological epistemology. We-might say 
that there are three key words; epistemology, salvation and Emil Brunner. 
The fact-that they-come together here is in one sense quite accidental. 
That is to say that their combination is for historical as well as.. 
theological reasons. 
Tho exposition of a theological epistemology has two objectives, 
First it seeks to explain the basis in human knowledge which legitimises 
the response of faith. Second it attempts to do so in such a way that 
any primacy which can be accorded to the nature of faith will not be 
violated., This concern in, itself raises a whole cluster of related issues. 
1. Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, p. 155 
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How legitimate is the knowledge buman beings claim to have of God? 
How closely can the particularity of the Christian confession be related 
to a rational explanation of faith? 
Furthermore it is necessary to recognise that these questions can 
only be understood in the context of the challenge of the Enlightenment 
to the Christian claim to have knowledge of God on the basis of both 
reason and revelation. Contemporary theology must recognise that it 
exists alongside a philosophical tradition that is sceptical of theo- 
logical claims. The seriousness of the challenge of scepticism cannot 
be overestimated. It is not clear that the responses to this challenge 
have been able to construct a more satisfactory basis for a theological 
epistemology. It may be that they are better seen as valiant attempts 
to defend a lost cause. 
This mood of scepticism can tie understood in a number of contexts. 
By common consent, both the sceptic and the theologian of the Protestant 
tradition have agreed that Natural Theology and the classical arguments 
for the existence of God, failed to provide the 'proof' of the truth 
which they attempted. Historical and literary criticism of the Bible 
has undermined the belief that the Bible as a book contains, in some 
literal way, divinely revealed facts and truths. Modern science-has 
shown how the Biblical view of the world is no longer credible, either 
as an account of a description of the world we live in. Our increasingly 
multi-cultural and multi-religious society is embarrassed by the claims 
of different religions to have an exclusive hold on the truth. 
It is not surprising therefore that for many the Christian religion 
has lost its power to explain the world and the fundamental meaning in 
human life in the transcendent terms which it claims. With that 
credibility gone, the next obvious step was to look for a satisfactory 
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human explanation of the phenomenon of religion itself. 
A variety of suggestions have been canvassed. Some argue that 
theology. 
-Itself rests on a philosophical error. 
Others that religion 
originates in the%hüman mind, or is the product of human society. 
Feuerbach! a claim that religion is merely expressive of human needs, 
,. and that theology is 
best understood as anthropology stands guard at 
the gateway to any new theological initiative. 
This is the setting. therefore in which faith is obliged to attempt 
to explain itself i. e., to make itself intelligible. This is the task 
of a theological epistemology. Indeed amidst this climatie of extreme 
scepticism, there are some who would suggest that it 
is a mistake even 
to try. 2 For them religion makes sense apart from the traditional 
metaphysical beliefs. Nevertheless our concern is to understand both 
whether faith claims are intelligible and whether the primacy which 
faith claims over rational knowledge makes sense. This is a theme 
which runs like a thread through this study. 
Running alongside, yet related to this epistemological concern is 
the theme of salvation. The temper of Western Protestant theology 
since the Enlightenment, in spite of some notable attempts to the 
contrary, has been very much on the defensive. It has been apologetic 
in the negative sense of that term. Even the confidence and exuberance 
of Barth and his followers has not been able to persuade the culture 
of the West that it is more than bravado, a brave failure to turn 
scepticism and doubt into a theological tour de force. Indeed it was 
Barth himself, who, with his message of the revelation of the hidden God, 
2. cf. D. Z. Phillips Reli ion without Explanation and 
D. Cupitt The World to Come 
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fathered the 'death of God theology' of the nineteen-sixties. 
3 
By contrast, from a first glance at least, it seems that there is 
more vitality and hope in the attempts of Liberation theologians, in 
Latin America for example, to connect the search for liberation in the 
Third World with the Christian message of salvation. At least here 
theology seems to lend real insight into the social and political needs 
of a society. For the most part, this is in contrast with our 
culture's recent experience of theology. 
In the Liberation Theology of Latin America three things come 
together. First of all there is the appropriation of the N. T. gospel 
as being a gospel almost exclusively for the poor and oppressed. The 
New Testament has proved to be a rich quarry for those who interpret it 
as having a polemical message on behalf of the poor and underprivileged 
over against the rich and powerful. 
4 Secondly it is not surprising in 
a country dominated by the tradition of Roman Catholicism that concepts 
such as natural law and natural justice, which have an important place 
in the lower storey of the mediaeval synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
should find life and force amongst people where oppression and violation 
of human rights are commonplace. 'Thirdly, in such 'a setting it is not 
surprising to find that Marxism too is present,, resisting the oppression 
and injustice; and the Marxist locates the enemy-in a political-and 
economic system which preserves not only the status quo in Latin America, 
but the status quo in the wealth and power of the United States and the 
West. 
3. cf. Altizer's introductory comments to his selections from Barth 
in Toward a New Christianity: Readings in the Death of God Theology. 
He says, "Thus Barth, who so powerfully revived the classical 
theology of the Protestant Reformation, in addition created the 
possibility of a radical theology proceeding from the total absence 
of God in human experience". p, 123 ibid. 
4. cf. G. Gutierrez, A Theolo of Liberation! I r Miranda, Marx and 
the Bible; J. L. Segundo, Theo ogy for Artisans of a New Humanity 
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"Tho Christian contribution to the dialogue with Marxism-has not 
merely been an ability to illustrate Marxist praxis from the New Testament 
and the Christian, tradition. Rather-it has enabled the concept of 
liberation tobe: discussed in the context of the transcendent dimension 
of the 'Christian concept of-salvation. The notion of God, restoring . 
peace, justice and health by the gracious gift of his kingdom, ideas all 
contained in the notion of salvation, has had a powerful critical 
impact upon a purely secular eschatology. 
Thus the practical and revolutionary programme. for, liberation in, 
the sixties and early-seventies wasºfurthered by, s Christian epistemology 
of, ealvation. Salvation, was the theologicalrcategory which was able 
to provide the basis for dialogue, Theologians were able to speak 
about justice, health and peace, and were prepared to speak out against 
oppression and the violation". of human rights. . Theology became engaged 
in the struggle for liberation and salvation. 
Many liberation theologians saw their social and political activity 
as-an indication ofthe bankruptcy and decadence of theology in-the West. 
Western theology had been content for the most part to remain at a purely 
intellectual level, at least-in the period since the Enlightenment. 
The traditional categories of reason and revelation had-only succeeded 
in'producing a popular scepticism towards religion, and a sinister 
scepticism within theology' itself, highlighted in the death of God 
theology. 5 
t 
To a student reading theology in a Western university, and one who 
was very conscious of the need for a more satisfactory theological 
epistemology, many of the ideas of the Liberation Theologians came like 
5. -cf. p. 74-79"vol. 3-J. Segundo, Theology for Artisans of a New 
Humanity 
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a breath of, fresh air. It the heart of Christianity aas its message 
of salvation, with all the practical and social implicationa, then why 
should not u modern Christian apologetic begin at that point, at the 
very centre of the religion? Thus the question was first raised in my 
mind as to what it might mean to speak of an epistemology of salvation. 
But whor© does Emil Brunner fif into this picture? This research 
began as a, study of contempoiary"Latin American theology, the aim was 
to draw out the theological and hermenoutical lessons which these 
Liberation Theologians might teach Western theology. As I have already 
suggested, it soon became clear that the category of salvation was being 
used as a key hermeneutical and theological principle. It was both the 
means by which Christianity could be linked with the contemporary political 
situation in Latin America, as well as the means by which the significance 
of the gospel itself could be re-appropriated with new life and vigour. 
Having le3'täblisliöd that' the' category of saI nation is a' central 
thäologicnl and hermeneutical'principla for thelatin American theologians, 
ý' the'question which than raised itself was the nature '"Of' the` principle 
theological and hermoneutical categorieo which control modern Western 
Prötestant theblögy. An obvious cohdidatö for consideration`, in the 
light' of'the"work of Karl' Birth, arguably the most' important figure 
within that theology this century, was that of revelation. Here then 
was a significant hypothesis to check out. 
But also"there came Into view at thin point another question. If 
revelation could be shown to b©'a $byrtheological and hermeneutical 
categöry'by which the'Protestant tradition was`mediated to contemporary 
Western society, then not only was there a-fundamental-difference between 
the modern Latin American tradition, or an important part'of that 
tradition, and'the Protestant tradition in the West, but the question 
of the adequacy of revelation to mediate that tradition to a post- 
a 
Enlightenment-Western-society came into view. 
h 
The natural place to begin the enquiry was with Barth. But after 
Barth the enquiry turned to Brunner, and an examination in Brunner's 
theology of the relationship between revelation and salvation. How far 
did Brunner, following Barth, use revelation as the cornerstone of both 
his dogmatic theology and his response to the problem of epistemology? 
Now for did Qrunner, 's theology begin from the Christian message of 
salvation?,. - , v., 1. 
Now in one sense it is clearly simplistic to set the theological 
categories of salvation, as rediscovered in liberation theology, and 
revelation, as re-emphasised by the recent tradition of German Protestant 
scholarship in particular, in opposition to one another. As we have 
seen, the. liberation theologies speak of liberation as a gift. It is 
a-divine offer and initiative. At the same time a number, of theologians 
following in the tradition of Barth; use the category. of revelation as 
the safeguard for the-Christian, message. of salvption.. For here there 
is not merely the concept of a God who does for man what man cannot do 
for himself, but rather the. actual revelation of God himself in the 
particular historical coming of-Jesus Christ. Revelation then protects 
and preserves the truth of salvation itself, for it can only be understood 
and grasped as God's act. 
However there are two difficulties with the Barthian theological 
initiative particularly as evidenced in dialectical theology itself. 
First of all the epistemological enterprise does not begin with 
salvation as a. graspable reality, -either in terms of salvation as an 
4' -. 
6. -I am thinking here"not only, of Barth, Brunner and Logarten, who 
might be labelled, 'dialectical' theologians, but also of Bultmann, 
. -, t 
Tillich add-Pannenberg cf. Pannenberg's essay, 'The Question of 
God', basic questions in Theology vol. 2 
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experience, or'as a social and political reality or goal. It begins 
with revelution', in-the'sense that salvation itself presupposes a prior 
act, (revelation as the epistemological touchstone), and the prior 
being of God, (revelation as the self-communication of the ultimate 
ontological reality). -Salvation then depends upon an epistemology of 
revelation. 
In the second place, for Barth in particular, the sheer groundless- 
ness of revelation is difficult to relate to the historical particularity 
of the Christian message. In fact the historical nature of the 
revelation cannot be submitted to an essentially human historical 
analysis. It can only remain pure assertion validated by the groundless- 
ness of revelation itself. 
Thus, in spite of the concern to safeguard the saving truth of the 
Christian message, that saving truth is itself preserved by the priority 
of the theological category of revelation. It is here that we can see 
the epistemological snare of Barth's initiative. For Barth uses 
revelation as a theological category to confront the anthropocentric 
nature of theology which had emerged under the influence of idealism. 
However, important as this initiative remains, the suspicion exists that 
revelation, which is conceived as an antidote to idealism, can also be 
construed as a product of idealism, particularly, as is true in the case 
of Barth, when the very groundlessness of revelation is stressed. 
Theology cannot escape from the prison of human conceptualisation merely 
by speaking of revelation. 
iRt 
Of all the German and Swiss theologians who were the well-known 
contemporaries"ofßarth, Brunner-is'perhaps the one who was most'over- 
shadowed by Earth. ,.. 
And yet, on closer acquaintance, _it. seemed 
to me 
that three aspects of Brunner's thought brought him closer than Barth to 
is 
an explanation of tho`soteriological centre of the Christian message. 
To begin with Brunner resisted Barth's refusal to offer a grounding 
for the saving revelation in Jesus Christ. He tried to speak of a 
'point of contact' between man and Cod, for it was only on! the basis 
of an initial relationship, now broken, that the notion of salvation 
was possible. Salvation, for Brunner, is not a divine bolt from the 
blue. It is a reality capable of being explained within a logical 
frame of reference. It is the healing and restoration of a broken 
relationship with Cod. This broken relationship is what human beings 
know as sin. Thus sin itself presupposes an original relationship 
with God by which Cod confers upon men and women that responsibility 
which can never be obliterated, and continually summons humanity back 
to its divine origin end-a creaturely obedience. - 
In addition it is interesting to note that Brunner, like Barth, 
sees the Cross and Resurrection as constituting the revelatory event. 
Brunner not only stresses that this is the saving event, but also that 
it is at this point that we have access to the Being of Christ. Thus 
a modern Christology should work inductively and not deductively. We 
do not deduce our salvation from the divine being of Christ, but rather 
we arrive at a knowledge of who Ho is by means of appropriating the 
salvation he offers. To know Christ is to know his benefits. 
7 Here 
we notice a shift away from a theological epistemology based upon what 
we might call an ontology of revelation, to an epistemology of salvation 
itself. Brunner has seen that because the route from a human concept 
of God to a knowledge of the reality of God is both philosophically 
problematical and theologically dubious anyway, our only access to Cod, 
and to any knowledge of him which we might wish to claim, is through the 
7. cf. Brunner: Dogmatics' vol. 2 p. 271 
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salvation which-he bestows upon us. 
Finally. Brunnor'o understanding of the nature of salvation is. 
impressive. -Salvation is not a mysterious dogmatic reality, guaranteed 
by assent toe doctrinal proposition, or conferred by the ecclesiastical 
institution, neither does it merely provide epistemological access to an 
authentic knowledge, of Cod. It is essentially an ethical reality. 
Salvation is not the mysterious unity-of, the creature with the Creator, 
but-°a free responsive and responsible relationship of human beings with 
Cod. It is the coincidence of authentic human freedom with the obedience 
of faith. i, ,A -- 
Once it became clear that the attempt to allow Latin American 
liberation theology to shed critical light upon the theological tradition 
of the West=was too vast an undertaking, and that liberation theology 
itself was not likely to by impressed by-a Western theologian asking 
somewhat academic questions about its epistemological basis, it aeemdd 
that Qrupner's-neology might well be able to. further-the inquiry as to 
whether a"focus, upon the category of salvation could assist-in making a 
response to the epistemological problem. - 
3. Epistemology and Ontology 
Having explained something of the context and the history of the 
study it will also be helpful to explain in a limited way at least the 
philosophical presuppositions which lie behind it. The most important 
concerns the use of the terms 'epistemology' and 'ontology'. It is a 
basic presupposition of this study that it is reasonable and comprehensible 
for human beings to claim to have knowledge, in some sense, of that which 
is external to their consciousness and their subjective minds. It is 
both natural and reasonable for them to speak of that which is or is not 
the case, and can be understood to be so. In this sense an epistemology 
12 
presupposes an'"ontology., ` 
However, this is not to say that the conclusions are to be read into 
the starting point. It is not to presuppose the answer that there is a 
rational unity which-we might-call 'reality' or 'world' or 'truth', or 
to presuppose a'transcendent, metaphysical foundation of reality. It is 
rather to suggest that it makes sense--for human beings, from the 
perspective of'the'limited nature of"their-knowledge, to'conceive of that 
which is 'other'-in-terms of both a rational whole over against us and 
even also of its having a'transcendent origin. This is not presupposing 
an answer in the sense that-we recognise that it is also possible to 
cönceive-that ultimately there may be no actual correlate- to ' the ontology 
conceived. ` 
Thus, the presupposition of an ontology as the basis of the 
epistemology of this study, is being used as an epistemological hypothesis. 
In the context of a Christian' theological enquiry we are employing the 
concept'of ontology to raise the question of`-whether human knowledge can 
legitimise the claims of Christianity to-speak of the reality of God and 
human salvation, -, and to-ask-ebout'the nature of the transcendent I reality 
that human knowledge can mediate, and in what sense it can be said to be 
mediated: 
Ontology is the question which human epistemology raises as the 
correlate to itself. - At aývery obvious level it is the question of the 
nature and reality of this 'other'; `'i. e. -of the world and of Cod, which 
the human mind creates as`the'content of, its subjective awareness. We 
are simply owning-that'(in human knowledge the individual subject is aware 
of apprehending the world as`external to'itself. To speak of an ontology 
is'simply to preserve this dimension of the lother', both as something to 
be understood in'"itself, as well as, an ingredient ' in; a concept of reality. 
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But it is to do so as, pert of the essentially, subjective and limited 
nature of'human knowledge. , 
It is to present the problem and ask about 
the possibility`of speaking about the 'other' and the 'real'. 
In the specifically Christian context of this study there are three 
important implications. The first is almost too obvious to be-worthy 
of comment, and yet in a context'where anti-realist, and purely 
internalised, interpretations of-Christianity are expounded, it needs 
to be said. ` Our presupposition allows us to affirm that the Christian 
message makes claims about a transcendent, reality. It-speaks of God 
as an independent being, the ultimate origin of all that is. Such, 
claims need. not' necessarily be the automatic occasion of embarrassment. 
In spite of the contemporary challenge of metaphysical scepticism it can 
be claimed that they are comprehensible even though in the end it may 
not be possible to affirm their validity. 
The second is to see that, if we, assert that ontology is a logical 
correlate of an epistemology, then-the Christian claims toimediate a 
transcendentreality are-comprehensiblb in the sense that it is logical 
to think in terms of the possibility that our conceiving ofwthe 'other' 
and the 'whole'"as a unity that makes sense, originates in"a transcendent 
Purpose that gives meaning to the whole. The concept of a transcendent 
ontology is the logical development of the concept of an ontology. 
Finally, again in the specifically Christian context, in which this 
study is located, to speak of a transcendent-ontology is not to pre- 
suppose the validity-of theChristian claims concerning the transcdndent'. 
The question, we are asking is not whether the-concept. -of a transcendent 
ontology makes sense$ but whether it is a valid concept in that it. actually 
helps to bridge the gap between concept and reality, and on what 
epistemological basis we judge! it to be valid, -and how it is related to 
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the specific ontological claims that Christianity makes. Thus the 
presupposition of an ontology in this epistemological'engdiry merely 
furnishes a philosophical-basis on which to'proceed with an enquiry into 
the validity of the Christian claim to mediate salvation. 
Inevitably any presuppositions; form the boundary of the study in 
question. And yet the attempt to clarify presuppositions can be 
problematical as well as valuable. The exercise is problematic in the 
sense that it serves to highlight the flaws in a completed project. 
At the same time it is valuable in that being aware of presuppositions 
is a help towards transcending them. No piece of work begins without 
them, and the processjof study must be seen as a continuing process of 
clarifying, refining and modifying. It is arguable that here lies the 
greatest benefit of'u particular study. 
In addition the purpose is to provide the reader with a yardstick 
by which to judge the work. Indeed in many ways, the reader as critic 
will be able to grasp a writer's presuppositions better than the writer 
himself or herself. For they are'part and parcel of`the writer's 
thoughts as he or she thinks them. The reader as critic can adjudicate 
and respond as another who sees, and hears with different eyes and ears. 
The attempt to articulate presuppositions also helps to clarify what 
such a study can achieve. The nature of this study therefore is neither 
'linear', in the sense of offering: 'newl knowledge, nor original in the 
sense of attempting to effect a change of direction in theological study. 
It is rather. to be seen as a process of refinement. It is a study which 
seeks to clarify, refine and develop Brunner's thought and to do so 
within the context of, certain presuppositions. This means that the 
refinement takes place not so much in terms of knowing better than 
Brunner what Brunner was attempting, or of attempting to demolish Brunner's 
MISSING 
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merely ss the projection or construct of. the subjective mind. After 
all mind is most naturally understood as the human mind'and not the 
divine. That ontology which sees the human spirit fulfilled and 
transformed in the divine spirit was understood by both Strauss and 
Feuerbach not so much asa description of reality, but rather as an 
epistemological construction. Thus Hegel's critics no longer saw his 
epistemology mediating a metaphysical ontology, but rather his mete- 
physical ontology providing. us with, evidence for an understanding of 
anthropology itself. Alisdair Heron, for example says: ;, 
Qßoth 
Strauss and Feuerbach in effect fastened on the hinge of 
Hegel's system - the identification of finite and infinite Mind = and, 
having grasped-it, turned it upside down. There is, they hold, no 
supernatural Cod of the kind Hegel still believed in; there is only 
man, Und-it is-the human spirit which finds oblique expression in, 
religion and theology. Hore they drew on Hegel's account of religious 
doctrines and institutions and symbolic objectificationa of that spirit. 
But having snapped the thread which had led Hegel on, from there to his 
speculative Absolute,. they- turned back to'find the real meaning and 
reference of these objectifications in the subject which had produced 
them as forms of its own self-expression. Theology was thus transformed 
back into anthropology". 
1p 
ý .. ý> 
Thus, if we are to listen to the verdict of subsequent philosophers and 
theologians concerning Hegel's attempt to resist the loss of an ontological 
security, then we must conclude that he failed. 
11 Ae a result, subsequent responses to the problem have been more 
modest. tmpiricism has offered the criteria of verification and 
falsification for determining the validity of knowledge claims. These 
are principles which operate on the basis of sense experience. We 
know that which we can verify by means of our senses. Moreover wo can 
lo. ' A. Ileron, A Century 'of Protestant Theology, p. 44 
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deny that thoae°statements which nensa expetlence Is not allowad'to, 
falsify are statements offset. ` In its expression as-logical positivism 
and linguistic philosophy,, empiriciam has limited the epistemological 
enquiry to-an=enquiry into the meaning and'uso of language. -Thus it 
proposes"a more limited objective for philosophy, asking about the 
propriety of language rather than its correspondence to reality. Ideas 
of truth and reality are treated with caution and suspicion because of 
their metaphysical overtones. Thus theology has found empiricism a 
stony soil in which to grow and thrive. Certainly one would not expect 
a term like ontology to have much significance for an empiricist, except 
perhaps inasmuch it is actually used by philosophers, and as such its 
use can be described and analysed. 
The existentialists also echo the scepticism of the empiricists and 
reject the confidence of idealism. Indeed some existentialists have 
eschewed philosophy itself as a discipline. They have preferred to 
describe the basic givenness of human existence rather than attempt a 
systematic analysis of reality itself. Thus the existentialism of 
writers like Sartre and Camus is to be discovered in their plays and 
novels. Nevertheless existentialism is spoken of as a philosophy, and 
there are great existentialist philosophers, notably Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger. Thus, while ontology as a study is not a dominant theme in 
existentialist thought as a whole, Heidegger himself, following in the 
Greek tradition, has undertaken an analysis of the phenomenon of being. 
However, although it is possible to speak of an ontology of Heidegger, 
and indeed to speak of it as a presupposition of his philosophy, it is 
used in ratherIa different nonce from the way'in which it will be used 
in this study. - For Heidegger it-is only possible to understand-an 
ontology. -Of Being. itself through a human-subjective knowing which speaks 
of being as human being in the world. ' Human'beings can only understand 
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Being in as much as they take up`their own knowing into a description of 
their own being inýthe world. "An account which leaves the subject aside 
is always a severely limited enterprise; it cannot possibly produce an 
ontology because it is the human subject who incorporates knowing into 
the structure of Boing". 
I1 
For this reason ºIeidegger does-not-consider that his ontology 
contains-metaphysical presuppositions in the way that the ontology of 
Hegel did. 'Ontology is a more neutral and factual term. We might 
say, in general terms that. on°the whole existentialism as such attempts 
to be metaphyaically"agnostic.: It seeks to. describe and come to terms 
with the human subject's-being and existence in the world. 
And yet, in spite of what we have described as a metaphysical 
agnosticism, both atheistic and theistic interpretations of existentialism 
have flourished. It may even be that it is because of the attempt to 
be metaphysically agnostic that these different branches have arisen. 
Paradoxically the atheistic existentialists like Sartre and Camus, in 
rejecting metaphysics have produced a sort of negative metaphysics. 
Human life has to be lived no longer in the context of Meaning, but in 
the context of Meaninglessness. Human life only makes sense once the 
Absurdity of existence has been grasped. By contrast the theistic 
existentialists have sought to leave God free to encounter human beings. 
For them God cannot be reduced to, or contained within, the structures 
of human thought as#a, reality capable of=being deduced from the world 
and human oxiatence, in, the world. 
At this point something of the contrast can be appreciated between 
the existentialist perspective and the perspective of this study. While 
11. David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief , p. 152 
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existentialism'as a whole seeks to avoid metaphysical presuppositions, 
and 14eidegger speaks 'of- ontology in a way which attempts to eschew 
traditional metaphysica, ontology in used here quite specifically to 
raise the question of' metaphysics. 
And yet merely to contrast the two perspectives would in the end 
be an error. The importance of the individual's consciousness of his 
existence in existentialist thought is an indication that the epistemological 
problem is of central concern here also. However existentialism seeks 
to go beyond a purely intellectual statement of the problem. Writers 
like Sartre and Camus seek to embody the 'angst' of human subjectivity. 
If It is possible to speak of an existentialist understanding of truth 
then it must be spoken of"as radical subjectivity. - It-is not so much a 
problem of mediating"a legitimate ontology, but rather of achieving a 
truly, authentic existence.. The truth of the human situation is the 
need for the-individual to make conscious and free decisions on the 
basis of what Heidegger'cälle a fundamental 'Doing unto death'. For 
the existentialist the epistemological problem is the thin end of the 
wedge of the problev of-human subjectivity. For Heidegger being 16 the 
basic reality out of which human'boings must create their own 
Authenticity, end the search for an ontology is the search for an 
authentic human being in the world. Being itself is beyond the yraap 
of human knowledge. 
Thus, 
_there, 
is a basic similarity between the existentialists' 
concern with human subjectivity-and the concern-of this study with the 
epistemological problem. There is however perhaps an even closer 
correspondence than this. 
, 
For it is misleading ultimately to stress 
the distinction between an existentialist ontology which we have spoken 
of as neutral and shy of metaphysical presuppositions, and the ontology 
presupposed here which seeks to be metaphysically open. In one sense 
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the existentielists'Use what we have described as a metaphysical 
ägnosticism to allow them to focus on the human dilemma', the need for 
radical decieiön dnd the reality*of human freedom. Here is the subjective 
centre'öf existentialism. , But in another'sense this leada'back to the 
very problem which the"use of ontology here is designed tö highlight. 
The supposedly 'factual' or Pneutrall nature of human 'being in the world' 
does not--come`to'grips with authenticity as a value-laden term. ' The 
concept`of authentic existence seeme'to enter Heidegger's ontology from 
but of the blue. Surely-'the"-fundamental ontological-question-is that 
which aska'about the nature of a reality in which it is-possible to 
presuppose a concept of authenticity: ' So James Brown asks: 
"Heidegger clearly conceives that not only should human life go on, 
but that men should choose good rather than evil, that the broadly 
accepted cultural tasks of civilisation' will prescribe in outline what 
can only be called on ethics. But how, does it come about that the 
authentic form of human existence should thus coincide generally with 
the pursuit of good? Even if this be granted as a phenomenological 
finding, is it. not a momentous one? If there is this interpenetration 
of fact and value, should not this finding be given greater scope in 
any reading of the final nature of reality? If the antic is susceptible 
of logical arrangement in the, thought-projects of the human being, what 
is ontology to make of this further discovery that there is a factual 
grounding of value in existence? "12 
, 
Thus the use of ontology in this study is designed to raise the , 
question of the nature of reality in which value is presupposed. Thus 
it is open to metaphysics, It is not limited to the subjective and is 
not no wary of, m©tophysica. In this sense it is different from Heidegger. 
And yet it is the same in the sense that it tackles the, question of the 
value of human being in the world. 
12, J. Drown, Subject andOb_lect in Modern Theology, p. 99 
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A. ° Perhaps the most significant theological response to the epistemol- 
ogical problem this century has been that of what is often called 
dialectical theology. Both Barth and Brunner have frequently been given 
that label. Neither idealism nor empiricism offered theology a 
satisfactory apologetic basis. Idealism led to the criticism that 
theology was better understood as anthropology, and empiricism in its 
strict form dismissed theology as nonsense, allowing in its guise as 
linguistic philosophy its continued function as a legitimate, but 
thoroughly human, language game. This crisis led Barth and Brunner to 
insist that our knowledge of God could not be derived either from human 
experience or from the human mind and spirit and the conceptual frameworks 
which they created. Over against the scepticism of empiricism and the 
illusions of idealism they asserted the metaphysical realism of the 
incarnation; God became man in Jesus Christ. Hence in this theological 
tradition there is little or no emphasis upon ontology. For ontology 
has connotations with idealism which dialectical theology was determined 
to supersede. 
Yet dialectical theology did not burst upon the world of theology 
in a totally new-way. It too had its philosophical antecedents. 
While Barth emphasised the divine act in opposition to human thought, 
the movement from God to man, rather than that from man to God, nevertheless 
in an important sense Kierkegaard's existentialism, and particularly his 
concept of the infinite qualitative difference between man and God, lent 
dialectical theology a philosophical grounding. 
13 Indeed it is 
in this context that Bultmann's attempt to marry existentialist 
categories of thought with the specifically Christian revelation can be 
13. D. M. MacKinnon points out that it is also possible to argue 
that "Barth's intellectual master is much more Hegel than 
the latter's critic, Kierkegaard" p. 167 
D. M. MacKinnon, Parable and Sacrament", Explorations in Theology 
Vol. 5 
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appreciated. ' " For ßultmann existentialism was the right philosophy 
for Christianity because it did not incorporate God into n"philosophical 
system, 'but left room for God to encounter human beings in his'divine 
otherness. ßultmann sought to build on Heidegger's existentialism, and 
to correlate the existentialist pre-understanding of ontology with the 
ontic encounter of revelation. 
ý 10 
The use of ontology in this study-, then, out of these different 
responses to the epistemological problem,, perhäps reflects most Hegel's 
attempts to move from the conceptual to the Absolute. In this sense it 
is an attempt to move from concept to reality. " Hegel's perspective, 
however, was different. He offers us a vision of the Whole which 
incorporates and stands over against the limitations of the subject's 
concepts. His purpose was to show how a-human epistemology'and a human 
understanding of reality is dependent upon an ontology of the Absolute 
Spirit. -Thus even the limitations in human knowledge are only 
comprehensible in the light of the Whole. Here then lies the task of 
the philosopher. It is nothing less than the task of mediating'the 
Whole, and it is a task from which he must not shrink, however awesome 
the responsibility it entails. 
' By contrast the use of ontology here reflects neither an attempt 
to tackle this gigantic philosophical task, nor the taking"'as read of the 
Hegelian thesis. This is no confident attempt to give epistemology a 
bold ontol'ögical frame. It is rather a perspective which sees ontology 
as an essential' element in the problematic na£ure'öf epistemology. For 
this reason our use of the term is perhaps clo's'est of all to Tillich's 
usage when'he'says, "Epistemology-cannot stand`on'its own feet because' 
knowing and the reality which'is known"are both ohtological'concepts. 
You cannot escape definite presuppositions if you deal with knowledge". 
14 
14. P. Tillich, p. 217-Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant 
Theology 
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The-value of. Tillich's ontology here io that he seeks. to set ontology 
free fromm Ole mgtaphysical overconfidence of idealism and also from the 
metaphysical scepticism of existentialism. When Tillich speaks of 
ontology in this passage he is not making a dogmatic metaphysical statement. 
Ne does not claim a metaphysical objectivity which threatens to stifle an 
authentic human subjectivity. He uses the term to raise the general 
question of. metaphysics implicit in human subjective knowledge. 
Tillich's ontology itself, as well as having roots in idealism, owes 
much to existentialist thought, particularlylthat or tieidegyer. Yet 
while he accepted much of the existentialist analysis of human existence 
he criticised existentialism on the grounds that it failed to explore its 
own metaphysical presuppositions. For Tillich existentialism required 
essentialism to complete it. This is what his philosophical ontology 
sought to do. The use of ontology, therefore, in this study reflects 
the search for a metaphysic which is implicit in Tillich's use of the 
term ontology. 
But this is not to say that we are presupposing Tillich's own 
Philosophical ontology or his philosophical and theological method. 
Tillich is aware of the problem of subjectivism in an idealist ontology, 
and so he uses a concept of revelation to add realism to this ontology., 
Reason requires revelation to answer the existential questions and to 
overcome existential anxiety. Our aim is not, like Tillich, somehow to 
combine ontology with the revelatory answer to the epistemological problem, 
it is rather to, suggest that the epistemological question is essentially 
a question about whether it is legitimate to presuppose that human knowing 
has some access to reality. We are not so much reading-the realist answer 
into our enquiry, but suggesting that we cannot properly auk the question 
unless we postulate, a realist dimension. 
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An-'epistemological enquiry recognises the centrality and priority of 
the subjective nature of human knowledge. To speak of ontology however, 
is an attempt to describe an essential dynamic in the process of knowledge. 
Ontology represents the pole of the 'other' in our experience which our 
concepts and our knowledge attempt to describe. Our talk of ontology Is 
an attempt to preserve this pole of objectivity in the essential 
subjectivity of our knowing. The human subject is aware that knowledge 
has in some sense a dimension that is 'other' and 'external'. In that 
sense one of the aims of knowledge is to strive towards a knowledge of 
that which is 'real'. The purpose of this enquiry, therefore, is to 
ask in what sense a human epistemology can claim to offer an ontology, 
and in what sense it can describe the nature of the reality of which we 
are conscious. 
-f 
'However, this is not to say'that the nature of this study is 
essentially"phi1o3ophical. The philosophy provides the framework and' 
the background, but the subject is specifically theological in content. 
It is an-attempt therefore both to-reflect the tension which the theologian 
feels between the all-too-bbviously'fiuman nature of theological concepts 
and''the reality-they-attempt to describe and mediate, and to ask about the 
validity of'seeking''to move'from the*one to'the'other. ' 
Two other observations are important following, on from the basic 
presupposition of an ontology. The first is by nature of a logical 
deduction. If it makes sense to speak of reality as a correlate in 
human knowing, then it also makes sense to speak of the truth. This 
question of the truth, or the search for the truth, is also rendered 
comprehensible for it can be admitted that human attempts to describe'the 
reality which they apprehend will be seen as conforming more or less to 
that which they attempt to convey. In this sense the prime concern of 
an epistemology which confesses the presupposition of ontology is with 
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the truth. --l 'f 
The second observation is bymay, of b©ing"a further clarification. 
;o for the discussion has been concerned with what it means to speak 
about a relationship between knowledge and reality. Moreover that 
relationship is the proper concern of an epistemological enquiry-given 
the presupposition outlined here concerningthe-nature of epistemology- 
and ontology:, But it cannot be deduced from"this that knowledge is 
the only, ý-or even the best'way*of appropriatingtthat reality to which 
knowledge relates. _-. II. that were-the case 
then faith would-inevitably 
be reduced toa second-class citizen; " but it would be an error to 
imagine that, if it were possible to establish"an epistemological'basis 
for the Chriatian'message. of salvation, the need 'for faith would have 
been removed. - For`Just as it seems quite in order to be open to the 
possibility that. -a-human epistemology is ultimately rooted in the being 
of God, so it is,. just as . much a possibility within the frame-of reference 
of this'enquiryfor faith itself to be described as the reality of that 
relationship'which exists. between creature and creator. Granted that 
faith be accorded an epistemological legitimacy, all that our presupposition 
entails-is that it is possible to offer an explanation of faith. On the 
basis of the same premise, all that it precludes is the conclusion that 
faith has no ontological foundation; i. e., that it is a subjective 
spiritual illusion. , Thus this understanding-of epistemology and ontology 
enablesýus to, see how faith could be, in some sense an, explanation of the 
human condition; and that at the same time euch an explanation would not 
explain away either faith itself or the need for faith. 
-., Finally this attempt to clarify-the philosophical presuppositions of 
the study leado also to a-clarification of certain theological presuppo- 
niticns. There are, two points of departure for this'eJuiry., One is 
tho attempt -to, recoynise the subjective nature of human knowing; and the 
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problematic implications of that inoight. 'The other is to insist that 
tho'thnologian's task is nevertheless a 'roaliut' one in that he sets 
himself the goal of-struggling to got at the truth of the matter. He 
ia. concerned to speak of that which is 'other'-which standa in relation k 
to our cubjcctivityr 
Granted this beaia, it is immediately evident that two theological 
positions stand, from the start, in a`critical relation to it. The 
first is the attempt by both Barth and Brunner himself to solve at a 
stroke the epistemological problem. Over aguinst the essentially 
subjective nature of, human knowing they bet God's revelation of himself 
as other. `' It Is God who sets humanity free from the prison of its 
subjective conceptualisation. ' However, it is not with respect to this 
insight no much that we experience difficulty. It is rather that when 
Barth and Brunner come to articulate the knowledge which revelation 
grants, we find them speaking-of the Bible and the traditional doctrines 
of the Church, interpreted, as perhaps we should expect, in the light of 
the work of the Reformers. It is here that the problems begin. It 
seems that a restatement of metaphysical realism in these terms at least 
is over-confident. Is not this tantamount to inviting'the Christian 
tradition to set at nought the epistemological problem? Yet this was 
certainly the very opposite of the intention of both men. For they used 
the category of revelation quite specifically to confront the problem, 
and indeed the value of this epistemological insight certainly"offseta 
something of the problem we find with their restatement of orthodoxy. 
At the same time this reotatement does raise the question as to 
whether the category-or revelation which they use can in fact mediate 
the metaphysical realism which they claim. For the traditional doctrines 
often. bear clear witneso. to the cultural and philosophical milieu in which 
they were born. Thus the suspicion must remain that the understanding, 
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of thoo4ogy"-of both Barth and t1runnnr, and their use of the. category of 
revolution owes more to idealism , than they. "recogniso. -- 
The confidence 
with which: sucti, traditional, doctrines are expounded-. in euch complexity 
and intricacy, is f-priori. ' evidenco that the category-or revelation io 
beat, undarptood as on-idea, 
It is clear then that although this study takes as its setting the 
theology of Brunner it recognises that it begins from a critical 
perspective. Already there is a basic dialogue established, and this 
should not cauae, ourprise, for any critical study of. 'u-theologian ends 
in dlslogue,,; andr yery likely it is , that. ', dialogue which has Shaped the 
whole of,, tho exposition. This clarifying, of presuppositions, therefore, 
is merely sotting4orth-the basis, of the dialogue.. - 
It Is interesting-to note at this point that Brunner himself did 
not use the label 'neo-orthodoxy' - to describe his theology, 
and he did not wholeheartedly endorse its use when applied to it. 
15 
From this we can recognise a tension which Brunner felt with his own 
theology. On the one hand it is quite legitimate to read Brunner's 
Doo matics as a modern exposition of the traditional doctrines. Indeed 
it serves that purpose admirably. On the other hand it is quite clear 
that Brunner saw himself not as an upholder of the tradition, but rather 
as a modern prophet pulling down the false religion of orthodoxy, in order 
that Christianity and the Church might be the better established within a 
modern society. On the whole, therefore, the way in which both Barth and 
Brunner clearly eschew a basis for their theology within modern philosophy, 
proforring a categorical assertion of a Christian revelation which 
restates the orthodox doctrines, seems to no to be both over-confident 
and unrealistic. 
15. cf. J. E. Humphrey, Emil Brunner, p. 1& 
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Another pösition which. is Inimical to the presuppositions expressed 
here is what we might term the anti-realism of contemporary writers like 
D. Z. Phillips and Don Cupitt. This attempt to enunciate the theological 
task begins from the empiricist response to the epistemological problem 
and 'itn-more recent modification-by, the tradition of linguistic philosophy. 
While our problem with neo-orthodoxy'was the confidence of its meta- 
physical realism, with Cupitt and Phillips our problem lies with their 
thoroughgoing-scepticism. 
The acknowledgement that all knowledge has its centre in the human 
'knowing' subject, has underlined the fact that the world is, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the conatruct of the human subject. Thus it 
is highly proper to be sceptical about all claims to have knowledge of 
reality. Metaphysical claims have been, and still are, viewed with 
great suspicion. Knowledge has either to be set in the context of 
that which can be verified or falsified with reference to sense experience, 
or else seen from the perspective of the way religious language is used 
in specific. context3. This perspective on the epistemological problem 
has been the father of a modern anti-realism in theology. Here, 
paradoxically, the grasping of the epistemological problem has; led to 
its abandonment as a central theological concern. For once it is 
understood as that problem which seeks to describe the relationship' 
between concept and reality, it is seen as being"a return to metaphysical 
presuppositions, because reality-and truth are metaphysical concepts. 
Metaphysical knowledge, is unattainable. The 'truth' is a phantom. It 
is far better for the theologian to turn his attention away from the truth 
question to the study of the phenomenon of religion, and to attempt to 
describe religion.,, The aim in view is an authentic, yet practical, 
autonomous human spirituality., Religion, it seems, does not need either 
an epistemology or a metaphysic in order to function as areligion. 
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Thus Don Cupitt argues, "It now looks as if it is a mistake to 
suppose that religion needs to be justified from outside by being set 
upon a firm foundation of metaphysics and epistemology. Religion no 
more needs that sort of justification than does art". 
16, fie goes on, 
"with this change it becomes possible to recognise the fact that modern 
religious thought is abandoning' theological realism and any sort of 
correspondence theory of religious truth". 
17' Again he says "... religious 
thought in modern times is progressively abandoning realism -the claim 
that religious statements purport to refer to and describe supernatural 
facts. The irrnal discourse-of religion is evolving; and who is to 
prohibit this evolution? Religious ideas are increasingly used, not as 
if they-were speculatively true assertions in dogmatic metaphysics, but 
as if their meaning-is the part they play in guiding-the religious life. 
In the end a religion is not so much a metaphysical system as a spiritual 
path, an ethic, a group of ideals, and a way of seeing-life; and as such 
it is something that must be chosen just for its own sake". 
18 
In this way Cupitt shows how the philosophical tradition of empiricism 
can lead to an-anti-realism in theology., In this sense Cupitt's anti- 
realism is yet another form of the empiricist's rejection of metaphysics. 
Yet, paradoxically, what Cupitt is proposing is a programme which might 
be termed 'realistic' in a pragmatic sense. Cupitt welcomes the modern 
shift in the study-of religion from 'theology' to ! religious studies'. 
19 
Because the Christian religion is fundamentally concerned with human 
spirituality; we no longer need a theological epistemology but rather a 
descriptive phenomenology, of religion. 
16. D. Cupitt, The World to Come, p. 36, 
17. ibid. p. 37 
1&. ibid. p. 37/B 
19. cf. ibid. p. 33 
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However it'aeems that both Cupitt and Phillips do not just offer 
phenomenological descriptions and analyses of religious language,. Ther 
are simply' not, interested in producing-handbooks for contemporary . 
spirituality. - They are a new breed of apologist, and certainly in 
Cupitt's case, a new breed of evangelist. In this sense the question of 
'realism' and 'anti-realism' proves to be something of a-smokescreen. 
These terms effectively obscure the most important issue. Phillips and 
Cupitt are just as concerned with what we might call the 'truth' or the 
'fact' of the matter in religion as theologians of former times. For 
Cupitt the 'truth' of the matter is the inner human spirituality which 
religion alone can breed and foster. He is concerned to separate the 
purity of an autonomous spirituality from the bogus security and alienation 
of a metaphysical theology. 
At the same time this concern of his prevents him from seeing that 
for most religious adherents, the truth of their religious claims, and 
the truth embodied in the religious way of life, is an integral part of 
their religion. It is not true to say that religion for its adherents 
is only a "spiritual path, an ethic, a group of ideals and a way of seeing 
life", 20 which can be separated from the truth embodied by the whole. It 
is surely the supposed 'truths of the beliefs and-practices which produces 
the inner coherence'of religion. - The concern and the 4e$1 which'have gone 
to produce Cupitt's-own thesis, and are clearly-'Visible within it, bear 
witness to'this. His thesis merely'offers'us a-new perspective on the 
'truth'. 
In this respect Cupitt, in spite of himself, is re-appropriating, a 
'realistic' perspective. His own claim to study religion from a position 
20. ibid. P. 3& ýýM +ý_ 
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of anti-realism, eschewing a theological epistemology, is misleading. 
An epistemology would seem to be implicit in the enterprise. Its roots 
are undoubtedly empiricist, and in many places his work contains the 
hint of ontological presuppositions, inasmuch as it claims to speak about 
what is, and is not, the case. 
Thus we return to the insight of Tillich, quoted above, that an 
epistemology naturally presupposes an ontology. Tillich continues, 
'"You cannot escape definite presuppositions if you deal with knowledge. 
The same-is true of modern analytic philosophy. It analyses man's 
'logical and linguistic structures, but it always has a hidden presupposition 
about the relation of logic and language to reality, even if it does not 
acknowledge it. "21 
In seeking to separate religion from this essentially realist 
perspective, Cupitt is ultimately seeking to separate it from its hearts 
the struggle for an articulation of the truth. If we take his views on 
the objective-of the theologian at all literally and seriously then they 
sign the death warrant of theology, even though they promise it a stay 
of execution. 
Of course Cupitt is right to suggest that the realism of metaphysical 
orthodoxy is no longer tenable. Such confidence is no longer compatible 
with the scepticism which the philosopher cannot avoid adopting. But 
realism, or the preservation of the concept of the real in our epistemology, 
must not be identified with metaphysical orthodoxy. To attack meta- 
physical orthodoxy as being synonymous with realism is to attack a phantom. 
It is perfectly proper to be sceptical over claims to have knowledge of 
reality, and to scrutinise euch claims rigorously. It is also equally 
21. P. Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology 
P" 
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proper to recognise that we can have no knowledge of things as they-are 
in themselves. Nevertheless the concept of reality as the concept of 
that which stands over against our subjectivity is an important ingredient 
in the philosophical enterprise in general. 
Toýepeok of reality'is-to speak, in the limited conceptual terms of 
the human subject, of that 'other' to which the subject is conscious of 
relating. It emphasises an. openness on the part of the subject to the 
'otherness' of the world, and for the theologian it legitimises the 
concept of God., -The concept of-reality can be-entertained both ate 
basic, factual, -level of language, and at-the level of metaphysics. it 
can be theway in which we contrast and compare objects in the world, just 
as It can be the way. in which we refer to the possibility of metaphysical 
truth. Mere is the epistemological significance-of the use of ontology 
in this study. 
Roger Trigg has defended the case of realism in his book Reality at 
Ri k. He says, "'Reality' is not some monolithic absolute to which 
there is only-one path. There-is no unique, set of all-purpose criteria 
which will help us to discover what is the case'in'any-area, 'whethor it 
be physics or theology". 
22, lie continues, "Our concepts may be mistaken 
or inadequate,, but they may also be quite correct in the distinctions they 
draw. Reality may be as we say it is, and we may be drawing attention 
to real similarities and differences", 
23 he concludes: 
"Man himself is apart of reality; and causally interacts with other 
segments of reality. lie can change things, and even sometimes control 
them. Ne does not decide what is real and what is not, but he can make 
up hie mind what he thinks real. This is the pursuit of truth ... The 
repudiation of it as a goal would not only destroy science, but, would make 
22. 
. 
id; p. 198-199 
23. ibid., p. 199 
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human intellectual-activity totally-pointless". 
24 
t 
Before attempting a final summary of the epistemological pre- 
auppoaitions'of this study it is appropriate to acknowledge my indebtedness 
to what I understand of Kant's philosophy. I refer particularly to his 
Groundwork of a Metaphysic of-Morals, The Critique of-Practical, Reason; 
and his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. It seems to me that 
Kant's thought offers both the philosopher and the theologian a fertile 
terrain in which to speculate and to pursue questions about the nature and 
meaning of human existence. There is a dynamic between an 'idealism' 
which-recognises the essential limitedness of human knowledge, and a 
'realism' which postulates a transcendent 'object' which alone makes 
sense of the subject's search for knowledge and truth. So J. N. Findlay 
concludes his recent study, Kant and the Transcendental Objects 
"The greatness of Kant lies in his balanced concern with all that is 
in the cave of experience, and also with whatever must be thought of as 
lendiny"intelligibility, to its baffling-assembly of disparate, ambiguous 
surface-shows, and thereby making our sojourn in it both intellectually 
and morally endurable. It is not to be conceived that the neod for his 
25 
peculiar sort of philosophical balance will ever become outmoded". 
The presupposition of this study endorses this Kantion perspective, 
and seeks to hold this balance between 'idealism' and 'realism'. D. M. 
N MacKinnon in his essay, 'Ideali 
s 
and Realism! An'Old Controversy-Renewed 
8ayst 
"It may-well`be that a part at least of the enquiry traditionally - 
named, 'ontology' is concerned to lay hold of the latter (limitations 
we may suppose one day likely or conceivably to be overcome, and what we 
must accept as built in to the very possibility of asking'whether or not 
something is the case) and to give an account of them as comprehensive and 
24. ibid. . 200 ý' 25. p. 383 op. ci . 
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as"free of counter-intuitive paradox as possible, It may indeed also 
emerge, here. that the very discontent with idealism,... is expressive of 
a recurrent sense that to abandon concern with what is the case, and to 
allöw all that one an justify oneself in accepting-in the sense in which 
one can render it acceptable, is to convert awareness of anthropocentricism 
from a"problem into a solution, or rather into a recipe for dissolving a 
multitude of problems. Yet through continual worrying'at these problems 
some insight may be won, even though that insight be very-different in 
nature and content-from what we might anticipate". 
26' 
It seems to me that MacKinnon is referring-to that same balance 
between idealism and realism which Findley understood as the basis of 
Kant's thought. It is something, like this balance that lies at the heart 
of this study. It is this balance which the use of the terms 
'epistemology' and 'ontology' represents. Therefore I use them to 
reflect both the limitations of human knowledge and the objective 'other' 
to which and with which the human subject is conscious of relating; 
According to this view contemparary"theology must begin by-recognising- 
the limits of human knowing, yet at the same time must surely tackle the 
question of what can or cannot be said to be the case. Thus the use of 
these terms reflects this tension. Inevitably we need to recognise the 
'slipperiness' of the term 'ontology'. For there is et sense in which it 
seeks to reconcile the irreconcilable. In one sense it seeks to speak of 
what actually-is the case, yet at the same time it recognises that the 
actual designation is formulated and structured as a result of human 
reflection. This can even be seen in its linguistic structure. On the 
one hand it refers to external reality in the sense of that which 'is', 
but at the same time it speaks of it in terms of a rational structure 
appropriated by-mind and thought. 
Others have tried to recognise this tension by differentiating between 
26. D. M. MacKinnon, Explorations in Theology, 5, p. 149/150 
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'antic' and 'ontological', 
27 
whore 'antic' refers directly to the real or 
the experience of the 'real', and the 'ontological' represents the human 
description or understanding of that reality. However, in our view, ouch 
a description, while helping us to recognise the tension, cannot of 
itself-resolve it. It seems therefore better that the word 'ontological' 
should'contain within itself that tension and should itself reflect the 
inevitable problem. 
} 
H: 
h 
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27. R. fultmann cf. p. 115-118, Exiatence'snd Faith 
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Part One - Orünner'a Doctrine of Salvation 
CHAPTER I 
REVELATION SALVATION AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Perhaps the greatest significance of Brunner's theology, along with 
that of Karl Barth, is the way it seeks to confront the problem of human 
knowledge of God, a problem uppermost for philosophicgl theology since 
the time of the Enlightenment, and at the same time to re-state the 
Christion faith in something like the recognisable fraaework of orthodoxy. 
For Brunner the epistemological problem is only the tip of the iceberg. 
The fundamental problem which epistemology can only reflect is human 
alienation from God. The basic relationship-between humanity-and God 
has been distorted by human beings themselves by-an act of the human will. 
This reality of sin, which is not merely apparent in the specific deeds of 
men and women, but is inherent in the human disposition, reveals that 
salvation rather than knowledge'is the essential human need. 
At the same time it reveals that this need cannot be met by any 
human resource, and certainly not by the human intellect alone. Here 
then is the significance of revelation. Revelation is that category, 
t 
par excellence, which speaks of the divine initiative and allows the 
message of salvation to encounter and transform the human condition. 
Thus the epistemological problem has tobe set in the whole perspective 
of the truth which encounters humanity and restores to it it lost 
fellowship with God. Only'in this setting'can mon and women know God, 
themselves and the world in which they live. What Brunner commends to 
us is not merely an intellectual grasp of the truth. The truth is a gift 
apprehended fundamentally in repentance and faith. 
Brunner offero us, 'therefore, a bold evangelical theology; which 
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preserves the primacy of faith. It is at the same time an ethical 
theology in that it speaks not so much of faith in terms of a' mystical 
unity; but-rather in terms of a free human response to the divine 
initiative in face of the reality of alienation. 
If we ask what criteria we are offered to validate Brunner's claim 
of revelation, then the answer he gives is that Christian revelation is 
defined in terms of its incarnational nature. Jesus Christ is the 
God-man who spans the abyss between humanity and God. In this sense 
Brunner re=etatec the classical confession of orthodoxy, that what men 
and women cannot-do for themselves God has done in Jesus Christ. 
Christian faith can be summarised in its essence as faith in the Mediator. 
It is this content which sets Christianity apart from all other 
religions and philosophy. Jesus Christ alone is the answer to the 
problematical philosophical search for truth and the religious quest 
for salvation. But for Brunner the two categories which allow modern 
man insight into the traditional doctrine are those of 'history' and the 
'personal'. - Jesus Christ is unique event. -Ile is not capable of being 
classified with existing historical categories. To the sinful eyes of 
men and women"he enters history'in no familisr"guise but as an alien, and 
an accident. He4s not so much an eventwhich is part of history, but 
the event which puts an end to history. At the some time he is 'personal' 
event in that he does not communicate metaphysical truth or mystical 
knowledge, but rather re-creates a personal fellowship which realises and 
fulfils the personal destiny of men and women in faith. 
This is a brief statement of the heart of Brunner's theology. From 
it we can see how his thesis relates to the task I'have set myself which 
is to ask about the validity of the Christian message of, salvation in the 
context of a contemporary-theological epistemology. For Brunner it is 
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an uncompromising assertion of the incarnation as the decisive fact of 
divine revelation which constitutes the Christian message of salvation 
and provides an answer to the problem of human Knowledge-of God in a 
climate of acute scepticism. It is only when men and women come to 
recognise that salvation, the full realisation of their personality, 
cannot be grasped by their own resources and autonomy, that they will 
come to see the epistemological problem in a-total perspective, and faith 
in Christ as the only answer. 
From this wo can appreciate something of the revolutionary-challenge 
of Brunner's epistemology-in a sceptical philosophical climate. In 
Truth as Encounter, which is'the most succinct and perhaps the best 
statement. of his position, he begins by insisting that this "is a concept 
of truth unknown to philosophy-and science". 
' Revelation is a 
'personal' event, and as such it can never be fully grasped by-the 
objective knowledge of. the philosopher or the historian. For this 
'encounter' mediates a new dimension of knowledge. 
My-first task, therefore, is to expand and explain the rather cryptic 
summary I have just offered. So for my emphasis has been on three 
things; the centrality of the message of salvation; revelation as the 
only category by-which such knowledge can be communicated; and the new 
dimension of knowledge which revelation communicates. 
Now it is this claim to offer a revolutionary epistemology which 
provides me with a starting-point for my'exposition. The revolutionary 
seeks to overthrow the existing system because he sees it as being'wholly- 
inadequate. Thus Brunner's revolutionary epistemology condemns the 
knowledge of God offered by 'popular' religion and claimed by philosophy 
1. Truth as- Encounter, p". 7 
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in general. -., The knowledge they'mediate in all, caoaa is a wholly 
unsatisfactory representation of the relationship between humanity and 
God. Only the Christian conception of truth is adequate, and that 
adequacy is present in spite of the attempts of orthodox Christianity 
to distort it. 
We find therefore a stark and uncompromising rejection in Brunner 
of the claims of religion in general and of the philosophical tradition 
as a whole. The truth can only be grasped through an appropriation of 
the authentic Biblical message. Even this truth was distorted from the 
earliest times by the Church, and only partially and briefly re-discovered 
by the Reformers. It is interesting'to note in his early-book on 
Schleiermacher, Mysticism and the, Word, where he argues for the essential 
mystical idealism of Schleiermacher's theology, and denies that it can 
truly beýcalled"Christian, that his appraisal of the, madern philosophical 
and theological tradition is far more negative than that of Barth himself. 
Barth did grant Schleiermacher the right to be called "the father of 
modern theology. " Moreover, Tillich has argued that . Schleiermacher s 
'feeling-of absolute dependence' not only allows.. the primacy of-faith to 
be grasped by-modern theology; but also stands firmly within the 
Protestant tradition itself, capable of mediating-the, Protestant principle 
of justification by grace through faith. 
3 From this the uncompromising, 
nature of ©runner's polemic against modern theology can be appreciated. 
We can see that his verdict is harsh, judged even by the standards of 
dialectal theology. 4 
2. of. K. Barth, From Rousseau to Ritachlq p. 301 
3. of. P. Tillich, Systematic Theology vol. p. 51 97; vol 3, p. 197' 
4. ß. "Gerrish quotes Barth to this effect in his Tradition-. arid-the' 
Modern World, tie shows that Barth is prepared to consider 
Schleiermacher's theology; if not as a theology of the Word, then- 
certainly-as a theology 'of the Holy Spirits p. 39, op. cit. 
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It iu the task of thi's firnt chapter, then, to explain Brunner's 
understanding of revelation and its relation to the Christian message of 
salvation in the specific context of the distinction he draws between 
revelation in the authentic Christian tradition, and revelation as 
understood in other religions, in the philosophical tradition, and in 
that theological response which associates revelation in some literal 
sense with scripture itself. First of all it is necessary to explain 
what Brunner understands by"the nature of the distinction, ' in order to 
see how he believes, that modern theology has eroded it. Finally-I shall 
describe Brunner's explanation of the principle which he believes is the 
fundamental cause of the distinction. the nature°of this first chapter 
therefore is expnsitory'and descriptive. ' 
Although it is this aspect of Brunner's theology which has met 
perhaps with the least approval, as I have hinted above, I do not propose 
here to discuss the detailed weaknesses of his analysis of modern theology: 
The purpose of this study Is to use insights of Brunner's thought to make 
certain suggestions towards a reconstruction of a more adequate contemporary 
theological epistemology. My critical reflection will be directed towards 
this end. The aim hero, theref: oro, is to listen to Brunner's argument, 
and the criticism will come later. Ploreover, it will relate rather to 
the coherence of hi- theology'as a whole. 
Brunner begins by-explaining the nature of the distinction, as he 
sees it, between religion in general, and Christianity in particular. 
However, in spite of the importance of revelation for his theology and 
epistemology os a whole, the distinction which he identifies is not to be 
be found in the claim of revelation itself. All religion sees itself 
as being validated by revolution* "There is no religion which does not 
believe itself to be based upon divine revelation in one way or another 
5. The Mediator, p. 21 
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This is-a principle which`"is'common to all religion und indeed, to the 
philosophy of religion". 
6 
There is also a further bond between what Brunner calls the 'popular 
religions' and Christianity. Both are based on the claim that revelation 
hen taken place in history. The divine reality "has been made known" in 
"something which has actually-happened". 
l 
But here the correspondence ends. There is one basic difference 
which allows us to see that the claim of other religions to mediate the 
truth is a false claim. If the truth which religion offers is the truth 
of the salvation of men and women, and it is offered through an historical 
revelation, then it must surely 'be that only that religion which speaks 
of a single and decisive revelation can be the true religion. To speak 
of many revelations is to fail to speak decisively., It is to fail to 
speak of the once-for-all revelation which alone can mediate the salvation 
which religion offers. Brunner says, "where revelations are frequent, 
there can be no valid revelation in the ultimate sense of the word. In 
each of these revelations what was said to have happened did not take 
place= for ifrit had actually taken place it could not have happened 
repeatedly". a 
This allows us to see the distinction which Brunner makes between 
general and special revolution, and that this is the essential distinction 
which he wishes to draw. For only that special revelation which offers 
itself as decisive in the event of the Cross and the Resurrection can be 
revelation at all. All claims which speak of general revelation do not 
in fact speak of revelation. They are nothing more than man-ma-do 
mythologies. Brunner sayer, "They are myths which, in the strict sense 
6". ibid., p. 21 
7.. ibid., p. 24 
_"_ Q. ibid., p. 27 cf. also Appendix for a brief comment on this argument. 
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of the word, can lay no serious claim to historicity. The mythical 
element eliminates historical reality 'from the actual event, and also 
prevents us from regarding-the 'revelation' as a serious decisive element". 
9 
Thus only the special revelation of Christianity is revelation and it is 
only this revelation which mediates the truth. All general revelations 
in the end cannot be called revelation. They are mythologies which only- 
mediate the human attempt to comprehend nature and historyr 
When we turn to the philosophical understanding, of revelation in 
modern theology we find not so much a stress on general revelations 
but rather on the one unique revelation. In this sense the tradition of 
modern theology is in harmony with the authentic Christian tradition. 
Thus we might interpret Kent's understanding-of the moral low, Hegel's 
understanding-of the Absolute Spirit, and Schleiernacher's notion of the 
'feeling of absolute dependence' as mediating-in some sense the unique 
and absolute revelation of God. All allow for the divine initiative in 
their philosophical systems. 
But the difficultytwith all three of those speculative attempts to 
restate a Christian apologetic is that they 'reduce revelation to an idea 
in human subjective knowing. They-all relate to the problem of how we 
can have knowledge of God, but fail in the end to mediate the essential 
'otherness' of Cod. They tibtain their idea of the unity of revelation 
from its being'absolute rather than its being , historically, once-for-all. 
And it is precisely only this element of historical uniqueness in the 
Christ-event, according, to Brunner, which mediates the divine otherness, 
and as a result the truth of salvation. 
So for Kant revelation is the idea of the moral law. Salvation is 
possible because rational autonomy asserts that the 'ought' presupposes the 
9. ibid., p-. 27 
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'can'. At most Jesus can be the supremo example of the moral law rooted 
in the human mind. So Brunner says, This concept of autonomy held him 
captive within the frontiers of immanence! '. 
10 Hegel, unlike Kant, does 
introduce the essential dimension of hiutory into his understanding of 
revelation. It was believed that his doctrine of the Eternal which 
entered history in order that history itself might become part of the 
Eternal reality,, constituted a modern re-statement of the Christian 
doctrine of the incarnation, which asserted that God became man that man 
might have fellowship with the divine. But here too history-becomes a 
human concept absorbed into the essentially conceptual reality-of mind 
or Spirit. Brunner says, "The mind which comprehends the stages of 
history as necoasary-elements in development is by this fact of 
comprehension master of history, independent of the historical and the 
particular". 
11 The divine transcendence of which Christianity-speaks 
Is collapsed into immanence. 
In the case of Schleiermacher Brunner finds both a positivistic and 
historical understanding of Christianity. - tie explains, "The individuality 
of each living religion is the same as its positive historical character, 
and this again is the same as its revealed character". 
12 Simply to 
describe Christianity-then is to speak of its, distinctiveness, and this 
distinctiveness constitutes its revelatory nature. Yet what is revealed 
is not so much the uniqueness of Christianity but rather what is funda- 
mentally the same in all religion, the essence of religion, the feeling 
of absolute dependence. Thus in spite of the fact that Schleiermacher 
insists that the "Christian believer knows that through redemption he is 
related to Jesus Christ, and, further, that it is this particular element 
10. Truth as Encounter, p. 14 
11, The Mediator, p. 6 
12. ibid. P. 52 
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which constitutea the essential element in his roligion"y13 this 
knowledge is merely symbolic of the more babic feeling of abooluto 
dependence. If, therefore, the Christian revelation is ultimately an 
expression, albeit the highest, of this feeling, its unique historical 
character is effectively-denied. We have returned once more to an idea 
of religion. Wo are still just as imprisoned in a purely immanent 
conceptualisation of. Christianity. 
There is not space here to exprlain in full Brunner's discussion of 
what ho terms the speculative element in modern theology. I have chosen 
to deal briefly here with the three thinkers whom ho discusses in the 
greatest detail. Moreover in figures like Ritachl, Harnack and Troelstch 
he identifies no fundamental departure from a theology of immanence. Thus, 
Brunner claims, the tradition of Christian speculation since the 
Enlightenment presents an understanding of Christianity which is not 
fundamentally different from that understandingW religion which we 
encounter in the 'popular religions'. Just as they claim to speak of 
divine revelation, but only 4succeed in speaking of human mythologies, so 
modern theology claims to speak of the unique divine revelation, but only 
succeeds in speaking of the idea of revelation immanent in the human mind. 
Both, for different reasons, fail to mediate the divine transcendence. 
Other religions speak of revelation as historical, but not unique. 
Modern theology speaks of revelation as a unique unity, but not as 
historically unique. The end result is the samo immanental understanding 
of religion. 
that is offered is a universal 'idea' - be it that of tho 'moral 
law', of 'universal history' absorbed into the 'universal mind', or 'the 
feeling of absolute dependence'. The 'special' revelation in Christianity; 
is used to illuatrato this general idea and is thus destroyed. The 
diotihetiveness of Christianity, its insistence upon a unique once-for-all 
113. ibid. p. 55 
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event us the content of revelation, is ubendoned. Thus, according to 
Brunner, when the wilole philosophical tradition of Christian theology 
cpecks about Chriotianity'it fails singularly and totally to opcak about 
it in that distinctivenaso which is the mark of its authenticity., The 
moseage, of Calvation is lost because it is no longer a message of God's 
trahscandent'saving act, but merely t human idea of salvation. The fact 
that humanity needs salvation, yet cannot accomplish it for itself is 
tragically overlooked. Brunner insists, "hence, in the last resort, 
the so-called 'special' revelations of the various religions come to the 
same thing-as the speculative assertions of the philosophy of religion 
and mysticism: namely, that revelation is merely an individual concrete 
instance of a general truth, or, in other words, the accidental incarnation 
of that Essence which reigns supreme beyond the confines of time and space, 
in the realm of eternal'"©eing". 
14 
=, 
For Brunner, therefore, as for Barth, to speak of the Christian 
revelation is to speak only of the distinctiveness of that special 
revelation of the unique and decisive event of Jesus Christ. Therefore, 
from the examples quoted, the whole direction and emphasis of modern 
theology has been an attempt to obliterate that distinction. In seeking 
to arrive at a secure epistemological foundation for Christianity, modern 
theology has effectively only served to undermine the epistemology and 
distort the message. not only-Kant, Hegel and Schleiermacher, but Ritochl, 
Troelatch and Harnack also, in Brunner's eyes, in response to the 
epistemological problem, offer a theology of immanence, a concept of the 
Christian revelation which can be derived from a knowledge of human nature 
Itself: We have already seen how this works in Kant, Hegel and 
Schleiermacher. Ritschl's theology is ultimately based, like Kant's 
philosophy, on the moral 'a priori' present in human nature. ".... it is 
14. ibid. p. 27 
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not, revelation at all with which we are here concerned but with something 
entirely different: namely, the historical introduction of the 'a 
priori' idea, valid in itself, of the 'Kingdom of God', in the Kantian 
sense ..... Historical positivism and Phenomenalism, both of these 
characteristic features in the theology of Ritschl, spring, from the same 
root, that of ethical Rationalism". 
15 
In the case of Harnack we note an even clearer return to rationalism, 
with the gospel as the formulation of the universal message of the 
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. "To Harnack revelation 
simply means the Gospel of Jesus, the sum total of the moral and religious 
knowledge of the world and of life, conceived in terms of that which it 
. contains which is 'always valide" 
16 
For Troelatch the history-of the Christian tradition can only have 
a relative significance. It is a historical manifestation of the 
universal possibility"of the religious experience in man. "Positive 
historical facts are therefore, as such, relative. Hence subjective 
religion, also 'faith', in the general subjective sense, must inevitably' 
and in principle, be detached from historical facts". 
17' Brunner concludes 
it It is admirable in the frankness with which it expresses the renunciation 
of all that is specifically- Christian, and in its recognition of general 
religion and revelation as the only form of religion". 
1D This revelation 
is the ! interior experience'. It is "the revelation as everyone can 
experience it and testify-to it". 
19 
Thus Brunner contends that a special revelation of the divine 
transcendence in the incarnation of Jesus Christ has been replaced. in 
15. ibid. P. 59/60 
16. ibid. p. 65 
17. ibid. p. 67 
18. ibid. p. 69 
19. Troelstch: Encyclopaedia: Reli ion in Geschichte un Ga 
vol. 4, quoted by Brunner p. 6D ibid. 
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modern theology by"a'concept of general revelation as defined either by 
Rationalism or, Speculative Idealism. If we pause for a moment to reflect 
on the significance of this thesis, it is difficult to imagine how anyone 
could offer a more total and uncompromising-rejection of the theological 
tradition to which they-are heir. For Brunner there is only one figure 
in the19th century who is able to point the way forward in any positive 
senses that figure is Kierkegaard. Moreover when we consider the 
reason for Brunner's sympathetic appraisal of Kierkegaard we'also see the 
reason behind this total renunciation of modern theology as a whole. 
Kierkegaard, in contrast with the whole modern tradition, begins 
from the presupposition of the rejection of immanences the truth is 
not in man; but must come to'him. Thus he can formulate the idea of 
that coming in-terms of "the incarnation of the divine Word in Jesus 
20 Christ, which can only-be perceived in the act of faith". For Brunner, 
"This means that the decisive character of the historical element in 
the rediscovered Christian understanding-of truth had become clear". 
21 
Brunner endorses this insight of Kierkegaard because he has seen 
what Brunner himself has identified as the basic error in modern theology; 
its conception of the truth, and its proclamation of'the gospel, based on 
immanence. He explains, "The divine truth is not the ultimate pre- 
supposition of all that exists, but id in conflict with it. It enters 
22 the arena as an alien force". 
But why is this principle of immanence total anathema to Brunner? 
Why is it the supreme stumbling block to Christian faith as such, and all 
attempts at a satisfactory Christian apologetic? It is in total opposition 
20. Truth as Encounter, p. 18, 
21. ibid. p. 18-19 
22. The Mediator, p. 107- 
49 
to the gospel because it successfully masks the real problem which 
Chriatianity, confronts. The truth is not in humanity because humanity 
itself has distorted it. It is for this reason that the truth must 
come to him. A theology-based on immanence can only offer a human 
message of salvation which is rooted in the distortion of human sinfulness. 
Only a theology-of transcendence is capable of mediating' salvation. 
Thus not only does a theology-of immanence impede the search for truth, 
it actually embodies the moral pride which is the very source of the 
distortion. Modern theology, therefore, even when seen aright, can 
only speak of the human need for salvation. 
How then does Brunner understand the error connected with the 
principle of immanence? It is to be located in the contiguity it pre- 
supposes between humanity and Cod. The human spirit is thought to be 
linked with the divine spirit. The divine spirit can, in some sense, 
be discovered and apprehended therefore through the human mind and spirit. 
But in fact this link has been severed. The idea of contiguity is an 
illusion. Brunner says-, "If evil is actual separation from God, then 
that continuity with the divine has been broken 
23 
Thus once we appropriate the meaning-and seriousness of sin, three 
things become clear. First of all a theology of immanence is a complete 
contradiction, for it offers a solution to the problem of sin, yet at the 
same time it completely overlooks its reality. This means, secondly, - 
. .,. - that an attempt to explain sin itself on the basis of this contiguity- 
between man and God can only-be an attempt to deny it. Brunner says, 
"Sin is something which we cannot explain, something which will not fit 
into any reasonable scheme at all". 
24 For if we do seek to explain it 
we do so on the basis of a reason which itself reflects only the reality 
23. ibid. p. 131 
24. ibid. p. 144 
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of ein. Our explanation is only a clever mask. The true explanation 
of sin is its unmasking, and this is impossible for men and women. Only 
God can do thin. 
Finally 'it is this seriousness of sin which leads Brunner to insist 
that the special revelation which actually overcomes sin is 'accidental'. 
He says, "For the very existence of the Christian religion depends on a 
vital connection with an 'accidental' fact of history ... ". 
25 It must- 
be 'accidental' In the sense that only'an event which is not derived 
from human rationality can be savingu 
Thus it is that special revelation alone, uniquely manifested in 
Jesus Christ, can validate the Christian offer of salvation, and effect 
the cure for sin. For it alone recognises that the human problem is the 
problem of sin. It alone treats sin with the utmost seriousness. Sin 
is not just a subjective concept. It is a real distortion, and disruption 
of the human relation with God. As such, only God can deal with it. 
In fact he has dealt with it. Human beings can only apprehend their 
restoration and healing in faith, and in faith as understood and defined 
as faith in the one historical Mediator Jesus Christ. 
Having-listened to Brunner's presentation of the case for 
Christianity, over against religion in general, and modern theology as 
a-whole, it is appropriate at the conclusion of this chapter to take stock 
briefly of the significance of what he has said, and to raise in a 
preliminary-way some critical questions. I have quite deliberately chosen 
to listen to Brunner through the pages of one of his: earliest works, 
The Mediator. As this analysis proceeds I shall show how he develops and 
modifies his thinking-to the extent of centring' increasingly upon the 
25. ibid. p. 30 
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category of the 'personal'. This is a concept which I have mentioned 
briefly, but which it has been possible to ignore so for in the detailed 
development of this exposition. I have chosen this method because it 
helps-me to ask how significant and successful the later modifications 
are. 
The basic claim which Brunner makes in the opening-chapters of T 
Mediator is that paradoxically'modern theology, in concentrating' its 
attention upon the epistemological problem,. has fallen foul of the very 
problem which it is seeking-to solve. The claim of salvation can only 
reflect the problem of human sin. Thus we can appreciate the significance 
of the category of revelation for the re-statement of the Christian 
message which Brunner offers. Revelation mediates God's otherness. 
Only here can the distortion of sin be overcome. We should also notice 
8 vital element in that otherness. This is its historical nature. It 
encounters men and women in history; - but not in a way that can be 
derived o. r understood on the basis of a human concept of history. It 
is historical in its uniqueness; in the fact that it has happened once 
and for all. 
We also ought to mention at this stage that Brunner also rejects 
that tradition in Christian theology which wishes to reassert the 
distinctiveness of Christianity by-insisting-that revelation has 8 
specific and exclusive- scriptural content. This approach can only be 
countenanced if the significant insights of the literary and historical 
criticism of the Bible, along with the results of scientific research 
into the origins of the world and human nature itself are ignored. In 
that sense it can offer no response to the epistemological problem. All 
that it can provide is a categorical insistence upon a 'sacrificium 
intellectus' Brunner says, "Orthodoxy had placed the Bible itself, as a 
book, in the place which should have been reserved for the fact of 
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revelation". Again, "Hence the destruction of the dogma of Verbal 
Inspiration, with its emphasis upon an Infallible Hook, by, the modern 
process of research in natural and historical science inevitably-carried 
away with it the whole Christian faith in revelation, the faith in the 
Mediator". 26 
This, then, is the extent of ©runner's assault upon religion as a- 
whole, and upon the modern tradition of Christian theology in particular. 
How, -then, are we to assess this epistemological tour do force? here is 
a question which cannot properly, be answered until we have completed our 
whole survey. ' . Nevertheless 
it is possible to identify in s preliminary 
way at least certain misgivings, as well as to underline what seem to be 
initial strengths in Brunn©r's position. 
While it is impossible, on the evidence so far, to accuse Brunner 
of rationalism i. e. of speaking- , of God on the basis of human reason 
alone, the suspicion remains as to whether the ghost of idealism has been 
well and truly laid by"Brunner. While many Christians, who, for want 
of a better name, might be called Biblical Christians, or conservative 
evangelicals, have welcomed the re-statement of traditional orthodoxy by 
Barth and Brunner, there are others who are highly sceptical of it. 
They believe that the fact that both Barth and Brunner take seriously the 
epistemological problem as raised by the Enlightenment, means 'ipso facto' 
that they are prevented from re-stating-the truth of the Christian message. 
Although Barth and Brunner speak of revelation and even incarnation, they 
cannot endow those concepts with either their full scriptural and 
historical content, or understand them as doctrinal propositions as 
formulated by orthodoxy. Their concept of revelation remains & purely 
formal idea. The effect is that they-deny the Christian revelation the 
full statuslof divine fact, because their apprehension of the epistemological 
26. Ibid. p. 34 
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problem (i. e. of the problem of moving from human concept to v definition 
or description of what is or is not the case), moans that their theology 
as a whole remains a child of idealism. 
Van Til, in his book, The New Modernism, makes this point succinctly 
and clearly. "Both Barth and Brunner were trained in the critically 
motivated theology of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Seeing'something, of 
the utter hopelessness and scepticism of such theology, enmeshed as it is 
in 'historical relativism' and 'psychological subjectivism', they sought 
an escape from it. In seeking to escape from it, however, they never 
forsook the critical principles which constitute the fountain-head of the 
hopeless scepticism of the theology, of their youth. In clutching, in vain 
for the solidity of the historic Christian position, and more particularly, 
for a firm hold upon the rock of the traditional Reformed faith, they 
were able to use only-its form of words, without the content that gives 
them meaning-and comfort. 
27 Also aThe story of dialectal theology thus 
indicates anew, by-negation, that it is only on the basis of the pre- 
supposition of the, self-contained God of scripture that human experience 
is seen to have genuine significance. 
2a 
In fact this criticism, voiced from the standpoint of conservative 
evangelical orthodoxy, is not one which this study embraces in terms of 
its main epistemological point. As has already been statdd in thds 
introduction, this study begins with the presupposition that the epistemo- 
logical problem is a central one for contemporary theology in the sense 
that it is impossible to escape from the essential limitedness of human 
knowledge claims in all areas of human thought. However it does serve 
to highlight the significance of the scepticism with which many of 
27: C. van Tilt The New Modernism, p. xx 
28.. C. van Tilt The New Modernism; p. 364 
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ßrunner's critics have greeted his co-called epistemological tour de 
force. If he in to deny both the historical access to the revelation, 
and the authority of revelation as the self-validating-authority-of the 
orthodox Christian tradition then it does seem that he must offer some 
more satisfactory criteria for its validation if he is not to succumb to 
the criticism that his notion of revelation is either yet another idealist 
construction, or else has not really-responded to the epistemological 
questions of idealism. We might be forgiven for interpreting-Brunner's 
suggestions so for as being, in the terms that I have chosen to use in 
this study, the pure assertion-of a groundless Christologicsl ontology. ' 
This wholesale rejection of the epistemology of modern theology does seem 
to run the risk of being a-case of pretesting'too much. This is a- 
question which we must carry forward in our enquiry., 
Nevertheless two aspects of Brunner's thesis do seem to be valuable. 
The first is the seriousness with which he tackles the problem of the 
human knowledge of God, and the second is the insight that all theology 
runs the risk of constructing itself on the very basis of the human 
distortion which it sets out to confront. If sin is a reality, -and it 
seems a reasonable hypothesis to put forward on the basis of what appears 
to be an almost universal apprehension human beings have of falling short 
of the mark, or of failing to be what they might or ought to be, then it 
seems entirely logical that it should be thought of as infecting and even 
controlling the use of reason. In other words reason may well be used 
as sin's own defence and screen to hide its distortion. In this Sense we 
would endorse Brunner's attempt to centre his attention upon the message 
of salvation, and to seek to expose whatever it is that distorts humanity, 
and is apprehended as an alien element by humanity. - Whatever ultimately- 
our verdict on Brunner's Christological ontology, it appears that his 
emphasis on the search for"an epistemology of salvation is not to the same 
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extent expodod -to the earlier criticibns I have voiced. 
'4 .r 
to w', 
Of course it is appreciated that the term 'ain' itself is ambiguous. 
out it is being used here not so much as a metaphysical deduction, but 
rather as the word used to describe that basic human apprehension of moral 
alienation and failure. It is here, then, that we take note of one of 
Brunner's insights. In short, he raises the question as to whether the 
epistemological problem is not bettor understood as a noral problem. 
The question still remains, however, as to how he is going-to proceed 
to offer such an epistemology of salvation. The uncompromising- 
assertion of an ontology -of the incarnation is not in itself necessarily 
a help'in this direction as we have seen. However, this is something 
which Brunner himself is well aware of. Thus, while he remains a bitter 
opponent of rationalism, this does not mean that he is opposed to human 
reason as such. He is only-opposed to it inasmuch as it incorporates 
the divine as its presupposition and successfully removes the need for 
the creaturely reopönse of faith* He is opposed to reason inasmuch as 
it is used primarily as a tool for human pride. Revelation does not 
remove the'need for reason. Rather does it furnish reason with its 
role as the servant of faith. tie says, "It is true, of course, that 
through, revelation the reason, within its own limits, is at the same time 
confirmed. Faith is not that suicidal rigid sacrificium intellectus for 
which it. is often mistaken; it does not imply the denial of the intellect 
as such, but only its limitation and control". 
29 
Thus, under the impact of revelation, reason itself can have knowledge 
of the world; and. knowledge of the world as God's creation. Once 
Brunner has taken this step there is yet a further stop that it is possible 
to take. - He has been-at pains to stress-the Christian revelation as that 
29. The Mediator, p. 43 
56 
special revelation which is unique and decisively once for all, one 
that is quite distinct from revelation as understood elsewhere in religion 
and philosophy; Yet-once it is admitted that reason can serve the 
interests of faith, it becomes possible to understand that even man's 
sinful existence in the world is based on an original general revelation. 
Thus paradoxically, having denied and rejected the concept of revelation 
in general, Brunner seeks again to speak about general revelation in the 
context of the specific and unique special revelation of Christianity. " 
However, although this sounds paradoxical and contradictory, it is 
not a difficult idea to grasp. For this understanding of general 
revelation does not presuppose any direct link between man and God, a 
notion which effectively denies the reality of sin. Rather does it 
speak of general revelation as the dimly perceived basis upon which the 
distortion of sin itself alone can be perceived, once sin itself has 
been exposed to the unique revelation which brings salvation. 
Brunner says, "This means thrust this word (the word of revelation) 
is addressed to one who, although he no longer possesses the word, when 
the word is once more given to him is able to recognise it as the 
original word, the word of his state as a being created by God. Hence 
also his present sinful condition is not without God, nor without a- 
revelation of God", 
30 
Faith, therefore, in Brunner's terms, may not be entirely the 
acceptance of an alien ontology, -an acceptance which belies explanation. 
It may actually be able to furnish rational explanation of salvation. 
It is here that the roles of Barth and Brunner are seen to be reversed. 
Formerly it was Brunner who categorically denounced his theological 
30. ibid. p. 151 
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forbears, and Barth who was more inclined to acknowledge dependence 
upon that tradition. Now, however, it is Barth who denounces the 
concept of general revelation as being an inevitable undermining, of the 
saving-act of the incarnation, and Brunner who is prepared to defend it. 
This is an important aspect, and indeed an important development in 
Brunner's thought, and I shall examine it in the context of his debate 
with Barth. 
ý- .. y 
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CHAPTER- 2 
-. r 
THE CONTROVERSY-WITfi"t3ARTI1 ' 
Before it is possible to understand the controversy between Barth 
and Brunner, it is necessary first of all to appreciate the common ground 
which they share. Moreover it is Barth, rather than Brunner, who was 
the acknowledged leader of the revolution of dialectal theology. In the 
essay Nature-and Grace, which sparked off the debate, Brunner says, "The 
credit of having given back to Protestant theology its proper theme and 
subject matter is due, witbout qualification and, if I may use the 
expression, without competition, to Karl Barth". 
' 
Both share the determination to escape from the imprisonment of a 
theology which is based on the principle of immanence, and re-discover 
the authentic tradition of Christianity, based on God's grace and otherness. 
Barth addresses himself directly to the problem of Feuerbach's criticism 
of religion which seeks to understand both religion and theology as a 
branch of anthropology.? According'to this view, God is best understood 
as a projection of the human mind. Barth's reply is to agree with 
Feuerbach. Natural religion and natural theology are products of the 
human imagination and nothing more. But, for Barth, a crucial distinction 
must be drawn between religion and Christianity. Whereas one is illusory, 
the other is the final revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
3 It is this 
1. P; 17 , Natural Theology, Brunner Essay, ' 'Nature and Grace', followed bBarth's answer 'No'. 
2. cf K. Barth, From Rousseau to Ritachl, p. 355-361 
3. Tillich, for example, discussing the significance of Barth's commentary 
on the Epistle-to-the Romans says, "All our attempts to reach God are 
defined as religion, and against religion stands God's act of revelation" 
(p. 241, P. Tillich Pers ectives'on-l9th centur and 20th centdr "Proteateht 
Theolo ). While the distinction I have made remains a useful general- 
isation, Barth's definition of religion and Christianity are infinitely 
subtle. He clearly recognises for example, that Christianity is a 
religion among the religions. "So far as Christianity has its reality- 
in such human acknowledgement, does it not undeniably belong to the field 
of general history of religion, in which no doubt, there are hills and 
valleys, but no heavens? " (p. 248", Church Dogmatics, vol 1: 1). 
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His point is that there is no deducing, or deriving, or comprehending 
God from the, 'hither' side of human religious experience. This is 
the 'illusion' of religion. Rather must we recognise that God from 
the side of the thither encounters us on the 'hither' side in the 
Word which is Christ. This is the 'truth' of Christianity. "When a 
man recognises the Word of God, all that we have said about this act 
becomes experienceable and experienced, psychologically real and 
definable: there takes place an understanding; a personal sense of 
being touched, an affirmation, assent, and approval, a concentration 
of remote times in the present, an obedience, a decision, a standing 
still before the mystery and a stimulation by its inner life, a 
founding of the whole man upon this mystery that lies upon his thither 
lido. All that happens and must happen ... But that all this happens 
and must happen, simply does not mean that in this event is to be seen 
and found the possibility of experiencing the Word of God, that in it 
man's self-determination becomes the opposite pole of the divine 
determination, that from man there results a "Word-bound ego", by the 
consideration of which we have to take our bearings when we raise the 
question of the Word of God. " (p. 250/251, ibid. ) 
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in reality, which effects tho salvation for which human being's long: 
It is revelation, and, the uniqueness of the, revelation in Jesus Christ, 
which transcends the limits of the human imagination and conquers the 
distortion of. sin. 
As we can see, 'here is an echo of the theme we discovered in 
Brunner in the previous chapter. There is a short passage in Brunner's 
Nature and--Crsce, picked out by-Barth, which well expresses the common 
ground which they share. fie says, "We (he means himself and Barth) 
are concerned with'th'e message of the sovereign, freely electing'grace 
of God. Of his free mercy God gives to man, who of himself can do 
nothing, towards. his own salvation, to man, whose will is not free, but 
in bondage, hi3.. salvation in the Cross of Christ and by the Holy-Spirit 
who enables him to assimilate this Word of the Cross". 
4 
however, this in the point at which their contiguity and their 
compatibility seem to end. Brunner, as we saw at the end of the previous 
chapter, wants to explain what 'special' revelation is by re-introducing 
a concept of 'general' revelation. He says, "The relation between 
Christianity and religion without a Mediator is therefore characterised 
by this, that the Christian faith, to"which revelation is a'unique, 
absolute, decisive fact, includes 'general revelation', and 'universal 
5 religion' as distorted truth within itself, as its own presupposition". 
What Brunner is saying is that revelation in Jesus Christ is unique 
and decisive in its saving efficacy., However, once that salvation has, 
as it were, been appropriated through faith, then it is possible to see 
salvation not so much as a pure and primal creative act of God through 
his self-revelation in Jesus Christ, but rather as the restoration of a- 
lost image of God in man. Indeed the very concept of sin, Brunner argues, 
4. p. 18, ibid., also quoted by 'Barth, p. 78, 
5. The Mediator, p. 33/34 
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presupposes an original relationship. Then also, in the light of that 
unique saving event, the world can be seen, no longer as the projection 
of a. human sinful conceptualisation. It reveals itself as the creation 
of, God, or rather humanity-can see'that the world is God's creation in 
spite of the distortion of human sin. This is something which 
previously-men and women were not able to do because of that distortion. 
".. e we shall not be able to avoid speaking-of a double revelation; of 
one in creation which only-he can recognise in all its magnitude, whose 
eyes have been opened by"Christ; and of a second in Jesus Christ in 
whose bright light he can clearly perceive the former". 6 
Barth believes that this attempt to return to s concept of general 
revelation is nothing short of a betrayal of the truth which dialectical 
theology has re-discovered. Just as this truth was re-asserted by 
the Reformers, but so quickly lost and abandoned, so, Barth believes, 
the same terrible danger is occurring-here also, once Brunner himself 
is prepared to move back from the stand that he has taken. Thus Barth 
uses the passage quoted above as a yardstick to judge the thesis in 
Brunner's paper. "The issue now is this: can the natural theology 
put forward in Brunner's counter-theses be maintained if measured by 
the yardstick of his own words? Can these words be taken seriously if 
viewed against the background of that natural theology? "7 
On-the face of it, therefore, it seems that Barth's position is more 
consistent than that of Brunner, and Brunner's shift in need of 
explanation. In fact it is surprising that Brunner does not spell out 
the reasons why he sees the need to make this move more clearly, and that 
he does not explain his position via ä via Barth more directly. 
.rmr. -T-, ^T. +, y f... Irý-, r--s}T.. ., Yr.. V,, ?T"1rr 
6. 'Natural Grace',. Natural Theology, ' p. 26/27 
7. ibid. p. 78, 
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At first glance it seams that Brunner's move is directed by a 
regard for the authority of scripture and tradition, for he says: 
No therefore teach a general revelation, or a revelation in the 
creation, because the Holy'Scriptures teach it unmistakably, and we 
intend to teach it in accordance with Scripture. In so doing-we 
remain within the general ecclesiastical and theological tradition". 
8 
He selects six areas for the debate. From these he hopes to 
establish the importance of continuing `to speak about general revelation. 
Their selection clearly illustrates the principle:. of scriptural or 
'traditional' authority. The areas are those of the 'imago of God in 
man', 'general revelation',, 'preserving grace', 'the divine ordinances', 
the"point of contact' and (grace and nature'. '- 
Brunner understands Barth to deny that there is an image of God 
in man. Brunner, however, wishes to insist, with the mainstream of 
the Christian tradition, that there is such an original image. He 
is careful to maintain that it is not possible for natural man to 
recognise that image, and from it to derive some natural knowledge of 
God. It is only-through the revelation of God in Christ that human 
beings are furnished with the knowledge that they are made in God's image. 
This, according to Brunner, is because in Christ we see the 'material' 
image of God in man -the obedient response of the creature to the 
Creator. In us this 'material' image has been totally destroyed by-sin. 
There remains, however, the 'formal' image, God's creative summons to man, 
a summons which lacks human response. However, while this 'formal' 
imago does not enable man to respond in obedience to God, and to be 
reconciled with God, it is only on the basis of this 'formal' image that 
the true 'material' image in Christ is capable of carrying-out the work 
8... Revelation-and Reason, p. 59 
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of reconciliation, -end restoring the 'formal' image to its 'material' 
fullness. ` "This 'function' or calling, as a"bearer of the image is not 
only-not abolished by"sin; rather is it the presupposition of the 
ability to sin, and continues within the state of sin". 
9 
Brunner doeo not think that Barth can give anything like a , positive 
enough place to general revelation in his theology. He points out that 
Barth thinks of general revelation as a 'aide-line', which a-theologian 
must speak about-in 'a low voice and without authority'. This is not 
enough for Brunner. -Heýcitea'as an example Paul's thought in the first 
chapter of Romans. --The pagan finds himself without excuse on account 
of his-sin in'refusing"to-recognise that God reveals himself in the 
world, and can be seen in the eyes of human reason. It is on the 
basis of this initial revelation that both pagan and Jew are able to 
recognise what Christ has done for them in. that he has brought about 
their reconciliation, as sinners, with God. In fact they-we 'able to 
recognise what was available for man in creation, because Christ himself 
was an agent-in-creation. Thus it is not so much that there is no 
general revelation in Creation, but rather that sin has clouded the 
Vision, -of humanity'so that they"can no longer witness it. "Therefore 
the creation of the world is at the same time a . revelation, a--self-" 
communication of God. This statement is not pagan, but fundamentally 
Christian. But nowhere does the Bible give any justification for the 
view that through the sin of man this perceptibility of Gdd in his works 
is destroyed, although it is adversely affected. Rather does it say- 
this, that surprisingly enough sin makes man blind for what is visibly 
set before our eyes. The reason why men are without excuse is that they 
will not know the God who so clearly-manifests himself to them". 10 
9. Natural Theology; p. 23 
10, ibde p. 25 
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Brunner believes, therefore, that Barth is unable to speak of God's 
grace in the context of creation and preservation. He can speak 
merely of saving-grace which is only available in Jesus Christ. But 
if there is no grace to be perceived in man's creation and preservation, 
how is it possible to recognise that grace in Christ which reconciles 
and saves man? 
Ne even wants to make room to speak of the 'divine ordinances'. 
For Barth there can be no divine ordinances observable in nature. To 
derive a law of nature from nature alone, he says, is tantamount to a- 
crime: Brunner however believes that an examination of nature does 
provide man with-guidelines for his'behaviour. For example monogamous 
marriage can be deduced as a 'lex naturae' from nature. A child is 
the result of the union between one man and one woman. Therefore the 
law concerning their fidelity to one another can be derived from the 
natural fact that the child is theirs and theirs only. Brunner goes 
so far as to say; "Matrimony is a 'natural' ordinance of the creator, 
because the possibility of and the desire for its realisation lies 
within human nature, and because it is realised to some extent by men 
who are ignorant of God revealed in Christ. For this reason there 
lies over these ordinances a twilight which cannot be dispelled". 
" 
Barth, according- to"Brunner. denies all point of contact between 
man and God. He is afraid that the result will be an attempt to 
derive knowledge of God from that point of contact. God's grace 
requires no point of contact. Any}such idea is an indictment of God's 
sovereignty. 'Brunner, however, argues that man's intelligence, and 
sense of responsibility are ir point of contact with God which enable 
him to recognise what God has done in Christ. "Not even sin has done 
11, ibid., p-. 30 
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away with the fact that man is receptive of words, that he, and he alone 
is receptive of the Word of God. Thin rgceptivity .... is the purely- 
formal possibility of his being addressed". 
1Z 
The final area of-the debate concerns the relationship between 
nature and grace. Brunner believes that Barth's understanding, moans 
the abolition of nature by grace. The image of natural man is completely 
destroyed when, through grace, the individual is redeemed by Christ. 
Brunner, on the other hand prefers to speak of grace perfecting nature. 
The 'material' image given to man by Christ restores the 'formal' 
image. It does not abolish or remove it. "The subject as such, the 
fact of self-consciousness, is not destroyed by the act of faith". 
13 
This discussion, initiated against &, background of scripture and 
tradition, however, really enables us to pin-point a more fundamental 
problem which Brunner discovers with Barth's position. He sees that 
without some concept of general revelation it is impossible to speak 
about sin, and, therefore, it is meaningless to speak about salvation 
as a result. To put the matter differently: salvation involves the 
recognition and the renunciation of sin, which is itself the denial of 
a prior possibility. It is this prior possibility to which Brunner 
refers, therefore, when he speaks of general revelation. "We are 
concerned with the revelation of God in Ilia works in creation, and also 
with the fact, based upon this truth, that man as a sinner is responsible 
and inexcusable, and, therefore that the 'natural man' stands under the 
wrath of God". 
14 Thus, without this 'a pri. ori' general revelation, 
the saving reality, which Birth is so much at pains to safeguard, is 
thrown into jeopardy: 
ý ýýý 
12. ibid., p. 31 
13. ibid., p. 33 
14. Revelation and Reason, p. 78 
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the root of Barth's problem, Brunner believes, lies in a confusion 
between the 'ratio cognoscendi' and the 'ratio essondi'. It is one 
thing for man to know there is a revelation of God in creation, and 
another thing for there to be a revelation of Cod in creation. For 
ßrünner, man cannot arrive at knowledge of general revelation via reason 
and nature alone, because his knowledge is distorted by sin. In this 
sense there is no general revelation. But once that channel of knowledge 
has been unblocked by the historical revelation in Christ then men can 
see that there always has been a revelation of God in'creation and nature. 
So Brunner argues, "Barth turns the true statement, only through the 
historical revelation of the Old and New Covenant is sinful man able to 
recognise the original revelation of Creation, which is concealed from 
him by his sin' into the erroneous statement, 'There in only one 
revolutions the historical one in Christi". 
15 
This save confusion in Barth, Brunner believes, produces Barth's 
hostility to the idea of an 'analogia entis'. lie explains, "The 
'analogic entis' does not, in point of fact, give sufficient ground for 
the construction of a ºtheologia naturalis! upon it ... It is, of 
cburae, true that in order to see the truth of these analogies we need 
the historical revelation and the faith which it creates, in order that 
we may see that these analogies do point to the true God. These analogies 
therefore do not exist because of 'fides', but they only become visible 
to 'fides'. Hence the lanalogia entis' cannot be replaced by the 
'analogic fidei', but the 'analogic antis' comes to knowledge only-through 
'fides'". 16 
This, then, forms the substance of Brunner's thesis, and his complaint 
against Barth. Barth, however, in in no mood to accept Brunner's proposed 
15, Revelation and Reason, p. 79 
16. Revelation and Reason, p. 80 
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modifications to. the, theological tradition for which they both are 
largely responsible. Barth begins by rejecting the very basis upun 
which Brunner attempts to initiate the debate. He does not accept 
that his thesis in the thesis with which Brunner credits him. It is 
not that he says, "No" to natural theology while Brunner cooks to return 
to a qualified "Yes". It is rather, Barth claims, that both the "Yea" 
and the "ho" are uninteresting to hin. "Real rejection of natural 
theology can come about only in the fear of God, and hence only be a 
complete lack of interest in this matter". 
17 Theology for birth, is 
inextricably linked to the revelation in Jesus Christ. Thus there can 
be really no such thing as natural theology. Brunner has been mistaken 
in imagining that Barth's theological presupposition can countenance 
the return which Brunner proposes. Barth says, "For 'natural theology' 
does not exist as an entity capable of becoming'a separate subject 
within what I consider to be real theology - not even for the sake of 
being rejected". 
10 
This preliminary"observation, leads Barth to make his basic criticism 
of E3runner's thesis: It locks consistency. -, On the one hand Brunner 
insists that 'man can do nothing for his salvation'. His "will is not 
free but is bondage". 19 But on the other hand he has a 'capacity for 
revelation'. There is a 'point of contact'. Man is not, after all, 
an object who has absolute and total need of God's saving grace. Ne is 
responsible. Barth believes these two points to be contradictory. 
Human beings cannot be totally helpless and bound in sin, and yet at the 
same time responsive and responsible. Barth says, "If a"man had just 
been saved from drowning by a competent swimmer, would it not be very 
unsuitable, if he proclaimed the fact that he was a man and not a lump 
17; Natural Theology, Barth's answer 'No(', p. 76 
18'. ibid. p. 75 
19, ibid, p. 7& 
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of lead as his 'capacity for being saved'.? "20 
This contradiction can further be seen when Brunner speaks of the 
'divine ordinances', which natural man is capable of both understanding- 
and obeying. Brunner says that "Matrimony is a 'natural' ordinance 
of, the creator because the possibility of and the desire for its 
realisation lips within human nature, and because it is realised to 
some extent, -by, -, 
men who are ignorant of the God revealed in Christ". 
21 
Barth-comments, "If man can realise the law 't4 some extent' without 
Christ, how much more must 'capacity for revelation' mean than merely 
the formal-fact of man being human? "22 He goes on, "Evidently-the 
'formal imago Dei' meant that man can 'somehow' and 'to some extent' 
know and do the will of God without revelation". 
23 Either the 
revelation in Christ is unique and wholly effective for human salvation, 
thus making any talk of 'general revelation' and 'a point of contact' 
irrelevant, or else there is a natural point of contact, a-freedom and 
responsibility-in human nature which is capable of comprehending' and 
grasping-the saving purpose. In this sense the whole message of the 
unique saving revelation in Christ is undermined. In Barth's eyes 
Brunner cannot have the matter both ways. 
-At this. point we can see the basic problem which Barth identifies 
with this new shift in Brunner's theology. ' Effectively Brunner has 
reneged on his rejection of the principle of immanence. Ne is, for 
Barth0, a traitor to the very'principle of dialectical theology, -the very 
principle which allowed him to reject wholesale both religion itself and 
the modvrn, tradition in Christian theology. '. Having, denied that there 
is contiguity between man and God on account of ein, he now wishes to 
r ,... frrr-wT .stT, 
20. ibid. p. 79 
21. ibid. p. 30 
22. ibid. p. &7- 
23, ibid. P-990 
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assert that sin has not destroyed the basic fact of responsibility in 
human beings.. It is this which constitutes the formal image of God 
in man. 
Also, Brunner does not consistently apply this principle that the 
general revelation of God in human nature and the world becomes apparent 
only in the light of the revelation in Christ. When he speaks of the 
divine ordinances he makes it clear that they can be realised "to some 
extent by men who are ignorant of Christ". What Brunner is proposing, 
here is something-more akin to a rationally deducible natural law rather 
than e principle of general revelation which is wholly hidden from the 
sinful eyes of humanity. - 
f 
This Means that Brunner's attempt to'distinguinh between a 'ratio 
cognoscendi''and a 'ratio essendi' does not really engage Earth's 
criticism.. It ia'not so much that he confuses the 'ratio cognoscendi' 
with the 'ratio essendi', but that he recognises that if knowledge of 
'being-' is mediated only through Christ, then there is no point in 
speaking about 'being' as such. It is the 'ratio cognoscendi' that 
Is all important. What is vital and unique is the channel of the 
mediation of this knowledge. Thus, for Barth, there is no point in 
speaking-about 'general revelation' unless it is spoken about in the 
context of 'special revelation' and even then it is only 'special 
revelation' which performs the saving function. Barth therefore argues 
that from°the point of view of this 'cognoscendi', any reference to the 
'esse'outside of revelation in Christ is quite superfluous and meaningless. 
There is no point in speaking, of 'general revelation', or a 'point of 
contact' or of 'preserving. grsce', if they are ineffective in themselves 
for accomplishing-human salvation. Their ontological reality-in itself 
and through-itself is'totally'hidden from, and therefore totally irrelevant 
to, ' human conceptualisation. 
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Yet`Barth's victory is in fact little more than a. 'Pyrrhic' victory. 
The debate has not in fact clarified or helped to advance the cause of 
either. As we have seen, they both have the same concern: to safeguard 
and ground the reality'of the salvation which is the heart of the 
Christian proclamation. For both, the-category of revelation accomplishes 
this task. At the same time both are right in the drawbacks they see 
in the other's position. Brunner sees that Barth's position is groundless. 
In fact, paradoxically; °the message-of salvation is preserved by its 
groundlessness. Barth, on the other hand, sees that Brunner's attempt 
to ground 'special revelation' in 'general revelation' fails because 
Brunner himself admits that 'general revelation' cannot judge 'special 
revelation', because 'special revelation' acts as its own criterion, and 
is the criterion by which 'general revelation' is judged. Thus Brunner's 
attempt to ground the special revelation in Christ in something other 
than in Christ himself is really a contradiction of his own position. 
It is difficult to escape the feeling that the debate itself is 
ultimately sterile, in spite of the great importance of its subject. 
Both men have been seeking-to defend essentially the some position. 
For both it is the 'special revelation' in Jesus Christ which overcomes 
the epistemological problem and opens the eyes of men and women to God 
and the world as it really is. It is then that they sea the world as 
God's creation, and glimpse the nature of their disobedience. 
It is true that Barth exposes inconsistency in Brunner's position, 
but Barth, for his part, either fails or refuses to see that behind the 
undoubted inconsistency'in Brunner's position there lies a-logical point 
whichýBrunner does not reallypsustain in his argument. Barth quite- 
d©liberately"avolds the ontological question. For the theologian it is 
out of order. All his attention must be focussed on the Christ event. 
Brunner, on the other hand, argues that the ontological question is a 
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legitimate one, for the claim of oalvotion in Christ presupposes the 
ontology of an original human 'being' in relation to Cod which alone 
can act as the basis of sin. Brunner sees that Barth himself cannot 
avoid making, ontolocjieal assertions oven if they are limited to the 
claims of salvation to be found in Christ. Barth's protest, therefore, 
against Crunner's shift, might well be construed as a-somewhat theatrical 
response which successfully'masks the. sheer lack of an answer to the 
ontological question which, for Brunner, is a necessary question. 
Thus, by-attacking Brunner at an admittedly vulnerable point and 
scaring a victory there, Barth has diverted attention from the central 
issue which Brunner himself has not succeeded in explaining with full 
clarity. Brunner's failure, then, is not so much a logical inconsistency 
in his argument, but rather a failure to show how it is the exclusive 
revelation in Christ which allows us access to the general revelation. 
Barth does not examine this aspect of Brunner's argument, because to 
do so would be to undermine his own. 
At this point the serious nature of the sterility of the argument 
begins to emerge. Barth attacks Brunner's return to a natural 
continuity between nan and Cod. flare, for him, is a'return to the 
principle of immanence, and thus to the whole danger of 
idealism. 
Brunner, on the other hand, attacks the sheer groundlessness of Barth's 
position. For him this lack of grounding, in in its own way just cs much 
evidence of idealism. To leave the matter at the level of epistemology 
which Barth, effoctively"doos, by refusing-to take up=-Crunner'e challenge, 
is to fnil. to distinguish the Christ event from the Christ idea. Thus 
the validity of the whole dramatic impetus and emphasis of dialectical 
theology most be seriously jeopardised when two of its loading: exponents 
do not seem to be able to protect it in a decisive way against the 
uuspicion of the idealism which they denounce. 
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On the whole, it seems to me, in the light of the presuppositions 
of this study, that Brunner's thought allows us to make more progress 
than does that of Barth. Barth's answer to the epistemological problem 
is a Christological assertion, which answers the problem by seeking to 
deny Ito validity; " If we take Barth's view seriously, there is no 
point in further discussion. Brunnor, on the other hand, recognises 
that an ontology of the incarnation presupposes e prior ontology as its 
epistemological foundation. This is the area which his discussion of 
the relationship between the 'ratio essendi' and the 'ratio cognoscendi' 
opens up.. This is why'he speaks of a formal image of God in man which 
he sees as the necessary'presupposicion of the Christian message of 
salvation. This, I would suggest, is a distinct advance, since Brunner 
does not claim that sin totally obscures the epistemological problem. 
For him it is when the epistemological problem is taken seriously that 
the problem of sin also can be taken seriously. ' 
Moreover it is possible already'to see the way in which Brunner 
will be able to offer an explanation of the Christian message of 
salvation, by moans of what I have chosen to call an epistemology of 
salvation. He says, "Upon these two characteristics, that of his 
capacity 'for words, and that of responsibility, which in their turn are 
closely interrelated, depends not only man's special position but also 
the connection between his special position and the form of the redeeming 
24 revelation, namely-that God becomes man". 
The formal image of God in man forms the epistemological basis 
upon which salvation can be understood because it offers epistemological 
validation of the incarnation. The incarnation is the restoration of 
the 'material' imqge of God in man which itself can only be both restored 
24. ibid. p. 23/4 
73 
and recognised because of the ontoloyy of the 'formal' image. Jesus 
Christ is the God-man: he is both the 'material' and the 'formal' image 
of God in man. He is God in ca for as he restores that which humanity- 
iv incapable, of,, restoring, and he is man inasmuch us his responsiveness 
and responsibility-is shared by till humanity: Thus it is Brunner's 
doctrine of man, (that, as Barth rightly perceives, does not accord 
with'his rejection of a continuity-betwan God and man), which offers 
the 'prospect of an epistemology, of salvation. This doctrine provides 
basis upon which both the continuity and the discontinuity between 
humanity°and God, as-well as the resolution of the incarnation can be 
comprehended. In the next chapter, therefore, I shall focus my attention 
upon ßruriner'a'understanding of the nature of humanity. 
-ýi, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HUMAN NATURE 
My exposition of Brunner's theology has identified two-distinct 
stages in his argument. The first consists of the assertion that 
only a unique and-decisive act of divine self-revelation can overcome 
human sinfulness. . 
This involves the rejection of a principle of 
immanence, the idea that there is a continuity or a point of contact 
between the world and God, or humanity and God which can be naturally 
recognised by human reason. "If what the Christian faith says be 
true.... Then it is'false to conceive God -i.. as the immanent 
presupposition of existence". 
' This allows Brunner to stress that the 
epistemological problem-is fundamentally a moral problem. The human 
search for God is at heart a search for salvation from sin, which only 
Cod himself can answer. -' 
The second stage, however, goes on to insist that to speak of 
salvation as the solution of the epistemological problem itself rests 
on ontological presuppositions. Salvation presupposes sin, and sin 
presupposes an original-relationship-which has been distorted - an 
original human 'being' in relationship with God. 
On this basis, as I have argued, Brunner can promise to provide an 
epistemology-of the incarnation, which is nothing less than the 'material' 
fulfilment of a 'formal' possibility'in human nature. I have also 
described Barth's extreme, negative reaction to this shift. He believes 
that Brunner's attempt to reinstate the idea of a 'formal' image of God 
in man is a contradiction of the earlier rejection of the principle of 
immanence. 
The purpose of the next three chapters of the study is to explain 
1. The Mediator, p. 108 
75 
Brunner's response to-this problem. In this chapter I shall examine 
his understanding-of human nature, and explore the significance of the 
'formal' and 'material' image of God in man. I shall show that 
Brunner's understanding, is fundamentally relational. It seeks to 
avoid an interpretation of human nature that is derived from human 
rationality or spirituality; and it rejects any suggestion of determinism. 
It is this concept which allows him to frame a reply to his critics, for 
when he speaks about the imgge of God in man he is not suggesting-that 
on this-basis we can proceed to a rational deduction of a human 
knowledge of God. (This, indeed, would convict him of the charge of 
an immanental theology). Rather is the image of God in man the 
potential for a relationship. Human beings are potential partners 
in a relationship with God. So Brunner says, "the fact that man has 
been made in the Image of God is conceived not as a self-existing- 
2 
substance, but as a relation". 
- This means that, just as we cannot derive knowledge of one partner 
in a marriage from the-other, so we cannot derive knowledge of Cod 
from ajlatentýpossibility"in human nature. Again Brunner insists, 
"Responsibility is a relation; it is not a substance". 
3 The tragedy 
of human nature is thatLnot only were human beings created for a 
relationship with Cod, but were actually created in a relationship. 
This link, however, has been deliberately severed by men and women. 
All that remains is the relic of the relational possibility, and this 
is a possibility which can only be restored by Cod, just as the original 
possibility could only 'be created by'God. 
, From Brunner's understanding of the difference between the 'formal' 
and 'material' image we can effectively derive the whole of his understanding 
2. Dogmatics, vol. 2, p. 59 
3. ibid., p. 59 
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of the nature of humanity. Hie anthropology has a-triple purpose. 
In the first place it is a way of grounding-the Christian message of 
salvation. More than this, not only does it offer a corrective 
to 
idealism and orthodoxy-in the Christian tradition, it also seeks 
to 
offer an intelligible alternative to modern interpretations of human 
nature. He acknowledges that anthropology is a "subject of common 
concern in discussion with the unbelieving world", and that although 
"we can ignore Cod, we cannot ignore man". 
4 a Christian anthropology 
therefore competes in the contemporary debate with a-variety of 
anthropologies. Brunner says, "All political, social and cultural 
development presupposes an 'anthropology 'll. 
5 
It should not surprise us that he insists that we begin our study 
from the restoration of the 'material' image in Christ. It is only, 
really Under the impact of the encounter with Christ that we are 
qualified to speak about human nature. He says, "we shall start 
from the centre, from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ". 
6 He 
7 asserts that, "'Anthropology'-must have a Christological foundation". 
Moreover it is this restoration of the 'material' image which constitutes 
human salvation. Only from the perspective of this saving'reality 
can human beings comprehend the full significance of sin. "We can 
only uee what sin is, what man is as sinner, in the light of the 
Christian revelation". 
8 
Therefore, if we begin with the 'material' image of God in man, 
restored to us through Christ, we are enabled to understand three things: 
4. ibid. p. 46- 
5. ibid. p. 47, 
6. ibid. p. 53 
7. ibid. p. 53 
8". ibid. p. 89 
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the nature and meaning-of salvation as the true human destiny; the 
reality of sins and the nature of the basic foundation of human 
existence. Brunner is adamant that we can only understand the human 
situation in the reverse order from the way things are. 
It is Jesus Christ, then, who confers upon men and women the 'material' 
image of Cod through faith. Thus Brunner avoids all suspicion of a 
return to immanence. Fie is quite clear that "man does not possess his 
true being in himself". 9 Christ is the "Imaterial' image. We regain 
that image only inasmuch as we are actually in Christ. "Jesus Christ 
is the true 'Imago Dei', which man regains when through faith he is 
'in Jesus Christ'll. 10' Once we see that the true image of God comes to 
man'only us a'gracious gift, and in Christ, then we can appreciate that 
the restored'relationship"which Brunner describes is-the salvation which 
human beings long for. He explains, "lie restores to us that existence 
in the Word of God which we had lost through sin". 
" Salvation is not 
a mystical union with God, or some esoteric knowledge. It is a right 
relationship with him, best described as communion, and this communion 
is possible because the essential nature of God is his love. 
Brunner says, "True humanity is not genius but love, that love 
which man does not possess from, or in, himself, but which he receives 
from God, who is love. True humanity does not spring from the full 
development of human potentialities, but it arises through the reception, 
the perception and the acceptance of the love of God, - and it develops 
and is preserved by 'abiding'- in communion with God who"reveale Himself 
as Love". 
12 
- ..., _.... , __ 
9. ibid., p. 58. 
10. ibid., p. 5ß 
11. ibid., p. 58-. 
12, ibid., p. 58/9 
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Inevitably-this restoration of communion with God also reveals 
the depth of the distortion of the old relation. Salvation brings 
with it e whole new knowledge of sin. It is somewhat like the short- 
sighted person wearing-spectacles for the first time, _apd apprehending 
along with the new dazzling and exciting quality of. sight,, an 
appreciation of how dismal and poor his former vision was. 
However, the knowledge of sin, which salvation mai<es clear, reveals 
that it is not a natural, condition, The gift we receive, in Christ is 
the restoration of a relationship. Thus, when in the light of salvation, 
we see the depth, of our. alienation from God, we see also that it is the 
result of a turninv" away "ori the part, of humanity. Men and women 
themselves have deliberately broken their creaturely links with the 
creator. They have chosen to be free and independent. Brunner says, 
"Sin is not a 'not yet' but a 'no longer'. Therefore it is not 
He goes on, sensuality, nor weakness, but defiance, rebellion". 
13 
"Sin in emancipation from God, giving-up the attitude of dependence, in 
order to try to win full independence, which makes man equal with God". 
14 
Here is the deepest root of sin which lies deeper than our consciousness. 
All this we are but dimly aware of in the bright light of the event 
which saves us and restores us to our true humanity. 
0 
We can even go a stage further. Because sin is rebellion, and not 
Just ignorance, it has changed the whole situation of, humanity. ' "Man 
cannot. turn away from God without becoming different; and when we have 
become different, we cannot be what we were before. Because our, 
existence, on account of-our creation, is, existence-in-God, therefore, 
as, severance from God, it is an alteration of existence, which cannot 
be reversed". 
15 God may, have restored us to communion through love, 
13. ibid., p. 92 
14. ibid., p. 93 
15. ibid., p. 109 
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by on act of grace, but that it'because our former state was a state 
of'beinq in hin wrath. , Because men and women have rejected their 
role as, creatures, -and denied their relation with God altogether, 
thoy! can only then apprehend, the love-Cod bears for them as his 
wrath. - Paradoxically-this wrath is the seal of the reality-of his 
love. Thus Brunner says, "As sinner ... man stands under the Wrath 
of Cod". 
16 "this is the negative form of the original love of Cod". 
17 
Moreover it is on this basis that he can explain the terrible 
consequence of sin. Once men and women rebel they have destroyed the 
very-basis of their communion with God, and, therefore, at the same 
time, the posaibility"of their restoration. "Once man has loot his 
true relation to God he cannot get back into the right relation because 
he has no right to do so". 
l©' 
Thus the-'materiol' image of Cod. restored. in Christ not only 
bestows upon us salvation, but also reveals to us the depth of the 
disruption in our relationship with God. It reveals that this 
disruption is our responsibility, and that even now it has a depth 
which cannot be imagined. At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, 
it reveals also the original basis, in our nature which makes salvation 
possible at all. In this sense the revelation in Christ, special 
revelation, is both consequent and dependent upon a general revelation 
in creation, which has been totally distorted in the conceptualisation 
of human beings on account of their sin. This is why Brunner says, 
"the Christian faith, to which revelation is a unique, absolute,, decisive 
fact, includes 'general revelation' ... as a distorted truth within 
itself, as its own presupposition". 
19 Thus salvation is to be understood 
"" -1 
16, ibid., p. 119 
17. ibid. p. 118, 
14. ibid. p. 107' 
19. The Meditator, p. 33/34 
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as restoration, of communion with God. 'Men and women 
have no way, 
either of restoring'the relationship' themselves, or of knowing'about 
the'relationship"-'and its distortion in their own right. However, 
because of God's gracious act in Christ, not only are they restored, 
and enabled to see the disfigurement they have caused; but also see 
for the-first time the original relationship-with God which still exists 
as the whole basis both for their sinfulness and their salvation. 
Human beings remain- responsible, however deep%the distortion of sin. 
They'are always free to choose to be obedient to God's law. God does 
not cease to summon men and women to obedience, even if the guilt of 
their sin makes them unable to respond. Our impotence is our choice, 
and the fact that we have a choice is the mark of the original relationship. 
This is the 'formal' image of God in man. This is why I said earlier 
that salvation is a possibility which can only be restored by God, just 
as the original possibility-could only be created by him. 
The basic foundation of human existence is, therefore, e relationship with 
God. Even if-we choose to deny this relationship- we can never obliterate 
e basic responsibility-which is intrinsic to the human condition. 
This natural 'a priori' 'formal' image of God in man remains a fact. 
Brunner says-, "The fact that man must respond, that he is responsible, 
is fixed; no amount of human freedom ... can alter this fact". 
20 
He insists that "Even sinful man does not cease to be a responsible 
person". 
21 
Thus, from the moment when the 'natural' image is restored through 
faith in Christ, we perceive the distortion of that relationship,, and 
the 'formal' image which remains the presupposition of all human 'being' 
in the world; an indestructible potential for a relationship' with God. 
20. ibid., p-. 56' 
21, Dogm_matic9, vol. I, p. 134 
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This is what it means to say that Brunner's doctrine of man is 
relational. It is interesting to note that this is a pattern which 
is not unlike Tillich's method of correlation, andýBultmann'o 
understanding"of the relation between a basic existentialist pre- 
understanding, and the existential transformation in Christ. However, 
in contrast with Tillich's philosophical ontology und Cultmann's 
existentialism, Brunner's distinction betwoen revelation and reason 
is fundamentally ethical. 
This analysis allows u3 to see that Brunner's anthropology and 
indeed his theology as a whole, can be defined in terms of it dialectic 
of freedom. On the one hand the restoration of the material image 
bestows upon men and women the gift of freedom. True freedom is the 
obedient response of the creature to-the creator. Fie says', "In Jesus 
Christ God meets me as the One who imparts Himself to me in freedom, 
since as Holy Love He claims me wholly for Himself. It is as such 
that He reveals Himself to me ... that is He shows me my relation to 
Himself. He is the One who wills to have from me a free response to 
His love, a response which gives back love for love, w living echo, a 
living reflection of His glory". 
22 
Human freedom, than, is not the freedom to replace God, to take 
over hin function, but to fulfil the role which God intended. This 
will involve limitation, if viewed from the perspective of an ideal 
human conception of freedom. In effect though it is true freedom in 
the sense that it in the discovery of a transcendent purpose. It is 
the gift of sharing'that transcendent purpose. It is nothing less than 
learning how to love as God lovos. 
22. ibid. p. 55 
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Brunner explains, "Thus also the true frecdom of man is complete 
dependence upon Cod. 'Deo Serviro libertus' (Augustine). The words 
. 11hose service is perfect freedom' express the essence of Christian 
faith. True humanity is not gonius but love, that love which man 
does not possess from or in himself but which he receives from God, 
who is love". 
23 
On the other hand, sin itself is an exercise of freedom. Because 
true freedom is freedom in love, that freedom cannot be discovered 
except in the context of the possibility of rejection. God's love 
does not compel obedience and faith, for that would be to deny freedom 
altogether. In this sense men and women are free to assert their 
autonomy over against God's summons and claim. Brunner says, "only 
24 
a'Self which is self-determining; can freely answer God". 
This enables us to see that there exists alongside the 'material' 
freedom of salvation, (which is the freedom of obedience and love), a 
'formal' freedom which is the presupposition of both 'material' freedom 
and sin itself. "Then how is it possible to perceive reflected 
similarity in this formmal likeness to God? The similarity consists in 
being 'subject', being 'person'; freedom. Certainly, man has only a 
limited freedom, because he is responsible, but he has freedom; only 
so can he be responsible". 
ZS 
However, what might be termed this 'formal' notion of freedom is 
not so much the freedom which God intended for men and women, but rather 
the freedom which they-comprehend only as a distorted freedom. It is 
a freedom which is only realised in effect In the assertion of a false 
autonomy. Thus Brunner says, "God calls man into existence in order 
23. ibid., p. 58/9 
24, ibid., p. 56° 
25. ibid., p. 57. 
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that he may respond to him aright - not in order thbt he may respond 
wrongly or rightly: Hun is not destined to choose between faith and 
Unbelief, obedience and disobedience; God ha''made man in such a way-' 
that he can respond as God wills him to do. A-certain freedom of 
choice, which makes this response posslblq only becomes visible when 
the wrong-response has been made.: Formal freedom, severed from ' 
material freedom, ýfrom existence in the love of Cod, is already the 
result of sin". 
26 
'Formal' freedom, which reflects the 'formal' image, exists alongside 
'material' freedom, which is the reality of salvation appropriated in 
the 'material' image, revealed in Christ. 'Formal' freedom, therefore, 
is not true freedom, and it cannot even be understood as freedom, 
except under the impact of the freedom which is appropriated in faith. 
'Formal' freedom is that freedom which only'the truly free human being 
can comprehend, but even when he comprehends it, he comprehends it already- 
as the distortion of sin. "The fact that he is aware of this freedom 
of choice is already the effect of sin". 
27 
There is not space here to explore the detailed way in which this 
understanding "of the image of Cod in man is reflected in Brunner's 
systematic exposition of s Christian anthropology, -but it is appropriate 
to illustrate how his teaching-allows a significant critique of the 
traditional doctrines of original sin, and the historical rail. To 
begin with, he rejects quite emphatically the Augustinian view that sin 
is a natural fact inherited by-all human beings through the act of 
procreation. "This view is completely foreign to the thought of the 
Bible, and especiallytto that of Paul; indeed it is irreconcilable with it". ' 
.... .. *.. .I. T . Y... r JrýI I 
26. ibid.,. -p. 60/1 27: ibid., p. 61 
26. ibid., p. 104 
04 
Such, n view ie rejected because it to a total denial of that essential 
element of responsibility 'which is, for (runner, the ontological basis 
far, human salvation. We cannot shift the burden of our sin on to 
another in ardor to explain its seriousness. If we do. co, we 
effectively deny. 'thn cariounnesa we are seeking to underline, - "In 
Jesus Christ wo stand before God gas one- 'Adfian', as a humanity which 
is totally infected with an indissoluble identical burden of guilt. 
The secret of this unity must not be cheapened by being removed to the 
region of visible biological facts, into the realm of heredity". 
29 
This way lies a moral determinism which is the bitter enemy of the 
Christian gospel. 
At the stns'tim© the notion of original sin does symbolise the 
facts about human sinfulness, namelyvtha dominant force it exerts over 
our lives, and the solidarity in ein which we all share. The revelation 
in Christ does not merely restore salvation to those who have lost the 
'natural' image. . The revolation. in Christ restores the 'material' 
imago to all humanitybecauae none has lost or can lose the 'natural' 
image. All are guilty; and all can only be restored through grace. 
For this reason Brunner clearly expounds the 'fall' in Adam as 
being-mythological. -. Hare again the danger of moral determinism can 
all too eanily arise. Adam's,. fall is not 'true' in the sense that 
it would remove the responsibility-for-sin from the rest of humanity. 
This, . too, would deny-the natural responsibility Orunner wishes to 
streso. `. %Cn the other hand it is Itrue' in the sense that the 'fall' 
is to be seen as historical in that sin is the disobedience of men and 
women that takes place, in'time, against-the background of a possibility 
for obedience. Brunner points out the difficulty which this creates: 
29. ibid., p. 104 
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"If, on'-the dne hand, we maintain that wo cannot think in Copernican 
terms'without giving up'the 'story' of Adam, then, on the other hand 
we'must also say r that we cannot believe, in Christian and Biblical 
, terms, `without holding firmly'to the distinction between Creation and 
, Sin, 'fnd therefore the idea of a Fall. To give this up-means to 
30 
abandon the Biblical faith as a'whole". 
On the basis of this exposition Brunner tries to show that the 
truth of Christianity is to be set over against two significant 
traditions within Christian theology. He speaks of "avoiding the 
Scylla of Pelagianism" so that "we do not fall into the Charybdis 
of a mistaken moral determinism". 
3'1 First of all there is the 
determinism which is implicit in Augustine's teaching-on double 
predestination. Here is an attempt to take the fact of human 
sihfulness"avriously-; but it is one which ends up, by removing-all 
responsibility from men and women. .., A metaphysical determinism 
takes the-place'of human responsibility.,, 
Secondly Brunner resists the rationalism inherent in the 
Pelagian tradition, which re-emerges in Kant and Ethical Idealism. 
Here men and women are acknowledged to be responsible, but they-are 
also made responsible for their own salvation. The Platonic tradition 
as a whole understands sin either as ignorance or the attempt of the 
senses to corrupt the soul. Kant comes nearest to exploring'the 
problems. of sin and evil. Even he; however, according'to Brunner, 
can only. 'flirt with the idea of-radical evil, lie cannot actually 
incorporate-it)into a-system which is, basically a philosophy tied to 
the principle that the 'ought' presupposes the 'can'. 
30. ibid., p. 51 
31. ibid., p. 109/110 
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Brunner believes that, only-an understanding-which insists on a 'formal' 
and 'material' image of God in man restored in Christ can do justice 
to the basicffacts of human existence. These-facts are an inalienable 
human responsibility,, and a total dependence upon divine grace for a 
full realisation of freedom. So he says, "The real 'dialectic' of 
man, however, always consists in the dualism of the 'grandeur et misere 
de l'homme'. There is nothing human which does not bear some traces 
of the original glory derived from the creation; again, there is 
nothing human which does not bear traces of the Fall? But it is due 
to the sinful blindness of man that he always, misinterprets the 
traces of this 'greatness' and this 'misery"; sometimes his view of 
human nature is pessimistic and cynical; sometimes it is idealistic 
and optimistic". 
32 
Also, Brunner offers this essentially Christian understanding, of 
responsibility and freedom over against the idealism and materialism 
of contemporary views of human nature. Idealism sees men and women 
as a mixture of body-and soul. The immortal soul is the human point 
of contact with God. Here sin is understood as the influence of the 
perishable, sensual body; which stains the essential purity of the 
soul. According to this view sin is not a-fundamental impediment to 
salvation, but rather, a temporal obstruction. 
By-cointrast, Brunner, echoing the Biblical view, speaks of men and 
33 
women as "an entity, consisting. of 'soul' or 'spirit' and 'body'A, 
not a duality. Here there is no mystical view of the divine-human 
correspondence, but a relational view which alone preserves both the 
responsibility'of humanity-as well as the problem of sin. He says, 
"It is true that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as a 
32. ibid., p. 126 
33. ibid., p. 61 
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'substances is of Platonist,, and not of Biblical origin. It is a- 
result of, the, view that the human spirit is essentially 'divine'. But 
if we-staTt from what Cod has given us in His self-revelation, this 
idea of an immortal soul is replaced by the truth of man's destiny for 
eternal communion, with God". 
34 
Materialism, on the other hand, sees humanity us being'essentially- 
a part of the natural world. Human beings are just another, albeit 
a more developed, species of animal. "Similarly the modern follower 
of Darwin regards man as a mere member of the series in the evolution 
of mammals". 
35 Here again, for Brunner, moral determinism is ro- 
appearing in a contemporary'form. Its problem is that it cannot explain 
the fundamentally ethical nature of human beings. 
Neither of these views is sufficiently realistic. The naturalism 
of the materialist does not reckon with the 'grandeur' of human beings. 
It fails to explain human subjectivity, 4and the consciousness of the 
'self'. Brunner says, "It is not possible to convince a man who 
thinks in this 'objective' way that his view is wrong. This will 
only become clear to him when he becomes aware of the ffundamenta'l 
difference between Object and Subject" 
36 
Idealism, on the other hand, is not sufficiently realistic, in 
that it does not take seriously enough the alienated nature of human 
freedom. Men and women, if they 'are honest, can only admit that true 
freedom is won, not, in the end, by reason and autonomy; but is rather 
offered to them as a gift of divine grace. 
There are two important observations, therefore, which emerge in 
.I.,. _r .., --. T,.... -- ..,. ,.... T. "' --^ "-*IT--' T-- 
34. 
rrt 
ibid., ' p. 69 
35. ibid., p,. 70 
36,. ibid., p. 71 
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the analysis of thin chapter which constitute both an apologetic 
initiative, and a, response to Barth! a charge that Brunner in fact 
has not deserted a theology based on the principle of immanence. 
Brunner asks both the philosopher and the Christian theologian to 
reflect on. the significance and the experience of human freedom and 
of freedom as it is spoken of in the Christian tradition. Flu asks 
whether the 'naturalism' of contemporary scepticism, and the 'idealism' 
of orthodoxy'can-take the phenomenon of freedom seriously. In the 
end they either ignore the subjective significance of the self in the 
natural order, or else the depth of human depravity and alienation. 
There isýan axis of freedom and responsibility at the heart of human 
experience,., which is an, indication of. the 'relational' nature of human 
'being' in the World. 
At the same time this 'relational' quality-of human nature clearly 
does not form a substantial basis from which to derive knowledge of 
God. Human freedom is rather, initially at any rate, the neutral 
capacity in men and women which permits and enables a response to 
the : 'quality' of a relationship which God himself initiates and fulfils. 
It is this relational 'quality' which forms the content of true 
freedom. This, is salvation itself. 
Thus, by means of a dialectical concept of freedom Brunner excludes 
the principle of immanence. Here is a concept of authentic freedom 
in faith, built upon a neutral human freedom, which neither violates 
nor determines the divine freedom and otherness of God. We are 
offorod, therefore, a definition of Christian salvation, and at the same 
time offered the epistemological warrants for such a claim. Thus we 
can see that in ©runner's theology his anthropology is just as important 
fok the understanding of the message of salvation as is the revelation 
in Chriot. . 
09 
Yet even'now it is not entirely clear that Barth's charge of 
3nconsistencylhas been entirely overcome. On the one hand Brunner 
insists that the divine summons to human beings remains in the very 
fact of human responsibility in spite of their response. He speaks 
37 
of 'the formal fact of being responsible' Which 'we cannot lose'. 
Ho claims that-"man as a sinner is responsible". 
38 Yet at the same 
time he insists that sin has actually removed from them the possibility 
of response. "He (man) cannot got back to the previous way of 
existence as God meant it to be, in his Purpose in Creation" . 
39 jaw 
can human beings be responsible, i. e. able to respond, and yet not 
able to respond? In spite of Brunner's attempt to deny the charge of 
immanence he still seems to be faced with a contradiction. What can 
it mean to speak of humanity being responsible merelylin the sense of 
being trapped in its guilt? Is it not difficult to see what even the 
notion of guilt can mean here, if they have no possibility of escaping 
from, or of atoning for it? 
Brunner's reply to this, of course, is to suggest that men and 
women can only understand this complex relationship from the perspective 
of a new-found freedom in Christ. Guilt and ain, so to speak, can 
only be understood 'post eventum'. There is undoubtedly something 
here which does chime in with our experience, but Brunner, even now, 
does not tell us what it is about the specific revelation in Christ 
which permits this new perspective. Are we asked to rest content with 
the mere assertion that such a reversal has in fact taken place? This 
is puzzling because Brunner continues to speak about freedom and love 
as human possibilities only in Christ, and yet they are still the some 
words which we all use whether or not they°are used in a Christian context. 
37. ibid., p. 76 
38-. Revelation and Reason, p. 70 
39. ibd., p. 1U7 
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We can understand that the freedom that is possible in faith has a 
different quality from that freedom which we apprehend in the moral 
choice. What is difficult to understand is why"that freedom is 
exclusively tied to Christ. There still remains an 'alien' quality 
to the assertion, and if he is to insist that this 'alien' quality 
remains, is there any point at all in speaking about the natural human 
possibility for freedom and love? Thus Brunner still seams to wish 
to offer with one hand an ontology or human freedom and responsibility, 
with all the epistemological potential we have explored, but to take 
it away with tho other by means of an intrinsically 'incomprehensible 
assertion. 
In the next chapter I shall show how he attempts to deal with this 
problem by upeaking of revelation as 'personal'. flare he claims to 
offer a fundamentally different sort of knowledge. 
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1, " CHAPTER FOUR 
TRUTH AS ENCOUNTER' 
In the last Chapter I tried to explain Brunner's response to the 
chargo that his return to the concept of a natural image of God in man 
repreaented. a return to an immanental theology; and was thus a denial 
bf the basic principle of God's otherness. His reply was that this 
formal image or God in man was relational and"not substantial. Knowledge 
of Cod was not derived from this point of contact. Rather did revelation 
realise and fulfil what amounted to nothing, -mare-than a bare potential in 
humanity. Moreover it waaýonly in the light of the reality of this 
relationship that human beings were aware of and could conceive of this 
potential. 
However in spite of the importance of this insight it was still 
puzzling as to how this idea of human responsibility und freedom, which 
now comes to the contra of Brunner's thought, could be. reconciled with 
his claim that it is uniquely the revelation in Christ, which äccomplishes for 
men and women what they cannot accomplish for thernselvos. 
1 The 
answer which Brunner gives to this problem is that revelation itself 
is 'personal'. In essence his reply-is that this 'personal' nature 
of revelation allows us to see a new dimension of truth-itself, and also 
incorporates the historically unique as a predicate of itself. So he 
says, "That the Ground of all being should come to man, and be found 
by him, this io what the Gospel tells us, and in so doing it expresses 
the difference between the Biblical understanding of truth and all others ". 
2 
Again he insiato "... faith in a personal encounter with the God who 
meets us personally in Jesus Christ". 3 Thus Brunner sees this 'personal' 
1. cf. Barth DoLmatics vol. 3 Part II; Barth makes this point in his 
discussion of runner's anthropology, p. 131 
2. Truth as Encounter, p. 4 
3. Iieve ation and oason, p. 10 
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reality, as"tho means-of, "reconciling a 'responsive actuality' latent 
in human nature with a Christological ontology. 
The purpose of this chapter therefore in to oxamine the first 
stage of his thesis, and to look specifically, at his understanding of 
the 'personal' nature of revelation. This concept allows him to offer 
both an epistemology of sin and an epistemology of salvation. In the 
next chapter I shall explain how Brunner links the personal with the 
historical, and examine his understanding of its historical fulfilment. 
The analysis of subsequent paragraphs will seek to show how, for Brunner, 
the knowledge which is revealed in the incarnation is none other than 
the saving self-communication of Cod himself. 
The 'personal' is a dimension of Brunner's thought which has so 
for not emerged in our discussion. Not only is this 'personal' concept 
of truth a distinctivo facet of Brunner's theology,, but, particularly 
in his later thought, he offers us this 'personal' truth as the reality 
of the Christian message of salvation. Christian existence in faith, 
which is salvation, is a 'personal' reality. It is a relationship'. 
Thus no amount of reflection about it can ever apprehend or penetrate 
its essential nature. Theology, therefore can only ever look in from 
the outside. It must describe and reflect on what is essentially 
personal communion and fellowship. 
4 He soya, "There is indeed such a 
thing as believing, or Christian existence, but no such thing as 
theological existence. For theology is reflection about faith, but 
not tho life of faith". 
5 
There arc three important claims which Brunner makes for this 
'personal' concept of revelation and faith. The first is that it in 
4. Truth as Encounter cf p. 115 
5, ibid., p. 44 
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a totally original concept of, truth. Quite dramatically he asserts, 
""Truth an Encounter' is a concept of truth unknown to philosophy and 
scienca". 
6 This loade on directly to a second point. Thio 
originality stems not so much from a claim to offer a completely new 
truth, but rather from the distinctive way°in which he concoivea the 
truth of the Christian faith. 
Believing existence no Brunner explains it, is essentially 
reletional. 
1 
ý There is in human nature an inalienable reoponsibility. 
8 
This responsibility is best understood however not so much as an 
immanent, moral potential9 but rather as a'latent, and what might be 
termed an unactualised ability for response, on ability Which in 
itself has been rendered impotent by sin. The truth about humanity- 
does not lie within humanity, but it is given by divine revelation. 
Truth, as Christianity understands it, is a two-way process; it is the 
divine initiative which brings to life und'uctualisea' the impotent 
possibility in human nature for a response to God. It is neither the 
truth-about men and women alone, nor the truth about Cod alone, but 
the realisation of human personality in the response of faith. A truly 
human personality can only be comprehended as a 'personal' relation with 
God. This in what, Grunner means by 'responsive actuality'. He explains 
"The being of man as person depends not on his thought but on his 
responsibility, upon the fact that a supreme Self calls to him, and 
communicates Himself to him. It depends on what is called in the 
following chapters 'responsive actuality'--, the claim of the Self who is 
Lord that is at the same time the assurance of the graciously creating 
and justifying self, as it is perceived in faith". 
10 Later he says,, 
7'. cf. p. 89 above 
0. cf. above p. 134 Dog-antics Vol. I 
9, cf. p. 20, Truth an Encounter 
10. ibid., p. 1 
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"... he (God)-ceases to be an object of my thinking and transforms 
the object-subject relation into a-relation of personal correspondence: 
wo"have fellowship together". 
11 
rr 
At this point it is possible to understand a third claim which 
Brunner makes. Moreover with this claim there can be glimpsed the 
answer he might give to the question raised at the close of the previous 
chapter. The concept of truth as encounter has enabled him to move 
beyond subjectivism and objectivism. "The antithesis between object 
and subject, between "something 'true" and "knowledge of this truth" 
has disappeared and has been replaced by the purely personal meeting 
between the God who speaks and the man who answers". 
12 It is on this 
basis moreover that the terms of immanence and transcendence take on 
now significance. Brunner's"understanding of salvation is open. 
neither to the charge that-it is derived from a purely subjective 
immanence or from a purely objective transcendence. The relational 
truth about human existence as an existence in faith is one which is a 
genuinely human possibility, but it is one which is given by God. . 
Faith is a graciously enabled human--response; it is neither deduced 
from a-human potentiality nor from a divinely revealed fact., It is 
rather a new and dynamic combination of both the human and the divine, 
a 'personal' reality created and restored entirelyton the basis of the 
divine initiative. 
Brunner's answer, therefore, to the question about how human beings 
can be described as responsible, and at the same time not able to respond 
in their own right as human beings, might be to suggest that true 
responsibility and freedom are. best understood as being graciously enabled 
11., ibid., p. 115 
12. ibid., p. 117-118 
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within the relationship of faith. Responsibility is a responsibility 
in faith, not a given fact of human existence. He rejects the 
principle of immanence as a starting point for theology, but reinstates 
it inasmuch as he speaks of a gracious human and 'personal' 
responsibility which is a predicate of the divine 'personal' transcendence. 
In this sense immanence, for Brunner, is to be understood as a quality 
of transcendence. "This is not anthropomorphism, which would violate 
the infinity, the unconditional and absolute character of transcendence, 
by forcing the ineffable into the human form of speech, and so robbing 
it of its absoluteness. Rather, is it the theomorphism of the divine 
self-revelation in the man Jesus Christ, who reveals the basis of our 
responsibility and our sonship of God in spite of ourselves. "13 
From this analysis it is possible to understand why in a subsequent 
chapter Brunner sees his own theological epistemology, based on this 
concept of the 'personal' nature of revelation, transcending that of 
Barth in a way which goes quite beyond the original debate described 
in the last chapter. Thus he speaks of 'Theology beyond Barth and 
14 Bultmann'. In fact this is merely an extension of the point that 
has just been made. Brunner says, "The extreme objectivism of the 
theology of Barth was followed by the equally extreme subjectivism 
of the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. "15 With regard to Barth he comments 
quite specifically, "The 'objectum fidei', the object of faith exercised 
so great a fascination upon him that he had neither interest in, nor 
understanding of, the identity of subject and object in faith '1116 
But what does Brunner mean when he speaks of the 'objectivism' of 
Barth'a theology? How does he understand the contrast with what might 
13. ibid., p. 24 
14. ibid., p. 41 
15. ibid., p. 41 
16. ibid., p. 44 
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be called the 'personalism' of his own? - At this point it will be 
helpful to examine'a little more clooely this 'objective' element 
in Barth's understanding of'the nature of theology'and. conpare it 
with this now dimension or Brunner's thought. 
At the very beginning of his Dogmatics in Outline Barth writes, 
"Dogmatics is ascience ... I propose that by'acienco we understand 
an attempt at comprehension and exposition ... So by dogmatics, too, 
we'understand this two-fold activity of investigation and-doctrine 
in relation to an object and a sphere of activity". 
17 Moreover Barth 
is also quite'clear about the 'sphere of activityl. It is the 
Christian Church itself, and it'constitutes what he describes as the 
'subject' of the enquiry. The Church forms the-background or context 
in which theology, as a dogmatic science takes place. 
However, he is not so clear about the nature of the object of this 
enquiry even though he is insistent that there is auch an object which 
forms the scientific basis for Christian dogmatics. -For example he is 
not content to allow faith-itself to form the substance of theological 
enquiry. He says, "The fact that wo believe can only be, 'a priori' 
a secondary'hatter". 18 Faith, then, -by its very nature, is dependent 
upon a prior reality or 'object'. To see faith as the object of study 
would not allow Barth'to, addresa the"epistemological problem at all. 
Theology would still be undiatinguishable from anthropology. ' Faith 
could still be dismissed merely as an anthropological phenomenon. Thus 
he continues, "the outstanding and real thing-involved in the Christian 
proclamation ... -that is, the object with which the Apostles' Creed 
deals: I believe in God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit". 
19 
17. Dogmatica in Outline, p. 9 
18. ibid., p. -15 19, ibid., p. 15 
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Even here it is not precisely clear what Earth moans by 'object'. 
He continues, "I believe 'in' - oo the Confession sayss and everything 
depends upon this 'in'. The Greed explains this 'in', this object 
of faith, by which our subjective faith lives". 
20 
While Barth refuses to identify the 'object' of dogmatic science 
with faith, or what men and women believe, he is also reluctant to 
say that the object of dogmatic science is God. The 'Wholly Other 
God' can never be thought of merely as an object of scientific study. 
Thus the 'object' of study, which Barth charucterises by the preposition 
'in' is the result of, and is constituted by, ' humanity's encounter with 
this wholly other God, an encounter in which Cod takes the initiative, and 
as it were provides, by the encounter, the object of human dogmatic 
science. This encounter is nothing other than revelation which is to 
be understood much more specifically. - as God's fiord incarnate in Jesus 
Christ. 
This elaborate and somewhat puzzling analysis and description of 
the object or dogmatics djives us an insight into Barth's understanding 
of the problem öf epistemology, and his attempt to solve it. It is 
Cod's revelation in his Word which provides men and women with their 
objective knowledge, not only of religious truth, but with their 
objective knowledge of the whole world. This is why he wants to claim 
for theology the status of science precisely because the knowledge it 
offers is no different from the sort of knowledge in any'scientific 
discipline, provided that the key to that knowledge - the Word in 
Christ - is acknowledged. 
He says, "There is no other possible way for theology to prove 
its 'scientific nature' than by showing in its work at its task of 
20. Dogmatics in Outline, p. 15 
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knowledge - work actually dono ahd. determined by its object - what it 
exactly means by 'scientific nath re'". 
21' The täek of theology,, 
thereforH, involve! tine 'objectifying' of faith, Ilumnn language 
about God becomes this 'object' of dogmatic' study. Thus it'is possible 
to think of theology as we think-of other human intellectual studies. 
Christian theology, ' therefore, can be described as scientific and 
objective not only in the sense'in which these terms place it alongside 
other disciplines, but also in the sense that the Christian revelation 
is the origin of all science. ' The objectivity bf all human knowledge, 
including seientifib knowledge, is made possible by'tha divine 
revelation, the Word of the'hidderi God, i. e. the Cod who can never be 
objectified. 
Revelation dose hot'deny or impede knowledge of the truth; 
rather it makes it possible. What impedes it is'human sin. This 
meins thut when human stud' of any sort morely'projects its own sinful 
nature, then'thu truly 'objective'°and scientific study is itself 
negated. True science in any field is that science which furnishes 
knowledge in the light of the revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Barth insists that- theology does not have "at its disposal a basis 
of knowledgo, 'which might not strätghtaway'be realised in every other 
science, nor 13 it aware of an objective area, which is necessarily 
hidden away from'any other science whatsoever". 
22 This constitutes 
Barth's understanding of the scientific nature of'human knowledge. It 
is on thin basic that all human'knowlodge can be underiitood. At least 
this is so in theory. In practice however the matter is very different. 
He comments, "In fact philosophic christiana has nevor yet taken shape; 
21. K. Birth, Church Dogmatics vol. I Part I, p. 10 
22. ibid., p. 4 
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if it-was philoa ophia, it was-not christiana; if it was chriatiana. 
it was not philosophic". 
23 What happens is that other 'scientific' 
disciplines judge theology on the basis of principles of knowledge 
which are really alien to the Christian epistemology outlined above. 
Thus they fail totally to reach any understanding of the claims of 
Christian theology to knowledge, and in fact jeopardise their own 
claims by doing so. Thus it becomes all the more important for theology 
to adhere to its own critical principles and methods. Barth says, 
"In other words, they judge the Church's language about God on principles 
foreign to it, instead of on its own principles, and thus increase 
instead of diminishing the harm on account of which the Church needs 
a critical science". 
24 
The point of this exposition is to emphasise that Barth wishes to 
speak of theology as a 'science'. The 'faith-knowledge' revelation 
affords becomes the 'object of study'. Barth's intention here is two- 
fold. Ile wants to cnaintain theology on the same basis as other 
disciplines. 
however, while Barth speaks of theology las "a human effort after 
a definite object of knowledge" in the light or -the revelation in Jesus 
Christ, - Brunner,, by contrast, thinks of theology'aq being descriptive, 
however inadequately, of a 'personal' encounter between God and humanity. 
tie says, "Truth as encounter is not truth about something, not even 
truth about something mental, about ideas. Rather is it that truth 
which breaks in pieces the impersonal concept of truth and mind, truth 
that can be adequately expressed only in the I-Thou form. All, use of 
impersonal terms to describe it, the divine, the transcendent, the 
23. ibid., p. 5 
24. ibid., p. 5 
100 
absolute, is indeed the inadequate way invented by the thinking of the 
. solitary self 
to speak of it - or, more correctly, of Him. "25 
Thus, while Barth thinks it important to respond to the 
epistemological problem in the rational and 'scientific' terms in which 
it is posed, Brunner seeks to move beyond that frame of reference. He 
believes that it is precisely the acceptance of it which cripples and 
invalidates the attempt at response. While both Barth and Brunner 
employ the category of revelation, and speak of the divine encounter, 
Brunner's emphasis is upon the fundamentally 'personal' nature of 
revelation, and the 'personal' encounter. It is here that the secret 
of his response is to be found. 
"The self-revelation of God is no object, but wholly the doing and 
self-giving of a subject - or better expressed, a Person. A Person who 
is revealing himself, a Person who demands and offers Lordship and 
fellowship with himself, is the most radical antithesis to everything 
that could be called object or objective. "26 It is possible now, 
therefore, to summarise those two very different understandings of the 
nature of Christian theology. For Barth there is one sort of truth 
in all areas of knowledge. This is the truth of God's self-communication 
in Jesus Christ. From this truth all truth is derived. Moreover its 
objectivity vouchsafes the reality of our salvation. "But it is just 
intractable faith and its intractable object that make possible the 
knowledge with which dogmatics is concerned, namely, as divine, certain 
knowledge. "27 
For this reason it must not be imagined that Barth is in some sense 
25. Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p. 24 
26. ibid., p. 109 
27. ' K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol I Part I, p. 12-13 
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oblivious or blind to©runner's understanding of truth as 'personal', 
where the 'personal' itself is grounded in the transcendence of God. 
Iowever he remains unconvinced that Brunner's reference to the 'personal' 
can so easily be divorced from the human idea of personality, and thus 
avoid being rooted in the principle of immanence. "Man's capacity 
for God, however it maybe with his humanity end personality has really 
been lost. We cannot, therefore, see that at this point there comes 
into view a common basis of discussion for philosophical and theological 
anthropology, the opportunityrfor a common exhibition at least of the 
28 
possibility of raising the question of God". This is why it is so 
important for Barth to speak of the objective nature of revelation. 
Brunner; on the other hand", believes that on1' If the t'wo sorts 
off' truth are recognised, Le; the-subject-object and the 'personal'. ' 
that the ultimate objectivity of our salvation becomes comprehensible. 
For him Barth's'concept'of the'objectivity, of revelation and the 
science bf dogmatics is Inevitably n subject-object construction which 
ceannot`avoid being located finally"in the conceptualisation of the 
human' subject. "The, correlation of the truth-of revelation and the 
truth of faith that we find in the-Bible and the Reformers is shattered, 
and the place of a divine truth that discloses itselfý'only to faith is 
taken by a metaphysical speculation about God". 
29 This is why Brunner 
offers a new dimension of truth as 'personal' encounter initiated by 
and derived from God himself. For him this is a more satisfactory 
way of speaking about revelation, and of responding to the epistemological 
problem. 
Both-the 'objectivism" of Borth, therefore, and the 'personalism' 
of Brunner must be seen as attempts ýto deny, the principle of immanence. 
ý8ý tb1 der; 3Truth 
as Encounter, p. 45 
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In spite of this however, each sees in the other's theology the 
principle of-immanence re-entering, as it were, by the back door. 
However it is not the purpose of this study, to delve any deeper into 
this particular issue. In one sense what can be seen is the re- 
emergence in a different context of the sterility and aridity of the 
earlier debate. 
From the point of view of this enquiry the important point is to 
grasp hold of and to explore Brunner's concept of the 'personal'. In 
the end, as will become clear, it seems to me that neither Barth nor 
Brunner can protect themselves by means of their different epistemological 
insights from the charge that their theology is based on the principle 
of immanence. In that sense I shall argue that theology must accept 
this as. a basic 'given' of the theological enterprise and begin on that 
basis. However this is to preempt a considerable portion of this 
enquiry. At this stage the point is to explore Brunner's concept of 
the 'personal' because it offers an interesting and potentially 
fruitful insight into the whole question of a theological epistemology. 
The first point to be noted is that this allows Brunner to consolidate 
his claim over against Barth's criticism that hie theology is not open 
to the charge of immanence. The truly personal is more a predicate 
of Cod than of sinful humanity. 
However it is the second insight which Brunner derives from this 
idea of the 'personal' revelation which has perhaps a more profound 
significance for his epistemology. This insight is the distinction 
he draws between the traditional 'I-it' model of human knowledge, and 
the 'personal' 'I-Thou' model. We can best approach the matter by 
thinking of the nature of the knowledge we have in our ordinary 
personal relationships. In a close relationship we cannot express 
the most important and fundamental elements of that relationship in 
103 
terms of objective, scientific categories. To describe a person we 
know well purely in such terms, and to imagine that wo have then, in 
some sense, described the person as we know them, is to diminish their 
being as persons. In a relationship, therefore, the 'relational' 
knowledge cannot be spoken of either fully or truthfully in the 
traditional objective categories. There is at the heart of a close 
relationship a fundamental mystery, which reduces any-attempt at 
exhaustive doscription1to silence. 
If this applies to human relationships how much more will it 
apply to the relationship between God and humanity? Thus Brunner begins 
by expounding his doctrine of God in terms of the Name of God. On 
this basis he can speak logically of the paradox of God's revelation 
being mystery. 'It is because Cod's revelation is his Self-revelation 
that it make3 sense to speak of it as unfathomable mystery: His Self- 
revelation is a 'personal' commitment. 
Brunner maintains that this insight is central to the Biblical 
witnosa. Interpretations of Exodus 3: 14 have made a fundamental error 
when they speak of God's reply to Moses as being the revelation of God's 
ultimate ontological reality. That revelation should rather be 
derstood as a Self-revelation; his 'personal' involvement in the 
plight of the Israelite slaves in Egypt. That revelation does not 
provide the theologian with any objective reality, to examine or explain. 
The Bible merely describes the encounter with a Person, historically J 
engaged in the salvation of 'his' people. 
, 
This same feature, Brunner believes, characterises Jesus' language 
about Cod. It is precisely Jesus' understanding of the Person of Cod 
which differentiates it from that of his contemporaries. God is Father 
who can be addressed as 'Abba'. He teaches his disciples to pray that 
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God's name be hallowed. -Thus-the stress always' falls on the 'personal' 
reality, rather than an objective, ontological idea. 
When we see that God is to be thought of in terms of his Name, 
and not as a speculative idea, we can realise the significance of the 
mistakes which purely philosophical enquiry into the nature of God 
has made. Hero Brunner clarifies the distinction with reference to 
the categories of the 'I-it' and the 'I-Thou', categories which have 
been explained, and received their classic exposition in Buber's 
I and Thou. 
30 The former is a subject-object category; By land 
largo philosophers have used this model almost exclusively to speak 
of God. In so doing they have reduced God necessarily to an objective 
site. In reality the 'I-Thou' model is the only one which will allow 
us to understand the nature of Christian revelation. In the 'I-it' 
relationship the person who is subject reduces knowledge of the world 
to an objective 'it', in order that the subject may remain in control 
of his knowledge, -. The self thus becomes the centre of knowledge. 
Only the''I-Thou' model makes it possible for the subject to speak of 
being addressed by another subject - the 'I' by the 'Thou'., This 
model therefore makes it possible for Brunner to claim anew dimension 
of knowledge, which transcends the purely subjective and impersonal 
epistemology-of the 'I-it' category. ßy'this means he explains the 
difference between objective knowledge and the 'personal' knowledge 
described above. He says, "In that moment in which he becomes a 'Thou' 
he ceases to be an object of my thinking, and transforms the object- 
subject-relatibn into a relation of personal correspondencd: we have 
fellowship together". 31 
30, cf. ibid., p. 60 
31. Truth es Encounter, p. 115 
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For Brunner therL-fore the teak of theology is to explain and 
describe this 'personal' encounter. It must never imagine that the 
'truth' of its description can in any sense replace the 'truth' of 
the encounter itself. The two are completely different. 
32 The one 
romaine, as a description, on the 'I-it' level of knowledge, with its 
epistemological limitation. The other Won the level of the 'I-Thou' 
encounter which alone allows the transcending of the limitation. 
This is the point at which faith truly assumes its primacy over reason. 
"The God who is merely thought to be personal is not truly personal; 
the Living God' who enters my., ephere of thought and experience from 
beyond my thought in the act-of making Himself Known to men by Himself 
033 naming His Name - He alone is truly personal. 
At the same time Brunner is aware that a distinction needs to be 
drawn between the other person as 'Thou' and God as 'Thou'. Basically 
the distinction is to be understood when we grasp the fact that while 
'other' persona can be reduced to an objective impersonal 'it', thus 
rejecting and negating any 'personal' summons which they may address 
, to 'me', the summons and address of God can never be reduced in this 
way. This is because the unique 'Thou' of God can never be subsumed 
beneath the 'it' of common humanity. God always meets us as a 'Thou's 
There is no impersonal category by which to comprehend God's 'Thou'. 
In thid way his inalienable sovereignty is preserved. Our attempts 
to conceptualise Cod - to change 'Him' into an 'it' - fail. This is 
the failure of Natural Theology. It illustrates not the luck of a 
transcendent dimension, but rather the basic problem with human nature. 
Men and women attempt to replace God's sovereignty by the contingency 
of their own reason. ' Here in the fundamental nature of their sin. 
32. cf. p. 92 
33. p. 122, Dogmatics vol I cf* also p. 113 Truth as Encounter 
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Thus Brunner claims that the charge that he, offers a purelys 
anthropomorphic concept of Cod could not be further from the truth. 
In fact the opposite is the case. God is not derived from a human 
concept of the 'personal', but, rather human. beings come to understand 
the nature of the,, 'personal' through the 'personal' revelation of Cod. 
God is not derived from a fundamentally objective 'I-it' conceptual 
model. Rather the 'I-Thou, ' address of revelation makes it possible 
to understand the 'I-Thou' nature of human relationships. This, in 
turn acts as. a criterion by which to judge the ultimate inadequacy of 
the 'I-it' model to mediate human language about God. ßy Ithis token 
Brunner maintains that this criticism of his theology, is not just an 
error, but sin itself. 
34 
Finallyf it remains to be, explained how the concept of salvation 
6 
is originally linked with his understanding of revelation as God's Self- 
revelation. To reveal one's name to another is not apurely formal 
act. 'It is an act of entrusting oneself to another. It is a commitment 
to the 'other'. . As such it is a risk which involves the possibility 
of the need for self-sacrifice. God's self-revelation therefore is 
nothing less than his 'Being for us'. Its purpose cannot be described 
as anything less than our'salvation. In offering Himself God does not 
offer objective knowledge of himself to men and women. Instead-he offers 
them salvation from their sin. God offers his personal 'Being for us', 
and in so doing takes up the bare and barren possibility famidst'our 
sinfulness, and transforms it into our own personal destiny in a 
relationship of faith. 'Truth as encounter' occurs when we welcome 
and accept Cod's 'personal' 'Being for us' and recognise that our being 
is only itself when it is being for him. Here is the truth which is 
so different from arid philosophical formulations. 
34. E. Brunner Dogmatics Vol. I, p. 126 
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At-this point, it can be understood how this new category of, knowledge 
allows Brunner to offer both an epistemology of sin and an 
epistemology of salvation. The 'I-it' model which preserves the 
subject-object antithesis expresses perfectly the very foundation of 
human sinfulness, the will to be independent and autonomous, the 
human desire to be at the centre of the world, and in control. tiara 
is the basic problem for all traditional theological epistemology. 
It uses a model which can only express the alienation which Christian 
theology speaks of as having been overcome. "The whole of Western 
philosophy and science that has issued from it are dominated by the 
subject-object antithesis", 
35 
At the came time the use of this 'I-Thou' model to refer to the 
divine human-relationship offers an explanation of the soteriological 
nature of revelation. Out: of his free will God chooses to offer men 
and women a relationship with himself. Thus his very nature is his 
personal boing-for-us, God's self-revolationýis-actually the source of 
our creation-us, personal 'being'. We owe our-existence as persons 
entirely to the fact that God's being is his-free and unconditional 
offer of communion with him. Thus knowledge of salvation is not 
derived. from human need, or projected on the basis of the human spirit. 
It has its origin-in. the being of God. This is: reflected in the 'I-Thou' 
epiatemology-which is faith's own rational ground for comprehending and 
freely accepting the divine offers but it is essentially distorted, as 
we have seen, by the traditional-subject-object model. 
I have outlined brunnor's understanding of the 'personal' nature 
of revelation in contrast with that of Barth's 'scientific' understanding. 
The main point has been to show that Brunner's epiatemoloyy is able to 
35. Emil-Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p. 7 
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respond to the charge of immanence.,, The 'personal' dimension of truth 
is not a human possibility derivable from human personality. It is 
rather the creation of the transcendence of the Divine Person on the 
basis of a barren and impotent potential in human nature. Thus the 
'immanence' of faith as a truly human possibility is nothing but the 
reflection of the divine transcendence, which has enabled and created 
it. At the some time we can also see that Brunner's insight allows 
him to reflect critically on Barth's own epistemology. 
There are three points at which'Brunner can criticise Barth: in 
the first place a 'personal' understanding of revelation makes it 
possible to"accuse Barth': ccientific`understanding, of being not only 
groundless, but also'subjoctive. Brunner's-thesis is that there is 
no 'objective''truth ih theology, at'least on the basis of the 'I-it' 
model. To think bf truth in this way distorts its essential nature. 
An objective' presentätibn'of the knowledge of God cannot avoid being 
the creation of the human 'nasse'. It is rooted in the self, and not 
in God. The human 'I' transforms both the world and God into an 'it'. 
For Brunner truth comes to us only as the 'personal' self-revelation of 
God, and that truth is salvation. Thus the saving reality of the 
Christian message is grounded in, and preserved by, the 'personal' 
nature of revelation. Barth's insistence upon revelation as the 
revelation of a wholly other God, which nevertheless can be spoken of 
in terms of a scientific investigation fails in this respect. Barth's 
epistemology must be judged as groundless. This is not so much because 
it is solely and uniquely grounded in the special revelation of Jesus 
Christ, but because it is essentially subjective, for Barth has returned 
to a statement of theological truth on the basis of the objective 'I-it' 
model'which is necessarily controlled by the human subject as the very 
centre of knowledge. The heart of Barth's theoloyyýis the human 'I' 
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and not the divine "Thou' which it has become in Brunner's thought. 
Secondly Brunner is able to explain the nature of salvation in 
the Christian message in a more satisfactory way than Barth, because 
his epistemology of sin is more clearly defined. We can see that for 
Barth the central problem for theology is the problem of epistemology. 
This is why he thinks of theology as a 'dogmatic science'. Now it is 
Barth's insight that human knowledge is inadequate and distorted because 
of the problem of sin. It is to his credit that he sees that the two 
problems are related. Yet, according'to Barth's view, it is possible 
for'the theologian to keep the two separate. Revelation, as it were, 
formally solves the problem of sin, and thus the theologian 'can go on 
to speak of the problem of epistemology. It is through revelation, 
therefore, that humanity, once more, has access to true knowledge of 
the world. The relationship between salvation and revelation has almost 
become a scientific formula. 
Brunner's insight is that this 'formal' relationship misses the 
point of the nature of revelation. For Barth human epistemology may, 
but does not inevitably, reflect sin. For Brunner, an objective 
epistemology is inevitably a projection of human sin. The 'I-it' 
category, which is the basic category of human knowledge, projects 
the way men and women distort reality by putting themselves in the 
centre of-the world. The reason for this, and the depth of this 
distortion human beings themselves cannot comprehend. To attempt to 
understand it is inevitably to return to some 'I-it' basis of' 
comprehension. The result is that an 'explanation' of sin only 
succeeds in explaining it away, and thus in denying its reality. 
This is not to say that the 'I-it' category of knowledge is 
illegitimate in the context of objects themselves, -and 
the relationship 
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between human beings and objects, but two things need to be borne in 
mind. First of all, this sort of knowledge, which is capable of 
universal recognition, ie not so clear and unambiguous as it is'often 
made out to appear, and secondly it is so easily and illegitimately 
transferred to operate in the context of inter-personal relationships. 
` Thus, while Barth uses the category of revelation to identify the 
problem of sin, he then proceeds to by-pass it. Brunner, on the 
other hand, uses the concept of revelation to confront the problem of 
sin first Wand foremost, in all its profundity. This is why only the 
'I-ThbuI category is adequate to a conceptualisation of revelation. 
Only revelation grounded in the divine Thou can speak to the problem 
Brunner identifies. Thus, just as revelation is mystery because it 
is founded on the divine and unfathomable Thou, so too can sin only be 
thought of as mystery. It is a total distortion of human personality. 
The reality of salvation, therefore, can only be correctly understood, 
paradoxically as it may seem, when the theologian insists on the basic 
mystery of revelation and sin. It is a mystery which preserves the 
reality of salvation. In this way Brunner sees'the problem-of sin 
and the reality of salvation as being at the heart of the Christian 
message. 
Finally Brunner's understanding of revelation allows him a greater 
consistency than Barth's concerning the apologetic nature of theology. 
Barth's position is paradoxical. He is insistent that Christian 
theology should see itself as a dogmatic science. - At the same time 
it cannot justify itself on"a philosophical or scientific basin. He 
sets his face against 'apologetics' as such. He Gaye, "All intended 
apologetic and polemic, on the'other'hand, has invariably and notoriously 
been. an irresponsible. act, -not up to date and so ineffective as well". 
36 
36. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I, part I, p. 31-32 
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Later. in the Church Dogmatics, he assorts, "This point of contact also, 
like everything become real in faith, i. e, through the grace of 
reconciliation, can only be spoken of theologically, and not theologically 
and philosophically". 
37 
Yet it is because Barth sees the centrality of the epistemological 
problem, and because he offers the category of revelation as a response 
to that problem, that his theology has been and still is of such 
significance for Protestant theology this century. It is precisely 
his understanding of revelation which puts theology in the contemporary 
setting on to such a firm apologetic basis. 
Now of course, this position is not inconsistent, nor even 
paradoxical, in itself. Barth is denying the possibility of attempting 
on apologetic theology independent of the special revelation in Christ. 
In this sense his attack is not on apologetics as such, but on the way 
theology has offered itself as a rational apologetic, grounding the 
reality of God in human reason. 
However Brunner's understanding of revelation as 'personal' reveals 
that this position is not acceptable. In offering theology as a 
'dogmatic science', Barth is once again offering an illegitimate 
apologetic. The very fact of speaking of revelation in terms of 
'scientific knowledge' is to start out again on the road which Barth 
himself has declared to be no road. 
Brunner's claims however are less paradoxical. He does not set 
his'face against apologetics. There is need for an apologetic defence 
of the concept of revelation. For Brunner, however, this is impossible 
merely on the basis of insisting upon its groundlessness. This is no 
37. ibid., p. 273-274 
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solution to the epistemological problem. Rather it must be done by 
showing how the 'personal'. nature of revelation confronts the basic 
'I-it' category, in itself sinful, in which the epistemological problem 
is framed. He'says, "The Christian claim to revelation stands in the 
strongest possible opposition to this conception of truth. For here 
the Church proclaims so absolute truth that which can neither be proved 
by intellect not verified-by experience. Hence the Christian doctrine 
of revelation is regarded with the greatest mistrust". 
38 
,: 
ý38. Revelation and Reason, p. 5-6 
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CHAPTER 'FIVE 
THE INCARNATION- THE HISTORICAL REALI5ATION}OF SALVATION 
This analysis so for, has helped , 
to, explain how ©runner's thesis 
concerning the 'personal' nature of. revelation has enabled him to 
respond to the criticism that his, theology is based on a, principle of 
immanence. Indeed Brunner's insight makes, ik possible,. for him-to 
argue that it is rather Barth himself who is more vulnerable to the 
charge of, idealism. However, what has not-. yet been explained is the 
significance of Brunner's determined attempt to link the historical 
with the 'personal'.,, He insists, "Here truth happens, here we are 
in the truths, which is. not in us but comes to us, which make us free 
by restoring to us our true being,; our being in, the Thou, and our being 
for the Thou. "' In some, way the 'historical' is a dimension of the. 
'personal', but, at the same time it-is the decisive channel through 
which the truth of the 'personal' can be understood. The nature of 
this relationship is the subject for. exposition in this chapter. 
However there still remäins in the background the problem identified 
earlier. Brunner clearly states on the one hand that human freedom and 
responsibility are a natural point of contact between the human and 
divine, yet at the same time he wishes to maintain that the revelation 
in Christ is in some sense an 'alien' event. Human beings are 
declared to be responsible, and yet it is denied that they are in any 
way capable of responding to the divine summons without this 'alien' 
encounter. It is the answer to this question which is awaited with an 
increasing urgency by, the reader of Brunner. 
If it is possible to claim that there is a single fundamental 
1. Truth as Encounter, p. 21 
114 
principle in Brunner's theology, then that principle is the conjunction 
of the historical with the 'personal'. This is what the incarnation 
actually is, and these are the categories by which it can be understood, 
for on, the one hand it is this historical event which provides us with 
epistemological access'to the divine ontology. It furnishes us with 
knowledge of Cod's 'personal' being for us. On the other hand this 
epistemological access is"also the expression of the divine ontology. 
The incarnation is God's 'personal' choosing to communicate himself to 
us. It is a two-way process. It is a 'personal' relation. We not 
only know what salvation is through Jesus Christ, we also apprehend 
ourselves as being taken up into the divine salvation. This is the 
actual expression of God's being in its 'personal', 'relational' and 
saving nature. The incarnation is the point at which human 
epistemology and divine ontology become one. The words themselves can 
only express human knowledge, but the reality is divine. To say that 
Jesus Christ is the Word is to say two things. It is to say that we 
have knowledge of God in the relationship of faith, and it is to say 
that God chooses to reveal himself in a relationship. These two things, 
human knowledge of God and God's unconditional offer of himself, come 
together in Christ. This is why I say that the heart of Brunner's 
theology is the conjunction of the historical with the 'personal'. 
Brunner says, "the historical and personal character of this truth as 
encounter are necessarily connected together. "2 To say that Jesus 
Christ is the Word, therefore, is not only a central tenet of Christian 
faith, it is also the expression of authentic humanity. 
Brunner continues, "It is of the highest-importance that Jesus 
Christ himself, the One in whom God imparts himself to us, is called 
2. ibid., p. 24 
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"the"Word". 3 It*is therefore he, this Person, who is really the'Word, 
He himself is the communication, the self-communication of God; it is 
he himself in whom`God proclaims and realises his will to Lordship, and 
his will to fellowship. ' Again he asserts, "The incarnation of the Word, 
the entrance of God into the sphere of our life, the self-manifestation 
of God in his Son - this is the real revelation, the establishment of 
Lordship and creation of fellowship. Words, therefore, are not of 
ultimate consequence, not even divine words, but the Word, which he 
himself, Jesus Christ is. "3 
t 
6asicelly Brunner's answerto'the'question raised earlier is that, 
because revelation is 'personal' it-is also historical. "Human sin, 
as has been seen, not only blinds'men'and women to their human point 
of contact with God, but also renders them helpless'at that point of 
contact. For God's love is transformed into his wrath from the 
perspective of the guilty eyes of humanity. In this sense the whole 
sinful history Iof humanity is the history of its impotence before God. 
Thus God's saving, 'personal' being for us cannot be truly itself 
unless it is also historical. The historical nature of revelation 
is intrinsic to its 'personal' nature. It is indeed predicated of 
it. Thus two things become clear. Since human history is the history 
of sin it is only through this historical realisation that we can have 
any knowledge at all of God and salvation. At the same time, once' 
this truth has 'encountered' us, we see also that the historical' 
revelation is not just an historical correction to an historical fall, 
but that the historical is incorporated into the being'of God himself. 
His 'personal' being for us is realised in his hietoric'al being for us. 
The two come together in the Person of Christ. To speak of the Person 
3. Truth as Encounter, p. 132 
116 
of Christ therefore is to speak of two things. It is to speak of the 
historical way-in which alone our personal destiny can be fulfilled. 
But it is also, to, speak of the way God is in himself. Jesus Christ 
reveale, the, essential 'personal' being of God. 
In Brunner's understanding of this conjunction, therefore, there 
is offered -a new depth of insight into the traditional two-nature 
doctrine of the, Person of Christ. The historical revelation is. none 
other than Cod's historical being for us. It is the divine summons. 
expressed in human form which enables our human response. Christ, 
however, is God's revelation not just in the human-form of the 
particular figure of Jesus of Nazareth. lie is-. God's revelation in 
our human form in that he expresoes the reply that we long to express 
but are impotent to realise. To God's claim upon us "You are mine", 
which he expresses, Christ also offers the response, "I am yours", and 
empowers us to do the same. Brunner asks; "Where does this truth of 
man become event? " He replies to his own question, 
"In. history and, in fact, in that history where the supreme Self 
that makes us responsible, himself so confronts us that he at the 
same time claims us and gives himself to us. This point in history. 
is Jesus, who is known in faith as the Christ, the 'kyrios'. There 
one stands before us who is indeed a real, human Thou, but in whose 
being and action the gap between what is and what ought to be is not 
present, in. whose pe'aon those different, 'characteristics of humanity' 
of which we spoke above can be understood as a unity, the man dependent 
upon 'God as the man obedient to God. This is he who as the One 
responsible knows himself to be identical with the Will that makes him 
responsible, and therefore the One in. whose self the Divine self speaks 
to us, whose claims are a divine commandment, whose forgiving love is 
God's forgiveness. "4 
ya 
In Christ there is revealed the relational reality of human 
salvation. In this 'personal' form it is revealed both as the human 
possibility which human beings can no longer realise, as well as the 
4. ibid., p. 20 
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gift of divine grace which ronliäes it for us and in us. Here is 
the truth of tho' traditional doctrine of'th©'Incarnation. ""The truth 
about'mon is founded in the divine humanity of Christ, which we 
apprehend in faith in Christ. "5 
The 'personal' revelation then describes. three things: the 
relation with. God which God alone makes possible; the historical 
reality of Jesus Christ, his Cross and Resurrection; and the human 
possibility which is always present in the fact of responsibility, yet 
which in itself is powerless to respond. It is the incarnation 
which mediates the dynamic reality between the divine and the human. 
This is the dynamic, relational concept of truth which Brunner sets 
over against all objective concepts. Moreover it is 'encounter' 
because'it is at-all stages only comprehended' in't©rms of the divine 
initiative. "Gad wills - even when we think about him as he Is in 
himself - to be known as no other'than that One who meats us in Jesus 
Christ. "6 
Thus we can understand the fusion between epistemology and ontology 
which was spoken of earlier. The incarnation permits epistemological 
access to the divine ontology. The incarnation actually embodies 
the epistemological relation to the divine being. Because the 
incarnation is the realisation of our personal potential in history it 
mediates to us that 'personal' reality of God which is the very source 
of our human being and our human knowledge. In this way it not only 
creates our 'personalnesa', but also restores it from the distortion of 
sin. Thus the categories of the 'personal' and the historical, which 
come together in the incarnation, are those which mediate the saving 
5. ibid., p. 21 
6.. ibid., p. 141 
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ontology, which is-the heart of the Christian roessage. Indeed that 
saving ontology is not a reality in its own right. It, is actually 
the reality of Cod himself. He is_no. other than 'personal' Being 
for us. What, we know of. him in the incarnation ia,. the gracious 
freedom of his will. in choosing to relate to us. "The con is no 
messenger;, he is the will of the lord himself, personally present n7 
Thus the epiatemological, access to God is not a neutral, intellectual, 
primarily human reality or possibility. It. is actually part of Cod's 
essential being for use and our essentiol. being inrosponse to him. 
At this point we can understand not only, the conjunction of the 
personal and the historical, but also'©runner's iniistence an I "'the 
uniqueness of the Chrietisn revelation. We can sea that this is no 
longer a mere assertion. Two things become clear. First it is 
only in the Christian religion that the 'personal' criterion of truth 
is fulfilled. God himself hes. furnished, this access to himself as 
an expression of himself. Thus it is legitimate to judge whether other 
so-called religious claims fulfil the criterion, which the Chriotian 
revelation offers. Moreover it is clear that, they do, notp for. either 
objective knowledge of God Ja , claimed, 
through a, wholo series of 
revelations, which can only invalidate the claim to salvation, or else 
they create Cod in the image of human subjectivity, and thus God is 
merely the reflection of the human need for salvation. Secondly, this 
category of the 'personal' realised in the incarnation also acts as 
the criterion by which all claims to revelation can be judged. The 
incarnation itself is epistemological protection against the charge 
of groundlessness. Thus it is important both. in its justification of 
Christianity in face of sceptical criticism, as well as its justification 
over against other religions. 
7. ibid., p. 157 
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'- In the incarnation 'God of fare us a new dimension of 'personal' 
knowledge. It is the knowledge of the 'I-Thou' encounter. Brunner 
says, "Subject and object may become one in a highest act of knowledge. "8 
"Becoming a new person has taken the place of knowledge of truth. "9 
In this way he reconciles the 'responsive actuality' we spoke of in 
the previous chapter with a Christological ontology. It is by means 
of this 'personal' knowledge that he seeks to avoid both the charge of 
immanence and the charge that the claim of revelation is groundless. 
For this 'personal' knowledge is not derived from men and women and 
human nature. It is rather the source of their being which is 'other'. 
This 'other' can be grasped and realised in God's own gracious act of 
salvation, the incarnation. While the'truth is not implicit in 
humanity, it is nevertheless a graciously enabled 'personal' response 
in e 'personal''relationship. This is what faith in Christ expresses. 
It seams that now perhaps some explanation can be offered of the 
paradox of Brunner'a position and the reason for his strong emphasis 
upon the 'alien' nature of revelation. The incarnation is not an 
anthropological projection of the human nood for salvation. It is 
rather the divine Person crossing the historical divide of human sin. 
In this way Brunner is able to preserve the seriousness of sin in his 
theology. For just as from the perspective of their existence in sin 
human beings perceive God's love as his wrath, so they perceive God's 
saving action on their behalf as an 'alien' act. Thus, just as God's 
wrath is really an expression of his love, so this 'alien' act is really 
the act by which humanity is enabled to fulfil its true destiny. So 
we can easily comprehend why our essentially sinful epistemology cannot 
8. ibid., p. 163 
9. -- ibid., - p. 163 
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either grasp or accommodato, it. to its understanding. 
The reality of human existence is a relationship between the 
Creator and the creature. Sin, however, is a real disruption of 
this relationship. Now, because human understanding itself is an 
element in this distortion, this means that it cannot be restored by 
any rational attempt merely to understand it. "All attempts to 
explain evil end in explaining it away; they end by denying the fact 
of evil altogether. "" They deny it because they explain it within 
the framework of an assumed autonomy of human reason, which itself is 
the product of the very distortion which it is seeking to heal. 
Now this insight enables the fundamental error to bo"recognised 
which theology in general has made in its attempts to, address the 
question of sin.. By this analysis sin is a total disruption of human 
nature, rather than a series of temporary, albeit serious, aberrations. 
Sin is not so much a culmination of specific sins, as a permanent state. 
This means that the will is incapable of responding to the problem. 
Even Kant's move from pure reason to practical reason is just as 
incapable as the idealist tradition as a whole of addressing the real 
problem. It is merely a move from pure rationalism to ethical 
rationalism as the basis for theology. As has been seen above, it is 
this ethical rationalism which Brunner understands to be the dominant 
concept in modern theology, and it is this ethical rationalism which he 
is particularly determined to resist, for it stresses the continuity, in 
the some way as pure rationalism, between the creature and the creator, 
In reality, however, the fact of the matter is discontinuity and 
disruption. Only on the basis of a 'personal' revelation of God is 
it possible to arrive at a true insight into the nature of the problem. 
10, The flodietor, p. 124 
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Revelation and sin, therefore, at their profoundest levels,, give 
expression to the unfathomable mystery of a 'personal' relationship. 
In this sense too; salvation is an. unfathomable mystery. There is 
no way for man and women to heal this disruption either through reason 
or will, or through a combination of these' faculties. Everything 
depends upon an act of God, an act which is both objective and once- 
. for-all. When we. speak of 'objective' here, wo do not use 
it in the 
sense that it is capable of being subordinated. to, and contained within, 
the understanding of the subject. We use objective rather-ih the 
sense of transcending totally human subjectivity. Wo speak of an 
'objective' act in the sense that it belongs to, and is expressive of, 
the truly 'subjective' nature of the divine 'Thou'. Brunner explains, 
"True self-impartation is love ... Unconditional love can happen only 
as the love of God ... Reason knows nothing of such love, or of such 
en event. 
"' 
Hore wo can glimpse something both of the seriousness with-which 
Brunner taken human sinfuln, ess# and also of the centrality of salvation 
in his theology. Because of sin, salvation is not something wo can 
understand, as it were, by natural right, for that right has been 
forfeited. Thus not even the. 'historioal' and the 'personal' ns 
categories. enable u3 to understand it. Salvation is rather something 
which invades our existence. ' It is somethingiwhich comes out of the 
blue into our history. It is not derived from it, and yet when it 
'comes' it restores our true 'personal' destiny by healing the 'personal'. 
distortion, and puts an and to human history as the history of sinfulness, 
by restoring to us our history as the history of eternal communion with 
God. 
11. Revelation and Reason, p. 368-369 -- 
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This decisive 'coming' is'the incarnation. It is literally all- 
important for Brunner. 'Not-only is it the solution'to the 
epistemological problem, it is the, cource of our salvation. The 
incarnation is not just the historical expression of God's 'personalp 
being for us, it is rather the historical 'sine qua non' of our 
salvation. , Thus Brunner, must not be coen to be attempting to 
accommodate the 'historical' to the 'personal', for that would be a 
return to the rationalism which only explains away human sins the 
reverse , is true. For us tho 'historical' is prior. Our salvation 
depends upon the starkness and the seeming absurdity of this historical 
event. Faith in the cross and resurrection of Christ in the essence 
of faith. It is our only lifeline. Brunner says, "It is not merely 
thab apart from Easter we would not know anything about eternal life - 
as we now know it through Christ - but that for us there would be no 
eternal life at all. "1z 
Sin is our chosen heritage and damnation our self-imposod destiny. 
The autonomyW the human reason, the result of our calf love, creates 
arg illusory world in which we pose as creator. The fate of such a 
world is destruction. However, because Codes nature-is love, he has 
imparted himself in Jesus Christ so that in faith we may recognise 
ourselves as creatures in Cod's world. In the vary fact that he has 
imparted himself he has, given to me what I cannot give to myself. He 
has said that which I cannot say to myself. If revelation is that 
category which breaks our epistemological illusions, and illuminates 
the nature of sin, salvation is that reality which heals the rift and 
restores to us the relationship in which, and for which, we were created. 
In Christ, and in Christ alone, our heritage is faith and our destiny 
eternal life. 
12. The Mediator, p. 580 
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;, -thus, 
in spite-of E3runner's. teachingthat the incarnation 
represents the point of, fusion botween. human; epistemologyand the 
divine. ontology, paradoxically that relational point of fusion is 
preserved in its, saving reality , only; 
by an equally adamant insistence 
ppon a . radical-discontinuity.. between. humanity and 
God. In Brunner's 
theology there are three points at which this is stressed;;; the 
rational, the historical and the personal. I.,. 
First of all he emphasised the absolute distinction between a 
'rational' human concept of truth, and the 'irrational'. divine. act 
of truth in the incarnation. . 
"Truth, came into being! For one 
schooled in the Greek conception of truth this phrase. ip utterly 
perverse..,, - Truth, after all, is, precisely that which is timeless, 
the eternal whichIa not subject to change. For truth to come into 
being is a contradiction in, terme.., =But truth that has coma into 
being is the very core of the Biblical message.. Truth is something 
that happens, that, God does. "13 Earlier in The Mediator he has made 
much the some point even more dramatically. "This, however, implies 
quite clearly that the process cannot be either historical or natural. 
It lies beyond the sphere of all human-intellectual or natural-causal 
happenings. Thus in principle, it is an event which canno" t be 
perceived, that is, it is one which can be neither understood nor 
explained. It is a divine secret; it is absolutely unique and 
therefore cannot be compared with any other happening; hence it lies 
outside the sphere of the imagination. "14 
Moreover, we can see how this distinction operates in ©runner's 
analysis of the Logos doctrine. It comes as no surprise then that 
Brunner wants to re-emphasise the importance of this doctrine and the 
13. Truth as Encounter, p. 154 
14. IT; e Mediator, p. 316 
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doctrine-of the two-natures. He points to the situation where 18th 
and 19th century rationalista, were suspicious. of the Greek ideas of 
the 'Logos' and the 'divine nature $. They pointed to the discontinuity 
between Greek philosophical thought and the Hebraic tradition. In ;.; 
fact their rationalism-and their idealism were more closely attuned to 
this alien tradition than they realised. So closely were they. 
attuned in fact- that their°dependence could-not be broken merely by 
the seeming rejection of the Creek concepts. 
Paradoxically, they were'so dependent upon this idealist, tradition 
that they could-not see-that the-, Johannine 'Logos' and the doctrine of 
the-two-natures originated not so much in Greek philosophy, as. in the 
Hebraic idea of the God who invades human history to bring salvation. 
Brunner comments, "The irony of the situation is this: that those who 
are most-suspicious of the Johannine Logos - Christ as the product of 
'Greek speculation', are precisely those who, zbaaing 
their argument on 
the real Greek conception of the 'Logos', attack the N. T, idea of the 
'Logos'. ! 5 
The significance of the two-nature understanding of the person of 
Christ transcends the limitsýof Creek philosophical thought. , It 
asserts rather the impossibility of humanity attaining salvation on its 
own behalf. Salvation must come from God, from the other aide of the 
abyss of sin. "He himself stands on the other side of the frontier, 
beyond which only Cod Himself can stand. "16 This is basically the same 
as the proclamation of-Jesus as the 'Logos'. 
If the Creeks thought of the 'Logos' as the principle of immanent 
Reason lying in the human reason, the Christian and Biblical idea of 
the 'Logos''is much more that 'of a Personal'Act or Word of Cod in time 
15. The Mediator, p. 232-233 
16, ibid., p. 241 
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and history, which encounters human reason from beyond: ` It stands 
over against human reason; just as at Creation God'sýWor&stood'over 
against the world he created. 'Brunner concludes, "The fellowship of 
the*Creator with the creature through the Word of the creator, the'real, 
spoken Word, ' the'Word which is an actual temporal event: this is the 
revelation of which the Bible spoaks, and of which the religious 
philosophy of Idealism; whether, Greek or modern, does not speak. "17 
Welcan understand therefore that-while'Brunner seeks to emphasise 
the importance of these traditional doctrines, he believes that it is 
possible to do so only insofar as'they'underline the prior category of 
revelation. We cannot come to"an understanding of Jesus as the 
'Logos', or'Jesus as the Divine Person, through the purely rational 
categories of Greek philosophical thought. Brunner says, "Christ. 
confronts us all as the One who is Himself God. "18 - "Every attempt- 
to destroy this quality of His Being, which'is defined in the "Two- 
Natures" doctrine, weakens and finally completely destroys the 
scriptural belief in-revelation. " 19 %-" 
Secondly this disjunction can be seen in Brunner's understanding 
of the historical nature of the incarnation. The incarnation is an 
historical event in the sense that the Divine Person is revealed in 
the human nature of the man Jesus of Nazareth, who lived at a particular 
time in history. However, human reason cannot appropriate or grasp 
this event as historical. This is so for two reasons: first of all 
the unique and decisive cannot be comprehended in historical categories. 
History can only be the comparison of events that are classified in more 
or less general terms. The particular is comprehensible only in its 
17. ibid., p. 214 
18. ibid., p. 247 
19. ibid., p. 248 
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relation to these more or leas general categories. '"When we have 
discovered what history really is, ' we realise that wo cannot senk for 
the decisive within-history. History represents the common human 
-element in the form of uniqueness. But the relation between these 
two elements consists in a certain tension. The element of uniqueness 
limits the common human element, -and the common human element limits 
uniqueness . "Z° Only the eternal then can be decisive and unique. 
The second reason why human understanding cannot grasp the 
significance of this element in purely historical categories is 
because history merely reflects human failure to achieve an authentic 
and full 'personalnees'. The 'personal' remains mere potential in a 
nature created by God. "The Christian sees history as a whole 
separated from God ... he sees brooding over all that is historical 
the 'wrath of God'* 021 This means that the incarnation, while being 
an historical event, is not essentially historical. In fact the 
historical figure of the man Jesus 'is but © concealment of the Divine 
Person.. The uniqueness and the decisiveness' of Jesus then cannot be 
described in historical categories. His uniqueness is a divine, 
eternal, 'personal' reality. It depends upon thesternal nature or, 
the. revelation in him. - The incarnation therefore, is'nothing other 
than the self-movement of God. The 'sending' and-the 'Willingness 
tobe sent' cannot be described in historical categories. The, fact 
that Christ. was sent is not a movement within history, it is rather the 
entry of-the Eternal in to time. The incarnation is God's decisive' 
response to the human predicament. "The fact that the whole of 
eternity must be set in motion for-his sake shows the depth of man's need . 
Z2 " 
20, ibid., p. 304 
21, ibid., p. 312 
22. Ibid. ,. p . 312 
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,. The incarnation is bettor to be seen then as the Eternal 
breaking into history. It is in history, and at the same time it 
brings history to on end. This can be understood in two senses. 
First the incarnation marks a fulfilment of history. Brunner says, 
"All history seeks for that which takes place in Jesus Christ and is 
"here' . n23 Secondly, inasmuch as the incarnation bringe humanity 
salvation from sin, it puts an end to that history which reflects sin. 
The incarnation therefore is "an abrogation of history. "24 "Where 
this deep gulf is transcended, there is the end of history. "25 
Brunner concludes, "Whereas previously men lived simply within history, 
absolutely immersed in it, we have now, so to speak, raised our heads 
above history, and we can see the mist in which history is enveloped. 
We see the riddle of history, of historical existence, and we see the 
sin of history and of historical existence. We know Adam, the 'first 
Adam', because, and in so far as, we know the 'Second Ada<n'. "26 
fiere, however, Brunner is careful to stress that the incarnation 
in no sense means a denial of history. It is possible to diotinguiah 
between history which reflects human personality in its sinfulness, and 
history which reflects human nature in its potential for obedience. 
For this reason the incarnation as the revelation of Cod's self-movement 
towards men and women, prompts them to make the decision of faith, to 
take upon themselves the responsibility of human nature in their lives. 
"The revelation of Christ is therefore absolutely decisive, for in it 
the non-historical, the eternal, breaks through into time at one point, 
and in so doing makes it a place of decision. "27 "The revelation of 
23. ibid., p. 305 
24. ibid., p. 305 
25, ibid., p. 306 
26. ibid., p. 306-307 
27. ibid., p. 308 
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Christ lays a heavy burden. of-responsibility, with absolute seriousness, 
upon the actual moment of'history. "Z8 
Finally the same disjunction is to be observed in the context of 
the 'personal' itself. We have explained already how the incarnation 
is the 'personal' revelation of God. Yet the person of the human 
Jesus must not be confused with that revelation. This paradoxical 
assertion claims that it is impossible to ground revelation in an 
understanding of human personality. Human personality as it is 
provides us with no approach for understanding the divine personality. 
It provides access only to an understanding of human sin. The human 
personality of Jesus only reveals the 'incognito' of the Divine 
Person. Thus, ' just'as"the prophetic Word was not'grounded in human 
reason, so the divine 'personality' is not grounded'in the human. The 
saving reality is mediated rather through a disruption and discontinuity 
between the two in each case. - Brunner says, "For in the inmost depths 
of, personality there dwells not God, but sin. " "An 'historical 
personality' means a vessel for the redeeming power of God, but is 
not itself the redeeming content. If Christ is to be worshipped as 
divine, then certainly He is not, to'be worshipped as an"historical 
personality'. -29 
This, however is not to say that Jesus did not possess, so to 
speak, a human personality. Inasmuch as he was a human being he had 
a human personality. It is to say that Jesus' human personality did 
not provide access to, and was not the mediation of, his divine V, 
Personhood. "Personality ... is the human aspect of His Person which 
can be known by every good historian; it is the 'incognito' of His 
deity, which, on the contrary, cannot be known by the good historian, 
but can-only be known by those to whom it"is 'given'. 1130 
28. ibid., p. 307 
29. ibid., p. 265 
30. ibid., p. 266 
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Paradoxically, though, the revelation that takes place through 
the human personality-of Jesus is the revelation of the divine Person. 
Concealed by the human personality-of the man Jesus is the revelation 
of the Divine Person. -This 
is so because revelation is not just the 
revelation of an 'idea' ar even a 'word'. It is because the essence 
of revelation is its 'personal' nature. Thus Brunner says, "If Jesus 
Christ Is the Revealer, in the Christian sense of the word, if He is 
the Word from 'yonder', then He Is the Revealer, the Word, not as the 
bearer of an Idea, but as a Person; not as a 'personality' in the 
historical sense, but as the authority, as the most intensely personal 
Word of God. "31 
By this means, therefore, we arrive at. the situation where the 
human personality of Jesus is accessible -to. scientific and historical 
investigation. Human reason can arrive at knowledge of the life of 
the human person known as Jesus of Nazareth. But reason cannot go 
beyond this. For concealed in this. historical personality, hidden from 
the. eyes of this human reasong'there is also the Divine Person. This 
ro. velation takes place personally in the 'I-Thou' dimension. It takes 
place precisely in its hiddenness from the rational 'I-it' objectivity. 
Thus the paradox of the two natures, the divine and human person, in 
one man, can be explained in terms of what we formerly described as the 
mystery of the 'personal' revelation. 
Brunner concludes, "The meaning of 'Person' in this respect cannot 
be, understood from a general conception of persons or of personality, 
but only through faith. For faith alone knows the meaning of the 
mystery of the Person, or the authority of the Revealer. Here alone 
does the word 'Person' attain its full meaning. For here 'Pelson' means 
simply the divine personality, the personal God. The personal God is 
31. ibid., p. 267 
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He who is only recognised in the personal revelation, the Cod who is 
known, because He makes known His Proper Name, His Mystery, nothing 
that forms part of any 'conception of God' - the God to whom our only 
attitude can be one of faith and trusts 
02. 
Brunner resolves this puzzling contrast between human and divine 
'person', by making a distinction between human personality and human 
nature. If human personality is essentially distorted by sin, human 
nature is not so distorted, because it reflects the good purpose of 
the creator. "The Christian doctrine has laid equal stress on the 
fact that although Jesus Christ assumed human nature, He did not 
assume human personality. "33 Our personality, than, is-a mask. It 
is not our true natura, in the sense of our original natura, our 
nature as God intended it to be. This distorted personality is what 
we really are. But it is not our true nature. ' Brunner explains, 
"The secret of our personality is that, having been created by God in 
His image, in His Word,, we have fallen away from God, from His Word. 
This is our 'eccentricity'; it is this which constitutes our present 
historical reality and at the same time our mask. "34 
So it is that Jesus assumes our human nature, the original image 
of man before the fall. His personality is unique in the sense that 
in that personality he realises a potentiality in humanity as yet 
unrealised. In this sense Jesus can offer himself as saviour. He 
took on human nature but he did not descend into the abyss of sin'. 
Had he done so, he would not have been able to be the Mediator, and 
offer himself as the bridge of human salvation. 
32. ibid., p. 267-268 
33. ibid., p. 317 
34, ibid., p. 319 
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He did, however, enter the abyss of the human situation in the , 
sense that he entered our predicament and condition inAhe fall. He. 
experienced the temptation which resulted. Yot, -as Brunner nays, he 
did not make the gulf wider by assuming sinful personality. It was 
because he avoided sin and the fall that he is able to offer humanity 
the prospect of salvation out of the abyss. , 
At this point wo can see a little more clearly Brunnor's 
paradhxical claims about the personality of Janus not providing us with 
access to the Divine Person. It is not so much Jesus who wears a 
mask which hidos his divinity. It is rather we who wear the masks, 
and thus cannot sea that the personality of Jesus is a reflection of 
his Divine Personhood. Wo filter our understanding of his personality 
through our, own einful personality. We see it through the distorted 
image created by our own mask. Only revelation and faith then can, 
remove the mask which we wear. Brunner says, "Christ also has to wear 
1135 a mask. It corresponds to our sin. " "He removes our mask in faith. 
In this sense Jesus does not take on human personality. He 
wears a mask, not in himself, but in the eyes of human beings who only 
see distorted images. Only Jesus can remove this mask, and correct 
the distortion of image. Only once this is removed, and the 
correction made, can we see the extent of the distortion in our personality. 
We see that we are no longer the centre of the world surrounding us, 
but see ourselves in a creaturely relationship with God who made us. 
Through faith, therefore, we-see in Josua, in a human nature, lhe 
revelation of the Divine Person. Only He, true man and true God, can 
show us, the distortion which runs- right through our human personality, 
and at the samo time restore to us the potentiality of our truly human 
nature. 
35. ibid., p. 346 
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Finally then the reason for'Brunner's insistence upon the 'alien' 
nature of the incarnation becomes comprehensible. Yet even now it is 
not yet clear whether or not this emphasis supports and justifies, or 
undermines and threatens the epistemological basis which he has 
expounded. On the one hand he has offered us a new dimension of 
'personal' knowledge which finds its realisation in the incarnation. 
He has offered us an explanation of salvation as faith in Christ. 
Here is brought together a traditional Christian confession, with a 
radically different epistemological basis. Salvation is no longer a 
religious doctrine or idea. It is a living, eternal, personal 
relationship. 
Yet on ttio other hand he denies humanity any ground for understanding 
the truth of the Christian message. The words which he uses to convey 
that message, the terms 'personal' and 'historical', must be understood 
in a way that is quite distinctive from the way in which they are' 
normally used. The historical does not refer to our ordinary human 
comparison of evcnts, but to the invasion of history by the eternal. 
The personal does not refer to ordinary human personality, but to the 
D1vine Person of Christ. Thus, if we carry this emphasis upon 
discontinuity to its logical conclusion, it would seem that the basis 
of ©runner's epistemology is not,. so much the conjunction of the 
'personal' and the 'historical'p but rather the same groundless 
revelation which we discover in Barth, 
Thus the next etaga of this enquiry and exposition will be to 
listen to Brunner's explanation of the traditional doctrines of the 
Person and Work of Christ in order to see whether this dilemma can bo 
resolved. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERSON AND THE WORK OF CHRIST 
Up to this point two basic insights have come, to the surface in 
this study of, Brunner'a thsology... One is a complex network of ideas. 
with the notion of the 'personal' revelation of God at its centre. 
The other is a critical question which is raised with increasing 
persistence concerning the meaning Brunner attaches to the terms 
'historical' and 'personal'. 
He offers the incarnation as the historical expression of the 
'personal' being of God. It is this 'personal' nature of God, 
expressed historically, which actually allows human 'personal' being 
not only to relate to God in faith, but actually to achieve authentic 
'personal' existence. In this way human, knowing itself,, us an 
expression of our. 'personal', being, is at the same time only truly 
realised in the relation of faith. Faith and knowledge are both gifts 
of the 'personal' historical encounter in the incarnation. The 
'personal' is that dimension which allows us to see that faith can 
not only be understood on the basis of a legitimate human epistemology 
but also expresses in a relational way the divine ontology itself. 
At'the same time the'question has been raised as to whether the 
category of the 'personal' really does enable us to understand the so- 
called 'personal' being of God, for the 'personal' encounter of which 
Brunner speaks is'an 'alien' encounter. It is an invasion of the 
human by the divine. Moreover it is-necessarily an 'alien' reality 
because human beings have rendered Invalid their original point of 
contact with God. In this way-it seems that Brunner might be charged 
with using the 'personal' to describe two fundamentally different, and 
diametrically opposed, realities; the human''personality' with its 
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basic distortion, and the 'personal' being of God. The purpose 
therefore of the next three chapters is to describe Brunner's 
exposition of the person and work of Christ in order to provide a 
more detailed description of his understanding of the Christian 
message of salvation, and to see how far-this question can be answered. 
From the earliest period of his writing Brunner is emphatic that 
it is not possible to separate the person from the work of Christ. 
He says in The Mediator, "While we lay so much stress on the fact 
that the Person of the Mediator is in itself the revelation, at the 
same time we do not wish to suggest that we either ignore the 'Work' 
of the Mediator or even relegate it to a subordinate position. "1 
The truth of the matter is that the revelation"of the 'personal' Being 
of God in the incarnation is at the same time the decisive act of the 
Mediator - the lifeline flung across the abyss of sin created by men 
and women. God's 'personal' Beingis his 'saving' being made known 
to us in the Mediator. " Thus the Mediator and the incarnation, express 
the same truth from two different perspectives. We recognise and lay 
hold on oür salvation through the Mediator, while Cod expresses his 
saving 'personal' being for us in the incarnation. The Mediator is 
the event which provides us with our epistemological access to the 
divine ontology, and it is the category of the 'personal' which allows 
us to comprehend God's nature and purpose. In this sense only in the 
drama of-the events of salvation, the incarnation, cross and 
resurrection of the Mediator, can men and women claim knowledge of 
the-metaphysical truth. By contrast, metaphysics, as a human study, 
provides only an illusory concept which only furnishes an understanding 
of salvation which is completely mythological. Brunner says, "The 
Eternal Truth bound up with an accidental fact of history ... This the 
1. The Mediator, p. 407 
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Mediator is in His Person, because in His Person wo meet the personal 
God. There is no other possibility of coming into contact with God ... 
For the meeting must be real and personal; -otherwise we remain by 
ourselves, carrying on a monologue with ourselves, with our own ideas. 
But God can be met only there where God personally and really comes 
towards us Himself. This is the Mediator. "2 Thus the fusion of the 
person and the work is-an expression of that 'personal' reality which 
we spoke of earlier as being the coming together of the divine ontology 
with a human epistemology. It is therefore the category of the 'personal' 
which acts as 6runner'e guiding principle in his analysis both of the 
person and of the work. 
Nevertheless he does believe that it is possible to criticise his 
Chrietology in The Mediator as being too much centred on the being of 
Christ, and thus of deriving the 'personal' work from the 'personal' 
being. In this sense he acknowledges the charge of docetism levelled 
at his early theology to be a legitimate one. In Truth as Encounter 
he says, "I must correct at this point certain emphases in my own book 
The Mediator. "3 lie explains, '"'It gave the Christian faith a false 
orientation about the being instead of the work of Christ. "4 Thus the 
reproach of 'docetism',, "that the divine-human character of the 
historical does not, receive full treatment. "5 is recognised by Brunner. 
In Dogmatics vol. 2 he identifies his error in terms of his method of 
analysis. Whereas previously he has moved to deduce the-work of Christ 
from the 'personal' being of God in the incarnation, now he seeks to adopt 
an inductive epistemology. "We are going to use an inductive, and not 
- as is usual -a deductive method. "6 
2. ibid., p. 406-7 
3. Truth as Encounter, p. 155 
4, ibd., p. 156 
5. The Theology of Emil Brunner ed. Kegley, p. 344 
6. D 
, 
mq a cs Vol. 2, P. 271 
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Here it can be seen that he is'applying the"principle which he 
believed constituted the fundamental difference between his understanding 
of revelation and that of Barth. There he spoke of 'general' 
revelation as providing the basis for 'special' revelation, without 
seeking to deduce the revelation in Christ from that 'general' 
revelation. He made this possible for himself by distinguishing 
between the 'ratio cognoscendi' and the 'ratio essendi'. It is by 
means of the 'special' revelation in Christ that we have knowledge of 
the more fundamental, and prior. ontological basis ofýour: relation with 
Cod. Thus the'cross and the resurrection constitute the 'ratio 
cognoacendi' not only of our salvation, but also, by dint of their 
salvific nature, of our original existence, ' now distorted, in relation 
with God. Thus we have rational access indeed to the ontology of the 
original being of humanity, but only through the knowledge which 
salvation itself brings. ' 
Now if this constitutes the logic of human knowledge of the 
relationship between creation and redemption, it must necessarily 
describe the logic of an understanding of the relationship between the 
'person' and 'work' of Christ. Thus it is the saving event of the 
t. a. 
i 
cross and resurrection which is the 'ratio cognoscendi' which alone 
provides knowledge of the actual being of Christ. This, in, reality, 
is an expression of the Triune Being of God. From our human perspective 
the prior self-movement of God, which initiated the incarnation, can 
only be comprehended in the light of our actual apprehension of the 
saving act. We quote this section from Brunner in full: 
"Jesus Christ is the ratio'cognoscendi, the foundation of all 
Christian truth. But Jesus, Christ,, the Incarnate Word, is not the 
ratio essendi, the basis of all existence. To maintain this would 
be to turn the Incarnation into an eternal truth, and this would 
destroy its historicity. The fact that the Son of God became Man 
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does, not stand at the beginning of all things;, but Christie the 
centre of history; He is the One who divides history into two parts: 
ante and post Christum um. The Incarnation and the Incarnate 
Son of God was, it is true, determined by God from all eternity, but 
it only became a reality in the fullness of time. If, from the 
point of view of knowledge, Jesus Christ comes first, and all'that we 
can say about God is secondary, yet actually God, the Three in One 
comes first, and the Incarnate Son, Jesus Christ, comes second. When 
this distinction between the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio easendi 
7 is misunderstood, it necessarily leads to speculation and fantasy. " 
_Brunner 
is insistent therefore that it is important to begin an 
exposition of Christology with the saving work of Christ. Yet in 
beginning with that recognition it is only possible to grasp its 
reality because it is the act of the divine Person. The act 
characterises the Person and the Person is expressed in the act. 
The expression is so much a part of the being that the two are quite 
inseparable. Once again the essential factor which is implicit in 
this whole pattern of thought, and that which makes possible the 
transition from human knowledge to authentic human being in. relation 
with God, is Brunner's understanding of knowledge_as 'encounter', as 
the 'personal$ act of God. It is because this knowledge, which we 
are vouchsafed, is'the 'personal' self-communication that we are 
actually put into contact with God,. whose ultimate being is his saving 
'personal' being for us. Here is an understanding of the true nature 
of Christ which transcends the traditional metaphysical categories 
which have sought in vain to explain Christ's person. Brunner insists, 
"This, method of approach,. from the work to the Person, as the right way 
to reach the truth of the Person of Jesus, is supported by the fact that 
the titles given to Jesus in the N. T., which are distinctive, are 
'verbal' and not 'substantive' in character; they all describe an 
7. ibid., P. 239 
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event, a work of. God, whiChlie does. thrauQh Jesus-, in or for humanity. 
Who and! whatýJesus is can only be stated, at first at any rate, by what 
God. d and , gives in ; 
Him. "ß 
It is interesting to note in passing that Brunner pro-empts much 
of our contemporary discussion about whether Christology should begin 
'from above' or 'from below!.,,. His response«to. this dilemma would 
be to-insist that we must, -begin-from both places at once. , It must 
begin.! from below'. in the. sense that the 'ratio coynoscendi' of the 
saving act of the, Mediator provides-the only acceas-to human knowledge 
of Christ's person. "Atrthe same time it must begin 'from above' in 
the sense that the 'ratio cognoscendi' provides knowledge of the divine 
being who is the true source and initiator of our salvation. He 
t 
sees that to begin from either end exclusively would be to risk losing 
the other dimension, and this would be absolutely fatal to a proclamation 
of the Christian gospel. 
This brief analysis, then, "is important for th"ge reasons. -First 
of all it is. poasible to see that Brunner's understanding of the 
dynamic between, the person and the work of Christ is actually-controlled 
by hic concept of, the 'personal': In this way he removes some of the 
traditional difficulties theologians have encountered by seeking to 
reconcile the two natures in one Person by means of the categories of 
Creek metaphysics. Moreover there is in this concept the potential 
to overcome the traditional stalemate between the subjective and objective 
theories of the atonement. 
- Secondly, and perhaps most important, his shift of emphasis in the 
Dogm atica 4s , yet another move in the direction . of , founding a modern 
t,. 'P fý mot' 1i + 
8. . 
ibid., p. 271-2 
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Christian theology on an actual epistemology of salvation. Here is 
an'}invitation'to begin with the apprehension of the saving act and 
event of Jesus Christ, rather than with a category of revelation, 
which in the end is"scarcely distinguishable from a metaphysical 
ontology. 
Yet, on the other hand, while this shift is important in the 
potential it holds for Christian theology, it is interesting to note 
that it is not clear how significant a shift it is. After all the 
emphasis in the Dogmatics is not really a fundamental change of position. 
It is rather a more systematic working out of what is already inherent 
in The Mediator. 
The stress on the priority of the work of the Mediator for our 
human approach to the Personal Being of Cod, does not answer the 
question, raised at the beginning of the chapter, as to whether the 
category of the 'personal' really does successfully restore the 
epistemological bridge between humanity and Cod, or whether it remains 
the 'alien' ontology of a 'wholly other' revelation. It may be that 
Brunner's stress on the significance of this shift, which he sees as 
overcoming a latent docetism, only actually marks a more fundamental 
docetism. 
While the basis of Brunner's understanding of the relationship 
between the pereon and the work of Jesus in both The Mediator and 
Dogmatics is derived from his understanding of the 'personal' nature 
of the incarnation, in Dogmatics, where the emphasis is more on the 
work of Christ, that emphasis only focuses more sharply on the 'accidental' 
and the 'alien' nature of the incarnation, upon the way it transcends 
human conceptual categories. In this sense it raises the question of 
whether the category of the 'personal' really does offer an epistemology 
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of the event, or whether what, Is being spoken of is a 'personal' 
event which is only comprehensible from the perspective of a totally 
'alien' ontology. If this latter is the case, then Brunner's shift 
of emphasis, far from overcoming the charge of docetism, makes the 
question of whether his Christology really is docetiq, all the more 
problematical. 
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.. CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE WORK OF CHRIST 
ý, 5 
On account of. the shift. ofemphasis described in the previous 
chapter I shall begin my exposition, and analysis, 9f. Brunner's 
Christology with the work of Christ. Even so I shall continue to 
use material from his earlier book, The Mediator.. His statement, 
recorded above, that the Biblical titles of Jesus are 'verbal' rather 
than 'substantive'-leads him to describe the work of Jesus under the 
three headings of prophet, priest and king. His work as prophet is 
to pronounce the Word and the will of God. He apolla out the 
judgement of God upon. Israel. It is in this context that we are to 
. understand his proclamation of the Kingdom of God.. . However, merely 
to describe the work of Jesus in prophetic terms is not satisfactory. 
Jesus did not merely-summon . 
his. contemporaries to take heed of his 
teachings and to beware of his warnings. The proclamation is 
intimately connected with his person. "But Jesus did not merely 
proclaim this coming Kingdom of God, at the same time He inaugurated 
this new age and represented it in His own Person. "1 Jesus is not, 
just the new Moses who came to bring the new Law. He embodies both 
the law and the Kingdom in his own person. Thus the prophetic work 
of Jesus itself points to his being more than a prophet. Brunner makes 
this point clearly. "Nov He was not a prophet. He never claimed, as 
they did, that His authority was derived from a Divine Call ... He 
says quite plainly that He is not a Prophet, that the time of thb 
prophets is past, that here is One who is 'more than a prophet '. "2 
Turning to the priestly work, ideas are to be found here that are 
already familiar from Brunner's exposition of The Mediator. This is 
1. Dogmatics, vol. 2 p. 298-299 
2. -ibiid, ýp. 275 
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where he explains his understanding of-the atonement. The N. T. 
describes Jesua' work in terms of the Servant and the High Priest. 
But, here again, as the Epistle to the Hebrews explains, Jesus' -_ 
priestly work transcends that of the high priest in the Jerusalem 
cultus. He does not merely perform the sacrificial ceremony for the 
atonement of the sins of his people. Fie, who is more than a prophet 
and more than a priest, offers himself as a sacrifice for human sin. 
He pays the penalty, like the servant in Isaiah 53. Brunner explains 
that it is the 'personal' encounter in the event of the cross which 
effects the 'objective' removal of human sin. Sin is the obstacle 
which 'must' be removed, but which men and women are incapable of 
removing. In the 'personal' role of the priest Jesus restores a 
truly 'personal' relationship to men and women with the divine Person. 
Thus this is no theory of atonement such as can be found in St. Anselm. 
Only this 'personal encounter' can effectively deal with the ob, tacle 
of human sin.: 
Finally Brunner deals with Jesus' royal work. This is the work 
of redemption. If the work of the High Priest atones for human sin, 
then the royal work inaugurates the eschatalogical reality of the new 
age. Here the lordship of Jesus is proclaimed. Jesus is lord of 
history and lord of creation. Fie is king, and yet more than king. 
He is to be seen as the only true Lord. All other rulers and lords 
are pseudo-rulers. While this reality, because of sin, is not yet, 
and while there is still real conflict to come, because of the atonement 
we know already that "Easter is the guarantee of final victory. " 
3 
Jesus is Lord of a "potential, prospective dominion, "4 prefigured in 
the Church. His lordship is lordship of the new age, when the sight, 
3. ibid., p. 305 
4. -ibid., p. 301 
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the hearts end the-wille of men and women have all been healed by the 
divine initiative revealed in the incarnation. This is the final 
synthesis between revelation and salvation', and between the person and 
the work of Christ. ' 
F 
The work of Jesus therefore is a combination of three things; the 
verbal, the 'personal' and the historical. First of all it is verbal 
rather than substantive. It is active. It transforms. It is not 
so much abstract and logical. Secondly it is 'pereonal't rather than 
objective. Those three offices mediate the 'personal' role of Jesus, 
and in this way the 'personal encounter'. And finally it is 
historical rather than essential. This role which is at once prophetic, 
priestly and kingly actually occurs in history in the. teaching, the 
cross and the resurrection of Jesus. 
'From all this it can be seen'that Brunner is not really interested 
in offering a new theory concerning the atoning work of Jesus. He' 
seeks to transcend'the traditional impasse concerning the subjective 
and objective theories of the atonement'. Moreover it is his 
understanding of salvation as a 'personal encounter' which enables him 
to do this. Brunner says, "The N. T. message of the Cross is indeed 
no'la priori' deduction, but in 'a posteriori' interpretation. This 
'must' cannot be proved logically', it can only be believed. It is not 
an objective fact 'in itself', but; it is a fact which includes 'faith, 
Looking beck, the believer knows that there was no other way for him, 
in order to attain the renewal of fellowship with God. On the basis 
of the fact of the Cross, 'and only thus, we'may say'that7the wrath of 
God is not an objective reality, but 'subjective-objective', a reality 
of 'encounter' ... but it is something real, -which can only. be removed 
by the real event of the death of Christ on the cross, and by faith in Him. "' 
5. ibid., p. 296-7 
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Brunner's position, as I have already expounded it, contains 
latent criticisms of both the subjective and objective -theories that 
can be clearly-spelled out. , The objective theory, as its label 
clearly implies, reduces both God and Christ to objects. The 'inter- 
personal dimension, which mediates true knowledge for Brunner, is 
excluded from the outset in the-objective theory. It-is a theoretical 
idea which has its reality purely in the subject-object-mode of human 
conceptualisation. With regard to Anselam's theory Brunner explains, 
"God Is the Object of the Atonement - it is God who is reconciled. "6 
Christ, too, is an object, for he is the means to this end. lie is 
the "instrument of the reconciliation. "? With regard to the 
subjective theory Brunner's criticism is essentially the same. Both 
theories fail for the same reason. If the objective theory is 
based on the 'idea' of God's being reconciled, so the subjective 
theory is based on the 'idea' of God's love. Through the experience 
of human love we conceptualise the love of God. The essential nature 
of love is reconciliation. Thus in Jesus we see not only the highest 
demonstration of human love, but because it is a demonstration of love, 
it illuminates the forgiving love of God. Atonement, therefore, 
according to the subjective theory, consists of a 'forgetting' of past 
sine in the light of God's love. Sin is an expression of guilt which 
arises out. of a misunderstanding of the true relationship with Cod 
which is characterised by his love, and which can never contemplate 
separation. -.. -It is men and women, -who separate themselves,, from God, ' 
not God who rejects them. The subjective theory of the atonement, 
therefore, is based on the idea that "God will forgive, because 
forgiveness is his business. "a- 
6. Dogmatics vol. 29 p. 290 
7 he ed story p. 409 
8, d., c p. 447 
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For. Brunner. both these theories illustrate the problem in 
addressing the question, of: atonement. In making salyation a theory, 
we merely project, not the. reality. ofýealvation, but. the, actual ,- 
obstacle 1n. the way-of, it., He explains, "-.. a all. these'views are 
not solutions, for they all, amount to thiss, that-guilt is. glossed 
over, and. this breeds a, still greater.. guilt. "9 Only the 'personal' 
address of God in the incarnation of the Mediator can transcend the 
merely conceptual nature of salvation in both these theories. 
The understanding. of, salvation therefore in the trpditional 
theories of atonement, is based, upon , an idea of, God.,,,,,, In the one 
it 
is an idea of Cod who is-reconciled; in the , other 
it is-an idea of 
God who reconciles, Infect both these . ideas, of God who ýbringa 
salvation are not rooted, in God himself, but rather in human. guilt. 
Now human-guilt,., the. sense of sin, is not just a subjective feeling. 
Human sin, as we have seen, not only changes our attitude to God, 
it changes God's attitude to us. This is of the essence of a 
personal relationship. Brunner says, "Since our attitude towards 
God has been perverted, God's attitude to us has also been changed. "10 
. 
Brunner's point is that sin is not an idea. --It 
is a fact. 
Therefore only a. fact. can deal with it. Moreover this is where the 
signifipance of Brunner's understanding of the. 'personal' can be truly 
understood;, for it is. only at the, level of the 'personal' address of 
God: to men and women, that as human beings we can move from the level 
of ideas to facts. - -Sin Is a 'fact' because it, is a distortion. of 
-this. Ipersonal'. relationship, which should be characterised by a 
response of faith. Only a 'fact' in this 'personal' sense therefore 
can remedy the situation. Brunner says, "The separation can only be 
9. - Dogmatics vol. 2, p. 291 
10. The Mediator, p. 443 
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removed by'God, and`it must be removed, if there is to be a 
restoration of fellowship between man and God. But this can only 
happen if God actually removes that which constitutes the separation. 
This removal must be as real an act as the reality of guilt. An 
act of restoration must'take place, if there is to be a real 
restoration, and this must be God's doing. "" 
Thus a true understanding of atonement must have two 
characteristics. It must be 'relational' in that it heals the 
breach in the 'personal' relationship. At the same time it must 
also come to men and women from outside themselves because they 
have successfully insulated themselves from God. In this sense 
it must be an 'encounter'. Thus only an understanding of atonement 
which speaks of it as being both 'personal' and an 'encounter' can 
mediate the saving reality. 
However, while Brunner rejects both the subjective and objective 
theories as theories, his sympathies are much closer to the objective 
than the subjective theory. The subjective explanation is a product 
of 19th century rationalism in its modern form. It is the optimistic 
mood, characteristic of theology produced in the recent climate, which 
Brunner seeks to reject totally. As has already been stressed he 
does not accept the answer of ethical rationalism to the problem of 
epistemology. As a result he does not believe that it can mediate 
either-knowledge of God or knowledge of human sin. This makes its 
belief in moral progress and the moral development of man completely 
without foundation. 
With the objective theory Brunner rejects the emphasis upon God 
as the object of reconciliation. Yet he sees in Anselm, in the 
11. Dogmatics, Vol. 2, p. 291 
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question he-asks concerning the necessity of the incarnation,. an 
attempt-to come to terms with the reality and the costliness of 
human sin. Thus he endorses Anselm's insight which lies beyond 
and behind his own theory, that no theory of the atonement has been 
or is able to contemplate the great weight of sin. It is only 
this 'objective' dimension which can reflect both the reality and 
the essential mystery of sin. " This, is why Brunner says, "Because, 
forgiveness is His free gift we are forced to depend upon it as a 
contingent, absolutely 'given' objective fact. "12 
Brunner's general criticism of both theories of the atonement, 
and his desire to preserve the insight of the satisfaction theory 
concerning the 'weight' of sin makes it possible to see why he wants 
to re-evaluate the ancient penal and sacrificial theories. Here, 
at least, the pain and cost of sin are stressed. The significance 
of these theories has been challenged on the basis of a moral 
argument. The objection is that the concept of God which these 
theories presuppose is an offence to the human moral consciousness, 
and thus to the God who is-lard of that consciousness. The objection 
is framed, along these lines; it is inconceivable that the unjust 
punishment of a just man can be held to transform an unjust humanity 
in away that is so manifestly unjust. The concept of justice is 
thus totally affronted. 
Brunner, however, challenges this argument which has received a 
large measure of acceptance. It is an argument which itself is 
rooted in 18th and 19th century rationalism. It is based on the 
presupposition that the human moral consciousness exists in an 
unbroken relationship with God. Yet Brunner's attack on such a 
principle has already been stressed and underlined. 
12. The Mediator, p. 459 
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-Moreover it has been on the basis of this attack that'his 
understanding of revelation itself can be grasped. Thus Brunner 
sees that once we"presuppose a disruption in the relationship 
botween humanity and God then the moral objections to the penal 
and sacrificial theories cannot be sustained. They are rooted, 
not in the moral reality of God, but in the God who is the moral 
projection of human sin. This is the irony of the situation then: 
that the so-called moral objections to these theories are grounded 
in the sinful distortion itself, and can offer humanity no hope, 
while the theories themselves, in spite of the fact that they have 
been morally condemned, highlight the seriousness of the moral 
predicament of humanity, and point to its unique 'historical' and 
'personal' solution. It turns out therefore that the theories which 
are condemned show greater moral insight than the moral objections 
which condemn them. In the light of this, it is not surprising to 
find Brunner expounding them at length. 
In describing his interpretation of these theoriesýit is 
imperative tö, explain first of all the centrality be ascribes to the 
cross, 'It is as if behind his whole understanding of'sotierology 
he is mindfulYof Paul's words, "lest the cross be emptied, of its 
significance. "13 For Brunner the failure of idealism has been the 
failure to take Paul's words seriously. Idealism has attempted to 
proclaim a Christian gospel without the cross as its central pivot. 
The centre of the idealist gospel is the message of human love. The 
cross reveals that love at its highest point. Brunner explains this, 
"The Cross'is thus the supreme proof of Christ's fidelity to God 1114 
His death'ia a sublime and noble martyrdom. "15 The cross is the 
symbol of the potential in human love. It provides a view of the 
13. I. Cor. 1: 17 
14. ibid., p. 438 
15, ibid., p. 439 
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heights to which human devotion may aspire. The idea of the folly 
of the cross has been finally abandoned. But, in abandoning what 
Paul calls "the foolishness of God" idealism has replaced it. by the 
folly of humanity. In place of God's wisdom we have human wisdom. 
At this point the gospel of idealism reveals itself for what it is. 
The good news of salvation; proclaimed in the cross, has become the 
desperate news concerning humanity and its need for salvation. 
"Thinkers of this type have no idea that this fact. represents an, 
actual objective transaction, In which God actually does something, 
and something which is absolutely necessary.! 
16 ' 
There is no doubt therefore in Brunner's mind that the cross and 
idealism are quite incompatible. "It is the Cross, more than 
anything else, which differentiates scriptural revelation from all 
other forms of religion, and from Idealism of every kind. "17 This 
means that the cross actually constitutes Christian revelation. 
And it is a double revelation; a revelation of holiness and mercy, 
of judgement and forgiveness. , Nor are these aspects of God's 
nature revealed separately. , They are revealed as being essentially 
integrated. -One reason for the failure of idealism lay in its stress 
only on the mercy and love of God revealed in Christ. In one sense 
it was quite proper"to see the revelation of God's mercy'as being the 
supreme significance of the cross, but in another sense, by stressing 
that single truth, it distorted and obscured its other central 
significance. It meant that the centre of idealist theology could no 
longer be the actual event and happening of the cross. It had 
removed the actual judgement of human sin, and had thus been reduced 
to a more human concept of mercy and-forgiveness. - 
The cross therefore is the revelation of God's holiness. The 
16. ibid., p. 439 17. ibid., p. 437 
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law is not suspended or superseded. On the cross we witness the 
fulfilment of the law. -It is an ex pression'of. God'a good purpose. 
This means that if the cross upholds the law, it reveals at the 
same time the reality of the divine judgement upon humanity. - It 
manifests the reality of God's wrath. Brunnor says, "If the Law 
lays down the conditions on which ... salvation can be attained, 
we can only expect ruin ... Divine punishment also issues, 
necessarily, not, indeed, as a penalty which is deliberately intended 
for us but simply and solely as the fulfilment of the Will of God. "lU 
The cross shows us therefore, contrary to what the idealists believe, 
that God's relationship with men and women does not remain the some. 
The myth of idealism is to imagine that a grave breach in a 
relationship does not actually change it. The divine love has 
r 
become the divine wrath seen through the eyes of our rebellion. The 
cross shows that something has to be set right, and this correction 
is impossible without the pain of judgement. 
However, it is this idea of setting right a relationship-which 
provides understanding of Brunner's attempt to integrate the idea 
of the holiness of God with his mercy: for judgement and wrath are 
ultimately expressions of a merciful purpose. Thus the cross is not 
only a mark of God's judgement but the revelation of God's mercy. 
The law, then, is not ultimately an impersonal and mechanical reality, 
which, on account of its own necessity, judges and condemns men and 
women. The law only expresses the saving purpose implicit in the 
divine 'personal' being for us. In this sense the 'person' of the 
lawgiver transcends the law. Thus tho crops may be said to reveal 
that the mercy, of God is a more ultimate expression of God's person 
than his law, -" In fact it is the-'personalness' of the lawgiver 
18. ibid., p. 464 
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from which the-low derives its meaning and power. -Brunner says, 
"The Law is only understood in its-superiority to the world where 
it is not itself the final-court of appeal, but where it-is 
regarded as the expression of the will of the'Lawgiver, of the 
personal God. "19 
Once again it is clear that it is the concept of the 'personal' 
which is the controlling factor in Brunner's understanding of the 
cross, for the event of the cross is nothing other than the healing 
of a broken relationship. In this way the concept of the 'personal' 
allows the ideas of holiness and mercy, of judgement and forgiveness, 
to be integrated. The cross shows us the distortion in our relation 
with God by judging our rebellion, but at the same time it heals that 
breach by forgiving our sin. The judgement is thus designed to 
achieve the forgiveness. In the cross, therefore, sin and 
salvation are seen in a double light. They are essentiallyt'personal' 
and thus 'mysterious'., At the same time they stand over against 
humanity in their stark reality. The fact that human sin cannot be 
ignored is a mark of the 'personal' integrity of God's love. 
Brunner believes that a re-evaluation of the penal theory leads 
back in the direction that will enable appreciation of this insight. 
What it stresses is the objective reality of human sin, and the 
inadmissibility of proclaiming a gospel without its removal in 
actual fact. Moreover it also sees that the depth )f human sin is 
such that this removal cannot be accomplished by men and women. 
Brunner says, "A debt must be paid. Man cannot pay. "20 
However he admits that the problem with this theory of the 
atonement is that it makea'God the object of reconciliation, rather 
19. ibid., p. 459 
20. ibid., p. 471 
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than the subject who reconciles. This is a problem, however, 
created not so much because of errors in the theology, but rather 
the result-of our modern awareness of the epistemological problem. 
Formerly it was believed. that human reason provided direct access 
from the subjective conceptualisation of reality to the objective 
reality' itself. God's necessary existence could be deduced from 
the human conceptualisation of God. Thus, given the 'objective 
reality of sin, God is necessarily the object of the task of 
reconciliation. God must be reconciled in the face of sin. Now 
this is an impossible task for men and women because of their sin. 
Only Cod therefore, can pay the price which humanity needs to pay. 
Thus it is that the God-Man in Jesus Christ pays the price on the 
cross, and creates, as a result, a new and permanent relationship 
between God and humanity. 
Brunner agrees that the Enlightenment was right to criticise 
the epistemology of such"a theology, but the response of ethical 
rationalism was wrong in trying to re-build theology on the basis 
of a moral reason. There can be no understanding of the objective 
reality of God via the subjective conceptualisation. This is 
certainly the mistake of the penal theory. Cod has become merely 
an object to be reconciled in the subjective imagination. On the 
other hand, Kant's attempt to move, admittedly with much greater 
caution, from the prison of human conceptualisation to the objective 
reality of the universal law, and to postulate the existence of God 
on the basis of practical reason is a failure also, because the moral 
demand itself cannot transcend the conceptual prison. Only the 'personal' 
inter-subjective 'I-Thou' category-where God reveals himself to men 
and women`as the divine'subjective 'Thou' - can do this. It is this 
inter-subjective' relationship which mediates the objectivity of human 
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sin, and discloses the 'personal' mystery of, God's saving purpose. 
Thus Brunner claims that, valuable and profound though the 
epistemological insight. of the Enlightenment was, not only was the 
Enlightenment unable to transcend the problem which it had not, but 
that, insight blinded many theologians of the 18th and 19th centuries 
to the specifically theological insights of the penal theory, even 
though those insights are expressed in a more primitive epistemology. 
In spite of Kant's attempts to make 18th century rational 
theology face up to the dimension of radical evil, therefore, in the 
end his notion of sin is based merely upon a projection of that 
reality from-within the conceptual prison. It is a projection 
which: postulates an illusory reconciliation which ultimately ignores 
sin precisely because it has underestimated it by objectifying it. 
This means that-, for Brunner the penal theory is more satisfactory. 
Although it projects a concept of God on the basis of the 
problem of sin, it actually points to the 'personal' nature of the 
solution. This is so because it speaks of the problem being 
essentially incomprehensible and insoluble from the human side. 
Thus such a theory is closer to the 'personal' solution than the 
spirit-of ethical rationalism. 
Basically the reasons for hostility to the sacrificial theory 
are the same as those raised against the penal theory. By the 
same token the insight of the theory, Brunner claims, is equally 
profound. If the forensic theory offends the moral sense, so does 
the idea of the ritual sacrifice of the innocent victim. It is on 
the basis of the autonomy of morality that ethical rationalism under- 
stands the nature of the law. The law, then, like religion, should 
be rooted in morality. What this claim failed to understand was that 
to separate religion from moeality, or rather, the failure to recognise 
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the 'priority'. -of religion, was merely to underline the human moral 
predicament, rather than to offer a solution to it. It is precisely 
this misapprehension which the penal theory corrects., Law and 
morality'are both derived from religion because only Cod's justice 
has any meaning. This same insight is characteristic of the 
sacrificial theory: , Ritual religion is a pointer to the 'personal' 
relationship between humanity and God. It is a. symbol that human 
relationships can only be understood in the context of the divine- 
human. relationship. Sacrifice, therefore, in its turn is a symbol 
of this dependence. 
-ý 
This sacrificial theory,. therefore, precisely. in its offending 
of the human moral sense, reveals the human moral, predicamant. By 
dramatising-God's own sacrifice of an innocent victim it clearly 
reveals the human impotence to restore the broken relationship with 
God. r So Brunner aaya,, "The existential danger of a broken - 
relationship between God and man is the presupposition of the expiatory 
sacrifice. "21 "Hence the truth resides in that expiatory sacrifice 
which is not offered by man but by God, - and. therefore, because it is 
a divine transaction, has been offered once for all. "22 
Brunner sees that morality, law and religion can only be, derived 
from this 'personal' revelation of God. Both the penal and 
sacrificial theories point to this truth. In doing so. they'resiat 
absolutely ttie prevalent suggestion that religion, law and ritual are 
derived from morality. Kant may have recognised the 'disturbance' 
of human knowledge in a way which revolutionised human thought, but 
what he failed, to recognise was that the categorical imperative could 
not remedy that disturbance because its roots lay deeper. Brunner says, 
21. ibid., p. 477 
22. ibid., p. 479 
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'! Tha°disturbance, of life is still deeper than , 
the, disturbance of the 
system of knowledge. "23 It is for this reason that "the Atonement 
is the final and the most profound expression of., the whole fact of 
Christa n24 The cross reveals that the 'personal' fact of the 
atonement expresses the 'personal' purpose of God. For this reason 
it is the source of all knowledge, as it is the true source of all 
law, religion and ritual. In its own inadequate way the sacrificial 
theory bears more eloquent witness to this reality than does the 
rationalism of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
In-this analysis-of the different atonement theories seen through 
the eyes of Brunner's exposition, -the basis of his own theory of the 
atonement has in fact been revealed. The 'subjective' theory fails 
because it merely projects a 'subjective' conceptualisation. Thus, 
In its idealism, it does not come to grips with the reality of sin. 
The 'objective' theory fails because, although it recognises the 
seriousness of sin, it objectifies God by projecting the objective 
nature of the transaction. However, because it underlines the 
inability of men and women to deal with their existential problem, 
Brunner believes that in this sense it is closer to the truth. 
It is therefore the 'inter-subjective', the 'personal' nature 
, of revelation which holds together the insights of both the subjective 
and objective theories. 'Personal' revslation, a relation between 
subjects, can only, and must only, be recognised at a subjective 
level. The revelation-of -the atonement 
deals first and foremost 
with the transformation of humanity as 'subject'. Yet it is 
precisely this level which also guarantees the 'objective$ reality. 
It is the 'personal' revelation which breaks through the prison of 
23. , ibid., p. 485 
24, ibid., p. 485 
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of the human subjective, subject-object, 'I-it', category of 
knowledge. In this sense 'subjective', 'personal' knowledge mediates 
'objective' (i. e. that-which transcends'human subjectivity) reality. 
On this basis the importance of the three categories which 
Brunner uses to describe the atonement can be understood. Atonement 
language is a language of fact and reality. It is unique and 
decisive. At the same time it is the 'personal' work of the 
Mediator. It is the 'personal' Mediator who accomplishes the fact 
of human-salvation. The cross is the point at which this 
revelation takes place. Brunner says, "For as the meaning of the 
fact of the Cross only becomes clear through our knowledge of the 
Person of the Mediator, so also on the other hand, the Person of 
the-Mediator can only be perceived as such through His personal 
activity-, on the Cross. "25 For Brunner the atonement can never be 
a theory, but only a 'personal' fact. Here then is the epistemology 
of the atonement grounded in 'personal encounter'. 
Finally he moves on to explain the distinction between atonement 
and redemption. It is here that the subject of eschatology arises. 
In his theology it occupies the traditional place in Christian 
Dogmatics, almost like an appendix at the end. The atonement is the 
righting of the 'personal' relationship between humanity and Cod. 
It establishes the priority of faith. It removes the reality of 
human guilt. Here is the fundamental solution to the problem of 
human epistemology. Knowledge gives way to faith when the depth of 
sin is recognised. 
This, however, is not the end of the story. It is not 
sufficient to set the 'personal' relation right between humanity and 
25. ibid., p. 492 
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God.. The objective world of the lives of men and women must be 
set right also. 4 Brunner explains, "First of all, things must be 
set right at the centre, in the personal relation between God and 
man. This is the atonement. But once this has been righted, 
really and truly, inevitably this implies the transformation of the 
whole of life. Or, to put it the other way round, this central 
position has not been fully restored unless reality as a whole is, 
placed upon a new-foundation. "26 
Human sin and guilt, therefore, have infected the whole of 
creation. Brunner says, "We do not live in sin through the will 
alone, but also though the body and indeed through the world. As 
the cosmos is poisoned from the centre outwards, so also it again 
poisons the centre . "Z7 Thus atonement is only the first, although 
decisive, stage in the realisation of God's redemptive purpose.., - 
Redemption itself is the eschatological goal towards which the 
atonement points. It, is the reotoration of the goodness of creation 
as a whole. It is the point at which faith becomes eight. Here 
the epistemological screen is removed, where it'ia no longer 
necessary to make distinctions between subject and object, 'I' and 
'it'. "We know as we are known. " 
This distinction which Brunner draws between the existential, 
'personal' reality of the atonement, and the objective eschatological 
reality of the redemption enables him to explain the relationship 
between sin and death. Guilt is the obstacle created by sin, which 
exists between humanity and God. It is a real obstacle which the 
atonement destroys. But the 'Personal' obstacle is not the only one. 
26. ibid., p. 531 
27. ibid., p. 531 
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If human sin has affected the cosmos as a whole, then there still 
exists the cosmic obstacle awaiting destruction. 4"In the main, 
therefore, bondage to the body also means a permanent bondage to 
sin, in spite of forgiveness, in spite of the Atonement, which in 
forgiveness and faith is really effective. "28 Thus, if guilt is 
the obstacle created by the 'personal' dimension of sin, which the 
atonement has destroyed, then death is the obstacle created by the 
cosmic dimension which is yet to be destroyed. This final 
eschatological destruction of sin and death is redemption. Death 
is the cosmic dimension of the wrath of God. Redemption therefore, 
is not to be understood as an eschatological life after death, but an 
eschatological removal of death from life. 
So far the relationship between atonement and redemption has 
been examined by means of seeking to understand the points of contact 
between the two. Brunner has been able to do this on account of 
the distinction, he draws between the 'personal' and the 'cosmic' 
nature of sin. It must not be forgotten, however, that the most 
striking feature of the relationship is the contrast provided by the 
eschatological dimension. If the atonement is 'now', the redemption 
is 'not yet'. If the reality of guilt has been removed, the reality 
of death remains. Just as forgiveness could not ignore guilt, but 
rather took it into itself, so there can be no ignoring of death. 
The atonement points towards the inexorability of death as the 
judgement of our sin. We must submit to death as the judgement of 
God's wrath. But. the atonement does not merely, or essentially, - 
express the reality of that wrath, it expresses the divine forgiveness 
as that ultimate reality. Brunner says, "The wrath of-God is not the 
28. ibid., p. 531 
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ultimate reality. "29 '"... it means'that the world-dualism caused 
by sin, which issues finally in death, is declared valid, and at 
the same time the overwhelming reality of Divine Love is also 
justified.  
30 
Thus the 'personal' forgiveness which removes guilt does not 
remove death., Rather does it prepare us for death, and fnr the 
justice of God's judgement, in the hope and faith that the ultimate 
reality is a redemption which transcends history. "The Atonement 
means our redemption and our life, as well as our humiliation and 
our death. Death and Resurrection,. judgement and liberation constitute 
the content of the word of reconciliation. "31 
At this point there might be a temptation to ask whether, in 
emphasising the 'not yet' of the redemption and the primacy of faith 
and hope, Brunner has not returned to an expression of ultimate 
reality on the basis of an illusory projection of the despair human 
beings feel at the prospect of death. Yet Brunner does have an 
answer to this half-formulated question. The 'personal' revelation, 
the divine 'self disclosure' is not limited to the incarnation on the 
cross, for this eschatological reality is proleptically revealed in 
the resurrection. The crosst then, is the pointer to the eschatological 
restoration of creation which is vouchsafed for in the resurrection. 
Brunner could not be more emphatic here, "The Resurrection of 
Jesus is the proof of the superior reality of the Divine will of 
redemption over that of the reality of wrath. " "It is not mecaly 
that apart from Easter we would not know anything about eternal life - 
as we now know it through Christ - but that for us there would be no 
eternal life at all. 1,32 
29. ibid., p. 519 
30. ibid., p. 520 
31. ibid., p. 535 32. ibid., p. 580 
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Thus it is this emphasis on the distinction between the 
'atonement' and the 'redemption' which enables Brunner to give his 
epistemological category of the 'personal' an ontological grounding. 
For the "personal' encounter in Christ, both in the cross and in the 
resurrection not only permits access to the knowledge of God's 
saving being for us, but beyond that to the reality of the eternal 
relationship men and'women have with God in a realm beyond history, 
for ultimately salvation is nothing less than the end of history. 
History as a whole is the history'of human' separation from Cod. This 
explains why it is futile to seek to understand the resurrection of 
Jesus in historical categories. The resurrection provides knowledge 
not so much of either Christ's or our own historical being in 
relation with God, but rather of an eternal being which lies beyond 
the barriers of sin, wrath and death, which form the actual parameters 
of human existence. 
Here therefore is confirmation of my thesis that, for Brunner, it 
is the category of the 'personal' which lies at the heart of his 
understanding of the"work of Christ. It is best summarised as a 
truly 'personal' work. Yet in spite of this confirmation the 
question about the $alien' nature of salvation remains unanswered, 
for the resurrection, as the ontological foundation of Brunner's 
epistemology, preserves this 'alien' quality, in that it is not open 
to us to speak of the resurrtction of Jesus in historical categories 
at all. "Therefore we cannot imagine what the Resurrection of Jesus 
Christ means. n33 Easter, the Resurrection of the Lord; is not an 
#historical event' which can be reported. "34 
33. ibid., p. 573 
34. ibid., p. 575 
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Brunner seeks to explain this paradox by suggesting that the 
'historical' can best be understood with reference to the 'personal'. 
Easter is important not so much in"that it offers historical proof, 
but rather in-that it, bears witness to and validates the testimony 
of the faith of the disciples-to the''personal' self-testimony of 
Christ. "It'is not the historical credibility of the Resurrection 
narratives which beara'witness-to Christ, but the self-testimony of 
Christ-conveys to the believer the historical credibility of these 
narratives. "35 . -Thus the resurrection is, 
'historical' but it cannot 
be comprehended within 'historical' categorica. Paradoxically it is 
because it is 'personal' that its 'historical' reliability in 
validated. 
Now, while Brunner's anxiety lest faith be reduced to purely 
historical statements is, understandable, nevertheless it does seem 
that 'his explanation of the-relationship between the thiatorical' and 
the 'personal', though it softens somewhat that 'alien' nature of 
the historical, only highlights once more the question of whether 
the 'personal' encounter itself and the 'personal' nature of faith 
are ultimately 'alien' and not 'personal' at all. Moreover this 
suspicion is confirmed in the light of his discussion of the penal 
and sacrificial theories where it is, the irrational and the seemingly 
amoral which point to the 'personal', rather than the 'perconal' 
qualities of reason, freedom and responsibility. Thus Brunner's 
insistence that the 'historical' is incapable of reflecting the 
'eternal' seems to'mirror his insistence that human personality of 
itself is incapable of reflecting the Divine Person. 
35. 
, 
ibid., p. 575 
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""- CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE PERSON OF CHRIST 
The logic of Brunner's expohition of Christianity in terms of 
'truth as encounter' has led him to reverse the traditional order 
in dogmatic theology. It is the epistemology of the saving work 
which provides access to the ontology of the person of Christ. To 
begin with the divine ontology and deduce from that the saving nature 
of'-. the incarnation is to fall into the trap of docetism. 
Brunner'claims that an examination'of the historical development 
of Christology in the N. T. shows that the Christological formulations 
arose out of soteriorlogical motifs. He explains the proceass- 
" "Beginning with the Man Jesus, in the Man Jesus perceiving the 
Christ and His royal authority, finally through faith we are, 
impelled to believe in Jesus as the Son of God from all eternity. 
This in the way of knowledge which lies before us plainly in the 
testimony of the New Testament. The earliest testimonies of primitive 
Christian faith do not yet say anything about the eternal pre-existent 
Son of Cod. The early letters of Paul are confined to the 
confession of the Risen Lord, and their main theme is the work of 
the Redeemer., It is only the later Epistles which, with some '' 
clearness, show the background of this work of salvation, the fact 
that Jesus is the Eternal Son of God, but even they do so in such a 
way that the historic work of salvation is still in the foreground 
of interest. The eternal'Sonship of Christ only becomes the main 
theme of, the Christian message in the Gospel of John. "' 
From this it can be understood why, in orthodox doctrine, the 
emphasis has been upon the priority of the person of Christ and the 
incarnation. The real ontological priority lies with the divine 
initiative. If the saving work stresses how we first apprehend the 
1. Dogmatics 11, p. 340 
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significance of Christ, then from the perspective of the divine 
initiative it is the ontological reality of the incarnation which 
comes first. 
Thus there is a double direction in Christology. Epistemologically 
we can only apprehend the person through the work. But 
ontologically the saving work of Christ is the result of the free 
choice of the divine Being. Brunner says, "It will be sufficient 
for us to say that the order of knowledge'- that in the historical 
Revealer, we know the Eternal Son of God - corresponds to an order 
of being, which goesAn the opposite directions that the Eternal 
Son became man' ... 't2 
There are two points to note here in connection with this 
'double direction' I have spoken of. In the first place Brunner 
sees that it is only by beginning with the epistemological point 
of contact (the work of Christ) that the true impact of the divine 
ontology (the person of Christ) can be understood. It is because 
the work is the work of God that it is possible to speak of God at 
all, and of his divine 'personal' initiative and purpose of salvation. 
Here is yet another insight into the importance of Brunner's use of 
the term 'encounter' to describe the Christian message. Only by 
beginning with. the 'personal' encounter is it possible to avoid 
speaking of the incarnation in docetic'terms i. e. to avoid deducing 
a 'personal' dimension that is not truly 'personal' from the divine 
revelation. This leads Brunner to the real point of criticism of 
his former methodology. His Christology in The Mediator, as well as 
the Christology of orthodoxy, can be charged with 'idealism' in that 
Christian theology is tempted to deduce an illusory salvation from 
2. Dogmatics III p. 351/352 
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what is merely a human concept of God. -Speaking of the unity of 
God and man in Jesus Christ which traditional dogma sought, to defend 
Brunner says, "It gave: the Christian Faith a falso orientation about 
the being instead of the workof Christ. In thia. way it imperilled 
the fundamental histarical. charactvrof the evangelical message by 
means of a static Plntonism. "3 
However, secondly, it-is important to understand that what he 
is demanding is not so much a metaphysical reality but a dynamic. 
Truth is an 'encounter'. which creates faith. Faith is that 
'personal' reality in which human beings can live authentically, and 
through which the divine Being expresses the nature of his own being. 
This is why Brunner says, "through faith we are impelled to. believe 
in Jesus as the Son of Cod from all eternity. "4 What allows this 
double direction to be seen at-work is the 'personal' nature of 
knowledge and revelation.. The 'personal' shows us the 'relational' 
dimension of knowledge, pnd thus points to the place where faith 
knowledge takes over from objective knowledge. In this sense it is 
the bridge which allows us to move beyond the limitations of human 
epistemology to an understanding of the. ontological reality of the 
human"being in faith in relation with the divine Being. 
Of course, right at the heart of this whole dynamic is the 
incarnation: the 'person' of Jesus Christ. If the now dimension 
of knowledge and being which salvation offers us is a 'personal' 
being, then, on account of our sin, that reality has only come about 
through the choice of God to become 'person'. Thus the incarnation 
is the expression of the 'personal' being of God for us, and at the 
same time the epistemological criterion which enables human beings 
3. Truth as Encounter, p. 156 
4. ibid., p. 34U 
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to claim knowledge of the divine revelation. . To speak of the 
person of Christ is not to speak of. Christology in metaphysical 
terms. - It is to. speak of God as he has made himself known to us, 
in the newly-restored authenticity of our own 'personal' being. 
And in fact this is to-speak-of God as he is in, himaelf. ý#ý 
The problem with traditional orthodoxy is that, while it 
preserves the ontology implicit in the incarnation, and thus the 
movement from person to work, it expresses it in the subject-object 
categories of traditional metaphysics, and thus destroys the 'personal' 
nature of the ontology. Brunner says, "Christological doctrine in 
the narrower sense, the doctrine of the Person of Jesus, is also 
'truth-as encounter. "5 This problem stems from a misunderstanding 
of the relational nature of faith, for faith soon came to be seen as 
the subscription to an authoritative doctrine. -. Thus the person of 
Christ came to be articulated by means of a process of logical 
deduction. "The Church, however,. in its formation of dogma, and in 
its doctrinal practice, very soon took the opposite line, which is 
not the way of knowledge but-the way of logical order .... It is 
evident, that, whereý'faith' is understood as belief in an authoritative 
doctrine, this second, deductive line seems the beat. "6 It is from 
this initial error, Brunner believes, that all the Christological 
heresies derive.: In seeking to reconcile the divinity-with the 
humanity. they either preserve the humanity, but'fail to mediate the 
divinity, =(as for example in 19th century ethical rationalism), or 
else°theyýmediate the divinity-in objective 'I-it', terms, andlin so 
doing necessarily. find their attempted reconciliation to be a, 
logical contradiction. 
5. ibid., p. 350 
6. ibid., p. 341 
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,,, In Brunner's own exposition ho proceeds next from the question 
of the unity of the person and the work to explain the unity of the 
two natures in one person. This is a unity in mystery. He says, 
"That disturbing mystery of the Person of Jesus which even unbelievors 
fuel, becomes evident to faith as the mystery of the unity of the 
divine and human Subject in the action and speech, in the suffering 
and in the death of Jesus. ,7 Not only does the 'personal' nature 
of knowledge allow him to explain the close relationship between the 
person and the work, but also the unity of'the divine and human in 
the one person. Indeed, already this study has shown how the basis 
for-such an-expoaition has been established. 
Yet, if the methodology which Brunner himself has taught us 
were to be applied it would be more logical, instead of moving 
directly to describe the nature of this unity, to show how it might 
be possible to, move from-the 'personal' encounter with Christ,, to 
his 'personal' being. Clearly ßrunner's understanding of Easter 
ought to be the essential point from which any such knowledge can 
be gained; -and indeed it is possible to read Brunner in auch a way 
as to verify this hypothesis. He asserts, for example, that the 
"supra-historical existence" of Jesus "became clear to the Apostles 
chiefly through the Fact of Easter. "ß Again he soys,; "The Apostolic 
doctrine of. Jesus expounds the Natura of Him who rose from the dead, 
but not of Him who was born of the Virgin, tlary. "9 Later he asserts, 
"The Christian Church knows that everything depends upon belief in 
the Resurrection. "10 Easter then is the key to our knowledge of the 
divine Being, as well as to our own 'pergonal' knowledge and being in 
7. ibid., p. 34; -343 
a. ibid., p. 328 
9. ibid., p. 329 
10. ibid., p. 366 
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faith. 4 Easter is the foundation of the Christian tradition as a 
wholo. 
"Therefore the message of Easter is the Christian message, and 
the Christian Church is the Church of the Resurrection. This is 
true from°the historical point of view: it was not until Easter 
had taken place that the Church was formed. On Good Friday there 
was no Church; all the disciples of the Lord were scattered as sheep 
that have no shepherd. It was the fact of Easter which drew them 
together. It was this fact alone which made Peter-truly understand 
the truth that had previously simply shot through his mind like a 
flash of lightnings 'Verily Thou art the Son of the Living God'. 
Easter alone made, a full belief in Christ possible, If the 
'movement' were to be real, its meaning could only be fulfilled at 
the point where it was perfected. A speculative belief in Easter? 
What nonsense! As a woman can only sew properly with a knotted thread - 
for otherwise her work would be in vain - so if. Christ-be not risen, 
really risen from the dead, and has actually been 'seen' as the Risen 
Lord, all Christian faith is vain. Everything also is pure fallacy, 
Positively as well as-historically - this coincidence is necessary - 
Easter is the foundation stone of the Christian faith and the 
Christian Church. "h1 
Easter in the point'at which the earliest disciples knew both' 
that they Were=°saved, end that Jesus was the incarnation of the 
divine Being himself. Brunner sayag "Apart from the Resurrection 
Christ's death on the Cross is s catastrophe not a saving fact. "12 
He continues, "His resurrection, moreover, revealed His divine power 
of reconciliation. To know this, and thus to Know'the action and 
sufferings of Jesus as God's reconciliny Act, meano to believe in 
Jesus, the God-Man n13 fiere is the contcnt of the gospel. In this 
sense Easter is the foundation of the Church. At the same time as 
11. The Mediator, p. 563 
12. Dogmatics II, p. 337 
13. ibid., p. 338 
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providing epistemological access to tho divine purpose of salvation it 
also enabled opprehenaion both of faith as a 'personal' relation, and of 
God's being as 'personal'. In the resurrection, history makes salvation 
real to us as a 'personal' event. It is because of this event, and 
only because of this event that we are, grantod access to the 'personal' 
dimension of knowledge as faith. Thus, if there is any place in 
particular from which to begin an exposition of Christianity then that 
place is Easter. From within the circle of faith Easter is the logical 
point to begin to explore that circle. 
So far this exposition has not described anything which could not 
be derived from what has been explained above. Easter is the historical 
catalyst which renews the possibility of 'personal' faith. This is its 
epistemological significance. It is the appropriate beginning point 
from which to exploro the circularity of Christian spirituality. But 
is it possible to go further than this? Will Brunner allow the assertion 
that the historical event of Easter can actually provide access to the 
circle of faith? There are places whore it acorns that thin might just 
be possible - that the historical reality of the resurrection provides 
the world as a whole with access to faith. Ne says, "This fact - that 
the message of the Primitive Church in the witness to the Resurrection of 
Jesus - stands upon such firm ground that even the unbelieving historian 
cannot got away from it. "14 A little further on he insists, "Without 
the fact of Easter the world would scarcely have heard either of a 
Church, or of Jesus Himself. "15 
However these are questions which must be left open for the moment. 
It-is important first of all to learn how Brunner proposes 
14. Do matice Ir, p. 366 
15. id., p. 366 
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to-proceed from the historical event-of Jesus to the assertion of his 
divine nature. It is reasonable to begin from the point already 
established; the resurrection of Jesus remains a presupposition of 
any discussion of the life of Jesus in the N. T. Brunner says, "But 
the apostolic witness to Jesus in its fullness and depth was only 
made possible by meeting with the Risen Lord. "16 Easter is the key 
to an understanding of the whole life of Jesus. 
First itýis possible to apprehend the fact that his life was in 
total-harmony with the will of God. - "The story of His life shows us 
a human being who is the personification of the Holy Love of God. "17 
In. this-sense the life. of Jesus was sinless,. and because it was 
sinless it was more than a human life. It was the life of a man 
in that it, was a life of obedience, but it was more than the life of 
a man in that it was perfect. "Not only can no-one accuse Him of sin, 
but He stands before us-as One who, at every point in His life, is 
wholly one with the will of God. "18 Thus, "while we agree with the 
verdict 'He is a Man like ourselves', we are also obliged to come to 
the'exactly opposite view and say: He is not a Man like ourselves. jig 
Secondly Brunner argues that we can see that Jesus was more than 
a prophet., He did not simply proclaim the future coming of the reign 
of Cod. " He 'actually initiated and inaugurated it in his own person. 
His'teaching', his miracles, his conflicts with the authorities, and 
his death on the cross were nothing less than the establishment of the 
Kingdom of-God. His whole life is to be seen from this perspective. 
Thus his nature is divine because he brings into being the divine 
dispensation. Not only does Jesus proclaim that ! 'the new, age has 
actually dawned in His own Person, "20 but, "this Messianic claim of 
16. ibid., p. 329 19. ibid., p. 324 
17. ibid., p. 324-5 20. ibid., p. 325 
18, ibid., p. 324 
170 
Jesus is an historic fact which can be proved. "21 
Finally it is Brunner's contention that we have evidence that 
in the life of this man we encounter none other than the Eternal Son 
of Cod. If we perceive in Jesus more than a man, in fact if we see 
in him the divine instigator of the now age, then we see him no 
longer as a man merely in terms of one who has a human consciousness 
of the roles of men and women, but as one who comes to us from the 
transcendent realm itself. He is the one who actually expresses in 
history the natura of the divine transcendence. "That is why the 
Apostles were impelled to go beyond the sphere of history. Jesus 
can only be the true Revealer, Reconciler, and Lord, if He is 'from 
above', from the sphere of true transcendence, from the un-created 
sphere, from Cod,, and this transcendence, this absolute authority is 
vested in His Person. =Hence this Person, in spite of the fact that 
He meets us as a human person, is at the same time divine Person ... "22 
Thus ©runner's argument might be summarised by saying that, via 
Easter, the life and death of Jesus provide us with knowledge of his 
divine nature. The gift and knowledge of our salvation offer us 
knowledge of who it is that has saved us. However it is here that 
we must take note of a strange phenomenon: for Easter both verifies 
faith and at the some time acts as a decisive invitation and challenge 
to faith. It. both establishes the Hessianic credentials of Jesus 
and invites faith in Jesus as Messiah. Brunner says, "The historical 
evidence supports the believer, not the unbeliever; although the 
verdict: "Jesus is the Son of God" is a verdict of faith, and not of 
more historical insight. 023 The actual evidence it seems, cannot 
finally establish that Jesus is the Messiah. A`pexson-faced with this 
21. ibid., p. 325 
22. ibid., p. 349 
23. ibid., p. 326 
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evidence "has to choose, either to regard Jesus as a visionary, 
who believed'something about Himself which was quite untrue, or to 
believe in Him .,, 
24 But once ho has chosen the path of faith he can 
affirm that the evidence can be said to establish Jesus' Meseiahship. 
"The-man who believes in. Christ can say with a good consciences at 
this' entral point faith proveaita be the only true historical 
perception. "25 The historical evidence cannot establish-the-, divinity 
of Jesus. It can only'invite faith, but once faith is entered upon 
then the historical reality can be seen to validate the divine reality. 
This is because the resurrection is not a historical fact in 
the way that any other fact may be said to be historical. It is 
'perfoctum futurun'. That means that it is the historical 
realisation of the final eachatological reality. It is 'now' as 
a fact, but 'not yet' as future ultimate reality. Wo can know the 
resurrection to be true because it is a fact, but only by faith 
because it is future. It is the proleptic realisation of our future 
destiny in faith. Thus Brunner can assert that "the meeting with 
the Risen Lord was only granted. to those who believed in Him. "26 
He says: 
"It is a 'Factum', certainly, but not one which can be fitted 
into a series; it is one which can be fitted into the succession 
of-historical events as little asýthe facts of. the Creation and the 
Fall, the Incarnation and Atonement. In all this whatever , 
becomes. 
historically visible is only the echo of this happening. It is 
super-history, eschatological history, hence it is ho longer 
historical at all. Again, it is a, 'perfectum futurum... ' We 
cannot understand this 'Perfectum' without the 'Futurum', nor the 
'Futurum' without the 'Perfectum'.... This is what it is, and yet - 
24. ibid., p. 326 ' 
25. ibid., p. 326-327 
26, ibid., p. 368 
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we live by faith and not by eight -, it is only for the'future. By 
faith we live now in the city which is to come, which Christ then, 
27 
founded. " 
It'is ©runner's view that because of Easter we know that Jesus 
was who he claimed to be, and at the same time we are presented with 
the choices. either to deny that knowledge, or'to enter on a 
relation of faith. ' This strange borderline between knowledge and 
faith, `where the validity of knowledge and the challenge of faith 
are asserted'at the-same time, is only comprehensible because the 
savingInatüre of the resurrection, although expressed historically, 
is fundamentally 'personal'. The saving event-is essentially the 
gift-of a gracious 'personal' relation in faith. However, that it 
is a gift at all is a mark of its historical nature. - Thus, 
incorporated in'the -essentially 'personal' relation is the historical 
knowledge of the validation of'the N. T. witness to Jesus. 
At this point it is important to return to the question raised 
earlier. We noted''above that it seemed that Brunner might be 
offering the resurrection as evidence to the world of Jesus' 
divinity - as an actual entry point into the circle of faith. Now, 
if'we are tö'judge by the general tenor of his exposition, it seems 
that this is not so. However it is possible'-to appreciate more 
clearly how the'dynamic'w rks. 'What comes first, in Brunnerºs eyes, 
is the 'pereonal'-encounter which creates faith 'ipso facto'. Only 
then, from the perspective of faith itself, is the 'historical' 
evidence seen as proof of the divine nature of Jesus. , The historical 
evidence can only be assessed from the already created circle of faith. 
Thus. there is no way in which the resurrection can.. provide purely 
historical access to faith. 
27. The Mediator, p. 583 
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He invites us to consider, "Meeting with the-Risen Lord, as 
,a spiritual, personal reality. 
"28 There is "one fact recorded by 
the disciples. which does not exist for the, non-Christian historian: 
the Resurrection of Jesus. "'29 In the resurrection therefore three 
things come together; the divine 'personal' being, the proleptic 
historical realisation of that being in human salvation, and our 
truly human 'personal' being in faith. Naturally this apprehension 
is accessible only to faith, because faith itself is the only 
authentic expression of that 'personal' relational being. Brunner 
quite clearly denies the-historian, as historian, access to such 
knowledge, because historical knowledge as such, in its subject-object 
mode, is really an expression of the sin which 'personal' knowledge 
overcomes, When it. is claimed that the resurrection provides 
knowledge of the divine nature of Jesus only that 'personal' knowledge 
is being spoken-of which is the characteristic both of authentic 
human knowing in faith, as well as the divine being in self-revelation. 
Having completed his study of the divine nature of the person 
of Christ Brunner turns next to a consideration of the hilmanity of 
Jesus. If the divinity of Jesus is to be understood in these 
'personal' terms, it is appropriate to understand the humanity in' 
these terms also. This enables Brunner to avoid the difficulty 
traditionally associated with Christology, i. e. the-difficulty"of 
reconciling the divinity of Jesus with the humanity. For him the 
humanity is actually an expression of the divinity of Jesus. Indeed 
more than this, the humanity of Jesus is an expression of our true 
humanity too,, because here also we are thinking of a relational reality. 
28. ibid., p. 368 
29. ibid., p. 328 
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Brunner interprets the Biblical lack of embarrassment at the 
problem of reconciling Jesus' humanity with his divinity as being. a, 
pointer to the truth of his thesis. Jesus is truly human in the 
full sense of the word. , This is the clear message to be discovered 
in the Bible. He believes that'if we look at the Biblical record as 
a whole we can discard the tradition of the virgin birth. Jesus 
matures and learns as an ordinary man. He has limited knowledge 
and experiences pain and distress as an ordinary man. " Brunner asks, 
"'Was Jesus' a man like ourselves'? This question must immediately 
be answered, quite definitely, in the affirmative. "30 And yet it 
is precisely those men who met him as an ordinary man who proclaimed 
him Messiah, Son of God and Lord. "It was those who knew the 'Jesus 
of History' best, His companions, who proclaimed Him as the Son of 
God, and as their Risen and Heavenly Lord. "31 For the Biblical 
narratives and for the disciples themselves it would seem there is 
an almost natural juxtaposition of the two natures. 
It has already been seen how the divine person is. revealed 
'incognito' in the human personlof Jesus and this has been confirmed 
through the exposition of Brunner's understanding of the resurrection; 
for there is, ino clear-cut histor. ical"proof of the divine nature of 
Jesus. It is this element of the 'incognitos also therefore which 
reflects the mystery which is associated for Brunner with the 'personal' 
nature of our knowledge of God. It is an intersubjective relation of 
faith rather than a subject-object conceptualisation. Now if it is 
this 'incognito' which conceals, yet enables us to comprehend the 
'personal' nature of God, it is also that same 'incognito' which 
appears before us as the historical personality of Jesus of Nazareth, 
and thus makes possible our 'personal' response of faith. 
30. ibid.; p. 323 
31. ibid., p. 251 
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The 'personal', nature of faith can only be realised if the divine 
person is revealed 'incognito' in a truly human personality. Thus, 
when we see the person of Christ from the perspective of the 'personal' 
then we see that the humanity and the divinity of Jesus form an 
essential unity,, which not only helps to overcome the traditional 
confusion associated with the Christological doctrine, but also helps 
to preserve the primacy of faith and its essentially moral nature. 
As the divine person confronts us mysteriously and secretly in the 
personality of Jesus of Nazareth we are offered the true freedom 
either to believe or to deny the relation of faith which is offered 
to us. 
In short the personal revelation of the divine person ! incognito' 
in the human personality means that God in his revelation refuses to 
compel faith, recognises"human freedom, and thus creates the very 
possibility of human life having-a moral dimension. "As revelation 
it is complete because a real personal approach can only take place 
through a real person whom we meet personally, As a veiling, 
however, it is complete, because to us there is nothing more ordinary, .. 0 
than a h. zman person like ourselves. " He continues, "The indirectness 
of the divine self-communication means that God does not force Himself 
upon man ... but that he summons him to make his own decision. " 
32 
=At-the same time, consonant with this possibility of authentic 
human life, is the possibility of 'offence'. Only the 'personal' 
address-which confronts an objectifying conceptuality, and thus human 
security'and fellenness, 'risks being rejected. Thus it is possible 
for-. men and women to shut themselves off from this address, to cling 
to their own authority and security, feeling affronted and threatened. 
32. The Mediator, p. 333-4 
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Brunner observes, "In faith, -however, through'the Revelation-in the 
Mediator, man is stripped... "33 The'Jews "could not endure the Son, 
who, aa: the heir, reminded. them of their stewardship and their 
unfaithfulness. " "The possibility of faith means also the-possibility 
of 'being offended'. The full humanity-of the Son of God includes 
both these possibilities. 
34 " 
We can see now why it is that Brunner insists that the unity of 
the two natures in one person is a mystery. It is not open to 
explanation on the basis of rational deduction. Chalcedon "simply 
places, two irreconcilable contradictions aide by side., 
35 At the 
same time it is comprehensible in-terms'of the 'personal', for it 
is the divine personality revealed in a human person that graciously 
enables the response of faith in us as the mark of our authentic human 
being. Brunner says, "It is the marvel of revelation that we shall 
never understand that this authority which is the authority of God 
meets us as a human being. " Again he says, "The teaching of the 
Apostles ... confronts us with the mystery of the Person of Jesus 
Himself. "I36 
Thus a more detailed exposition of the work and person of Christ, 
seems to`confirm and underline what has already been indicated to be 
the heart of Brunner's theology; namely the conjunction of the 
'personal' and the 'historical' in the incarnation. Brunner presents 
us with a traditional Christology of the two natures in one person, 
but explained in such a way as to offer a genuinely modern epistemology 
of salvation. , The 'personal' and 'historical' encounter with the 
risen Jesus allows faith to understand itself as the authentic mode of 
33. ibid., p. 340 
34. ibid., p. 341 
35. Dogmatics II9 p. 353 
36. b d., p. 363 
177 
a truly personal existence, - through th©.. mediation of the divine 
person-in the human person of Jesus of Nazareth. , What is mystery 
to an essentially sinful-epistemology-, is rationally comprehensible 
as grace to a human epistemology which owns the priority of faith. 
Beginning from the actual experience of salvation Brunner's 
originality lies. in his understanding of orthodoxy"not as doctrine 
with an objective validity in its own right, but as a doctrine that 
gains Its, -validity through a faith that is genuinely human and 
truly 
moral because it is grounded in human freedom and responsibility. 
.. While Brunner has not said anything new in. the sense of further 
exploration and explanation of his epistemology, this analysis helps 
an understanding of how the framework, which has already been outlined, 
can be-filled out in detail. Moreoverit has confirmed the centrals 
significance-of. the ! personal' and the 'historical' for his epistemology. 
Finally, however, there still remains the question which has 
consistently raised itself throughout this enquiry. That is whether 
our salvation is comprehonsible from an ordinary human perspective on 
history and personality, or whether it is only comprehensible on the 
basis of an 'alien' revelation which merely uses the terms 'personal' 
and 'historical'. Brunner's reply might be that he has offered us 
the N. T. record as a rationally comprehensible confirmation of a 
human 'personal' being in faith. If there is anything 'alien' in the 
revelation and'the faith which Christ makes possible it is not so 
much 'alien' in itself as 'alien' from the perspective of the actual 
separation from God which we ourselves have chosen. Moroover if 
that separation is to be overcome it can only. be achieved by an 'alien' 
revelation which quite categorically is. not comprehensible from the 
perspective of our history and personality. _ 
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©ut'will this do? Brunner's analysis must be commended for the 
seriousness with which it takes the problem of sin. However in 
spite of the fact that this analysis has confirmed the centrality of 
the category of the 'personal' for Brunner's theology as a whole, 
nevertheless it has also confirmed that his understanding of revelation 
has an 'alien' quality which permeates his whole thought. . Is it 
possible for these two themes which run like threads through Brunner's 
theology to be reconciled? 
At one point in his exposition of the resurrection as 'perfectum 
futurum' he says, "This statement may make the logician's hair stand 
on end. "37 Does this mean that ultimately the 'personal' explanation 
of salvation is no explanation at all, but actually a contradiction 
of human reason? Can sin create two aorta of reason and logic? Does 
this mean that what is offered is an understanding of the 'historical' 
and the 'personal. ' with regard to the resurrection and the incarnation 
which-is totally discontinuous with what human reason understands by 
the. 'historical', and the 'personal'? It is important therefore at 
this jincture to. investigate carefully Brunner's understanding of these 
categories. I shall deal first of all with the 'historical'. In 
what sense does he invite us to consider Easter as history? A more 
detailed scrutiny of this subject reveals that his thought becomes 
complex and puzzling. 
However, if care is taken to listen attentively to what he says 
about the relationship between the 'historical' and, the 'personal' 
it is possible to make sense of his intention. It seems to me that 
there is a key statement which will help to clarify his meaning. He 
speaks of tithe meeting with the Risen Lord, as a spiritual personal 
37. The Mediator, p. 583 
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reality. "38 It, is important here to reiterate-on insight of Brunner's 
theology noted above: that the historical, as-far as the Christian 
faith is concerned, is a predicate of the 'personal'. - The 
resurrection, therefore, is something like. an historical catalyst 
which permits 'personal' knowledge of the ultimate 'reality of. God's 
saving purpose. ' There can be no objectified historical understanding 
of the resurrection, for that-would be to seek knowledge of our 
salvation on the basis of an essentially sinful epistemology. This 
is why it is so important to stress that meeting with the Risen Lord 
is a 'personal-en, counter'. It is this 'personal encounter' which 
furnishes on-epistemology of the divine being and the ontology of our 
salvation. Easter is not s. o much a fact in itself. It is a 
catalyst which enables that encounter without which there would be 
no salvation. 
Now this insight makesýit possible to frame the question which 
it , seems to me to be important to put to this thesis of Brunner. 
Does this exposition allow him to speak intelligibly of the ! historical' 
as a predicate of the 'personal'? Or to put the matter another ways 
can he eschew all objectivity-with regard to the history of Easters 
and yet still claim to speak of the historical? " 
I shall use all three books, The Mediator, Revelation and Reason, 
and Dogmatics II to, provide the evidence, as Brunner appears to be _, 
remarkably consistent in his exposition of the resurrection. At, first 
his comments about-its historicity seem paradoxical, not to any 
contradictory. The language he uses is the objective language of 
history and the historian. For example he speaks of the 'fact of 
Easter'. So he says, "This fact - that ... it was the appearances of 
38. Dogmatics III p. 368 
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the Risen Lord which brought the shattered and scattered disciples 
together again after the catastrophe of Good Friday, and formed the 
real foundation of the'Christian. Church - stands upon such firm 
ground, that even, the unbelieving historian cannot get away from it. "39 
He insists, "It was the encounter with the Risen Lord which rescued 
the'disciples from their perplexity and hopelessness.. "40 So strong 
in fact is this emphasis upon the historicity of the resurrection 
that he speaks of this "historically indubitable fundamental fact. "41 
We are faced with the categorical statement that "Every reliable 
historian will admit that very soon after Good Friday the Apostles did 
see the Risen Lord. "42 
At the same time, in other places he is equally clear that for 
the New Testament Easter is not essentially historical at all. Thus 
he says, "Easter, the Resurrection of the Lord, is not an historical 
event which can be reported. "43 In Dogmatics II he claims, "The 
knowledge of the Risen Lord had to be one which was granted to faith 
alone. "44 Again he insists, "Faith and faith alone knows what the 
Resurrection means. "45 The paradox and contradiction therefore might 
bettated thus: on the one hand Brunner speaks of the appearances of 
Jesus as historical, and yet at the same time he can assert that they 
are not historical after all. 
However it'is possible to resolve this seeming contradiction and 
glimpse an important insight. If the encounter with the risen-Jesus 
is"a 'personal' encounter, it is possible for the historian to record 
39. ibid., p. 366 
40. ibid., p. 366 
41. ibid., p. 366 
42. ibid., p. 370 
43. The Mediator, p. 575 
44. Dogmati II9 p. 368 
45. The Med iator, p. 576 
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the Christian testimony to the resurrection in an objective historical 
analysis, but not to objectify the actual event itself. This is why 
the sentence, quoted above, is so important when ho speaks of "the 
Meeting with-the Risen Lord" being "a spiritual personal reality. "46 
The historian can verify the fact of belief, but not the encounter 
which gave rise to the belief. 
This distinction allows consistency to be observed in Brunner's 
position in two areas. First it is possible to see that by historical 
fact he does not so much mean the encountor, itself,. butýrather the 
actual historical record of the beginning of the specifically Christian 
faith. Ile says, "he (the unbelieving historian) cannot shake the 
actual fact of belief in the Resurrection as the-basis of the, , 
Christian--Church. "47 In this sense he does not. attempt to objectify 
the 'personal encounter' itself. 
Secondly, however, two other insights are accessible to the 
believer. Once he or she has been encountered by the risen Lord then 
the New Testament witness to the resurrection can be understood from 
the inside of faith, 'so to speak. From this perspective, the believer 
can testify to its historical validity as an account of the 'personal' 
encounter with Christ as it was experienced by the Apostles. Brunner 
says, "... our belief in the Resurrection of Jesus is not only, and 
not primarily, based upon the Apostles' testimony to the Resurrection. 
The Christ, whom we know through their witness cannot be other than 
the Risen Lord Nimsolf. "48 } Fie goes. on, I'The Apostles needed-these 
appearances in order to restore theirýfaith in. 1iim. "49. In The 
Mediator he asserts, "It is certainly a 'proof' to the faith which 
already exists, but it isýno proof to one who is not yet convinced, 
and faith is not based upon it. "50 This perspective on history 
46. Dogmatics II9 p. 368 47. ibid., p. 366 48. ibid., p. 370 
49. ibid., P071 50. The Mediator, p. 579 
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from the sido of faith and ealvdtion'is somewhat like the perspective 
faith dllowe on the world änd nature as God's creation. "Brunner 
explains, "The self-communication of the Risen Lord to His disciples 
is a 'sign' of His divinity; like all His Isigns' or miracles, it is 
the shining forth of His divine Being in the sphere of the natural 
human world. u51 
In addition, what at first sight appeared to be-a paradox, can be 
seen to have epistemological validity also. Brunner says, "No one 
believes that Jesus Christ rose from the dead who'doee not first of 
all'believe that He is the Son of God . n52, Clearly he is correct to 
make ouch a statement in'the sense that we do see and experience day 
to'day events tb a large extent'in terms of an overall concept of the 
world which we have built up, a concept which in itself may very well 
be determined by faith or lack of it. In this sense there is justice 
in the verdict that only from the perspective of faith can it be 
understood what it means to say that Jesus is risen. 
It seems` then' that- Brunner may'well be justified in'the paradoxical 
and seemingly contradictory position which he adopts. However let me 
press the questions a little more firmly. What is the nature of this 
'hiatory''to which faith bears witness? What does he mean when he 
speaks of the experience of the "Easter fact"? 
53 What is the meaning 
of words like 'meeting', 'encounter' and 'seeing' the Risen Lord? 
My does he say that the resurrection 'prov-es' the divinity of Jesus? 
54 
Are these words being used in an historical and scientific way? If 
they aro not being used in this way can they be said to have any 'real' 
51. Revelation and Reeoon, 
52. ibid., p. 305 
53. The Mediator, p. 574 
54. Revelation and Reason, 
p. 306 
p. 306 
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meaning?,, We may be forgiven for thinking that Brunner offers us two 
sorts of history -a sort of double level of reality, a 'faith' 
reality, and a 'neutral, empirical' reality. What then is to be 
made of this notion of the resurrection as a 'personal encounter'? 
Let me focus attention on what Brunner thinks actually took 
place in this encounter with the risen Lord. 
55 On the one hand 
he says, "Every reliable historian will admit that very soon after 
Good Friday the Apostles did see the Risen Lord. "56 Brunner informs 
ua, it seems, not only that the historian can testify to the fact of 
belief, but the 'fact' of an historical event, i. e. the seeing of 
the risen Lord by the Apostles. This might appear to take us a 
stage nearer the actual encounter than Brunner would allow in the 
passages,., quoted above; 
On the other hand the risen lord whom the disciples saw is not 
an 'object' anyone might have seen. He assures the reader that 
there is no question of "neutral ocular testimony for the Resurrection. "57 
Even in Dogmatics II, following on from the previous quotation he 
nays, "The interpretation of this fact, that they actually sawwHHim$ 
does not belong to the sphere of history, but either to that of one's 
general philosophy of life, or that of faith. "S8 
55. It is important to focus on thia-rather then the 
historicity of the term $resurrection'itself because in the 
New Testament this term has already become a theological 
interpretation in a way in which the term (ho appeared) 
in I Corinthians 15 has not. Here the Nov! Testament offers 
us direct testimony to this encounter, something which it never 
does with regard to the. reaurrection itself. Thus the 
statement 'he appeared' is much closer to the actual experience 
than the claim 'he is risen' 
56. Dogmatics Ii, p. 37O 
57. Th He, p. 576 
58. ogmaats cý f_I, p. 370 
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Is it'legitimate to conclude"then that Brunner offers us two 
sorts of sight; what might be called a double ontology of history? 
There is the 'sight' of the disciples who saw the risen Lord from 
the perspective of faith. On the other hand there is the 'sight' of 
the unbeliever who did not see, and could not have seen the risen. 
Lord. But what does this word 'see' mean in the context of the 
believer? If the neutral observer, using what might be called his 
empirical faculty of sight, could not, by definition, have seen the 
risen Lord, then, by what right does the believer use the term 'see' 
to describe his experience of the risen Lord? Does the word describe 
a 'real experience' of the world, or the experience of what is simply 
the creation of the subjective imagination? 
It would be possible to argue that if Brunner offers us a 
double ontology of sight, then he must offer us a double ontology of 
history. In the first place there is a history which the believer 
can bear witness to. In this dimension of faith the appearances of 
the risen Lord are historical. At the same time there is neutral, 
purely empirical history which is quite incompetent to judge the nature 
of these appearances. Once again it might be said that there are two 
sorts of history; the history witnessed by the believer, and the: 
ordinary history of the neutral historian. 
Here, too, the question arises, however, about the meaning and 
use of the term 'history' in the dimension of faith. How can the 
term 'history' be used to refer to events in a different dimension to 
which the'neutral observer cannot by definition testify. Brunner 
himself comes close to admitting the contradiction in a passage quoted 
above. He says, "In all this, whatever becomes historically visible 
is only the echo of this happening. It is super-history, eschatological 
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history, hence it is no longer historical at 011.1159 
His use of the term 'proof' raises the same difficulties. On 
the one hand Brunner recognises that the New Testament speaks of the 
resurrection as the cause of faith. It is certainly not the effect 
of faith. To make such a suggestion is to risk the claims of faith 
being understood as the illusory projection of the imagination. He 
says "The historian who can be moved to replace the connection of 
facts as it is described by the Primitive Church by the opposite 
point of view can only be moved by general philosophical reasons, 
and not by historical reasons , 
60 The implication here is that such 
a view involves a return to idealism. 
At the same time Brunner is quite clear that the resurrection is 
not the historical cause of faith. lie says, "This must not be made 
a proof for faith. "61 In Revelation and Reason he asserts, "In no 
way are they (the miracles) the basis of belief. This is true even 
of the miracle of the resurrection. "62 This is because it would be 
quite unthinkable for faith to be made to depend upon objective 
historical evidence. Brunner says, "Faith, and faith alone knows 
what the Resurrection means. "63 Thus it is possible to see why his 
argument is that the resurrection is neither the cause nor the effect 
of faith. It is the 'personal' nature of God himself revealed finally 
in the resurrection, and expressed in the incarnation, which is the 
only grounding for faith. "For faith is based on nothing but the 
witness to Christ, which is always the witness to the Risen Christ, 
which faith knows to be the word of God t164 
59, 
' 
The Mediator 
. p. 
583 
60. ibid. 9 p. 579 
61. ibid., ' p. 579 
62. ' Revelation and Reason, p. 305 
63. he ed a or, p, 576 
64. Sid. , 
p. 579 
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This somowhat, paradoxical state of affairs helps us to understand 
his use of the term 'proof' with regard to the resurrection. On 
tho one hand the event of the encounter with the risen Lord can never 
be the 'proof' which validates faith, and provides an entry point to 
faith for the unbeliever. This would be to make faith depend upon 
sinful objectified history. On the other hand the event of the 
encounter with the risen Lord is 'proof' to the disciple who already 
believes in Christ. This prevents the resurrection from being 
merely the creation of faith; for it is rooted in the ultimate 
objective reality of the divine revelation. He says, "This (the 
N. T. witness to the resurrection as the cause of faith) must not be 
} made a proof for faith. It is certainly a 'proof' to the faith 
which already exists, but it is no proof to one who is not yet 
convinced, and faith is not based upon it. ""65 
Two critical questions arise here. First of all, in what sense 
can the encounter with the risen Lord be called the cause of faith, 
if this encounter cannot be described empirically? What sort of a 
cause is it which is by definition and in principle unconnectable with 
the effect? Brunner asserts, "Historically it is for believers only, 
It is not part of the historical continuum. "66 And secondly, if it 
is difficult to understand what he means by 'cause', it is also 
difficult to understand what he means by 'proof' when he speaks of this 
encounter with the risen Jesus as the cause of faith being "'proof' 
to the faith which already exists. "67 In what sense can it be called 
'proof' if Brunner precludes the actual event from empirical 
description. He speaks of it as "the shining forth of His divine 
Being in the sphere of the natural human world. "68 But he will not 
65, ibid., p. 579 
66. Dogmatics II, p. 328 
67. he Media or, 0.579 
68. ea on and Reason, p. 306 
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allow the anthropologist or the historian to speak of that to which 
the naturalhuman world testifies in the resurrection. Once again 
Brunner leads his reader to the very threshold of contradiction. 
Even now, however, care is tequired not to indict Brunner too 
neatly, for he can respond. to these criticisms in the context of his 
claim that it is important to think of the "meeting with the Risen 
Lord, as a spiritual personal reality. "69 Once again there are two 
aspects to this possible response. It must be remembered that the 
knowledge which the encounter conveys is 'personal', In that sense 
it is not tobe compared with objective, empirical facts. It is 
fundamentally and essentially 'personal' and for that reason is only 
really comparable in its elusiveness with the mystery of the knowledge 
of an intimate friend. 
More than this, though, the 'proof' and the 'seeing' are the 
'personal' witness to, the indescribable divine reality, and the 
saving 'personal' transformation wrought by the divine act. Brunner 
says, "But just because it really is-the other side which is revealed 
to us at this point, which comes to us, it is evident that just here, 
where we know what Easter means, we feel most powerless to say it, " 
70 
We must not expect to be able to describe the event of the resurrection 
or even the 'appearances', for they belong essentially to the divine, 
and are thus inexpressible. 
"The historical element is only the margin of the hole, which in 
itself says nothing. We cannot do anything else. Even the Apostles 
could do no more than lead us to the edge and say: Look there) 
Look through the hole and see that He has gone through, and indeed 
properly speaking from outwards within and not from within outwards. 
69. Dogmatics II, p. 368 
70. The Mediator, p. 583 
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For the breach comes from'the side of God, from the further side. 
God raised Him up; as the One who is restored to the divine world 
is He attested to the vision of faith. But since this factual 
character thus characterises the 'edge of the hole' in the historical 
world, so it points already to the Other, to the Light, in whose 
radiance alone we can know the reality of the ', breaking through'. 
This, however, is something which even the Apostles cannot state in 
so many words. "71 
Thus, in defence of Brunner's insight, it might be, said; that it 
is the adjectiyes 'personal' and 'spiritual' which explain what-he 
means by the encounter with the risen Lord. When the believer sees 
the risen Christ the seeing is a purely 'personal', 'spiritual' 
reality, but nevertheless one which is grounded in and initiated by 
the reality of God himself. This is why the neutral observer sees 
nothing and encounters no one. 
Does this mean therefore that the conclusion of, this analysis is 
that he, has successfully defended the thesis that the 'historical' is 
to be understood, as far as Christian theology. -is concerned, as a 
predicateof. the 'personal' nature of our human. relationship with God? 
Clearly it has been important to explore the complexity and subtlety 
of Brunner's position. Yet. even now it does not seem to me that he 
can be said to have made, out his case. - I began py asking whether 
Brunner's understanding of the 'personal' and the 'historical' could 
genuinely be said to, be derived from, and in some sense consonant with, 
what might be called a common-sense human, understanding of these terms, 
or whether they were really descriptive of an 'alien' reality of 
revelation itself, which was ultimatelyrand essentially incomprehensible. 
My main problem here is that, while I can sympathise, with his. desire 
to distinguish between 'personal' and 'factual' knowledge -. the inter- 
71. ibid., p. 563 
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subjective', from the subject-object category -I am still puzzled as 
to how this 'personal' knowledge of the resurrection can be said to 
be 'personal'. The fact remains that Brunner will not allow 'personal' 
knowledge or sight or reason, as we might speak of them in a neutral 
context, i. e. apart from a very specific context of faith, to 
describe the encounter with the risen Jesus. In short Brunner does 
not in fact explain how this 'encounter with the Risen Lord' can be 
said to be 'personal'. Rather is the 'personal' defined with reference 
to this transforming event, and its ultimate source as the incarnation. 
Thus it seems to me that the only way- in which we can properly 
understand what Brunner means by referring to the "meeting with the 
Risen Lord, ýas'a spiritual personal reality" is to understand his 
reference to the 'historical' and the 'personal' as being defined by 
the 'spiritual' i. e, with reference purely and simply to revelation 
itself. Thus this analysis confirms the suspicion raised at every 
critical juncture of this study, that Brunner's epistemology depends 
upon an appeal to an alien concept of revelation. It is my 
contention therefore that we are entitled to take him literally at 
his word when he says, "Easter, the Resurrection communication of the 
Christ, is itself revelation, the divine self-testimony, which, as 
such, allows of no objectivity, because it is addressed wholly to 
faith. "72 In effect he surrenders an appeal to history when he says, 
"It (Easter) is no part of the historical continuum. "73 It remains 
to be seen whether the category of the 'personal' itself is part of 
a continuum'with'human personality, or whether, it`too receives its 
definition with reference to the otherness of the Divine Person. ' It 
must be admitted that the analysis so far leads'me to doubt whether 
72. ibid., p. 575 
73. Dogmatics III p. 328 
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the. concept of a 'continuum' between human personality and the 
Divine Person is really intrinsic to Brunner'a thought. 
However, before moving on to an exploration of this question, I 
believe that it is possible to argue that Brunner's analysis of the 
New Testament understanding of the resurrection of Jesus provides 
confirmation of this thesis that he offers us a view which is not so 
much 'historical' as 'revelatory' in the alien way in which this 
study has doscribed. It seems to me that ßrunner's use of the New 
Testament to illustrate his thesis is very uncomfortable, specifically 
in his attempt to show that the New Testament record' concerning the 
resurrection does not offer an historical continuum between 
resurrection and faith., 
In the first place he asserts, "Historically it is for believers 
only. "74 He claims, The appearances of the Risen Lord were only 
granted to believers. "75 Now while this conclusion would appear to 
be a fair summary of the gospel accounts themselves, it is not clear 
that Paul's testimony supports such a conclusion. In Galatians It13ff. 
Paul speaks of Cod's revelation of Christ to him as being the decisive 
turning point in his life. It would seem difficult to describe Paul 
as a 'believer' in any decisive Christian sense of the word before what 
in I Corinthians he speaks of as his experience of the risen Jesus 
(I Cor. 15: 8). It would seem to be perfectly legitimate to speak of 
this historical 'event' as creating the faith of Paul. 
i Similarly in that famous passage in I Corinthians 15 Paul also 
speaks of other witnesses of the resurrection. Among these is the 
figure of James. - In his commentary on this letter, C. S. C. Williams 
74. Dogmatics NO p. 328 
75, ibid., p . 328 
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refera"to "James, the Lord's brother, who had not believed before the 
resurrection in Jesus. "76 R. H. Fuller says, "There can be little 
doubt that this is James identif ed by Paul in Galatians 1: 19 as the 
brother of the Lord. "77 U. Wilckens78 also takes it for granted that 
the, James referred to by Paul here is James the brother of Jesus, who 
later became the leader of the Jerusalem church. [lore, too, as in 
the cane of Paul, it seems that there is prima facie evidence that it 
was the appearance of Jesus after hie death which had something to do 
with the change from unbelief to faith on the part of James. 
79 
This is not to say that the appearance-of Jesus in'either of these 
cases can be said to offer proof of the truth either of the`resurroction 
itself or"of the validity of'faith in him. However, whatever-the state 
of mind of both Paul and James before their conversion,, there is clear 
evidence here that the appearance of Jesus provided some historical 
entry point'for faith. In these important cases it seems that faith 
was not some prior qualification for witnessing the-appearance of'the 
risen Jesus. It is clear that while the resurrection does not prove 
his divine being to its witnesses, it does at least provide the 
historical continuum, which Brunner denies, between what-can be 
described so a human historical experience and faith in the divine 
reality which the New Testament understands to have been its author. 
Moreover it'ehould also be noted that it is the basic presupposition 
of the gospels, in their existence as a literary genre, that there is 
a continuity between faith in the historical and faith in the risen 
Jesus. - For this reason it would be unreasonable to'look in the gospels 
for evidence of the resurrection creating faith_In the disciples from 
76. Peake's Commentary ed. H. Black, p. 963 
77. he. forma iora of the Resurrection Narratives, R. N. Fuller, p. 36 
78. Tesürrection, U. Wc ena, p. 12 
79. cf. John 7s 
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a position of total unbelief. 
Secondly Brunner seems to be over-hasty in drawing the conclusion 
that the New Testament does not speak or think of the discovery of 
the empty tomb itself leading to faith. He speaks, for example, 
of "the eight of the Empty Tomb" being "a matter of independent 
significance . "ßp In The Mediator he saysp "the empty tomb, which 
any secular eye-witness could observe, plays no part whatsoever in 
the New Testament as the foundation for faith in the Resurrection. "81 
It-is true that this might be offered as a legitimate interpretation 
of the synoptic-account. In Mark discovery of the empty tomb leads 
83 
only to fear and terror82* Luke too records this intiel terror. 
Matthew, -however,, perhaps predictably, appears to have modified the 
starkness of the flarcän-account by speaking of the awe of the women 
in terms of joy rather than fear. 
84 However in John's gospel we are 
told quite explicitly that John, the beloved disciple, having heard 
of Mary Magdalene's discovery of the empty, -tomb, rushes to the place. 
He and Peter both discover Mary's story to be true. The gospel'writer 
continues, "Then the disciple who had reached the tomb first went in 
too, and he saw and believed. "85 Here, quite clearly, the discovery 
of the empty tomb is the gateway to faith in the risen Jesus. Thus 
Brunner's verdict that "The original witness to the Resurrection of 
Jesus referred to the appearances of Jesus to his disciples, and not 
to the world-fact of the Empty Tomb. " 
86 
rihile true in the sense that 
it reflects the Pauline and the Synoptic material, is misleading in 
that the Johannine evidence quite clearly in this instance points in 
80. Do matic3 11, p. 367 
81. The Med atoro p. 576 
82, cf. ar< 16,8 
83. Luke 24: 5 
84. cf. Matthew 28: 8 
85. John 20: 9 
86. Dogmatics II, p. 369 
193 
the opposite direction. Moreover, ifs as Raymond Brown suggests#07 
the Johannine material is likely to go back through various editions 
of the gospel to someone close to the original beloved disciple, then 
its record here cannot be dismissed as a late account in the way that 
Brunner implies. 80 
Here too it seems that Brunner's interpretation may somewhat 
distort the New Testament evidence by suggesting that a sharp 
distinction can be drawn between the 'factual historical' nature of 
the empty tomb tradition and the 'personal revelatory' nature of the 
appearances. Moreover the actual fact of the witness to the 
emptiness of the tomb being included in the essentially faith 
documents of the gospels lends support to this criticism of Brunner's 
analysis. The actual experience of the empty tomb, it seems, may 
well be presented as being just as vital in its own way to a 'personal' 
faith in Christ. In this case the distinction Brunner attributes to 
the Now Testament evidence between the transcendent as 'personal' and 
as a 'world-fact$ cannot be so neatly drawn as he would have us believe. 
Finally his assessment of the historical trustworthiness of the 
New Testament witness to the resurrection seems to me to lack consistency. 
He admits that there is "some historical weight to the tradition of 
the Empty Tomb. "89 This 'weight' consists in the fact that neither 
the tomb nor the body of Jesus were produced as evidence by the 
authorities to discredit the Christian claim that Jesus had risen. 
Brunner concedes: "This certainly makes us think. "90 However in 
the next sentence or two he goes on to speak of "the scanty and 
67. cf. R. Qrown, Commentar on John's Gospel 
8ß. cf. also R. N. u er Ibido p. 10 adX Dufour. Resurrection 
and the Message of Easter p. 175 Both refer to a prim ve 
tradition which speaks 6f the discovery of the empty tomb by 
Peter and the beloved disciple. 
69. Dogmatics II9 p. 368 
90. Dogmat ca , p. 368 
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contradictbry°; nature of the source material. "91 Now hero ho does 
not explain what is 'scanty' and 'contradictory' about the tradition of 
the empty'tomb in the gospels. It is the one 'fact' concerning the 
resurrection to which all the gospels bear witness. Moreover the 
actual-discovery that the tomb was empty is told in as much detail 
as-one would. expect- from the general length of gospel accounts of 
individual incidents. Thus the terms 'contradictory' and 'scanty' 
hardly seem to apply. The one contradictory aspect of the evidence 
which Brunner does refer toýconcerns whether the earliest tradition 
of the appearances arose in. Galilee or Jerusalem. However he does 
not-spell out this objection in this particular context and make it 
the basia', of his verdict of 'non liquet'92 concerning the evidence of 
the empty tomb. - The impression received is that it is rather the 
theological presupposition that the tradition of the empty tomb cannot 
be understood as the gateway to faith which seems to control access 
to the verdict. - 
Lest there be any misapprehension, it is not my intention hero 
to re-state the case for the reliability of the New Testament testimony 
to the empty tomb. 'It is rather to point out that Brunner does not 
give duo weight to the strength of the case he himself has made out. 
In addition, -in the case of this evidence which he cites with regard 
to the NewJestament record of the empty tomb, the reasons-for his 
conclusions are not clear. If, for the New Testament, "the Empty Tomb 
is a world fact, which everyone, whether they believe in Christ or not 
could, have-porceived; "93 then it seems rather startling to insist 
that-"'It plays no part whatsoever in the New Testament as the foundation 
for faith in-the Rosurroction. "94 Surely that in precisely how the 
91. ibid., p. 368 
92. ibid., p. 369 
93. ibid., p. 360 
94. The Mediator, p. 576 
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gospel writers present it for their reader's interpretation. 
Moreover, in the actual historical situation, if this is an accurate 
presentation of the events, then I fail to see why it could not 
legitimately have been interpreted as a divine act. Indeed this 
appears to be precisely the message we hear in John 20: 9. That is 
not of course to deny that other interpretations were equally possible. 
It is perfectly easy to understand why some might any that the body 
had-been stolen, or that Jesus had been taken down from the cross while 
still alive. No doubt there are other interpretations which could 
have arisen. - My point here is simply . that even though faith, or lack 
of faith, may have been a vital factor in the interpretation of such 
a fact, if fact it was, nevertheless it would be legitimate for a 
historian, on the basis of this evidence to have recognised that the 
interpretation that God had raised Jesus from the dead was a possible 
interpretation with a claim to validity. In this sense, even if we 
follow Brunner's own reading of the New Testament evidence, the 
historical continuum which leads from the evidence to the gateway of 
faith and the transcendent might well be said to exist. 
Similarly when it comes to the appearances themselves there is a 
lack of consistency here also in Brunner's assessment of the evidence. 
On the one hand he speaks of "a historical fact which is supported by 
such unwarranted and contradictory testimony . "95 Now clearly in one 
sense his verdict is just. It is not possible to harmonise the gospel 
stories of the appearances in themselves, let alone to harmonies these 
stories with the story of the empty tomb. Nevertheless Brunner 
himself later on says, "Every reliable historian will admit that very 
soon after Good Friday the Apostles did see the Risen Lord. 1,96 Indeed 
95. Dogmatics II, p. 369 
96. ibid., P. 370 
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in spite of the puzzling complexity of the gospel narratives concerning 
the appearances there does seem to be good reason for interpreting the 
Pauline tradition of I Corinthians 15: 1-7 as being in some sense a 
basic factual historical given of the Christian faith. In this 
case the historian as historian might offer his views on the 
reliability or otherwise of such an interpretation. Thus Brunner's 
own verdict that the historian can testify that the Apostles saw the 
Risen Lord, does not appear to be consistent with a view which speaks 
of "an unwarranted and contradictory testimony. " The testimony that 
Jesus was seen by his disciples after death in itself seems clear and 
unambiguous. Here too the New Testament itself does not seem to 
preclude the historian access to the evidence. Rather does Paul in 
particular offer it as historically reliable and substantial, and as 
such able to support the claim that God himself had been active in 
these events. In this case also, therefore, Brunner seems to shy 
away from the verdict attested to by the evidence he himself has cited. 
There does seem to be an historical continuum offered by the New 
Testament from the event of the appearances to faith in Jesus Christ. 
In the light, of this it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
reason for the inconsistency can only be Brunner's basic theological 
presupposition that revelation can only bear witness to itself by 
means of an essentially 'alien' character. In the context of the 
resurrection therefore Brunner uses the terms 'historical' and 
'personal', it seems, to describe purely and simply the revelation 
of the divine incognito. 
This analysis, therefore only underlines how deep the 'alien' 
nature of revelation runs in Brunner's thought. If there are two sorts 
of 'personality' and 'history', and if, moreover, the unbelieving sort 
has no access to the believing sort, then it is difficult to see how 
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Brunner is offering his reader an epistemology of salvation on the 
basis of the 'historical' and the 'personal' centred in the incarnation. 
It is not so much the 'historical' and the 'personal' which are 
important for human salvation, but the 'alien' revelation itself 
which mediates these new dimensions of 'personality' and 'history'. 
In this sense the 'point of contact' between men and God which 
Brunner sought to preserve, and which, with its central insight of 
the 'personal' held out so much potential for a theological 
epistemology, seems to have come to nought. 
It is puzzling therefore, to understand the nature of the 
knowledge of salvation which Brunner offers. On the one hand I 
have argued that the coming together of the 'personal' and the 
'historical' in the incarnation is the point at which human personality 
is once more enabled to relate to the divine person in faith. The 
category or the 'personal' not only allows epistemological access 
to the divine ontology but rather in the divine-human encounter the 
one is an expression of the other. 
It is even possible to see how this principle applies in Brunner's 
rejection of, the doctrine of the virgin birth. He believes that it 
undermines the teaching of the human nature of Jesus, and thus the 
truly 'personal' nature of revelation, He asks, "Is a man who is 
born without a human father 'a true man'? Does he not lack the most 
essential thing for a human being, the fact that he has been born in 
exactly the some way as we all are? "97 Thus Brunner himself makes 
the point about the incarnation offering epistemological access to 
the divine ontology, and to an authentic ontology of faith, precisely 
97. ibid., p. 355 
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becauso Jesus was a human historical person. 
fie says, "The great, unthinkable, unimaginable miracle of the 
Incarnation which the Apostles proclaim, is not that the Son of God 
was born as the son of a virgin.. but that .. He, the eternal and 
personal word of God, meets us in Jesus Christ as man, of our flesh 
and blood, as our Lord, who in His existence manifests to us the 
Being of His Father, and as the Redeemer, in whom we have 
reconciliation and free access to God and are true sons of God if 
we believe in Him. " 
98 
, 
While Brunner's rejection of the virgin birth is in harmony with 
the way I have chosen to expound his thought in this study, on the 
other hand it seems that his return to the 'penal' and 'sacrificial' 
theories of the atonement can be taken as evidence to suggest that 
in the end it is this latter epistemology of an 'alien' revelation 
which takes us to the heart of his theology. For there too there is 
total discontinuity between an ordinary human understanding of 
personal freedom, responsibility and rationality. In fact it would 
be more in keeping with Brunner's insistence that the New Testament 
record validates itself to faith, if he were to uphold the tradition 
of the virgin birth. Its sheer incomprehensibility could be taken 
as evidence of the break in the historical continuum, and of the 
discontinuity between our 'personal' understanding and the 'personal' 
revelation of God. This is what I mean by speaking of a confusion 
in Brunner's thought, 
Indeed from this discussion it is possible to understand something 
of the nature of the problem. It seems that in effect Brunner does 
98. ibid., p. 356 
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not allow the shift from on epistemology of the 'historical' events 
of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, and the 'personal' 
nature of knowledge both in our human relations, however distorted, 
and in the faith of the man Jesu3, to an ontology of the saving 
purpose of God. Instead he imposes upon us an 'alien' ontology of 
revelation which, although it speaks of the 'personal' and 'historical' 
in ways that attract our attention and sympathy, amounts to nothing 
more than an ontology of the Biblical authority and the traditional 
doctrines of the person and work of Jesus. 
Thus, instead of attempting to demonstrate how tho, Bible, itself 
invites an, explaration. of its record as an attempt to proclaim a 
legitimate ontology of, faith on the basis of an epistemology of the 
history and personal life of Jesus, Brunner reasserts the validity 
of the Biblical and doctrinal revelation of the person of Christ as 
an ontology in itself which preempts all epistemological justification. 
In this way therefore the suspicion remains that the ontology of 
revelation which he offers is no more than an epistemological 
construction, which must fail to mediate the ontology it claims, 
because the epistemological foundation is groundless. There seems 
to be no way, in a modern context, that an 'a priori' understanding 
of the ontology of such an epistemology can be accepted. The 
literary and historical criticism of the Bible and the history of the 
Early Church have provided more than enough evidence that the Bible 
and early Christian doctrine are to be accepted as an epistemological 
construction. Any ontological basis cannot be assumed. It must be 
validated. In Brunner's thought the seriousness of sin, which I have 
commended inthe last analysis, _has 
become the excuse for a total 
abandonment of reason and logic. This is why Brand Blanchard in his 
chapters on both Barth and Brunner in the book Reason and Belief speaks 
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of their theology ae giving way to the 'temptation of irrationaliam'. 
At this point however, in spite of increasing doubts as to the 
adequacy of`Brunner's epistemology, it is appropriate to ask whether 
or not his shift in emphasis in Dogmatics II to stress the priority 
of the work of Christ can be said-to meet in any way the objections 
that have been made. Certainly it would seem to be a much sounder 
principle to seek to move to the divine ontology of Jesus from the 
'personal' nature of his saving work, than to deduce the saving work 
from a principle of revelation which merely asserts the divinity of 
his person. Thus it is important to ask whether Brunner's understanding 
of the 'personal' nature of salvation helps to meet the criticisms 
which have been raised. 
It must be admitted however that the analysis in the present 
chapter of-Brunner's interpretation of the resurrection does not 
really help. It does not seem that the resurrection can be 
accommodated either to an epistemology of the history of salvation, 
on to a description of a Christian history of salvation. The 
historical 'continuum' seems to be broken rather than fulfilled by 
the resurrection. Also, as I have noted above, Brunner does not begin 
his exposition of the-doctrine of the work of Christ with the 
resurrection. 
. 
One other difficulty to be-faced with this shift is that while 
it-is-in order to endorse the epistemological validity of beginning 
with the work rather than the person of Christ, nevertheless, because 
both The Mediator end Dogmatics II stress the significance of the 
'personal' encounter with Christ, and the unity of the person and the 
work, it. is not so obvious that Brunner's earlier work is more exposed 
to a charge of docetism than the latter. All that in effect has 
201 
happened 'in Dogmatics II is that the logic of ©runner's earlier 
position i's applied to his theological method. 
It is through the event of the cross which mediates the 'personal' 
revelation of God that the objective, real obstacle of sin is removed. 
Thus, for Brunner, what is important is not so much whether the person 
or the work should come first, but rather that the person and the 
work are both 'personal'. We recognise that Jesus does, and can 
speak of who he is because of the 'personal' nature of his encounter 
with us. 
" I-have, noted,, already that in The Mediator Brunner says, "The work 
and the person of the Redeemer are an indissoluble unity. " 
99 He goes 
on to say "His Being is itself Redemption. "100 Here he is not so 
much trying to derive the work of Christ from his person, or define 
the work in terms of the person. The two are an indissoluble unity 
on account of the 'personal' nature of revelation. In the later 
second volume of the Dogmatics it is possible to see, not that the 
work precedes the person, but rather that here too there is a unity 
of work and person, in, the 'verbal' office of the prophet, the priest 
and king. It-seems that the very concept of the 'personal' allows the 
uniting of the two functions of 'word' and 'status'. 
On the evidence so far, therefore, I would claim that the charge 
that Brunner's Christology is docetic is without foundation. This 
judgement would seem to apply both to his workin The Mediator as well 
as that in Dogmatics II. Docetism is the result of an over-emphasis 
on the divine nature of Jesus such that the human nature is devalued 
99. The Mediator, p. 399 
100.1l` 1b d., p. 402 
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and effectively excluded. For Brunner it is clear that this 
Christological error is a-result of the objective 'I-it' category 
which attempts to describe the divine nature of Christ. It, is based 
on a notion of this nature which is purely conceptual, and thus only 
reflects not so mucha disjunction in the person of Christ, as a 
disjunction in hS. men personality. Paradoxically it reflects the 
distortion created by sin. The 'personal', 'I-Thou' category 
however, in its own terms at least; ' avoids this problem altogether. 
Only on'the basis of a 'personal'. understanding of-revelation does 
the idea that a man can perform the saving function of God alone 
cause. no tension and embarrassment. 
Thus here too it seems that the 'personal' basis of Brunner's 
epistemology and ontology is more securely confirmed. However, at 
the same time as confirming these basic insights, which it would 
appear haveýnot been fully spelled out by Brunner himself, it also 
seems that-the question raised concerning the 'alien' nature of the 
Opersonal' clamours for attention even more insistently. 
In his essay on Brunner's Chriatology, Edward Dowey criticises 
him for not really carrying through his understanding of 'truth as 
encounter' to illuminate the actual person of Christ in Dogmatics II. 
Dowey asks whether 
"Dr. Brunner has gone far enough in adjusting the traditional 
loci of-theology to-his apprehension of 'truth as encounter'. It 
seems to me as if the force of this apprehension has brought to the 
fore the subject of Christ's 'work' in Dr. Brunner's theology, 
thoroughly re-stated and personalised. This he has realised and 
expressed it systematically by correcting the-arrangement and content 
of The Mediator as promised. But oven more has happened, and he did 
not appear to be fully aware of it in writing his dogmatics. The 
concept of Encounter has really robbed the traditional locus on 
Christ's 'person' of.. any 'raison d'ttre' as-a separate theological 
topic. .. The next development may well be to take more seriously 101 the union of the work and person and, give a fully integrated analysis. " 
(p. 204, Edward Dowey, Redeemer and Redeemed as Persons in History in 
The Theology of Emil Brunner, e d, C. Kegley and R. W. reta 
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In this way Dowey shows that he has cettainly seen the basic 
insight of Brunneris theology. But, I would question whether, in 
criticising Brunner's treatment of the person of Christ as 'repetition 
and polemic' he has'focussed his attention on the real problem. In 
an important sense Brunner can give a reply to Dowey's criticism. A 
negative polemic is important for him concerning traditional 
Chriatology precisely because it relies first and foremost on a prior 
ontology which must necessarily afford a false starting point for 
Christology because it is-conceived in the subject-object categories 
of Greek thought. Brunner is clear that-any ontological description 
of. Christ's person must be derived from an epistemology of the 
'personal'. 
However it'is at this point that it seems to me that an important 
question emerges. Would not Dewey's criticism be better directed at 
Brunner's description of the work of Christ in Dogmatics II? There 
are two questions. Is his description ofthe work of Christ under 
the headings of prophet, priest and king really derived from his 
understanding of 'truth as encounter'? If there are doubts expressed 
at this point does it'not mean that it may be the central category of 
the 'personal'-which is unable to bear the woight which Brunner 
explicitly wishes'to put upon it? 
My view is that in his description of Jesus' work as prophet he 
moves to an ontology of the person before he has described the work. 
He speaks of Jesus being more than'a prophet. The work itself is 
described-in terms of the totally different status of the being of 
Jesus. "Here is One who is 'more than a prophet' ... This, in 
contrast to the 'Word' of the Prophets, -is a new stage of revelation, 
and by its very nature, final and complete ..... the Word is no longer 
a pointer to something beyond, but the 'Word' actually expresses the 
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presence of that world beyond, for thin in the category of the 
'Emmanuel! - God Himself acting and speaking in the action and 
speech of this Unique Person: Jesus . "102 What acorns to be the 
case. herel where Brunner speaks of 'more than a prophet' and 'God 
Himself acting and speaking', is a repetition of his chapter in 
The Mediator on the person of Christ, which sets out the importance 
of speaking of Jesus as the 'God-Man'. Moreover it is on this 
basis, which he believes to have been established, that he goes on 
to speak of the priestly and the royal work of Jesus. Here again 
this corresponds closely to his chapters on atonement and redemption 
in The Mediator. 
Thus it is my contention that-Brunner is mistaken in his assertion 
that hie methodology in the Dogmatics has radically altered the 
theological emphasis of his Christology, and protected it against 
the charge of docotism. In both The Mediator and the later volume, 
his Christology derives the work. from the 'person'. There is a prior 
ontology in both books. Thus the claim he makes to have begun 
Christology 'from below' cannot be substantiated. In both cases his 
doctrine of the person of Christ clearly begins 'from above'. This 
means that if there are weaknesses in the Christology of The Mediator, 
which Brunner admits, then those weaknesses must be present in the 
later work also, and indeed throughout his work. 
However it must be admitted at this point that this criticism 
is only the negative side of a point that has already been made in a 
positive context. in support of Brunner. If the Christology in both 
The Mediator and the Dogmatics is really rooted in the 'personal' nature 
of revelation, then this criticism is irrelevant. The real question, 
102. Dogmatics II, p. 275/276 
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which'wes raised earlier, and to*which it is important to return, is 
whether the category of the 'personal' can provide an ontology which 
is based on. a valid epistemology, as opposed to an ontology which 
is based on the mere assertion of revelation. 
I have already hinted that in the later work this is by no means 
'apparent. There is no doubt that, for, Brunner Jesus shares our 
human nature: But, at the some time, because, incomprehensibly, he is 
'a man "in'whose life. 'sin plays no part. "103, he asserts that. "He is not 
a'Manvlike-ourselves. "104 In this sense'he is a 'men beyond the 
borderline'. -,. Thus there is a dimension of his being a man which is 
'other', and in no sense 'relative' to the ordinary status of manhood, 
and it is this 'other' quality of his 'person' alone which is effective 
for our salvation. "Nis action was not .... an ethico-religious 
truth, which, in principle, is at man's disposal, but something which 
waa completely new to men. "105 We can only comprehend this 'manhood' 
beyond the borderline through faith. 
This problem is even more apparent in The Mediator. I refer 
apecifically'to a passage which might well give rise-to the charge 
of! docetism. ' Although-Brunner uses the word 'personal' to describe 
the new dimension on which his theology depends, nevcrthelous there 
is a dichotomy between human personality and the divine 'person'. I 
quote a whole paragraph from The Mediator. 
But can 'person' have any other meaning than this human meaning, 
with its reference to the Idea? It is evident that within the sphere 
of history and humanity no, other meaning is possible. In the sphere 
of revelation, however, ýthron h revelation, it has another meaning. 
If Jesus Christ is the Revealer, in the Christian sense of the word, 
if He is the Word, from 'yonder', then He is the Revealer, the Word, 
103. Dogmatics IT, p. 325 
104, ibid., p. 24 
105.. ibid., -"p. 335 
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not as the bearer of an Idea, but as a Person: not as a 'personality' 
i'n the historical sense, but as the authority, as the most intensely 
personal Word of God. But the meaning of 'Person' in this respect 
cannot be understood from a general conception of persons or of 
personality, but only through faith. " 106 
Brunner's intention here is clear. It is via the category of 
the 'personal' that he seeks to move from an invalid, purely conceptual 
reality, to a new, valid, 'subjective' and revelatory one. Thus to 
avoid any charge that his idea of the 'personal' is conceptual he 
denies emphatically that it is derived from a concept of human 
personality. In thin way he seeks to safeguard the revelatory nature 
of the 'personal'. 
However the question arises whether, by insisting on this 
difficult conception of a dichotomy between 'personality' and 'Person', 
he is not ultimately depending upon a prior, and equally conceptual, 
reality of a two-nature Christology. It does not seem that the idea 
of 'person' can be derived from any other source, because it is not 
derived from human personality at all. The problem then is whether 
or not, by insisting on a dichotomy in his understanding of the 
'personal'., Brunner is not presupposing an equally invalid conceptual 
reality which he has so strenuously sought to avoid. 
Moreover, if the conclusion is reached that he has not avoided 
this problem then the charge of docetism arises at this point rather 
than earlier, It seems that, according to Brunner's own criterion of 
judgement, his Christology both in The Mediator and in the Dogmatics 
falls into that error. Indeed I must go on to protest that his whole 
understanding of the atonement must be seen fundamentally as a theory, 
and therefore just as much liable to criticism as those 'idealist' 
theories which he himself so fiercely attacks. 
106. The Mediator, p. 267 
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It must be doubted therefore whether the category of tho 
$personal' has any content of its own, which allows Brunner to speak 
legitimately of a new dimension of knowledge. It is clear that if 
it is used in a-purely formal way to allow him to make the transition 
between an invalid conceptual epistemology and a valid revelatory one, 
then it cannot accomplish that task for the reasons which have been 
given. 
Thus, an examination of Brunner's Christology reveals three 
things. Firstly his understanding of the 'personal' is at a crucial 
point discontinuous with our'human nature. Secondly even the so- 
called work of Jesus is in fact derived from that prior ontology which 
is absolutely beyond our ordinary human being. In this sense the work 
of Jesus is derived from its 'alien' nature once more. Jesus is not 
just a prophet. He is more than a prophet. He is not just a priest. 
lie is the divine self-sacrifice. "The message of the Cross is the 
highest expression of the fact that forgiveness cannot be taken for 
granted; forgiveness is God's act of reconciliation. "'07 Thirdly 
Jesus is not just a king. He is the eschatological king, through 
whom all existing rulers are declared to be pseudo-rulers. 
It is my view therefore that Brunner's later focus on the work of 
Christ does not fulfil its epistemological potential, for even the 
'personal' work of Jesus is rooted in an alien ontology of revelation. 
It seems that in his theology Brunner attempts to do the impossible. 
On the one hand he wishes to appropriate the advantages of a theology 
of immanence by preserving the point of contact in the 'personal' and 
the 'historical'. On the other he insists that modern Protestant 
theology must at all costs follow Barth in rejecting any notion of 
107. Dogmatics II, p. 295 
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immanence. Hero is the source of confusion in his thought. This 
is the reason why I continually find myself applauding his insights, 
and yet finally being unable to accept his theology as offering a 
legitimate opistemological. otep forward. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE 'PERSONAL' AND ITS CONTENT 
In the previous chapter my exploration of a certain confusion 
in*Brunner's epistemology allowed me to identify a basic dichotomy 
in hid understanding of revelation. There is a whole strand of 
thought in his theology to which the following critical response seems 
entirely appropriate. , There is so much in ßrunner's theology, which 
rejects the principle which believes it is possible to, move from a 
knowledge of the world, nature and humanity to a knowledge of God. 
Ne places a-clear $no entry' sign on the road which runs in the 
direction from a human epistemology to the divine ontology. For 
this reason I have argued that Brunner's idea of revelation can be 
seen to be both groundless and without content, in that there is 
nothing in the world or human nature which bears comparison with it. 
Even the points of contact which he does offer prove to be like the 
desert traveller's experience of a mirage. At first they appear 
tempting and exciting. They lead the reader on into his theology. 
But at the last moment they are withdrawn. They vanish as he tries 
to grasp them. Thus a legitimate verdict might be that the inevitable 
and paradoxical result of his rejection of the principle of immanence 
is that, even more securely than the idealism which he attacks, he 
has locked humanity in the prison of its conceptuality. The result 
is that revelation itself becomes nothing more than a word and an idea. 
- Yat to allow this logic to become the seal of this critical 
analysis would be unfa tunate. There is, as this study as a whole 
has-shown, another dimension to his thought which counteracts, and 
in places contradicts this verdict. Indeed there still remains a 
facet to his understanding of the 'personal' which resists the charge 
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that it has become a bare concept under the impact of a groundless 
revelation. There is an immediate response to such criticism. 
Revelation is by no means the content-negating reality which these 
allegations might suggest. It is the divine self-impartation, and 
behind. that initiative lies quite simply the reality of love. 
Brunner says, "But how would it be were God to impart Himself precisely 
where a human being really imparts himself. True self-impartation 
is loves Were a human being to meet me in unconditional love, in 
the very fact that he imparted himself, he would give me that which 
I cannot give to myself, and he would say that which-I cannot any to 
myself. This would release me from my isolation. "' 
My task therefore in this chapter is to ask whether there is 
latent in-Brunner'a thought some reply to the dichotomy which I have 
described, ý It is vital actually to appreciate something which has 
already been stressed. 'Personal' knowledge is a fundamentally 
different dimension of knowledge. Brunner does not wish to imply 
that in speaking of revelation as 'personal' or of knowledge as 
'personal', the more use of this label of the 'personal' solves the 
problem. There is no solution for Brunner to the epistemological 
problem in conceptual terms at all. In this sense he sees and 
sympathises with the fundamental objection I have raised to the 
category of revelation. But his reply to the allegations is that 
it is only possible to criticise his concept of revelation if his point 
that 'personal' revelation transcends conceptualisation is totally 
ignored, for . 'personal' revelation actually mediates the life of 
authentic human existence. This is what it means to speak of a 
different dimension of knowledge. 
1. Revelation and Reason, p. 368 
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He explains hic position clearly, "It is true that I think of 
Him (Cod) as Subject. "2, but "The God whom I think is not the one 
who really confronts me. "3 The truth of personal knowledge, then, 
is not to be discovered'in the conception of it. The truth of it 
is mediated in the'bncounter., Brunner says, "Indeed,, if God, 
instead of being 'thought' by me were to impart Himself, that would 
be no longer merely a relative, but an absolute self-communication, 
and therefore, something that would truly change my life. "4 The 
point which must be noted therefore is that while Brunner does not 
solve the problem I have raised, or meet the criticism in the terms 
in which I have raised it, he is at least aware of the force of it, 
And his reply opens up new possibilities for progress. 
My criticism has been to ask whether the'category of the 'personal' 
can really transcend the conceptual and move to the ontological. 
Brunner's reply is that while human conception of the 'personal' does 
not transcend the level of human epistemology, the divine reality 
does. Yet if Brunner is going to insist that human personality 
provides us with no basis at all for understanding what it means to 
speak of the divine Person, is he not obliged to give this 'personal' 
revelation some content? Must he not seek to say in some sense what 
it is? Are we to understand that there is total discontinuity between 
concept and reality? 
Here it seems that he does make-himself some room to respond 
to this criticism. The essential quality of the 'personal' is self- 
impartation. This is"what the 'personal' is and this is why it is 
described in terms of encounter. Moreover it is the notion of 'encounter' 
2, Reason and Revelation, p. 366 
3. ibid., p. 369 
4. Revelation and Reason, p. 367/368 
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which distinguishes it from a mere concept. Self-impartation 
is the 
basis for Brunner of both the 'personal' and the 'encounter'. It is 
self-impartation which breaks into the prison of the 
human 'personal' 
isolation in the self, thus enabling the 'person' to be a 'person'. 
It is self-impartation which acts as the criterion for distinguishing 
between conceptual knowledge and knowledge as 'encounter'. 
Moreover Brunner goes on to describe this self-impartation as 
love. We have noted that he says; "True self-impartation is love. "5 
He'says, "Were a" human being to meet me in: unconditional love, in the 
very'fact that he imparted himself, he would give me that which I 
cannot give to myself... This would release me from my isolation , 116 
It might be argued therefore that it is 'love', defined in terms of 
self-impartation, which gives content to the 'personal' reality by 
which Brunner is enabled to speak of 'truth as encounter'. 
If this interpretation is correct then it puts the epistemological 
problem in a new light. The question all along has been whether in 
using the category of the 'personal', Brunner has really enabled 
himself to move from concept to reality, from religion to Chriatology, 
from illusion to truth. --- The idea, of the 'personal', used merely as 
a category, was in danger of remaining purely at the level of the 
conceptual. Now, however, it seems that in defining the 'personal', 
in terms of the nature of the encounter, Brunner is providing the 
criterion which the critical questions of this study have been seeking. 
It is God's love, his self-impartation in Jesus Christ, which opens the 
epistemological prison, and offers itself as the ultimate ontological 
reality. It is God's love which creates the possibility of 'personal' 
5. ibid., p. 3613 
6. ibid., p. 368 
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knowledge, and informs ua that human knowledge is essentially an 
ethical reality - nothing less than a sharing in the divine self- 
impartation. 
There is a very important implication of this insight, if it is 
at all correct to glimpse this direction in ©runner's thought. It 
entails a complete re-appraisal of the relationship between the 
revelation and salvation in his theology. No longer is it revelation 
which acts as the basic theological category, along with the prior 
Christological ontology which has been, criticised as groundless. 
Instead here the actual description of the work of Christ is given 
the epistemological priority which has sought in vain in the last 
chapter. 
The situation therefore has been reversed. Now it is 'love' 
which is the fundamental category, the ontology behind the divine 
self-revelation and self-impartation. This self-impartation is 
nothing other than God's saving purpose in Christ, through whom we 
come to know that God's love is the ultimate ontological category. 
This is why I say that human knowledge is essentially ethical, because 
it is knowledge of the reality of God's saving action on behalf of man. 
Thus it is on this basis of God's self-impartation, and of human 
knowledge of, it in Christ, that it is possible to speak of revelation. 
Yet it is still not clear that it is legitimate to interpret 
Brunner's thought as a whole from this perspective. I may have 
carried his theology beyond the point he desired to make. A closer 
examination of this passage, reveals that this latest contention is 
debatable to say the least. He says, "Were a human being to meet me 
in unconditional love .... " (see above). The implication behind this 
remark is that no human being actually does meet me in this way. I 
214 
may conceive of such an event, but the conception of it does not 
make it happen. Thus the conception of self-impartation is to be 
distinguished from the reality. True self-impartation is a divine 
reality. The concept of self-impartation must remain a purely 
human concept. It cannot be translated into the reality of human 
lifo. Only God in Christ effects the transition. Thus self- 
impartation as an actual reality is quite 'alien' and distinct from 
the human concept of it. 
The implication of this trend of thought leads us back to the 
starting-point and to my original critical questions. It seems 
that there are two sorts of self-impartation: the self-impartation 
which we can conceive, but cannot achieve, and the reality of divine 
self-impartation. But how are we to recognise the latter if it has 
no relation to our human concept of self-impartation? How do we know 
that it does take place, or has taken place at all? How do we know 
that self-impartation is not a totally human concept? 
It seems that there is no escape from the theological categories 
which I identified and criticised in the previous chapter. It is 
revelation which vouchsafes the reality of God's self-impartation. 
This category of 'personal' revelation stands over against the concepts 
of self-impartation, and human love, which can only be arrived at on 
the basis of human sin; i. e. the inability and refusal of men and 
women to give themselves unconditionally. It is 'personal' revelation 
which validates real self-impartation, over against the human ability 
to conceptualise it. 
It seems then that Brunner is a disciple of Barth right to the 
end. He ends where he was seen to begin, with a fierce and categorical 
rejection of immanence. Only revelation in Christ can safeguard the 
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reality of salvation. It is not possible to speak of salvation 
outside that framework. To do so is to risk salvation itself 
becoming W mere projection of human desire. Brunner is not willing 
to"compromise himself and risk a return to the, 19th century theology 
which could not be distinguished from anthropology. 
What conclusions therefore are to be drawn? There is an important 
sense in which this chapter reveals a significant development in 
Brunnor's thought. Not only is the 'personal' encounter itself 
described in terms of the self-impartation of love, but also in-line 
with, his stress on the priority of the work of Christ. Brunner 
begins for the first time with an explanation of what motivates, and 
actually takes placeýin the saving event. It is because God's nature 
is lovo, and his purpose is self-impartation that men and women have 
any'being, and any knowledge of their being, in relation with God. 
Yet there is no resolution of the dichotomy which has been 
identified throughout. In fact it seems that here, too, there is 
confixnation of a contradiction in Brunner's thought. As with his 
concepts of 'history' and the 'personal', there are two sorts of 
self-impartation. There is the self-impartation men and women can 
conceive of. Brunner says, "We can indeed form some conception of 
such a happening . 117 There is also the self-impartation in the 
divine act which is beyond rational conceptualisation. "Reason knows 
nothing of such love, or of such an event. "8 The two are by definition 
different because the former is conceivable whereas the latter is not. 
But this is surely not what Brunner means! Behind this confusion lies 
the idea that the self-giving love which we conceive of only becomes 
7. ibid., p. 368 
8. ibid., p. 369 
216 
actual fact in the incarnation. However Brunner will not allow 
himself to come to the point of saying this. On the one hand he 
defines the true self-impartation as a 'personal' meeting "in 
unconditional love", and yet et the same time he contradicts that 
definition by affirming that "Reason cannot conceive that which 
transcends it. "9 
Once again the source of this contradiction is the holding 
together of an immanence which sees the transcendent potential in 
human love, and a wholly transcendent love, which because of sin, 
severs all links with love as we know it. Thus here, too, the 
transcendent potential immanent in human history and 'personality' 
is at the last, moment_denied. The possibility of the divine love 
becoming a 'personal' event is beyond our conceptualisation. 
Neither human history, nor human personality can bear auch reality. 
Brunner says, "Reason knows nothing of such love or of such an event. " 
Thus the very. categories of history and personality which come 
together in the incarnation, must be seen to be discontinuous with 
any understanding we may have of history and personality. 
Moreover, if Brunner were to reply that even now this analysis 
has failed to grasp his point about the totally different nature of 
'personal' knowledge, then I should have to say that implicit here too 
is a total discontinuity between human reason and divine reason, which 
leads us to a contradiction similar to the ones already described. 
A point is always reached where the existence of two sorts of reason 
is asserted; the reason conceived by human sinfulness, and the reason 
of divine revelation. 
9. ibid., p. 369 
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Yet, even at this point, having checked out the thesis that the 
"alien' nature of revelation runs right to the centre of ©runner's 
theology, it would sUill'be a"mistake to seek to come to some final 
summary conclusion of the essence of his thought. It seems preferable 
rather to state the dichotomy rather than seek some final resolution. 
For the truth of the matter seems to be that at the heart there is a 
desperate attempt to hold together two insights which are fundamentally 
irreconcilable. There is something more akin to schizophrenia than 
a coherent nucleus of thought. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
REVELATIONt THE BIBLE AND THE CHURCH 
Although the discussion of the 'personal' and 'historical' in 
Brunner's theology leads to a rather frustrating impasse, there still 
remains the question of the source of his understanding of revelation. 
If the 'personal' and the 'historical' cannot be said to constitute 
and mediate that source in terms which human reason can comprehend, 
then in the final chapter of this study of Brunner's epistemology of 
salvation I shall examine his teaching about the Bible and the Church 
to see if the authority of the Christian message of salvation is to 
be discovered there. 
From the outset it is very clear that he regards the Bible as 
being God's revelation in some special way. "When we say that 
Christian faith is belief in Jesus Christ, we tacitly imply that it 
is faith in the Bible. No Bible - no Christ; no Bible - no word of 
God. "' At the beginning of his book Revelation and Reason, he says, 
f 
"Holy Scriptuze therefore does not only speak of the revelation; it 
is itself the, -revelation. "2 And yet, in spite of this virtual 
identification of scripture with revelation, the Bible is not to be 
understood as the divine disclosure in any literal or purely verbal 
sense. It is not the revelation of dogmatic propositions or doctrines. 
It does not present us with an accurate scientific and historical 
account of the world and the past. 
To understand. the Bible as revelation therefore does not demand 
a 'sacrificium intellectual. Like Bultmann, Brunner can insist that 
"the Biblical world view, cosmological and historical, has gone for good. "3 
1. The Word and the World, p. 83 
2. Revelation and R eason, p. 21 
3. -TFe' Word and the Word, p. 98 
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The Bible, as words and as history, even as theology, does not 
constitute the divine revolution. It is rather through the Bible 
that revelation encounters us. The Bible itself is not the message, 
but rather the medium through which the message is communicated. "But 
for the true Christian the Bible is not a divine oracle of instruction; 
it is the testimony or witness to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. "4 
Moreover, at"this point Brunner is not making a virtue out of 
the necessity of the modern-situation. For while a contemporary 
world view can only be said to clash with a Biblical view, this clash 
is a gain in the sense that it highlights-the danger inherent in 
Protestant orthodoxy, where it is all too easy to turn the Bible into 
an object of faith itself, in defiance of modern culture and science. 
All too often this view'of the Bible has produced an escape route for 
Christian apologetics, in that it invites-an understanding of faith as 
blind obedience, and rational understanding as the very antithesis of 
faith. Brunner is firm on this point. "Orthodoxy has made the 
Bible an independent divine thing, which just as such, as a corpus 
mortuum, is stamped with divine authority. "5 The obedience which 
ouch faith demands can only be described as idolatry. 
The Bible itself then is not divine, but rather the testimony to 
the divinity of Jesus Christ. Thus it is possible to see the 
relationship between the Bible and revelation, a relationship which 
makes sense in the context of the previous analysis. The Bible is 
witness to the divine revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. Once 
again the 'personal' is to be discovered at the heart of Brunner's 
understanding. Ne sets the centrality of the 'personal' self- 
revelation of God in Christ over against a literal view of Biblical 
4. ibid., p. 83 
5. ibid., p. 92 
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revelation. For such a view is just as dependent upon an illegitimate 
objective understanding of knowledge as the rationalism which he has 
,, o fiercely condemned. 
Brunner's understanding therefore of the relationship between 
the Bible and revelation can now be summarised and assessed. There 
are two important insights. The Bible is not itself divine 
revelation, but bears a unique witness to that revelation, for Jesus 
Christ himself is the true revelation. Brunner echoes Luther's 
thought, "The Scriptures are the crib wherein Christ is laid . jj6 
Moreover this revelation is to be understood as 'personal' encounter. 
But "this message is given in human form. "7 This means that because 
the Biblical revelation is a 'personal' reality it must not be reduced 
to literal, propositional truths, or even, for that matter to a 
formal doctrinal Christology. For such an identification leads 
ultimately to the confusion of faith with idolatrous obedience. 
It is this concept of the 'personal' which allows Brunner to 
distinguish between true and false claims to revelation, and hence 
between the truth and falsity of religion as a whole. Thus he is 
able to avoid the Scylla of rationalism and the Charybdis of 
superstition. He says, "Bible without Spirit is orthodoxy; Spirit 
without Bible is mysticism or rationalism. "© 
For Brunner the modern situation can easily appear to present 
a false choice between either a modern scientific view of the world 
which rejects a Biblical view, and with it the. revelation of the Bible 
itself, or else an acceptance of the literal and verbal inspiration of 
6. 'ibid., p. 94 
7. ibid., p. 95 
8. ibid., p. 90 
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the Bible.,. Behind the former alternative lies the autonomous human 
self, the Ego, which the Enlightenment has exalted as the ultimate 
arbiter between truth and falsity. Brunner says, "If the modern man 
feels himself rather repelled than attracted by the Bible, it is not 
because of its scientific insufficiency, but because of the rationalism 
which will not permit him to acknowledge any authority in matters of 
truth outside-of himself. "9 The rejection of the Bible as revelation 
is not so much an act of the reason which our scientific knowledge 
demands, but rather an act of sin itself, where the autonomous human 
self seeks to account for its own existence by rejecting the external 
claims of God who is other than us, the one who created us, and who 
claims us as his own. "The Bible with its clear assertion that it 
is the witness to the salvation in Christ, binds me to history, and 
to other men, and destroys the delusion of autonomous reason. It 
is the index of the fact that I do not have truth in myself, but have 
to get it from outside. "10 
For this reason the other alternative he offers is preferable, 
in that while the one casts aside the Bible, pearls and all, the other:, 
does at-least jealously guard the Bible, the corruptible with the 
incorruptible, the treasure with the chest in which it is contained. 
Nevertheless it is. still an error to confuse the message with its 
means of communication. For the message itself is misconstrued as a 
form of words, as an historical record, rather than as the 'personal' 
word of God to men and women in their lives and in their relationships. 
So Brunner says, "He who confuses the message with the material in 
which the message is written is foolish. But he who, because of this 
earthen material, despises the message is much more foolish. The 
former, the orthodox, after all is concerned about the message, and for 
9. ibid., p. 91 
10. ibid., p. 91-92 
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its sake he thinks the material to be holy, which is (so to speak) 
a piece of childish folly; but the other throws away the pearls 
because they are covered with sand. "11 
Biblical criticism however need not lead to a rejection of the 
Bible as God's revelation. There is a way in which the Bible can be 
understood as revelation; a way which has been open to us since the 
time of the Reformation. Biblical criticism merely confirms what., 
the Reformers taught about the Word of God in Scripture. At the 
same time it closes the door once and for all on the error of 
orthodoxy. It warns and instructs with the utmost clarity that the 
medium must not be mistaken for the message. At the same time the 
message must not be jettisoned, because in so doing the whole truth 
of the human situation is described. "This identification of human 
witness and divine revelation is destroyed for good. Orthodoxy has 
become impossible for anyone 'who knows anything of science. "12 In 
short the truth of the Biblical revelation is that in the Bible we 
encounter God's 'personal' word to us. It is God himself, through 
this 'personal', self-communication who validates the Biblical 
revelation. "We trust the Bible, not because somebody says it is 
God's Word, but because we hear God Himself say so. "13 A little earlier 
Brunner claims, "The revelation of God is not a book or a doctrine, but 
a living person'. "14 At the centre of the Biblical revelation therefore 
is the person of-Jesus Christ. 
From this evidence therefore it could be argued that Brunner's 
understanding of the nature of revelation in the Bible is centred, like 
his Christology, on this category of the 'personal'. It is by this 
11. ibid., p. 96 
12. ibid., p. 101 
13. ibid., p. 93 
14. ibid., p. 84 
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means that he can speak of "Scripture and the Holy Spirit as one - 
this'wan'the conception of true revelation which was held by the 
Reformers. "15 Scripture and Spirit both confirm the truth of the 
revelation they proclaim, in that behind both lies the 'personal' 
reality of Jesus Christ. Here is the norm which unites-and justifies 
the human witness both to scripture and the, spirit. It is a norm 
which repudiates the rationalism both of orthodoxy and idealism, for 
rationalism in both these forms seeks an objective-validation of its 
claims. In Christ however this objective rationalism is transcended, 
in that the autonomy of the human reason has to give way to the reality 
of faith-in both its freedom and responsibility. For it is only the 
"'I-Thou' relationship between God and man which the revelation in 
Christ embodies which is capable of breaking free from the epistemological 
prison of the 'I-it' categoryiin which a sinful humanity naturally 
conceives of its relationship with the world. Brunner says, "The 
core of the conflict is the question whether man will remain his own 
lord in his reason, or is willing to acknowledge God as his Lord, 
God, the Lord, is the God of the Bible, the God who declares his name 
in Jesus Christ, Whether we obey him or not is a question not of 
science, but of life, and one in comparison with which all questions 
of science become insignificant. 0116 
Once again; in spite of my previous criticismat it is possible 
to sense the great strength of this theological epistemology. 
Christian faith "is a question not of science, but of life. " Reality 
itself is not reason but faith. It is this 'personal' knowledge 
granted by-God in his self revelation which allows us to see knowledge 
as life,, und not as an autonomous intellectual pursuit. Furthermore 
15. ibid.,. p. 90 
16. ibid., p. 105 
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we can sea that. this-, reality of faith. ic an ethical reality. Brunner 
spealcs of it. on obedience, for reality is at once God's 'personal' 
claim, and humanity's 'personal' response. Because it is this 
'personal' claim it reaches humanity not no much as a rational choice 
or a freedom, which itself is merely the conceptýof human reason but 
rather as a claim that enables obedience. - Obedience is made possible 
by grace. We know that it is God's claim precisely because it is 
not objectively justifiable as a rational choice, but because we are 
encountered at this 'personal' level in a way that is creative of 
human personality in its freedom and responsibility. "The voice of 
God, 
_in 
the Bible captures our heart, unmasks our existence, and opens 
up before us a new possibility. " 
» Here we can glimpse Brunner's 
vision of reality no gracious, personal, moral and enabling. This 
is the burden of the Bible's message to humanity. This is why 
Biblical faith is still possible and necessary for the salvation of 
men and women.. 
And yet here, as above, I an not confident that a consistent 
exposition of this insight is offered.. - Just at the point at which 
it is possible to glimpse this 'personal' understanding holding 
together all the pieces of the jigsawýin a, coherent whole, revelation, 
scripture, the spirit and the person-of Jesus Christ, Brunner will 
not allow any continuity to be traced between the historical Jesus 
and the 'personal, ' self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The 
personal portrait of Jesus which a biographer might paint is proclaimed 
to have nothing to do with God's self-revelation. The personality of 
Jesus of Nazareth is of no interest to faith because it has its roots 
in an alien epistemology. "What interests the Church and the believer 
is Jesus Christ, - - the Jesus in whom God speaks to us His Word. The 
17. ibid., p. 93 
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'historical' Jesus i8 a corpse, a scientific abstraction which is of 
no value to use It was not the deeds, the life, the teaching of 
the rabbi Jesus, that Mark and Luke wanted to hand down to posterity; 
like the author of the Fourth Gospel they wanted to tell the deeds 
and the Word of Cod in Jesus Christ. "18 The personality of the 
rabbi, hie life, teaching und deeds, it seems are entirely discontinuous 
with the divine 'personal' revelation in Jesus Christ. Thus the very 
category from which Brunner's epistemology gains its strength is, 
at the last moment withdrawn again. Instead his theological 
epistemology is seen to be grounded in the category of revelation 
itself, a revelation that cannot be grounded in human history, reason 
or 'personality'. There seems to be no escape from the original 
conclusion reached in chapter eight that Brunner conceives of 
revelation as being 'extra nos at aliens noble'. It is a revelation 
that is groundless. The strength of the epistemology is actually 
derived from its groundlessness. 
An examination of Brunner's eccleaiology reveals a_similar pattern 
of thought, Just as he can-insist that without the Bible there would 
be no Word of Cod, so he aseerta, "There is no such thing as Christian 
faith without the Christian Church""19 However it must not be 
concluded from this that the Bible and the Church each has an 
independent relation to revelation. For it is the Church that produced 
the Bible, and it is from the Bible that the life of the church is 
renewed. " "We have the Bible through the Church, and we have the 
Church through the Bible. "20 This means that just as the Bible is 
the unique witness to God's revelation in Jesus Christ, so the Church 
is the only community in which salvation is to be found. Thus Brunner 
18. ibid., p. 88 
19, ibid., p. 106 
20, ibid., p. 112 
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wishes to underline the traditional doctrine that outside the Church 
there is no salvation. 
However, as previous analysis has revealed, this is only part 
of the story. Once again it is the 'personal' nature of revelation 
which we encounter in the Church which validates the claim that it 
is only there that salvation is to be found. For the Christian 
revelation is revelation of God's 'personal' commitment to men and 
women', 'and their 'personal' responsibility towards one another. "The 
Word of God can be found only in the message of the Church. And 
man can share in truth only by becoming a member of-that communion. 
In binding"me to Himselfi God ties me to man. "21 Thus it can be 
seen that not only does Brunner's ecclesiology reveal this same 
dependence upon the dimension of the 'personal', but also, that, 
inasmuch as community is the inevitable correlate of the 'personal', 
his ecclesiology marks the culmination of his theology. "Personal 
existence is ... existence in communion, in that communion which has 
its ground in God's Word. "22 God's 'personal' self-revelation creates 
my truly 'personal' existence, which in turn can only be understood 
in the. context of community. : Here is the essence of the.. gospel, and 
the Church is the unique expression and embodiment of it. "In the 
Christian idea, of the Church, human personality is conceived of as 
correlative-to community, and community to personality . m23 
The Church is the place where the individual finds his or her 
identity in the context of faith, freedom and responsibility. It 
is the place where community is founded upon God's word. Thus it 
is in the context of the Church that Brunner's intention to underline 
21. ibid., p. 119 
22. ibid., ] p. 122 
'23. ibid., p. 117-118 
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the, basic ethical reality of the gospel is to be witnessed. Not 
only is the Church the bearer of the word, but also expresses the 
grace which'enables the Christian in filth b bear his responsibility 
for his fellows. Faith in Jesus Christ is at the same time the 
discovery of personality and community, freedom and responsibility. 
The following extract from The Misunderstanding fthe Church 
illustrates this point. 
"The Ecclesia of the New Testament is the true but extremely 
paradoxical antithesis to both individualistic anarchy and totalitarian 
collectivism. To belong to the Ecclesia means both to be committed 
to the highest personal responsibii tý y and to renounce all merely 
private isolated individual existence. Faith in Jesus Christ is 
at one and the same time freedom and obligation and both in the 
highest degree. Only he is free who is reconciled with God, with 
himself and with his fellows; only he, is free who is utterly 
dependent upon God; and whosoever is "free indeed" through the Son 
who makes him dependent upon the Father, is entirely committed and 
entirely bound up with the life of his fellows. He is bound by 
the obligations of the situation in which he finds himself, and it 
is this constraint which makes him a real person; through it, his 
life is bound up firstly with those who share with him that deepest 
inner obligation and then also with those who have been created for 
the same God and for whose sakes the atoning death of Christ has 
taken place. For Jesus Christ died for the world and not merely 
for believers; he made atonement for all mankind and not for 
believers only. Therefore he who belongs to Him knows also that 
he owes all men the service of truth and love. " 24 
From this analysis therefore two points emerge; first it is 
the idea of the 'personal' nature of revelation which explains 
Brunner's ecclesiology, and secondly this understanding of the 'personal' 
in Jesus Christ finds its fullest expression in the freedom and 
responsibility, which the community of the body of Christ demands and 
enables. It is inasmuch as the fundamentally ethical reality of the 
gospel is expressed in his ecclesiology that we have claimed that 
Brunner's theology as a whole is perfected and culminates here. 
So far I have based my analysis very largely on his earlier work, 
24. The Misunderstanding of the Church, p. 114-115 
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The-Word and the, World. However there is confirmation of my thesis 
in Qrunner'e-The Mirunderstandinn. of-the Church. Here he claims to 
identify ® fundamental miaunderatanding of the nature of the Church 
which exists both in Roman, Catholic,. as-well as Protestant orthodoxy. 
This misunderstanding occurs whenever the 'personal' and the 
'community' nature of the Church are neglected and replaced by, an 
objective notion. of the revelation of. Cod's word. Thus Brunner 
argues that-: in Roman Catholicism the Church has come to be understood 
as a sacramental insitution which confers the saving reality of the 
gospel. Here revelation has become identified with an objective 
tradition, guaranteed by an episcopal and sacramental institution. 
In Protestantism the idea of 'c, ammunity' and thus of 'personality' 
has, been lost-on account of the distinction the Reformers made between 
the visible and invisible Murch. Here salvation has been underetood 
in terms of the individual, and thus the. Church has been seen as a 
'numerus electorum' - an invisible community not to be identified 
with the external and observable institution. Protestant ecclesiology 
thereforeýon the, whole failed to identify the community element as 
part of the gospel. The Church, was not seen as the 'communio, - 
sancto; um' expresaiye of the 'now' but 'not yet' of salvation., 
Instead it became merely an objective, aid. to salvation. It was the 
means, to: the, end of salvation, and not the end which-expresses the 
reality itself. 
Thus Brunner's thesis is that the Catholic tradition is right 
in that it stresses the visible community of the Church as the place 
where salvation. ia to be found. E3ut.. it is wrong in that it corrupted 
the essential community into an institution and organisation. -The 
'ecclesia' became the Church. The Protestants therefore were right 
to resist the idea of the ecclesia-as an organisation, a sacramental 
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institution capable of dispensing salvation. But they were wrong 
toýsee the Church merely as an external aid to a private individual 
salvation, whore the idea of"community is lost. Brunner says, "The 
Catholics are right: the Ecclesie of the New Testament is no externum 
Subsidium fidel, but the real thing. The Protestants are right: 
what the-Church has become as a matter of historical fact is not the 
real thing, but something which may very fittingly be understood as 
a means to an e6d. 025 
Against this Brunner presents his own thesis which we have 
analysed above. Fie himself explains it in the following way: 
"The Eccciesia of the New Testament, the fellowship of Christian 
believers, is precisely not that which every 'church' is at least 
in part -. an institution, a something. The body of Christ is 
nothing other than a fellowship of persona. It is 'the fellowship 
of Jesus Christ' or 'the fellowship of the Italy Ghost', where 
fellowship or koinonia signifies a common participation, a togetherness, 
a community life. The faithful are bound to each other through 
their common sharing in Christ and in the Holy Ghost. But that 
which they have in common is precisely no 'thing', no 'it', but a 
'he', Christ and His Holy Spirit. " 26 
The Church then is the bearer of the 'personal' revelation of Christ 
and His Spirit, and at the same time the reality of human salvation 
is found in the Church. For the Church is the only place where 
humanity finds its personal freedom and responsibility in the 
fellowship of community. "The Ecclesia, the Christian society, thus 
itself belongs to the substance of revelation and constitutes the 
true end of the latter. "27 
Once again it is possible to see as with ©runner's Christology, 
and his understanding of scripture, that it is this dimension of the 
'personal' which gives his ecclesiology its coherence. The ecclesia 
25. The Misunderstanding of the Church, . 10 
26. ibid., p. 10-11 
27. ibid., p. 14 
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is created by God's 'personal self-revelation' in Jesus Christ. 
However an essential correlate of the 'personal' revelation is the 
revelation and creation of-'community'. It is precisely these 
correlates of community and the 'personal' which allow Brunner to 
formulate his ethical proclamation of the gospel in its most 
impressive form: for inasmuch as freedom and responsibility in the 
community of the ecclesia form the substance of the Christian gospel 
of salvation, Brunner has been able to move away from an ethic 
rooted in legalism and rationalism, to an ethic rooted in grace. 
It is this ethical proclamation of the gospel which seems to justify 
his claim that Christian theology is not grounded in rationalism 
which merely expresses the sinfulness that has its source in the 
human ego, but rather in the divine 'personal' self-revelation. 
"The message of the cross and of reconciliation, the message which 
is the basis of the Church, is the one in which true freedom and 
community are founded. It is the message of God's personality which 
makes man personal; it is the message of God's love which creates 
communion. This message can be heard only in the Communion of Saints. "28 
Yet here, as before, can be discovered the same discontinuity 
between the 'personal', which describes our humanity as we know it, 
and the 'personal' which is the gift of divine revelation. "Man's 
life becomes personal in so far as his relation to his fellow-man is 
not objective but personal, in so for as he sees in him the one to 
which he belongs, i. e. in love ... But the love of which the N. T. 
speaks has its origin not in man but in God, in the fact, i. e. that 
God sets man in His love by His Word. "29 Thus it is not so much the 
'personal' which grounds Brunner's ideas of revelation, the Church, 
28. The Word and the World, p. 123-4 
29. lGid. 9 p. 120 
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human. freedom and responsibility, but rather a groundless revelation 
which validates. the idea of the 'personal'. So, although in his 
ecciesiology is to be discovered the most impressive explanation. of 
the 'personal' essence of revelation, nevertheless it cannot be 
said that even at this point it is able to transcend the basic flaw 
discovered earlier. 
-t In the, last analysis, in spite df his intention, Brunner is in 
error to claim that it is the 'personal' nature of revelation in the 
Bible, and the Church-which authorises faith. It has been 
established beyond-doubt that he'abhorrs any notiontof the continuity 
between the. world and humanity on the one hand, and revelation on 
the other. "Sympathetic 'feeling' and deep human understanding do 
not help us-here, for I cannot understand the message of the Crosa, 
as the-Bible means it, from my human point of view. "30 Step by step 
it has been'observed how"Brunner's description of revelation in 
terms of: -the ! historical', the 'personal' and the self-impartation 
of unconditional love disappear in the light of critical scrutiny. 
Nevertheless care must be taken not to bypass his claims that 
the Bible and the Church'are authoritative even though the basis of 
their authority which-he sought to establish proved to be insubstantial. 
In this sense his idea of revelation is not without content. It is 
not an abstract idea. He speaks of this salvation "contained in the 
Biblical message as the jewel is contained-in the goldsmith'ssetting. "31 
He assures us that "it'is through the preaching of the Church ... that 
man is pierced to the heart; the lie of-his existence and the truth 
of the divine message, is unveiled, so that he-knows his own foolishness, 
and in so doing the message of the Church becomes wisdom to him, and a 
30. Revelation and Reason, p. 166 
31. ibid., p. 2 
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precious treasure. "32 Does this mean then that the claims which 
are made for the 'personal' nature of revelation really obscure the 
true heart of Brunner's theology which is simply a reassertion of the 
authority of the Bible and Reformation doctrine? 
In the light of his outspoken attacks of the concepts that the 
Church is an institution authorised to dispense salvation, and that 
the Bible is an infallible historical and scientific record of the 
acts of God it will be difficult, on a first reading at least, to 
come to such a conclusion. He says, "No Church can guarantee the 
divine truth for me; if I want to have certainty, then I must get 
it from a more than human source. I can never believe something. is 
true simply. because a single person, or a particular group of people, 
or an ecclesiastical hierarchy, assures me that he can 'guarantee' that 
this is true. "33 A little further on he claims, "Christian faith is 
not faith ina closed Bible, but in an open Bible. It is not faith 
on an assumption, based on an authoritarian preconception ... Faith 
in the Scriptures does not precede the message which they proclaim 
but is produced by the letter, 034 
The Bible and the Church, then, are not themselves the source 
of the authority of the Christian message of salvation. They are 
however the unique setting in which that authority is revealed. The 
individual Christian is both bound to the scriptures and to the Church, 
and at the same time liberated from the letter of scripture, and the 
authority of the Church. It is in this rather paradoxical sense that 
Brunner reaffirms the traditional emphasis an the Bible and the Church. 
They may be authoritative, but they are not the seat of Christian 
authority. It seems therefore that this study has not yet penetrated 
32. ibid., p. 182-183 
33. ibid., p. 167 
34. ibid., p. 169 
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to the heart of the matter. However, the paradox noted above that the 
Christian is, bound to scripture and the Church, and at the same time 
liberated from them provides the clue that is needed. ' They are 
vital in that they are the sole'vehicles through which the Holy Spirit 
manifests himself. Brunner says, "This 'freedom, in being bound' 
and'this 'bondage in freedom' is the work of the Holy Spirit. What 
He"does'in'relation to the word of the Bible, He also does in relation 
to the word of the Church ... this salvation, which is contained in 
the Biblical message as the jewel is contained in the goldsmith's 
setting, can only become salvation .. as the Holy Spirit once more 
enables the heart of the blinded human being to see ýýýr, 
JS 
Thus very much at the centre of Brunner's thought is-the 
transformation in the hearts of men and women which the coming of the 
Spirit makes possible. It is the Spirit, who, in'alien guise, unlocks 
the door of our human alientation, and offers us access to God, and 
at the'same time to our-true-human nature. The Spirit is the secret 
content of revelation and the source of the authority of the message 
of salvation. "The ground, the authority, which moves me to faith is 
no other than Jesus Christ Himself as he speaks to me from the pages 
of the Scriptures through the Holy Spirit, as my Lord and my Redeemer. 
This is what men of old used to call the 'testimonium spiritus sancti 
internum'. "36 Once we have seen that the 'personal', 'historical', 
and 'scriptural' basis of authority is stripped away then what finally 
remains as the epistemological principle of Brunner's theology is the 
witness of the Spirit to its holy source. It is the principle of 
revelation defined in terms of the working of the Spirit. "The fact 
that this inner movement arises in the heart of man, a movement which 
35. ibid., p. 182 
36. ibid., p. 170 
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is the very opposite of the sinful striving for autonomy or independence; 
this is the work of the'Holy Spirit. "37 Quoting Paul, he goes on, "'But 
where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty', These statements 
should be, understood not only from the ethical point or view, but also 
from that of the theory of knowledge. The Holy Spirit, ss He who 
testifies to me the truth of the witness of the Scriptures, creates a 
'knowledge' of a new kind ... 
38 " 
There is some confirmation also that there is this 'spiritual' 
heart of Brunner's epistemology in that much of his language is 
reminiscent of pietism. There are images which conjure up an intense 
experience. It speaks of revelation producing "the illumination in my 
heart and mind, so that I can now see what I could not see before, and 
what so many are unable to see. "39 The revelation of the Spirit is 
the moment when "Christ takes my heart captive ... 1140 He goes on, 
.f- "Hence this faith means the effectual working of the Holy Spirit in 
the spirit of man, life-renewing energy, the principle of new birth 
and of sanctification. j941 
I conclude therefore that it is the Holy Spirit which is the 
'alien' strand in Brunner's epistemology, and therefore also ultimately 
the source of the mysterious new dimension of knowledge. In this 
sense the 'mystery' Brunner has so often referred to is rooted here 
rather than in the 'personal' which is has claimed. Thus I come to 
the end of my analysis of Brunner's theology for the purpose of this 
study. The path gives out at this point. 
ire rýýýr"i. rrr. 
37, ibid., p. 179 
38, ibid., p. 179 This provides surprising confirmation of what was discussed in-chapter eight when Brunner's reference to the 
encounter with the risen Christ as a personal spiritual reality 
was noted. There is was discovered that it was the spirit which 
ultimately validated language about 'personal encounter'. 
39. ibid., p. 170 
40. ibid., p. 175 
41. ibid., p. 184 
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I say that because a number of problems still remain. His 
insistence that the Bible and the Church have no objective authority, 
that it is the mysterious power of the Spirit alone which validates 
an-epistemology of salvation raises again the old problem of 
groundlessness., There is no attempt to answer the question 'how do we 
know? ' There is merely the assertion0 'we just know. ' He says, 
"When--the Holy Spirit testifies within me that the Word of Christ is 
the Truth, I know, myself, that it is true. I do not need any 
further human guarantee. 1142 Right at the outset of this study I 
noted that Van Til offered much the some criticism. " "In clutching 
in vain for the historic Christian position they (Barth and Brunner) 
were able to use only its form of words, without the content which 
gives them meaning and comfort. "43 While I reject the reorientation 
which Van Til looks for, his point that Brunner is the victim of the 
idealism he eschews is well made. For he offers us no way of 
discriminating between the reality of the Spirit and the spirit as 
a human idea. 
Finally, now that it is possible to see that the 'mystery' of 
Brunner's theology has its source in the power-of the Spirit rather 
than in the category of the 'personal', that leaves us with the 
question of what has happened to personal freedom, responsibility and 
even natural reason which that category allowed him to highlight. 
The language he offers is a language of power. He says, "Christ takes 
me captive through this witness of Scripture . 1144 It is 'mystery' 
and 'miracle'. "It is the divinely effectual miracle that man, 
through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, becomes able to see the 
truth of God in Jesus Christ . "45 , 
Human reason, by definition can be 
42. ibid., p. 178 
43. Van Til, The New Modernism, cf. p. 53 above 
44. ibid., p. 
45. ibid., p. 184 
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of no assistance. "It is not knowledge that I have gained by my 
own efforts, but it is that which I now have, which is neither capable 
of proof, nor, ihdeed, requires proof. "46 To read these words in 
the light of the emptiness we have discovered in the category of the 
'personal' is to raise the question of whether the whole moral 
emphasis of his thought is undermined. Thus the justice of ßlanshard's 
charge that Brunner's theology is guilty of moral nihilism becomes 
comprehensible. 
. 
Humanity is invited to believe. in a God "whose 
morality as explicitly set before him, is not above his human standard, 
but below it. "47 
However the purpose at this point is not to pursue the criticism 
of Brunner. Having identified the impasse, the aim now is to try to 
move beyond it. To this end I shall turn away from this strand of 
the 'alien' in Brunner's epistemology, and ask whether there is any 
way in which the categories of the 'personal' and the 'historical' 
which Brunner sought to locate at the centre of his thought, can be 
used in their own right to form the basis of an epistemology of 
salvation. 
46. ibid., p. 179 
47. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Belief, p. 280 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
AWAY FORWARD? I (1. THE 'PERSONAL' AND THE TRANSCENDENT) 
Once the 'aiien' ontology has been identified as the source of 
the impasse in Brunner's theology, then, if this study is to use 
anything of. his thought, it must begin to build with those points of 
contact-between humanity and God which he sought so strenuously, 
albeit in vain, - to establish. - To put the matter another ways the 
principle of immanence which he vehemently repudiated must be 
reaffirmed. This will no doubt prompt the allegation that the 
fundamental principle of neo-orthodox theology has been betrayed. 
However I begin this task attempting to be entirely pragmatic in 
my approach. It seems to me that however attractive it may be for 
theologians to speak first about the divine initiative, it must in 
the end, if such a starting-point is insisted upon, be judged an 
assertion which is indistinguishable from human fantasy. There is 
no other way to speak about God but in terms of human experience and 
using human words. I return to the basic question which theology 
cannot avoid. It is a painful question which leaves open the 
possibility of ultimate humiliation and defeat. There is no 
epistemological coup which the theologian can hope to bring off. He 
is perpetually confronted with the sober realisation that everything 
he says and writes may be nothing more than empty word-spinning. Is 
it possible for human accounts of experience and history, for human 
reason, argument and philosophy to speak of a divine reality? How 
for can a human epistemology mediate a divine ontology, and more 
importantly how far can it actually articulate the legitimacy of its 
claim to do so, showing the precise ways in which this is considered 
possible? This then is what I mean by reaffirming the principle of 
immanence. Initially at least it is fundamentally pragmatic. 
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However thin is not simply an attempt to put the dock back, and 
return to the theological agenda of the 19th century. Perhaps the 
moot apparent and appreciated valuo of nec-orthodoxy was the naº4 
awarenesvtof the divine grace which it offered to the theological 
debate. It did ceom that there was some truth in Barth and Brunner's 
interpretation of theology since the Enlightenment on being a largely 
fruitless and arid se, nrch for God. Yet, in the. laut analysis, this 
attempt to speak about God, as it were from the 'Cod-end', proved to 
be illusory. In this sense Cupitt's verdict is just when he says, "So 
neo-orthodoxy turned out to be a blind alley' When it passed away 
all the old questions that it had rejected came back again, tougher 
than ever after decades of neglect. "' 
From the perspective of this study however perhaps the most 
valuable-of Brunner's insights concerning epistemology is that it 
can be used to-mask the assertion of an illegitimate moral autonomy. 
It is all too easy for the inevitable subjectivity of our concept 
or the world to lead us to the false conclusion that the human subject 
is the centre not only of his or her concept of the world, but also 
of the world itself. Thd`fact that we do have to create the world 
for'ou'saelves in our own imaginations can lead us to think that we do 
actually exist at, the centre of the world in some factual sense, and 
that the world revolves around us. It exists to serve our needs and 
interests. In other words the factual reality of the essential. 
subjectivity of our knowledge may become a moral assertion of dominance 
over the world and others who live in it. The fact of our epistemological 
self-centredness may be transmwtediinto a moral self-centredness. 
Thus, it is perfectly logical for Brunner, speaking from a 
1. The Debate about Christ, p. 131, Don Cupitt 
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theological perspective, which cannot be rejected 'a priori' on the 
basis of the existence of the epistemological problem, to perceive it 
as a mask for human sin. The subjective autonomy reflected in the 
way we know, is interpreted as being a rejection of the supreme 
sovereignty of God. This is why Brunner will have no truck with 
attempts to solve the problem in the terms in which the problem itself 
dictates. Only an 'alien' ontology can save humanity from its 
inherent and essential subjectivity, 
Hero, however, it is all important to distinguish between the 
validity of Brunner's insight that the epistemological problem has a 
moral dimension which should enter our consideration, and the conclusion 
he derives from the equation of the problem with subjective autonomy. 
It is in his understanding of the relationship between the subjectivity 
of our knowledge and the assertion of autonomy that he makes the error. 
It is the one thing to see that a necessary epistemological 
subjectivity can lead to a false assertion of autonomy. out it is 
another to identify and equate the two. It is, in effect, quite 
easy to distinguish between a sober recognition that our knowledge of 
the world. is limited, and necessarily so, because the world exists 
initially for us sea concept we create, and the moral will to mould 
others and the world into the patterns we have created in our 
conceptualization. The shift from subjectivity to all pervasive 
autonomy is:: not at all a logical one. Even if we do have to create 
our own conceptual world to live in ourselves, that is manifestly not 
the same as'actually creating the external world itself. Of course 
we can be creative agents in the world, and are of course creative of 
our own species, but that is not to say that the world itself in any 
initial, or fundamental sense, is dependent upon us. 
In fact the logic of the epistemological problem points us precisely 
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in tho opposito direction. Although wo are at the centre of our 
awn world view, we ore dependent upon the world and our experience 
of it for that view. Indeed wo are also dependent upon the way 
others, individuals, societieo and cultures, conceive it. Thus 
the logic of the problem leads us to a recognition or dependence 
rather than an assertion of autonomy. Indeed this logic means that 
the fact of our dependence leaves open the question of whether 
ultimately its source is a transcendent God. In that sense the 
subjectivity of our knowledge does not militate against religious 
belief but positively prompts the question of its possibility. 
Nevertheless it is quite easy to understand how such a seomingly 
illogical shift is possible. One of our basic human needs is the need 
to feel secure in our relation with the world and with other human 
beings in it. In this sense the epiotemological problem both 
illustrates the threatening nature of our existence, and at the some 
time provides a potential escape from the threat. On the one hand 
it is an indication of the essential isolation of the subject in 
relation to others and the world. We are all islands, not knowing 
whether, or in what ways, our view of the whole actually corresponds 
to the whole, or even if there is such a thing as the whole. On the 
other hand the fact that we do actually conceive of the world as a 
whole, the fact that our existence does have a subjective centre, does 
provide a certain raw material out of which it is possible to create 
the security we need. Indeed the more we insist on, the more 
confidence we have in our view of the world and the more we are able 
to ensure that our view prevails, the greater security we feel. In 
this sense the threatening nature of our existence which the epistemological 
problem reveals can paradoxically be transformed into a greater security 
by means of this some subjectivity. Everything can depend upon the 
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authority, power end succeos with which our view can dominate or 
control the views of others. 
Thus it is not so much our reason which makes the shift from the 
subjectivity of our knowledge to an assertion of autonomy over against 
the world and other people, but rather a subjective need. Our reason 
is seen to depend upon our concern to be accorded value, and to give 
value to ourselves. In this sense there is a moral dimension at the 
heart of human existence which is prior to our reason. Moreover this 
moral dimension - and here Brunner is quite right - can use reason as 
the means by which it seeks to achieve personal security. Reason can 
become the tool of our search for value, and reflect merely the 
security we prize. 
What is interesting here is that we have discovered a prior moral 
category which affects our conceptualisation of the world and of other 
people, but which is not directly derived from the external reality 
which our conceptualisation mediates. One might argue against this 
however and suggest that the value of myself which I apprehend is 
mediated through a knowlodge of the world, for it is the world itself 
which provides me with the incentive to survive. But even the incentive 
to survive, although in one sense natural and manifest in the world, 
cannot actually be deduced from it, For the value which we apprehend 
as centred in ourselves can be both in harmony with the world but at 
the same time at odds with it. Thus even the in cntivu to survive, 
although visible in the world, is a primitive manifestation of the 
prior moral category. The actual desire for, and drive to, life has 
an intrinsic moral dimension. A biological explanation of human life 
is valid only up to a certain point. 
Similarly, although it is possible to describe human needs and 
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personality itself in psychological t©rms, the fact of reed contains 
an irreducible and intrinsic moral quality. heed pr©cupposea v©lue. 
UUy. need. fox food and shelter and sex, not-to mention the other needs 
of which I am aware, are inseparable from the value which I apprehend 
in myself and which I accord to myself. In fact my needs are in a 
sense both an expression and a result of the value I grant to myself. 
And we must not overlook the claim of the sociologist to 
contribute to this debate. Yet, here also, although it is possible 
to describe human need and identity in sociological terms, the actual 
fabric of society is founded upon the axis of dependency and 
responsibility which themselves are terms of value. Dependency and 
responsibility presuppose value. Thus, whether we speak about human 
life in biological, psychological or uaciological terms, in the last 
analysis, we encounter the fact of value which those categoriou cannot 
fully explain. Human life does not have an intrinsic biological, 
psychological or sociological value. Biology, psychology and sociology 
are human means of exploring the value life has for us rather than 
means by which we explain it. 
Paradoxically, we have begun to speak of human value in terms of 
a need for security which drives us to insist on our autonomy over 
against the world and other people. This need leads us to asaert 
our own needs 1n opposition the needs of others. And yet, just no 
with the epistemological problem, the logic of the value dimension in 
human life drives us in the opposite direction. The fact of the matter 
is that we are dependent di ent upon others for the value which we are able 
to give ourselves, just as others are dependent upon 'us. Thus the logic 
implicit in our recognition of value leads us not towards an insistence 
upon subjective autonomy but in the direction of dependency again. And 
this notion of dependency introduces in turn the ideas of responsibility 
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and freedom., Thus the imposition of my value at the expense of 
others is in factýa denial of the basic axis of dependency and 
responsibility which constitutes value as we apprehend it. 
Once again, therefore, the actual fact of value raises the 
question of its source. The 'a priori' nature of our dependency 
upon others, in that it is only through others and as a result of 
others that we-actually apprehend our own value, even more insistently 
raises the question of whether the fact of dependency itself is an 
indication that ultimately we derive our value from a transcendent 
source. 
We discover therefore that the relationship between the essential 
subjectivity of our knowledge of the world, and our potentiality for 
imposing our subjective autonomy upon the world and others, reveals 
a twofold possibility stemming from that initial apprehension of value. 
On the one hand both the limited and subjective nature of our knowledge 
of the world, as well as the apprehension of the dependent nature of 
the value we attribute to ourselves, leads us to a concept of dependence 
which raises the question, but does not offer the answer, of whether 
ultimately our dependence rests upon that which is transcendent. On 
the other hand the very apprehension of value which we discover at 
the centre of human existence drives us to search for a security of 
life and. identity which can often lead to the imposition of our own 
values and the arbitrary rejection of the values of others. 
This basic point is really the foundation of my argument. Brunner 
is right to see a connection between the epistemological problem and 
the imposition of subjective autonomy upon the world and others but he 
is wrong to try to equate the two. This is what drives him to the 
conclusion that an 'alien' ontology alone can offer humanity salvation. 
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In my view it is possible-to distinguish between a natural and legitimate 
expression of human subjectivity which is logically able to raise the 
question of transcendence, on the basis of both conceptual and moral 
dependence, and an illogical, but psychologically comprehensible 
assertion of an illegitimate autonomy and independence. 
Understood'in this light Brunner's insight illuminates a double 
problem for the theologian. The fact that we can distinguish between 
an authentic subjectivity in terms of our knowledge of the world 
and an inauthentic subjective autonomy and independence over against 
the world means that the theologian has to see danger on two fronts 
and not just on, one. However before the double danger can be 
appreciated it must be understood that no rational argument can be 
expected to take precedence over that area of our existence where we 
apprehend our value. - The drive to personal security which autonomy 
and independence can symbolise, is not subject to rational or logical 
control because our 'reason' may easily be the product of the very 
drive itself. We must accept that this is the price that has to be 
paid once the 'a priori' nature of value is recognised. Of course 
that is not to say that logic and reason do not play a part in the 
drama of our own subjective attempts to come to terms with, and express, 
our identity. But they do not exist before all else at the heart of 
what it means to be a person. Therefore this one factor militates 
against logic and reason using the category of human epistemology to 
speak of the possibility of a transcendent ontology. 
Brunner therefore is right to criticise rationalism, idealism 
and scepticism inasmuch-as they seek to seal off in a quite arbitrary 
way our reason and our search for meaning from the question of the 
transcendent. For, asýwe have aeon, it is a logical question given 
the subjectivity oVhuman knowledge and the 'a priori' nature of our 
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apprehension of value, whereas the assertion of autonomy and 
independence is not in itself logical at `all. 
However, at the some time, he does not see another dimension of 
the problem. Brunner's solution to both the problem of the 
subjectivity of human knowledge, as well as the sinful assertion of 
a false independence and autonomy, as has been seen above, is the 
appeal to an 'alien' ontology of revelation. But such an ontology 
is suspect because it makes metaphysical knowledge claims which go 
beyond the limited subjective nature of our knowledge. The 
difficulty lies not so much in the metaphysical nature of the claims, 
as in the fact that they ignore the basic principles of epistemology 
which is that'. all knowledge=claims must be judged to be constructs 
of the human. -mind. Thus an 'alien'-religious ontology such-ss 
Brunner offers'merely short-circuits the epistemological problem. 
Moreover the distinction I have tried to draw makes it possible 
to see that the assertion of such an ontology can be but an oblique 
manifestation of the moral inauthenticity which Brunner has identified 
in rationalism, scepticism and idealism. He stresses the authenticity 
of dependence and obedience over against the assertion of autonomy. 
What he does not appreciate is that dependence and obedience can 
express themselves inauthentically too. It has already been argued 
that the search for security can lead to an over-confident and illogical 
assertion of subjective autonomy and freedom. However the search for 
security can have the opposite effect. We can seek security in a 
dependence which shies away from a natural freedom and responsibility. 
We can find security by renouncing our subjective responsibility just 
as much as by asserting our subjective autonomy and independence. Mere 
assent to an 'alien' creed, an 'alien' moral code and an 'alien' 
religious ontology offers much the same illusion of control and power. 
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For the epistemological problem teaches us that such religious claims 
are first and foremost constructs of the human mind. We have in an 
oblique way achieved just as illegitimate an autonomy by taking such 
a step of 'faith', as we have by a straightforward assertion. We 
might claim that the source of the attraction and power of an 'alien' 
ontology is that it'absolves us from the need to think and to trust 
at"a truly 'personal' level. Indeed the lack of an epistemological 
basis not only for Brunner's 'alien' ontology, but-also for many 
religious statements would seem to confirm such a suspicion. We can 
assert our 'autonomy just as much by creating and 'controlling' an 
imaginary transcendence as by denying transcendence altogether. 
I began this chapter by reaffirming the principle of immanence 
on a purely' pragmatic basis. However now that the implications of 
this proposal have been explored it is a principle which can be seen 
to have a vital theological significance. It is necessary to accept 
that no contemporary theology can bypass or short-circuit the 
essential subjectivity" of human knowing. ' However directly individual 
human beings can have knowledge of God, theology and even religion 
itself are in the business of speaking about God at an essentially 
human level. At-the some time this sober recognition of limitation 
does not necessarily lead to an assertion of subjective autonomy and 
independence. Rather does it illustrate human dependency upon that 
which is other, whether it is in terms of our actual experience of the 
world, the concepts of the world we derive from others, or the moral 
values we learn. What we face therefore is not so much the need for 
a divine take-over of our false autonomy, but rather the courage to 
face up to the significance of being dependent and responsible, and 
ask the question whether our dependence and responsibility are derived 
from a transcendent source and what meaning we must attach to them if 
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they are so derived, Clearly human subjectivity needs that which is 
outsido; it., nut whether that which transcends it can be spoken of in 
theological terms is another matter. Paradoxically it would seem 
that the$truggle-for subjective autonomy in face of the problem of 
subjectivity, whether in. terms, of a denial of transcendence or in 
terms of a contrived hereonomy, would. seem to underline the 
subjective., need of what. is. 'other', if only because. of its essentially 
illogical nature., Thus both,. idealism and neo-orthodoxy would seem 
to be important not so much in terms of the answers which they give to 
the epistemological problem, but rather in the fact that they highlight 
that it is human need which is the real problem which lies behind the 
pröblem of epistemology. 
Howevorfthe distinction I have drawn while it involyea: the 
rejection of the-neo-orthodox element in Brunner's theology does mean 
that it is possible, positively. encouraged by the logic of this 
analysis, to buildthp. more clearly on the. two central insights, 
which hs. brings. together in his understanding of the incarnation, 
namely-the: 'personal' and the 'historical'. Despite the. 'alien' 
nature of ßrunner's concept of revelation, this study identifies an 
impasse in his theology, caused by. the fact that on the one hand 
revelation, is. thought, of as being 'alien', while-on the other hand 
there-is a dimension in human experience of the-world, persona and 
history which does open, itself to. the transcendent. Thus, starting 
from Brunner himself, it is possible to explore-the immanence of the 
'personal'. 
He states clearly that nothing can destroy a basic awareness of 
responsibility which is intrinsic in human nature. "Responsibility 
is-part-of the unchangeable structure of man's being. "2 There is- 
2. Dogmatics II, p. 57 
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therefore a moral element intrinsic to human subjectivity. This 
means that the 'i-it' model of human knowledge which is capable of 
distorting everything except our own subjective awareness of actual 
objects in'the world is not a satisfactory category to mediate the 
full reality of human subjectivity., 'There is immanent in human 
nature a dimension which cannot be satisfied simply by the 
objectivity of the world and by transforming into an object all that 
exists outside our subjectivity. Here then is one legitimate point 
of departure. 
At the; same time Brunner is emphatic in his claim that 
Christianity is an historical religion. By that of course he does 
not simply mean that it is an historical phenomenon. For all religion 
is historical in that sense. Nis understanding is rather that 
human salvation has actually taken place in history. This is why 
he asserts that without Easter there would be no salvation. Easter 
is an historical event. He speaks of it as a 'fact'. For Brunner 
Easter is the historical turning-point which has transformed the 
whole destiny of humanity, He sayag "Certainly we may look forward 
in-faith to the day of the victory of Joaus, and from this point of 
view we can look back to Good Friday and Easter as the point at which 
the decision was made, ' once for e11.03 Moreover, although this study 
has been critical of whether Brunner's statements about Easter can 
truly be said to be historical, nevertheless there does seem to be a 
train in Brunner's thought which refers to the essentially historical 
nature of Christian faith. As stated above he says, "No reliable 
historian would object to the fact of the appearances of the Risen 
Lord as auch ... "4 Following this particular strand of Brunner's 
3. Do matics II, p. 305 
4. Dogmatics , p. 369 
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thought, sind indeed the analysis in this study of N. T. evidence 
pertaining to tho reeurroction which seemed to encourage the idea 
that there is a-continuum between historical events und their 
transcendent-orirjin, it would seem possible to explore the moaning 
of claims that historical events can be understood as having a 
transcendent' origin and indeed to point to that transcendence as 
their-origin, in addition to'and beyond their empirical causes. 
There seems to be nothing illogical in admitting the possibility of 
suah. an interpretation. Here too therefore is to be found a 
platform from which to explore what it might mean to speak of a 
Christian epistemology of salvation. 
The definition of the remaining task in this study has now 
become possible. I have reaffirmed the principle of immanence in 
the context of the question of how far the 'personal' and 'historical' 
dimensions of human existence can mediate the divine transcendence. 
The task then is to explore that possibility, and reconcile it with 
the opposite tension that has been discovered. For that very same 
subjectivity which may open itself to the transcendent is also likely 
to assert an autonomy either in'terms of a denial of transcendence, or 
inUrms of reliance upon's pseudo-heteronomy. In each of these cases 
the logic of such an assertion is not at all obvious even though it 
is posoible to understand why it occurs. In other'words the 'personal' 
is capable of raising the question of whether its true correlate is 
in the transcendent, and at the same time it is capable of imposing 
on autonomy which seeks control and power for itself over the world. 
My, task is to explore the one question without losing sight of the 
other. z 
Brunner saw his understanding of the 'personal' nature of 
revelation as a major contribution to the development of a modern 
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theological epistemology. The 'I-Thou? dimension of knowledge over 
against the objective 'I-it' model enables an understanding albeit 
only-in-an approximate way of the actual nature of revelation. It 
is possible to see why, looking at the epistemological problem from 
the perspective of revelation itself, Brunner's concept seemed to 
offer a breakthrough for a modern theological epistemology. It made 
revolution comprehensible without reducing it to the necessary limits 
of human objective knowledge. From the perspective of this study 
however and its stress on the inevitable limitations of human knowledge 
which wo are called upon to accept as a definition of the human condition, 
it seems less of a breakthrough. For effectively Brunner is merely 
underlining the priority of personal value which we apprehend in our 
existence which cannot satisfactorily be reduced to objective categories. 
Seen in this light he is echoing the insight of Kant that the moral 
has an 'a priori' quality in our apprehension of what it means to be 
a human being. 
Nevertheless he is right in his basic point to insist that the 
'personal' has a priority and that it is a distinct dimension of 
knowledge. However the fact that he looko at it in terms of an 
understanding of revelation means that he divorces it entirely from 
the 'I-it' dimension. It is the 'alien' nature of revelation itself 
which determines the distinction. I have argued however that such 
a distinction is no longer necessary. The 'personal' and the 
'objective' dimensions of knowledge although distinguishable are 
interconnected. Our apprehension of value, according to this argument, 
although 'a priori', does not occur in a vacuum. We give value to 
the world and objects in the world. Even human beings are objects 
at a certain basic level. The objective is the medium through which 
our subjective humanity is expressed. We can only recognise the 'I' 
251 
by mednsof the 'it'. The dimension of moral responsibility, which 
is tho recognition that the person as a porcon has value and rights, 
while not derivable from the empirical realities of-need and support, 
ie mediated through those realities. In this sense it would mean 
nothing to speak of personal worth and value in isolation from an 
objective model. 
However the fact that-personal value cannot be deduced from 
objective knowledga, helpa to explain why it is that although value is 
expressed in terms of objects and persons in the world it is also 
possible to deny that'value, and treat a person simply as an object. 
Flare it is important, to"noticeýthat the objective does not itself 
deny the 'personal'. Rather is it the 'personal' itself which, in 
its own interest, can choose to dehumanise that which is human in the 
world. For, having recognised the priority of the 'personal' in 
terms-of 'my'. -need, it is possible os it were to regress and treat 
persons as-objects in°order to meet 'my' personal needs. Thus, while 
we recognise the 'personal' through the objective, the one being 
dependent upon the other, it is equally possible to reverse the process 
and deny the 'Thou' dimension in the other in order to affirm the 'I' 
dimension in myself. 
Following the pattern of my previous analysis it would seem 
possible-to do this in two ways. We might assert our own autonomy 
and independence and impose it on others, treating them as objective 
means to our personal end. On the other hand we might remain in 
total dependence upon another person or a group, so that here too the 
other 'Thou'"effectively becomes an object serving 'my' ends. For in 
this-case 'my' needs only hinder the other from's truly personal 
expression of freedom and responsibility in relation to me. In 
Christianity it is all too easy for Jesus, the Bible and the Church 
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to fulfil such a role. Religion may becone that 'alien' reality 
from which we derive our uccurity, and to-which and for which we 
are prepared to sacrifice our freedom in the interests of no longer 
being responsible for our destiny. 
Even now we have not exhausted the various permutations of the 
relationship between the 'personal' and the 'objective'. Just as 
the 'personal' need and insecurity can reduce the 'personal' itself 
to the objective, so 'personal' need and responsibility can invest 
the objoctive world with the dimension or the 'personal'. Thus we 
can express personal responsibility in the way we use the resources 
of the world, in the way we create our environment. Nature and the 
world. of animals are often described by poets and writers in terms 
which invost them with 'personal' meaning and significance. And this 
is not to be seen so much as a romantic fantasy, as a way of adding a 
new and authentic dignity to the world. , It is this possibility which 
allows Us to give 'personaV purpose to the tasks we perform. 
Finally, this capacity to lend a 'personal' dimension to the 
'objective' world, the capacity we might say to transcend the 'objective', 
raises the question as to whether, in view of the fact that the 
'objective' world cannot demonstrate or explain the 'personal' 
significance we discover in it, whether the 'personal' itself can only 
be understood in terms of that which transcends it, and which lends it 
its 'a priori' uniqueness. It seems that the world itself cannot 
answer human need in any ultimate sense. Often we long in vain to 
discover 'personal' meaning for our lives in what seems an alien and 
disinterested world. As 'persons' we are appalled by natural 
calamity and disaster. We grieve over the death of a loved one. Thus 
death which is natural in the 'objective' world is often alien and 
brutal to our 'personal' sensitivity. That 'personal' love should 
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transcend death seeps natural to the logic of such love. In such a 
context wo can sense the force of Tillich's question as to whether we 
can only understand the anxiety we feel in association with guilt, 
death and meaning in a theological context. Is there after all an 
image of God in humanity which we can see reflected in the 'personal' 
quality'wo apprehend in our lives? Is David Jenkins perhaps right to 
suggest that'theology could only have been reduced to anthropology 
because it reflects the theological origin of humanity? 
5 
Although it is possible at this point to raise the question of the 
legitimacy of speaking theologically the threshold into doing theology 
has not yet been crossed. This preliminary analysis has merely been 
clearing the ground in preparation. However already it is possible 
to begin to understand what it might mean to speak of sin. It is 
also possible to see a way of avoiding Brunner's confusion of 
understanding reason itself to be derived from sin. I have given 
the outline of a natural progression from reason to the possibility 
of faith. Objective knowledge is the plainest knowledge we have of 
the world itself. And yet this objective knowledge is permeated with 
the 'a priori' apprehension of 'personal' value. The security our 
knowledge offers gives way at its boundary to a dependency which makes 
faith both a practical and logical possibility. We might speak of sin 
as the fundamentally irrational and illogical blocking off of that final 
stager the attempt to secure for ourselves the personal value we 
apprehend by objectifying the world, other people and religion. 
To sum up these observations on the relationship between the 
'objective' and the 'personal', the distinction identified earlier 
between the essential and authentic rational subjectivity of knowledge 
S. The Glory of Ilan, p. 79 
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and the imposition of a subjective autonomy upon the world and others 
helps two things to be grasped. First it is possible to understand 
how subjective knowledge of the world can move via the category of the 
'personal' to the'threehold of faith. Secondly it i's possible to 
understand that the subjectivity of our knowledge can guard and extend 
its objective pretensions. - It-Is the claim of this study, seeking 
to'pürsue Brunner's insight, that the''personall, building on, and 
making use'of`the objective can provide an'epistemological path to 
the possibility of faith. 
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CIIAP TER TWELVE 
A WAY FORWARD? : (2. HISTORY AND TRANSCENDENCE) 
From the 'personal'"I turn now to the 'historical'. In the 
sphere of 'history' also there is a basic question to answer. It 
is important, if the principle of immanence is offered as the 
starting point for the-theological enterprise, to understand in what 
sense the transcendent can be said to be immanent in history. I 
shall try to show that while there are similarities between the categories 
of the 'personal'_and the 'historical' they cannot finally be said to 
be comparable. I shall claim rather that it is possible to understand 
the 'historical' as the 'arena' in which the 'personal' comprehends 
or is grasped by the transcendent, i. e. that the 'personal' itself 
provides the 'continuum' between history and transcendence. 
Two stages are necessary therefore in this-analysis. The first 
is to explore the relationship between history and transcendence, 
The second-is to. explore the relationship between all three categories, 
the 'historical', the transcendent and the 'personal'. 
In earlier chapters I have criticised Brunner's understanding of 
the relationship between history and transcendence on two grounds. 
In the first place he claims that Christianity is an historical 
religion, but fails to justify how the doctrines of the incarnation 
and resurrection can be said to be historical. For him it is not 
so much history which furnishes the content of Christian faith, but 
rather revelation itself. Thus, secondly, ho repudiates any 
'continuum' between history and faith. however, it may prove easier 
to criticise Brunner's failure to establish a 'continuum' than it is 
to explain how history might be said to mediate the transcendent. 
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-. Aa a beginning it is possible to identify two ways,, of looking 
at the matter. In the first place it would seem logically proper 
for a person to think and speak of events having a transcendent cause. 
Take the case of someone who has been diagnosed to have an incurable 
cancer, or someone who is seemingly hopelessly trapped in a pit 
disaster. Let us suppose that the person with cancer is cured, and 
that the person trapped is rescued. Furthermore, particularly if 
these events are seen to be a contradiction of natural probability, 
or do not have any explanation, or have occurred against impossible 
odds, we can understand why the person cured of cancer might claim, 
'God cured me' or-why the man rescued from the pit might conclude, 
'God rescued me'. 
It is important to understand that the suggestion is not being 
made that the circumstances referred to in these examples are in any 
sense necessary conditions for the conclusion reached, or for that 
matter that the conclusion is a necessary conclusion. There are. 
certain qualifications and clarifications that it is appropriate to 
make in connection with these examples therefore. First the 
conclusion that God cured me cannot be deduced from the fact that 
all other explanations have failed. Second, the person in such a 
situation would not inevitably come to the conclusion that Cod was 
responsible. Third, the verdict that God has been involved in an 
event in some way is possible and legitimate even if it has a natural 
explanation, and does not appear at all out of the ordinary. Finally, 
there is no implication that these events provide the only background 
to the examples. The individual will inevitably bring his or her own 
values and beliefs to bear on the situation. Nevertheless in spite 
of these essential qualifications it is still possible to understand 
why the person might claim that a miracle had occurred. Moreover it 
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would also be illogical to deny categorically that this is what had 
actually taken place. 
There are two ways in which the logic of the conclusion can be 
expounded. It is possible to think of the transcendent as being 
historically immanent in the natural and historical processes. This 
is very similar to the way in which God is thought of as being the 
transcendent creator immanent in the natural dynamic of creation. 
Thus, as I recover from an illness, I might feel that God is aiding 
my r©covery-rig a creative, part of the natural processes of healing. 
It is also possible to think in terms of a dramatic divine inter- 
vention where the so-called natural laws are 'suspended'. In this 
case it might be argued that if the so-called natural laws have their 
origin in the divine will, it is perfectly logical to think of the 
divine will actively 'suspending' them. 
a 
So Richard Swinburne says, "If there is quite a bit of evidence 
that there is a God responsible for the natural order, then any 
violations are plausibly attributed to his agency and so plausibly 
recognised as miracles. "' 
What I am saying, therefore, is that there would seem to be 
nothing logically improper in considering that an historical event 
hada transcendent cause. Moreover, in the light of these examples, 
it would seem perfectly possible for someone who claimed to recognise 
God's activity in his or her life on the basis of a cancer cure, or a 
dramatic rescue from certain death, to consider that the whole of 
history is under a transcendent and providential control. 
1., R. Swinburne, Faith add Reason, p. 188 
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Admittedly: it-is not as easy to think of the transcendent being related 
to the 'historical' as it is to the 'personal', nevertheless it is 
possible to think of God as a transcendent cause of history in a way 
that is different from all other historical causes. It is possible 
for me to understand how and why something has happened and still 
believe that God is responsible. This, then, would constitute the 
first-way of looking at the matter of the relationship between 
history and the transcendent. 
However, when the question is asked, "How can I claim to know 
that this event had a transcendent cause? " it is then that the 
problems arise. They arise moreover at two points: first in 
connection with the epistemological justification, (how can I claim 
to know this? ) and secondly with regard to what is meant by a 
transcendent cause, a problem hinted at in the previous paragraph. 
I have argued in this study that human knowledge is a construct 
of the subjective mind. Now historical knowledge is no exception. 
That is not to suggest that there is no external correlate to the 
human mind. It is not ultimately to be doubted that there is an 
external reality, in terms of objects and events which exist as the 
raw material out of which human concepts are formed. Nevertheless 
the reality as we conceive it, in our attempt to mediate and 'know' 
what actually is the case, must remain a human construct. Thus, if 
this situation is related to history, while no one can truly doubt 
that events do happen in the external world, those events, when the 
historian seeks to record them as facts, are at that point an 
interpretation. They have become events which are no longer what they 
were in themselves, in terms of the vast complex of the dynamic of 
what might be called 'happening'. As soon as they are recorded they 
are a human subjective interpretation. 
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In this sense all history, even though the historian struggles 
to record what actually took place, can be said to be interpretation. 
There is therefore no escape from the essentially limited nature of 
historical knowledge. The historian can never claim to uncover 
events in anything like their full objectivity. On, the other hand 
this is not to "say that the subjective nature of the knowledge means 
that every different interpretation is equally valid. The historian 
will still be able to record that the Queen celebrated her Silver 
Jubilee in 1977, and consider that to be an 'objective' fact. Also 
he might still and will indeed very often, wish to claim that one 
particular way of interpreting certain events, is more likely to 
represent the way things actually happened than some other interpretation. 
This means that although the historian may be sceptical about his 
ability to say finally what took place, it nevertheless makes sense 
for him to strive to mediate the 'reality' of the events, and, moreover, 
it behoves him to be confident in his ability to claim that one 
historical verdict may be more appropriate than another. 
At this point the brief analysis of the relationship between history 
and the epistemological problem allows the problematic nature of claims 
which refer to events having a transcendent cause to emerge and to be 
grasped. ," My purpose here has not been so much to debate the issue of 
theýreletionship between fact and interpretation in historiography, it 
has been rather to register the-topic as a problem. Suffice it to suggest 
that, if there is a question mark over the historian's ability to mediate 
events at the level of empirical reality, how much the more will there be 
a question mark over his claims to have knowledge that an event has a 
metaphysical cause. Hore then is the first problem associated with any 
claim that history has mediated the transcendent. It would seem that 
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a statement like 'Cod cured my cancer' can only be understood as a 
statement of the individual's own conception and belief concerning 
what has taken place rather than an actual. mediation of the event 
itself. For such an event, from an empirical and historical point 
of viewirhas no way of being examined, or the language of being 
tested for appropriateness. 
The second problem has to do with what it means to speak of a 
, 'transcendent cause' of an event. An effect this simply allows the 
same difficulty to be explored from a slightly different perspective. 
I think it is important here to make clear a , significant distinction 
between on the one hand attempts to speak of an event as having a 
transcendent cause, and on the other of an event being interpreted 
as having a transcendent significance. We have already seen how 
the interpretative nature of the historical and the complexities of 
historical-interpretation mean that access to the ontological in terms 
of the actual way in which the facts, events and motives were is 
difficult to conceive. While we have'an eagerness and zeal to get 
at the truth of what happened, at the same time the nature of our 
historical. knowledge illustrates supremely well the limited nature of 
all knowledge. - History should be seen as a tool which refines and 
shapes our incomplete, understaniing rather than aprescription which 
proves 'the truth of the way things were or are. This fact makes it 
hard to see how it would be possible to. check the truth of a claim that 
a specific event had a transcendent cause. 
Let us take two examples which may help to make a difficult problem 
more tractable. In the first place I shall refer again to the 
, $miraculous' cure of an incurable cancer, where the person involved 
attributer the cure to God. And secondly I shall take an example which 
will tie in, with the later discussion of the resurrection. And here 
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therecis no attempt made to refer specifically to the N. T. material, 
or any implication that this illustration represents what the N. T. 
eayo. The body of a man was placed in a tomb. The tomb was sealed 
and guarded. -Throe days later it was opened and found to be empty. 
The conclusion is reached that God has raised the man. 
In each case a specific event has been attributed to a transcendent 
cause. A historical event is claimed to mediate a transcendent 
ontology. However to begin with we might be puzzled as to what is 
actually meant by a 'transcendent cause'. We might perhaps consider 
the whole world, and, in view of the fact that the reason for the 
world's existence is not self-evident, argue that this might lead us 
in the direction of concluding that it has a transcendent cause. But 
the matter is rather different in the cases of a cancer cure and the 
disappearance of a body from a tomb. How does the conclusion that 
the explanation is a 'transcendent cause' differ from the conclusion 
that I cannot explain the cause at all? We might be tempted in such 
circumstances to argue that to speak of a 'transcendent cause' is a 
logical contradiction, for a cause by definition implies something 
finite and empirical. In other words it is very difficult for us 
tö'think'of"a cancer being cured apart from certain chemical and 
biological changes having taken place. Similarly it is hard for us 
to think of a, body disappearing from a tomb without some physically 
calculable forces being exerted upon it. 
Indeed the fact that the conclusion that the event had a 
transcendent cause cannot be distinguished from the conclusion that 
the event has no explanation, would seem to be confirmed by the fact 
that the likely result of being confronted by such an event would be 
sheer bewilderment and confusion. We seem to have reached a situation 
where history is no longer able'to help us. Under euch circumstances 
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the natural outcome'is for us to continue to speculate as to likely 
empirical causes. Thus we might suggest that the woman cured of 
cancer might have undergone a psychological change, or was subject 
to some dramatic transformation of the chemical structure of her body. 
In the case of the empty tomb we might conclude that the body had 
been stolen while the guards were not looking or were asleep. We 
might even suggest that a mistake had been made in identifying the 
tomb. The historian, faced with this bewilderment, naturally looks 
for historical reasons. It does not necessarily appear to him to 
be unusual because he will have learned to come to terms with historical 
riddles. In the end he will be prepared to accept that no historical 
explanation is entirely satisfactory, and is, as such, one of the 
features of the limited nature of his historical knowledge. For all 
these reasons, without any further information, the conclusion that 
these. events had, a transcendent cause is not really likely to appeal 
to him. 
It would appear that an impasse has been reached almost as 
intractable as that noted in ©runner's thought. On the one hand the 
historian's knowledge is essentially limited and subjective. It is 
difficult to know how a claim that a particular event had a transcendent 
cause can be made, and on wh dr basis it can be chocked and tested. 
Yet, at the same time the conception of such an event is neither 
meaningless nor nonsensical. However hiotory as such seems to have 
no way of resolving the dilemma. 
Perhaps here is a clue that the category of the 'personal' can 
be of assistance. If historical knowledge is essentially subjective, 
then it is also 'personal'. In this sense the 'a priori' value 
attributed to the 'personal' is likely in some cases, if not all, to 
form part of that subjective construct. Thus it will influence to a 
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greater or lesser extent the content of my historical knowledge 
either in terms of selection or intorprutation of materiel. 
Moreover if this 'a priori' value is itself not explicable in 
terms of the empirical world, then it may be that this value is able 
to lend events a legitimate transcendent significance. On such a 
basis it is possible to claim not that the event can be given such a 
significance as a matter of historical judgement, but rather that it 
is only the dimension of 'a priori' 'personal' value which can actually 
penetrate to the full and true significance of an event. Thus it 
might be argued that 'personal' value does not lend the event something 
which is not intrinsic to it, but rather allows us to glimpse the 'real' 
significance of an event. 
2 
2. It'will be clear that I am making a distinction similar to that 
which has boon-made in German philosophy between 'Historie' and 
'Geschichte'. R. Gregor Smith defines the two terms as follows: 
"... 'Historie' to describe the enquiry into the past and the mat- 
erial results obtained by such scientific historical investigation, 
and 'Geschichte' to describe man's (personal? ) past, what has 
happened. " (p. 02, R. Gregor Smith Secular Christianity) (brackets 
in quotation are mine). He definesGe ich e more clearly a 
little later. He says, "It is history in the sense that it 
connects with your own life" (p. 84, ibid. ). Bultmann himself, 
to whom Gregor Smith owes much of this thought, makes a similar 
point. It might be said that it is the existential dimension 
of history which characterises 'Geschichte'. Bultmann, quoting 
Collingwood, asserts, "the object of historical knowledge is 
'not a more object, something outside the mind which knows its 
it is an activity of thought which can be known only in so far as 
the Knowing mind re-enacts it and Knows itself an so doing. " 
(p. 119, R. Bultmann. History and Eschatolo ). He concludes, 
"The object of historical knowledge in man himself in his subjective 
nature. " (p. 119, ibid. ) My concern here however is not to involve 
myself in the debate as to how far Cultmann's concept of 
eschatological history 'dissolves' the historical nature of 
Christianity (R. Gregor Smith thinks that he deco not cf. p. 33, 
Secular Christianity), Suffice to say that even though Bultmann 
may be accused of isolating history from the cochatalogical 
revelatory encounter with God, the movement which followed 
fultmann, in which the work of people like I(ascmann and Bonnkamm 
is outstanding, set out to show how existential history could be 
related to the objective history of the tradition. This is why 
James Robinson, speaking of Mark's gospel says, "Mark finds 
moaning and divine action in history, and therefore intends to 
be recording history. " (p. 12 J. M. Robinson, The Problem of History 
in Mark). 
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In this sense it can be conceived how human, reason can understand 
that 'personul', faith alone can mediuto thu way things are and the 
intrinsic` truth of evepts. , 
Thus. the claim that God is responsible 
for the cancer cure ia. not a historical judgement, but, a, modiation of 
the actual significance of the event which only faith can appropriate. 
And this is not because faith is the instigator, but rather because 
the initiative comes from the transcendent, and faith is the truly 
authentic response. According to this view the transcendent can 
legitimately be conceived of as a dimension which impinges upon my 
life and experience. However this remains still only the speculative 
threshold of any theology. Nevertheless it does seem to be a 
threshold. Thus the purpose of this analysis is to explore this 
hypothesis in greater detail. 
The discussion of. the previous paragraph has shown how the subjective 
nature of historical knowledge leads naturally into a consideration of 
the relationship; between history, the 'personal' and transcendence. 
propose to-begin the second part of this section however by exploring 
a negative dimension which it can be argued the 'personal' lends to 
the relationship between history and transcendence. This will help 
to clarify the whole nature of the relationship to be explored, and 
its complexity. In fact this negative dimension is directly parallel 
to possible difficulties already noted in the relationship between the 
'personal' and the transcendent. 
of the pnoblem. 
Hore too thero is a double aspect 
In the first place it is possible for the individual not only to 
I 
judge events-according to a model created by his or-her own experience, 
an inevitable problematic for human knowledge, but also to predetermine 
the nature and significance of events by that criterion alono. The 
effect of this is to exclude the 'new' as a concept in experience, and 
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the 'other', -both as the contribution of the experience of othero, 
as well as the 'other' in terms of the poseiblo 
impinyiny, of the 
transcendent. At-this extreme point historical knowledge constructed 
on this basis would lose any power, and abandon all pretension, to 
mediate a tension between the conceptual and the real. 
On one-level, of course, scepticism towards claims which 
transcend our experience, and more especially what might be considered 
es ! normal'- experience, remains a sound and positive principle. 
However, on another level, it is possible to conceive that other 
factors, such as the need for a sense of personal security, will 
influence our judgement on the experience of others. When it comes 
to such judgements the familiar may often, be preferred to the new, 
for, what maybe demanded is a whole new-way of looking at things and 
even of living. Moreover this prejudice towards the judgements of 
historical-experience can operate purely at the level of the personal, 
or-equally at the level of. the tradition, be it familial, religious, 
cultural-, or political, or indeed on both levels at once. 
Thus it is possible to imagine how a sufferer from arthritis, 
when faced with the claim of a fellow-sufferer to have been completely 
cured of the complaint by practising yoga, might deny the evidence 
and reject the judgement. The verdict may be that the ailment cannot 
have been arthritis at all, or that the cure happened for some other 
reason, 'or"that the disease had temporarily abated. It is easy to 
see'that such a verdict may well be influenced by a fear of going 
outside the security of traditional medical treatment, or by a fear 
oreated by the need°to try-some wholly unfamiliar activity. 
Similarly, at the level of ideology, we can understand how a 
capitalist employer when faced with the evidence and judgement of an 
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historian that the trade union movement has been for the common good, 
might reject-it, not by means of counter evidence and argument but 
because to entertain such-viewa would be too much of a threat. 
Moreover, if this factor of preferring the security of the 
familiär operates, on the empirical level, then it is likely to 
operate-even more-so in terms of-claims that historical experience 
has in some sense mediated the transcendent. Here, at least in 
empirical terms, the essentially unfamiliar is being spoken of. 
This is an attempt to refer to that which by definition cannot be 
confined to a conceptual model based on human experience. Thus, if 
personal-security is a factor which affects our judgement of 
historical experience, then it-is intrinsically likely to reject 
automatically all claims that the historical has mediated the - 
transcendent in someone's experience. The logical possibility that 
this-may indeed, be the case will have been ruled out on 'a priori' 
grounds that have nothing to do with logic. In this sense metaphysical 
scepticism will be an important ingredient in safeguarding personal 
security and identity. The metaphysical might be said to provide the 
greatest threat of all to personal security. 
However, at this point, paradoxically, the second element in the 
negative impact which the 'personal' may have on the judgement of 
historical experience must be noted. From what has just been said 
it might be concluded that throughout history scepticism with respect 
to the transcendent has been the norm. In fact the reverse is true. 
In general terms it might be said that the norm has been that 
interpretation of experience which speaks easily and in an unself- 
conscious way of spiritual beings and the transcendent influencing 
the events in human history. Does this mean therefore that this 
evidence effectively falsifies the suggestion of the previous paragraphs 
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that the need for personal security may adversely affect and distort 
the'. legitimate sceptical approach to historical experience based on 
the inevitably limited nature of our knowledge so that the transcendent 
is ruled out as a"dimension capable. of affecting our experience? - 
Clearly the evidence is capable of being interpreted in this 
way. However I consider that it would be wiser to modify and extend 
the thesis rather than discard it. Modification is required in the 
sense that where a cultural tradition influenced and even dominated 
by religion has thought and spoken of a divine control of history, 
then the points at which scepticism has entered the culture have 
themselves required the demonstration of an 'openness' to the 'new' 
and the 'other' in human historical experience. In the context of 
the tradition of-Western thought the work of the empirical philosophers, 
notably that'of David Hume, and the work-of Immanuel Kant in the 18th 
century offer evidence of that need for 'openness'. One aspect of the 
contribution-they-made-to Western thought was to undermine the, 'personal' 
security which-many felt in the metaphysical tradition-provided by 
Christianity. -- 
However that insight helps to pin-point the second danger I have 
referred to. This 'openness' to a 'sceptical' and an essentially 
secular interpretation of history illustrates how, while the prevailing 
culture in one sense conceived of an openness to the transcendent, it 
was also able in its own way to provide a sense of 'personal' security 
precisely because it offered a metaphysical view of history. Seen 
from this perspective such a. tradition, instead of offering an authentic 
openness to the 'new' and the transcendent, might be, seen to offer a 
sort-of control over history, and a security against its vagaraies 
because it claims to mediate a metaphysic of. history. 
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"ý -Thus fat it hag been my argument that it is possible to combine 
e legitimate scepticism in relation to historical experience with an 
authentic openness to the Onew1 and the transcendent. Indeed such 
a combination is necessary to do justice to the limited yet 'personal' 
nature of our historical experience. - By contrast, and this is the 
first danger I have referred to, any scepticism which allows historical 
judgement to be controlled and predetermined by subjective experience 
is likely to be no longer a logical scepticism but an illogical means 
of preserving w'personal' security on the basis or a false subjective 
autonomy; 
Now, however, attention is focussed on the second danger. It 
is argued that it is possible to speak of the religious tradition 
mediating an openness to the transcendent, yet at the same time it 
is suggested that the metaphysical history of the tradition is capable 
of the inauthentic protection of 'personal' security. At this point 
some clarification is required concerning how it is proposed to 
distinguish between the two. In fact the first danger allows a 
parallel to be drawn which illuminates the nature of the second. In 
the first case the limited nature of historical knowledge is stressed 
in order to propose a false subjective autonomy. In the second the 
limited nature of human knowledge is ignored to propose a false 
objective hereonomy. In the former danger 'personal' security is 
protected by an illogical subjective autonomy. In the latter it is 
protected by a dependence upon a questionable historical metaphysic. 
Having explained this danger in principle, let me explore it in 
a little more detail. It is possible for 'personal' reasons, which 
are not connected with the historical as such, to make historical 
claims which transcend the legitimate boundaries of what we can claim 
to know. Both the Jewish and Christian traditions, for example, make 
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historical claims about the escape of the Jew3 from slavery in Egypt 
being a miraculous, event initiated by a transcendent and omnipotent 
God. , The 
Christian tradition speaks of the crucifixion of Jesus 
being a once-fat-all event which accomplished human salvation in 
history., "Now,, while, -sa has been argued above, it is quite legitimate 
to conceive of a relationship between history and the transcendent, it 
would seem to be-quite, unacceptable to. understand mere assent to the 
accuracy of:. these claims as historical statements to be a satisfactory 
understanding of the tradition. At least, if-, that wore generally 
thought, to be theicase it would seem that the validity of the claims 
of the . tradition, itself would be under threat, on account of the need 
to, accept the essentially subjective and limited nature of human 
knowledge. This means that, while it is still conceivable that the 
tradition may legitimately mediate the transcendent, it is also 
conceivable that when either the history of the tradition is stressed 
beyond its epistemological legitimacy, or when the relationship between 
the historical and the transcendent in the tradition is not clarified, 
that the claims' that are made are to be aeon more as a reflection of 
the 'personal' security they afford than as a reliable guide to the 
historical truth of the tradition. The difficulty here is that, 
while auch personal need and desire might in themselves be valid, it 
seems debatable to say the least to suggest that the need can legitimately 
be met in the context of a contemporary epistemology simply by 
reliance upon a historical tradition which does not recognise and 
podtively rejects the limited nature of human knowledge. Total dependence 
upon the tradition in this way may provide personal security, but that 
security may have been bought at the expense of personal freedom and 
responsibility. It may be that the God who can be known to have 
saved in the history of a tradition, or the God whose promises to save 
can be known like some guarentee. is no longer the transcendent God but 
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the heteronomous creation of our subjective autonomy. It may also 
be that in surrendering the freedom to exercise historical judgement 
in the context of the responsibility to accept the limited nature of 
our knowledge, that the vital elemento'in what constitutes the 'personal' 
have been denied, and the 'personal' itself threatened. thud, the 
heteronomy which has been skillfully manipulated by human personal 
autonomy in order to protect its own security may have been unwittingly 
used to undermine it. Such a 'personal' dependence upon the history 
of a tradition might be seen to cast significant doubts upon the 
validity of the tradition. In short the tradition itself might well 
be seen to be merely a reflection of 'personal' need rather than a 
true answer to it. 
It is important to understand therefore right from the outset 
that when the dimension of the 'personal' is, introduced into an 
analysis of the relationship between history and transcendence it may 
well only serve to confuse the issue. On the one hand the prior 
'personal' value may insist, in the interests of 'personal' security, 
upon an illogical autonomy of the subjective with regard to the 
knowledge of historical experience, which may lead to the scepticism 
of a closed mind, effectively isolated from the experience of others, 
and also as a result, totally insulated from any openness to the 
possibility that the transcendent might in some sense impinge upon 
history. On the other hand the prior ! personal' value may insist, 
again in the interests of security, upon an epistemologically unacceptable 
dependence upon metaphysical historical judgements which effectively 
protect the individual from a truly free and responsible relationship 
to his or her own history, as well as to a more general knowledge of 
history, not to mention with the transcendent- itself. 
It seems that neither a secular autonomy nor a religious he¬eronomy 
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can in itself be claimed to offer a satisfactory mediation of the 
nature of our historical experience. For this reason it will be 
necessary to explain the relationship between the 'personal' and 
the historical in terms of both a scepticism which reflects the limited 
nature of 'personal' knowledge as well as an openness to the 'other'. 
This 'other' will be understood both in terms of the experience of 
others as well as in terms of the possibility of the transcendent 
impinging on human experience, for included in the human consciousness 
of-our historical experience-is the indescribable and inexplicable fact 
of 'personal' value. Paradoxically I have argued that it is that 
very 'personal' dimension which is also capable of seeking to mediate 
our historical experience in terms of a closed scepticism as well as 
in terms of'a knowable metaphysic of history. 
At this point it seems appropriate to summarise briefly the 
results of this analysis of the relationship between history and 
transcendence. that emerges is a fundamental tension with regard 
to the conclusion that an individual might reach concerning his or 
her historical experience. On the one hand human knowledge can be 
seen to be essentially-limited and subjective. Thus scepticism towards 
any historical knowledge is intrinsic and valid, especially towards 
any interpretation which claims that. an essentially unknowable 
transcendence has influenced or-initiated any event. On the other 
, hand this same limited and subjective knowledge on account of the 
dimension 'of an 'a priori' 'personal' value which cannot ultimately 
be described in empirical or historical terms, is essentially open 
to the transcendent, -und therefore to a transcendent interpretation 
of events. In'this'sense an essential 'openness' both to the inter- 
pretation of others and the transcendent itself is an equally valid and 
intrinsic response to historical experience. 
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At the same time the matter is further complicated by this 
?a priori' 'personal' value, for the desire to secure and protect 
'personal' value may involve two dangers. The first is the danger 
of insulating our historical judgements from the 'new' and the 'other' 
by predetermining them according to moulds already shaped by our existing 
experience. This is to run the risk of denying in a quite illogical 
way both the experience of others where it conflicts with our own, and 
the possibility of our experience mediating the transcendent. The 
second is the danger of safeguarding our personal identity by means of 
a dependence upon the heteronomy of the metaphysical history of a 
religious tradition. Here the risk is one of severing links with 
a legitimate historical epistemology, and of resigning all 'personal' 
responsibility for historical judgement. 
So for the discussion has dealt with what I might call an 
analysis of the individual's historical experience. The subject 
has been set out in the broadest possible framework. History has 
been understood in terms of its being the basic context of human 
experience. However such a broad definition may well not be very 
helpful to the historian. For him history has to do with specific 
historical evidence and with the making of historical judgements. 
My 'historical' experience therefore, is, unlikely to be of interest 
to him for two reasons. In the first place he is concerned either 
with events that are of special interest in themselves, or with events 
that are of interest for some special reason. In the second place he 
is concerned with evidence and judgements which can in some sense be 
publicly recognised and debated, Thus 'my' cure from cancer is 
unlikely to be of historical interest in itself, and even if i claim 
that it has been divinely authorised, it is difficult to see how such 
a claim could become a judgement which the historian as observer could 
273 
finally reach. In this sense the historicn stands in an oblique 
relationship to the way in which I have described the possible 
experience of a transcendent dimension to an individual's history. 
This 'special' relationship, of the historian therofore raises 
the questions of the factors which pertain to his role which have a 
bearing upon the discussion of history and transcendence. In the 
light of the confusion which the dimension of the 'personal' might 
create at any attempt at an understanding of this relationship, the 
introduction of an independent scientific observer might be seen to 
offer some new hope of progress. Twopossible advantages spring to 
mind. First it might be said that it is an intrinsic mark and an 
essential requirement of the historian to be aware of the tension 
between scepticism and openness. It is important for him to be 
sceptical in the sense that he needs to verify and check out what are 
claimed to be historical facts or events. He will be particularly 
sensitive to claims that seem to, or are in danger of, going beyond 
the limits of the historian's remit. At the same time he will see 
it as an essential part of his task not just to limit his judgements 
to his own experience, but to be open to the interpretation of others, 
and, as far as possible to be open to 'other' ways of interpreting 
history; that is he will wish to achieve a sympathetic understanding 
of the historical interpretations of other cultures. This point 
allows a second advantage to be highlighted, which the historian as 
such might be said to possess over the ordinary individual attempting 
to make sense of his or her own experience. He would seom to be 
professionally protected from the immediate 'personal' search for 
security which may control the individual's own judgement. 
However, at the same time, while his professional expertise may 
protect and assist him at one level, the tension I have described 
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manifests itself at a number of different levele-in a complexity of 
ways. 'In the fist place the basic tension between scepticism and 
openness still confronts the historian. On the one hand he will be 
acutely aware of the limited and subjective nature of his knowledge 
as an historian. On the other he will also be aware that in some 
sense his responsibility is to got as close as he can to the truth 
of the matter. Moreover the very fact that the 'personal' dimension 
impinges upon the subjective nature of knowledge means that the meta- 
physical interpretation of history in terms of providence cannot be 
removed from his perspective altogether, although it is very difficult 
to see how it could enter or feature in a judgement he may make as 
an historian. 
In , the second place the tension will be apparent in that he will 
be aware-that there are different traditions of history-writing. We 
might speak of. -the modern, emphasis upon a scientific and objective 
historiography, which could well be characterised by the scepticism and 
openness already. described. The basic ingredient of - this. historiography 
might be said to be the autonomy of the historian. Van Harvey 
describes it in this way: "If there is any characteristic of the modern 
critical spirit readily identifiable, it is the insistence on the 
right to think for oneself, to be free from any authority that would 
circumscribe research and enquiry. "3 
It will also include the scientific gathering and analysing of 
evidence and proper inferential argument, all of which is to be brought 
to the bar of what we might call a simple 'common sense', based on the 
fact that there is a certain common 'given' about human experience. 
Again Harvey says, "The universality of law and what he (Bradley) 
3. V.. Harvey, The Historien and the Believer, p. 39 
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called loosely 'the causal connexion' were the ultimate presuppositions 
in. the light of which the critical historian judges his so-called 
witnesses* 
This is a very different view of history compared with, let us 
say, the historiography of a Livy or a Tacitus. Then, an essential 
part of the historian's task was an imaginative reconstruction of 
events. Thus, for example, the ancient historian would report in 
great detail a fictional account of the speeches of great leaders 
as they addressed their troops before some decisive battle. Here 
was an attempt to recapture the drama, the personal feelings of the 
participants, and the issues that were at stake. But more than this, 
when Tacitus records that, before the celebrated battle of the Mons 
Graupius, his father-in-law Agricola told his troops that they had 
reached the ultimate boundary of Britain, in his exaggeration, he was 
extolling not only the virtues of his father-in-law, but the triumphs 
and achievements of Rome. For the Roman historian it was quite 
legitimate to see hie work as serving the glory of the Roman imperium. 
At the same time the Old-Testament historian would exhibit no 
embarrassment or inhibition at speaking of God as an active participant 
in the history of Israel. He was their king and their deliverer, their 
rescuer from slavery, the vanquisher of their foes, their captain as 
cities fell miraculously before their attacks. 
These examples allow us to see that the historian has a dual 
responsibility. On the one hand he has to be able to enter sympath- 
etically into the attempts of historians to mediate the truth as they 
saw it, -even though their cultural and metaphysical presuppositions 
4. ibid., p. 71 
5. cf. Tacitus, Agricola 33 lines 290-291 
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may be very different from his own. , On the other hand he has to 
remain true to his own canons of criticism and judgement. He may 
be aware that his own standards are necessarily relative, but at the 
same time he will moat likely wish to say that his own critical 
criteria are more accurate and provide a more adequate representation 
of the facts, and the overall truth of the events than does the 
historiography of his antecedents. It is just as important to give 
due honour to our own cultural experience as it is to seek to 
understand that of other societies and generations. There is no 
doubt therefore that we should be unwise to treat the books of Kings 
and Chronicles as a more reliable record of the Israelite monarchy 
than the history of a Bright or a Noth. Again Harvey expresses the 
dilemmas "The historian, like his witness, is also the son of his 
time, and his present standpoint may appear to subsequent generations 
also to be relative. But he cannot 'jump out of his skull' or 
return to the standpoint of a former time, for his explanations and 
language inevitably reflect this one. Moreover it is only by 
taking responsibility for this present standpoint that a better, 
future one can responsibly emerge. The historian, to paraphrase 
Bradley, not only does presuppose present knowledge, he ought to do 80.116 
This comment of Harvey that the historian cannot 'jump out of 
his skull' illustrates yet another dimension of this tension between 
scepticism and openness which characterises the role of the historian. 
It illustrates the fact that the historian even as an historian is 
still a. person, This points to a further element in the tension I 
have described. On the one hand it has already been explained that 
it is difficult to see how a contemporary historian faced with the 
6. ibid., p. 99 
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complexity of the epistemological problem can draw metaphysical 
conclusions from historical events, or claim to have knowledge of 
the metaphysical origin of an event. On the other hand he is faced 
with understanding other cultures who did claim such knowledge. 
Moreover, as a human being, he is faced with the problem of how his 
own understanding of the nature of the 'a priori' of 'personal' 
value relates to experience. In short as a person he is likely 
to ask whether his 'personal' history has a meaning, which is 
ultimately grounded. in a transcendent reality,. and indeed at some 
stage he may acknowledge the question as to whether history as 's 
whole has a-meaning which it derives from a transcendent source. 
Granted that there is,, inevitably; this 'personal' dimension to the 
historian's own experience and judgement it would seem important 
therefore for him to ask himself whether and to what extent, the 
response to this question, or indeed the lack of response, affects 
the judgements he makes as an historian as such. 
It seems that there are two results therefore which emerge so 
far from this analysis of the way in which the 'personal' impinges 
on the relationship between history and transcendence. The first 
is that the need for personal security, prior to, and in defiance 
of, any rational or logical appraisal of the question is capable of 
distorting our concept of the relationship between history and 
transcendence. The second is that, although for the historian it is 
helpful both to recognise the epistemological limitations upon 
historiography, and to have to restrict oneself to historical judgements 
about matters and events which are publicly verifiable and debatable, 
nevertheless the 'personal' impinges upon his work in that it is 
reflected in the essential 'personal' limitedness of historical 
knowledge, and in that it is scarcely possible to adjudicate. how far 
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the 'veluö' element of the 'personal' influences the selection and 
interpretation of material. 
Those aspects might be termed the negative dimension of the 
problem when it comes to a consideration of the relationship between 
the 'personal', the 'historical' and the transcendent. Evon so it 
will be as well to recognise these factors in that they are all an 
integral part of the complexity of the issue. 
However the 'personal' has a natural and positive impact upon 
human historical experience, as well as allowing a fruitful exploration 
of the relationship between history and transcendence. Because 
history is subject to the same essential limitations of human 
subjectivity as is all our knowledge, it is merely one of the 
dimensions through which I express my concept of the world. This 
means that historical statements can easily and naturally mediate 
the dimension of 'personal' value. Although it in not possible to 
grasp the particular 'personal' significance which existed in the 
context of the statement, "my mother gave me a present", we can 
understand that such a statement would normally contain such a 
significance. - 'In the same way if someone said, "my girl friend 
visited me" we can understand that such a statement may well be seeking 
to express more than the objective event. Thus both the historical 
event as it is apprehended, as well as the statement we make describing 
it, are capable of mediating the dimension of 'personal' value. 
Indeed'not only are they capable of doing so, but in fact it is only 
on rare occasions that they will fail to do so. This seems to me to 
be the value of Ramsey's analysis of what he calls 'discernment' 
situations. 
He soya, "The same kind of 'disclosure' occurs when hills or 
buildings are named. Suppose we are on a railway or car journey. 
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The countryside: might look very much like anywhere else: hills, 
houses, churches and so on. But then someone has a map or a 
guide: "There's Winter Hill", That's the-Manor House", That's 
St. Lawrence's Church - going back to Saxon times. " Is it no 
more then additional information? Do we delight to know these 
details simply because we want to know more facts? Or is it 
that, with euch details, our surroundings become familiar, that 
this familiarity develops into a feeling of friendship which 
finally evokes a sense of cosmic kinship-where before there 
were only unknown objects. We not only see the hills, houses, 
churches around-us,. -but the landscape comes alive. " 7 
- He continues, "Let us emphasise without any possibility. of 
misunderstanding, that all these situations, all these characteristically 
different situations, when they occur, have an objective reference and 
are, as all situations, subject-object in structure. When situations 
'come alive' or 'the ice-breaks', there is objective depth in these 
situations along with and alongside any subjective changes. " 8 
It seems tobe, fairly clear that historical events can take on 
and be given 'personal' significance. Ramsey's argument however goes 
further than this when it comes to religious statements. They 
exhibit qualities of 'discernment'. and 'commitment'; but in the end 
it seems the oddness of religious language lies in the way an 
empirical situation can be the means of divine revelation. However, 
the purpose of this discussion is not to debate Ramsey's position, 
but rather to endorse his initial point. Even so, the fact that 
historical events can be given 'personal' meaning which is not 
empirically. contained, within them, means that, because the actual 
nature of-the 'personal' is not subject to°empirical explanation, 
the historical event can. be interpreted us having a transcendent 
dimension. -. Thus not-, only might a sunset speak to me, and move me 
aesthetically, -, but also I, might view it-in a cosmic perspective. 
I might claim that, it speaks to me of God, or even that God speaks 
to me through the event, :,. 
Or to take another example; when I get a job, I may intuit that 
7. I. T. Ramsey, Religious Language, p. 27 
-8. ibid., p. 28 
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the job is right for mop and the circumstances have in some way 
indicated that I was the 'right', person for the job. It may be 
that I respond positively to the people I shall work with, or that 
my experience turns out to be more appropriate than I had anticipated 
for the work. I may discover in the events surrounding the 
appointment a , confidence in the situation, a confidence to go out 
and win it against the opposition in a way that is not generally 
typical of my behaviour. Some other person may be supportive of my 
application in a way which strikes me as being significant in that 
it seems to be not just another ingredient in a complex conglomerate 
of events, but rather the piece of a pattern. It is possible to 
conceive therefore how some such experience might lead me to believe 
and conclude that I was encountered by a transcendence which upheld 
and strengthened me as a person possessing value. 
Note that here is no claim that the revelatory nature is self- 
evident or can be. assumed to be true# but rather that such claims are 
comprehensible given the nature of our historical experience as I 
have described it, and its relation to our 'personal' interpretation, 
At this point it may seem that I have taken examples to describe 
the relationship between the 'personal' and the 'historical' which 
are unusually wide-ranging. After all a sunset might better be under- 
stood as a natural phenomenon rather than an historical event. 
However to offer such a criticism is to mistake the purpose of the 
example. It has already been made clear that the 'personal' value 
which is being 'historically' discovered or confirmed is not in itself 
deducible from the empirical, worldt either the world of objects or the 
world of events. Thus it is perfectly possible for an event to have 
significance for me which may well have no significance for others, and 
may even not be considered to be an event. It may be that I feel a 
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particular sense of privilege at having been taken for a ride in an 
uncle's new car'whon I was a small child. It may be, again as a child, 
that I was either praised or blamed, in a way that made no particular 
impression on-others who observed the incident, but in such a way that 
it made a deep impression upon me, and it will continue to be seen by 
me os being of great significance in my own 'personal' history. I 
may look back to the first time I heard Beethoven's 'Eroica' symphony 
and see it"as'a turning point in my life. It may be that I shall see 
the event as decioive in my decision to become a composer or a 
conductor. 
My purpose, therefore, in using examples which refer more to a 
'pers. onal' history than more significant and recognisably objective 
events, is to suggest that although the elusive nature of the 'personal' 
itself makes the description and isolation of these 'events' more 
difficult, nevertheless because the 'personal' is ,a fundamental 'given', 
such events'as these are likely. to'take on proportionately greater 
aignificanco for the individual. 
It is not the main concern of this study to explore in detail the 
nature of historical experience. However it might be helpful to 
explore this matter a little further in the hope of clarification. 
Ramsey's initial point is surely well made. It is our human experience 
that events in an individual's history can take on 'personal' 
significance. We lend them something of ourselves. Moreover there 
is no way of separating some events from this dimension of significance 
which they hold. Most obviously in the context of family life the 
birth oVa child is an experience of personal-joy, and the death of a 
member''of the family an occasion of personal grief or sorrow. Even 
with the death of-someone we know, or who in well known, the experience 
is one of being personally diminished. 
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But more than thin it is not unusual for such events to be given 
or to-assume a transcendent significance. Many people describe the 
birth, particularly of a first child, in terms of awe and wonder. 
The new-born child is accorded a 'personal' significance which 
transcends the empirical situation. For the new-born baby neither 
communicates nor acts responsibly. We 'lend', as it were, the 
infant an identity. And even this can be an understatement of the 
experience, for often the parents, from the very beginning of a child's 
life, invest the relationship with a spiritual dimension. It is 
easy for parents to consider that a dimension has been added to the 
personal meaning of their lives which is not describable in purely 
temporal terms. Just as the baby is lent an identity it does not 
possess in an objective sense, so the parent can realise and reveal 
a personality which it has not heretofore possessed in objective terms. 
The event of death also is traditionally both a 'personal' as well 
as a religious occasion. When death occurs it is very common for 
those. bereaved to feel a deep sense of personal loss. However it is 
also possible for those same people to have the experience that the 
'personal' significance of the one they loved is in some sense not 
lost. Some may prefer not to see the corpse, but to remember the 
person as he or she was when alive. Others may speak with conviction 
of experiencing the presence of the person, even though they are dead. 
Yet others may come to feel a certain security beyond their grief that 
whatever has happened to the one who has died that he or she is in 
some sense 'safe'. 
Thus, through events which have a deep 'personal' significance it 
seems that particularly here, an experience may take on a transcendent 
interpretation. Indeed this transcendent dimension of our experience 
is perhaps more widespread a phenomenon than might in fact be appreciated. 
9 
9. cf. David Hay, Exploring Inner Space 
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what is not being claimed is that here wo have in some sense proof 
that human experience can be revelatory. I am merely suggesting 
that our historical experience is capable of being given a transcendent 
interpretation which cannot be denied on 'a priori' grounds. Moreover 
that transcendent significance is mediated through the 'personal' 
significance which such events may have for our lives. The 'personal', 
it seems, is capable of speaking of the transcendent as its correlate. 
It is interesting to note here that a new element has been 
introduced into the study. I have begun to speak not. just of events 
which have a 'personal' significance, and through the 'personal' 
claim to mediate the. transcendent simply in the context of the 
individual's experience. The concept of the tradition has surfaced. 
I shall deal later with. the question of the actual history of the 
Christian tradition of the resurrection, but it is perhapa. a not 
insignificant observation to recognise that for some individuals the 
tradition can play an important part in the history of a person's life. 
Moreover I think that it is legitimate to relate the tradition to the 
particularly 'personal' events which I have been describing, or rather 
to suggest that the tradition. helps to mediate the 'personal' nature 
or dimension of certain events. 
Once again I propose to use the word 'tradition' in a somewhat 
extended sense. By 'tradition' I moan some publicly accepted means 
by which the 'personal' significance of events can be expressed and 
recognised. Thus in the loosest possible way I might suggest that 
certain words and phrases can express a 'linguistic' tradition. 
Phrases like, 'I have fallen in love' or 'nursing is my vocation' or 
'he has seen the light' help the individual. to describe and express 
something that has happened or been discovered, which, in the ordinary 
way of describing events, would be difficult if not embarrassing to 
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oxprosa. They do so in a way which allows the 'personal' importance 
td be accepted and fully recognised. 
Similarly, music, art and literature might be referred to as a 
tradition or traditions in this sense. Of course it might be 
objected that the arts are merely there to provide personal pleasure 
which has nothing to do with history or events. However it will be 
worthwhile pausing briefly to consider the matter with respect to music, 
art and literature. It is not uncommon to hear it said that this 
music moves me'. Moreover there are certain pieces of music, or 
passages in pieces of music, which'some people will agree are 
supremely able to 'have that effect. Reference could be made to the 
late Beethoven quartests, or to the slow movement of the Bach double 
violin concerto. It is presumably not too much to suggest that in 
the statement, ''this music moves me', what is meant is that this 
passage has deep 'personal' significance for me, in that on one 
particular occasion, and perhaps on frequent subsequent occasions, 
although not necessarily always, the hearing of the music has 
occasioned, and still does occasion, an emotion which is a deep 
experience of what it means to be a person, with a power of communication 
even beyond that of words. It is not difficult to understand how 
music can distil and highlight that dimension of the 'personal' which 
we use words like 'nobility', 'tragedy', 'nostalgia', 'joy', etc. to 
refer to. 
Might it not be possible therefore to describe a concert as being 
an occasion when that dimension is publicly and historically recognised? 
By that I mean that the concert provides public recognition of the 
'personals in that many-people meet to share precisely that dimension, 
and it provides historical recognition of the 'personal' in that the 
experience of the music might well be said to have significance in my 
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'personal' history. That is not to coy that there is any empirically 
verifiable causal relationship between music and history through the 
'personal'. It in rather to suggest that music can furnish a 
perspective from which to view my 'history', be it simply in terms of 
a mood, or much more significantly in terms of its ability to be 
determinative and descriptive of my deepest relation to the 
significance of my life and history. This in surely tacitly recognised 
in the way music in used on public and ceremonial occasionu as for 
example the 'Hallelujah' chorus or the 'Pomp and Circumstance' march. 
Much the same might be said for the relationship between art, the 
individual and society. It goes without saying that looking at a 
picture can be not just merely a pleasurable experience, but also a 
deeply moving and possibly determinative experience in an individual's 
history. In this sense we might say that the heritage which art 
furnishes provides again a public tradition which can mediate the 
significance of the 'personal' to the history of the individual. 
In literature also a similar dynamic is observable. The overall 
effect of reading a poem or attending the performance of a play may be 
the some in terms of the individual's experience so that of looking at 
a picture or hearing a piece of music. For this reason the 'tradition' 
of literature allows the individual public access to the dimension of 
personal value. In the context of a play or a novel, like Macbeth or 
Sons and Lovers the whole question of the meaning and nature of 
existence can be communicated, appreciated and debated. In the events 
and decisions recorded in literature the 'personal' dimension of my 
own experience will be the common denominator in my ability to understand 
their significance and meaning. At the some time they will extend 
and deepen my own experience of what it means to be a person. The 
tradition of literature therefore can be conceived potentially to have 
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e'diraot influence upon the understanding 1 have of my own history 
in terms of love, marriage, rejection, treachery, ambition or death. 
Finally itwill not b©'unreaaonabl© to suggest that roligious 
traditions function in'a similar way. " I 'shall think first of all' 
of`traditionafisuch as baptism, marriage and the funeral. -It has 
already been seen-'how 'linguistic' traditions, and the traditions in 
the arts lend-a-public dimension to events and experiences, which 
although they have an empirical dimension, "are primarily understood 
as having-a deeper 'personal' significance for 'my' history. 
Now this is precisely what the traditions of baptism, marriage 
and the funeral do in the Christian religion. Of course they claim 
to do more than this. But even an objective and unbelieving observer 
can be reasonably sure that a 'personal' significance is being 
accorded to these events, and that a religious tradition is a means 
of its expression. ' Thus a baptism allows the parents to share the 
'personal' significance they -discover in the birth of the child, just 
as it allows-the'congregation to acknowledge it. Moreover, that 
significance can be shared either in the sense that the act of baptism 
symbolises a significance which has already been apprehended in the 
event of the birth, or else it might actually mediate that significance. 
Secondly it is appropriate to examine rather different traditions 
such as Christmas and Easter. In the case of Christmas there will 
be a number of different levels at which the public recognition of the 
tradition can lend 'personal' significance to our history. The three 
levels of auch traditions are immediately discernible. They are 
those of the family, the culture and the religious community. Thus at 
the family level Christmas may symbolise and mediate the deep 
significance the family has for 'my' personal history. At the 
religious level Easter may both symbolise and mediate the experience 
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of hope emerging out of a situation of despair, or of tho experience 
of new life emerging from some experience of death. 
(what is the significance then of the tradition for an understanding 
of the relationship between the 'personal', history and transcendence? 
I have confined myself in the preceding paragraphs to a study of the 
function of the tradition in what might be described as a contemporary 
existential context i. e. what the tradition might be said to mean for 
'my' history'. I shall return below to an examination of the actual 
history of the tradition. At this juncture my contention is quite 
simply that a tradition, whether understood in a narrowly religious 
context, or in a broader cultural context provides an important public 
forum for the 'personal' significance which humans lend to their 
experience and to the events which occur to them, a significance which 
cannot be known on a purely empirical basis from the events themselves. 
This is an interesting observation in itself, but it does not 
help with the atte4mpt to show how the transcendent can be spoken of 
in the context of the overall relationship between history and the 
'personal'. That is to say that the tradition cannot validate the 
person's claim that the transcendent has been encountered in their 
history. Of course . people may claim that their 'falling in love', 
the experience of Beethoven's 'Missy Solemnis', or their participation 
in the eucharist does mediate the transcendent or has mediated the 
transcendent on certain specific occasions. But the tradition itself 
cannot validate those claims. For it is here that the epistemological 
scepticism of our age confronts us. This is precisely the reason why 
our so-called secular society has become critical and sceptical of 
such religious ceremonies and more puzzled by their claims to mediate 
the transcendent. A religious ceremony may give a marriage for 
example a very real 'personal' meaning, but does not mean that it can 
be manifestly said to carry with it the divine blessing and seal of 
288 
approval which the tradition claims. Thus contemporary philosophy 
of art eschews a metaphysical theory of art. As far as the religious 
tradition is concerned the actual history of the tradition is unlikely 
to be recognised as history by the modern historian, while the resort 
to the category of revelation is likely to raise the question of what 
it moans to claim to know something not on the basis of human and 
subjective experience of the world and of other people, but rather 
on the basis of that which is essentially and in principle 'alien'. 
In addition the argument of this study has shown that participating 
in a religious tradition may be a means of persons securing their 
identity with reference to an external source. Such a security may 
be more a reflection of 'personal' need than a vindication of the 
objective validity which the tradition claims. 
This brief excursus into what I have called the existential 
significance of the tradition helps two things to be made clear. 
In the first place it can be seen that a tradition, and most obviously 
a religious tradition, can be a means of allowing an individual to 
lend both a 'personal' and a transcendent significance to events in 
their personal history. Moreover it has been argued that there is 
nothing philosophically illogical or contradictory about such a 
procedure. In the second place, however, while the tradition allows 
the 'personal' significance of events to be self-validating, for 
the baptism of my baby or our wedding ceremony is self-evidently a 
reflection of the 'personal' significance I give to my child, or we 
give to each other, it seems that they cannot validate the transcendent 
significance which I may also claim for the events. The 'personal' 
can, as it were, be verified because the tradition can only be 
understood as a 'personal' sharing. It would not make sense to 
understand it as anything else. However the transcendent significance 
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claimed by mo for the events, and echoed in the tradition, may be 
seen by others as merely a reflection and projection of the 'personal' 
itself. 
At this point therefore it will be as well to take note of the 
fact of a whole negative dimension of the relationship between the 
'personal' and the transcendent. While there may be nothing illogical 
or contradictory about my seeing a personal event to have a transcendent 
dimension, it is perfectly possible to interpret it otherwise, and it 
maybe more logical and therefore preferable to do so. 
Thus, while claims that the 'personal' can be seen as a legitimate 
channel through which events can be given a transcendent meaning are 
in themselves comprehensible, it is important not to rush into making 
extravagant claims which might lead us to think that all our experience 
should be interpreted as mediating this now dimension. Ultimately 's 
religious person might want to make some such claim for his or her 
belief. But from the present perspective of this study, on the very 
threshold of a theological apologetic, the truth of such a belief is 
by no moans obvious. It will be as well to proceed cautiously and 
with no small degree of scepticism. Two points are important to bear 
in mind as a guard against over enthusiasm. There is no guarantee 
that even events which are of momentous significance in our lives will 
take on this aspect oUthe transcendent. The death of-one relative 
or friend may possess it, but the death of another may be embarrassingly 
and painfully empty of significance. It may prove to be a merely 
debilitating experience, full of despair. The birth of a child too 
can be a negative and demoralising business. Even the traditional 
image which pictures the mother as bearing a natural and maternal 
affection for the child may be false and hollow in the experience of the 
mother whoIas found no joy in the birth, but pain and humiliation, and 
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foolu somehow that the child is rosponsiblu. 
Yet even the scepticism which is attendant upon such experiences 
such as these need not be totally destructive of this argument. We 
might think that a gracious transcendence ought to be ultimately 
reliable. And of course we should, be right to think along those 
lines. But that is not to say that our concept of gracious 
transcendence should or does correspond to the actual reality. Thus 
the seemingly haphazard nature of the experience of transcendence may 
be seen to be the authentic mark of a genuine transcendence - an 
indication that grace is not under our conceptual control. Wo cannot 
both trust in the divine grace and control it in our experience at one 
and the some time. 
The other point to bear in mind is that when we speak of a 
transcendence immanent in our experience it is of course possible that 
such a dimension may simply be the creation of our own imaginations. 
It is easy to, understand how situations can arise when we might be 
tempted consciously or unconsciously to conjure such experiences. out 
of our need. We should be foolish to dismiss the traditional 
psychological and sociological explanations of religion, and of the 
human phenomenon of language about God. And yet here too the fact 
that there is no uniformity about the interpretations of such 
experiences makes it possible to argue that not every such interpretation 
is to be placed in that category on an 'a priori' basis. 
It might be argued that this is a case of seeking to have one's 
cake and eat it. On the one hand it is acknowledged that experiences 
of this type might not be accompanied by a so-called experience of the 
transcendent. But then the argument continues that this fact is a 
pointer to the possibility that the claim of the experience of 
transcendence, when it occurs, is likely to be genuine. What is 
291 
iynorod is the possibility tht t the ohccr lack of experience , of 
tranocondence is likely to be the real pointer to'tho truth of. tho 
matter. I could be accused of ignoring the most likely solution 
to the problem. 
On the other hand it in acknowledged that some people may create 
and invent such experiences out of their need. However here the 
argument continuos to say. that this need may in fact have a 
txanscondont corrolato. In this case might it not be simpler to say 
that psychological need can actually be understood as the explanation 
of the so-called experience of the tranocendentl In other: words$ this 
fact, that many do not make tranocendent claims for their experience, 
and even whenothera do, a 'perfectly good psychological explanation 
is at hand, would, on the surface, suggest that there is-no--need to 
look further for an explanation. '' 
tlowever,.. such, an observation would miss tho whole point of what 
tºac been argued, here. The fact that there may for some be no need to 
tjpeak of the trunscendený, and a psychological explanation might seem 
to suffice in the cases where it is opoken of, does not prevent the 
possibility of, a transcendent explanation being logical in its own 
-right.. So A. E. J. Rawlinson, speaking of "psychological" interpretation 
of the transfiguration, echoes thin ideas lie Bays, "... such a 
psychological interpretation of the phenomena does not at all preclude 
the view that ouch experiences, however subjectively determined as 
regards their form and perceptual content, may yet have boon the 
vehicles in particular cases of genuinely spiritual intimations from 
on high. "'0 Indeed the 'personal' interpretation we offer of our 
historical experience would nüggest that-there is a need for, human 
10. Se,! iar k p. 119 
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beings to demonstrate an openness to the 'new' in their experience 
which leaves room for that 'new' mediating a transcendent quality. 
For the 'personal' interpretation which, we 'lend' to our experience 
is not in. itself deducible from the empirical events themselves. At 
any rate the 'a priori' rejection of such a possibility would seem to 
be in greater need of. logical demonstration than a position which 
remains open.; Thus, this argument is not an attempt to offer some 
proof of. the truth, of transcendence, but an attempt to make room for 
the question of transcendence being recognised to be legitimate. 
McKinney, in his essay 'Historical Relativism; the Appeal to 
Experience and Theological. Reconstructipn', (cf.. Creation, Christ and 
Culture ed. R. W. A. McKinney), argues that, in spite of the complexity 
of, our historical experience, and in spite of the complex problems 
involved, in using that experience as data For constructing a theology, 
we do not in effect have any choice as human beings about where we 
must begin our theology.. At the same time the appeal to experience 
by the theologian is not to be understood as a sign of defeat. The 
difficulties involved in the reconstruction do not mean that the task 
must be ruled out in advance. He says, "The appeal to experience is 
an appeal to the 'ordo cognoscendi's as euch it does not rule out 
the realm of being, the question of ontology, at all. It is only in 
and through and out of our experience that we are able to make the 
ontological claims that we do. Those who appeal to experience do not 
ignore or reject such ontological concern or interest ... That being 
so, the question is not whether we appeal to experience, but what 
experience permits and compels us to say*"" 
Thus. the claim of-this study is that it remains quite logical and 
11. ibid., p. 247 r 
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proper to speak of the possibility of the historical mediating the 
transcendent. Yet, even now it might be alleged that very little 
progress has been made. It might be suggested that the one step 
forward has been counterbalanced by two steps back. While the 
'personal' can be seenyto provide a theoretical 'continuum' between history 
and transcendence, when it comes to checking an how such a claim can 
be said to be known, neither history nor the tradition seem to have 
any way of clinching the matter. 
Thus there are two questions-which remain. The first involves 
crossing the threshold, into doing-theology albeit theoretically. It 
is necessary to explore the nature of claims which speak of the 
transcendent entering history. What exactly is the nature of an 
'event' which claims a transcendent cause? What function does the 
dimension of the 'personal' play in the claim that such an event has 
taken place? The second. question has to do with the role of the 
historian In assessing such claims. 
I would identify two ways in which an event can be given such a 
significance. The first category could be labelled descriptions of 
events which are transcendent by nature. Someone might say to us, 
"My daughter who died last week came and stood by my bedside last night. " 
We can understand how someone might feel constrained to describe their 
experience in such terms. What is being recorded here is not just 
an event, but one which is pregnant with 'personal' significance. Now 
we might say that such a description, although understandable, is 
really only a manifestation of the person's grief. Indeed we should 
be foolish to ignore the plausibility and likelihood of that verdict. 
But bow are we to assess the case in the last analysis? There may be 
other evidence which could be seen. as corroborating the person's claim. 
If the grief-stricken mother continues to have a sense of the presence 
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of her daughter, 'is able to live with her grief, adjust back to life, 
and from that time on speaks of the event as some sort of personal 
turning"point,, then we should be wise not to be dismissive of her 
interpretation. Indeed wo would certainly be less disposed to do so 
if we knew how dearly she loved the daughter, and how demented we 
should feel if someone equally young and dear to us died suddenly and 
tragically. °''' 
The second category could be labelled ordinary events which take 
on or are given; a transcendent significance. - Someone might say to 
us, "My-grandfather was dying, but at. a certain point while I sat with 
him-I knew that beyond death he would be safe. "- Here, we might say, 
historically the actual event consists of the last moments or hours 
of a person's life. The transcendent element here amounts to something 
like a-mystical experience, one which is not mediated by any of the 
senses. Again we might say that the shock of death could easily 
cause such an awareness, the reluctance to face the finality of what 
was now recognised-as inevitable. And yet-here too there might be 
evidence which would corroborate the claim. If the person was able 
to comfort the rest of the family through-their grief, demonstrate an 
equanimity and serenity through the subsequent days of mourning, and 
continue to speak of the event as being decisive for his or her 
'personal' philosophy and outlook on life, then here too outright 
rejection of the interpretation would seem unwise. 
At first sight these two events ere very different. The first 
refers to an"event which clearly justifies the description of transcendent, 
and yet at the same'time it is'scarcely possible for the historian to 
exercise his historical judgement concerning it as an event. The 
historian's bewilderment can be comprehended if it is asked whether or 
not such an event could have been photographed. The second would seem 
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to refer much more clearly to a specific event, namely the death of 
the dying hours of the grandfather. In this example the event takes 
on, or is given, a transcendent significance by the person. There 
is no need to ask whether this is an event which is capable of empirical 
verification, ' for-there is no question of anyone hearing or seeing 
anything in particular. All that can be checked are the effects of 
the claimed 'event' on the person concerned. 
However to stress the difference is perhaps to overstate the case. 
The truth is that there are similarities. In the example of the 
'appearance' of the daughter, there is no suggestion of any words 
being spoken. Moreover the mother clearly does not expect to see 
her daughter the next day or in any sense as part of the normal course 
of historical events. Thus, although it qualifies for description 
as an 'event' it would appear to be best described in 'spiritual' 
rather than 'historical' terms. In the second example it must be 
observed that it is an oversimplification to say that the actual death 
is the only event in this incident. It seems that the actual 
assurance of the safety of the grandfather might be described as an 
'event' in its own right. The empirically observable death is only 
the occasion which allowed the 'event' of spiritual reassurance to 
take place. 
This means that if this analysis focusses on the similarities it 
is possible to see a common factor in both examples. What 
characterises both 'events' is the apprehension of the transcendent 
breaking through into time and history. They are the 'time' when the 
'personal' apprehends the transcendent. There occurs in history a 
'personal' apprehension of the transcendent, and the 'personal' can 
only comprehend it as an event which takes place as it were at the 
initiative of God. 
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What I am describing is not unlike the 'hole' in time and 
history to which Brunner made reference. The historical context 
which has been described here in these examples can only act' as the 
marker of the transcendent event, which cannot itself be empirically 
verified or described adequately in historical terms. Nevertheless 
the historical descriptions which are offered here do in themselves 
stsndýas it were at the boundary of the breakthrough. They mark the 
limits of=the testimony of historical experience and iny, that sense 
they can truly be described as part of a 'continuum' which links 
history with the transcendent. Perhaps the closest it is possible 
to reach to an actual description of this point on the 'continuum' 
is to describe it as an experience of salvation - i. e. the very 
point at which the 'personal' apprehends its value affirmed or 
validated or vindicated. In this sense the term 'aalvific' describes 
the meeting point between the 'personal' and the 'transcendent'. At 
the outer edge of my experience it is historical in that it both 
occurs in my life and my history, and at the same time it happens to 
me. At its centre it can, with legitimacy, be considered as part 
of the divine life and is an expression of the divine will. Thus the 
examples offered might be used to suggest the hypothesis that salvation 
is that part of the historical 'continuum' where knowledge ends and 
faith begins for the person. It is the point at which revelation grounds 
itself in that knowledge which is prepared to give way to faith. 
The final question which arises in this analysis of the relationship 
between history, the 'personal' and the transcendent, concerns the role 
and function of the historian. How can the historian assess claims of 
the sort described above? In the first place it must be acknowledged 
that there is an important distinction to be drawn between accepting 
that the person's historical experience may be seen legitimately as the 
arena in which a 'personal' value' intrinsic to human life can be spoken 
297 
of asmodiating"the transcendent, and making the assumption that this 
mediation will be able, in some way, to be verified or validated by 
the judgement of the hiotorian. I chall contend that, while the 
historian cannot offer such validation, this limitation does not 
, 
jeopardise or threaten the 'continuum I have sought to argue for 
between the historical and the transcendent. Moreover I shall 
maintain that the agnosticism of the historian is an entirely proper 
verdict which is in harmony with the primacy which the theologian 
would expect to. accord to faith. 
In a previous paragraph I have considered the role of the historian 
in the relationship between the historical and the transcendent. There 
I spoke of the difficulty of understanding how the historian could 
ever claim to know that an event had a transcendent origin. This is 
what I mean when I refer to the agnosticism of the historian. On 
the one hand he or she, according to the argument of this study, will 
recognise that the individual may attribute transcendent significance 
to his or her experience but will refrain from any attempt to make the 
individual's judgement into an historical judgement. Furthermore the 
relationship between the 'personal' and the 'historical' as it has been 
explored in the above paragraphs gives no cause for any revision of 
that verdict. The question to be answered therefore is how this 
agnosticism of the historian with respect to the transcendent can be 
related to the 'continuum' I have argued for between history and 
transcendence on the basis of-the mediation provided by the 'personal'. 
It is clear that this is not the place to undertake a detailed 
study of the role of the historian and the philosophy of history. My 
aim in this brief section is to consider how the historian as such 
might operate in the context where claims are made that events have a 
transcendent origin. For the purpose of this discussion I shall pro- 
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suppose the conclusions of the previous section that it is legitimate 
from a philosophical point of view, on the basis of the 'a priori' 
dimension of 'personal' value, to conceive of the transcendent 
confirming that value in the context of historical 'experience. I 
shall content myself by offering two models to describe two possible 
options that are open to the historian. The first I shall call a 
'neutral agnosticism'. , The use of the, term 'agnosticism' as used 
here has already been discussed. The term 'neutral', however, requires 
some definition. By 'neutral' I refer to an attempt to be both as 
objective and scientific as possible in amassing and assessing the 
evidence, as well as having a concept of the historically accurate 
or true as being as value free as possible. If the 'personal' itself 
is defined in terms of individual, cultural and religious values and 
prejudices, then here is an attempt on the part of the historian to 
disassociate himself as far as possible from the 'personal' because it 
is this that constitutes the greatest danger to an autonomous and 
objective historiography. 
With thin basic philosophy how can the historian assess the 
evidence of a person's claim that in a particular event he or she 
has been encountered by God, as for instance in the examples I gave 
of the experience of the sunset, the unexplained' cure from cancer, or, 
if an instance were selected which might be of more intrinsic interest 
to the historian, the conversion of an historically important religious 
person. Even with these examples it in possible to detail a fairly 
elaborate methodology which can be followed by the historian who adopts 
the approach of 'neutral agnosticism'. Given that he or she wishes to 
relate this occasion for some reason, the first stage will be to record 
the event and its context at a basic factual level as the individual 
concerned records it or remembers it, or if the person is no longer 
alive, to record any written evidence he left, or how any witnesses or 
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contemporary historians spoke of it. At all events he is likely to 
wabt to con3ult other people who wore there, or involved in some 
way, to check the basic reliability of the historical background. 
He may wish to confirm that the person involved really did go out 
to sae the sunset, and whether his description tallies with the 
location. He may want to check that, the person really was suffering 
from cancer and that the 'cure' has been medically confirmed. 
The second stage is to record the interpretation which is placed 
on that situation or that event. Of course it is possible that these 
two stages in some examples will merge in to one, but even so it is 
hard o conceive of the so-called transcendent encounter occurring 
In a context or situation which is entirely lacking in empirical detail. 
He will wish to listen carefully to the testimony of the individual 
Co as to understand as clearly as possible what constituted the event, 
and what the experience actually was. He might wish, to know how the 
experience which is described in religious terms can be said to differ 
from an aesthetic experience. Was it, for example, an experience 
of colour-and beauty? Or was it accompanied by hearing or seeing 
anything over and above the visual impact of tho-sunset? Not that 
this is to'suggest that because it was simply an experience of colour 
and beauty it cannot for that reason be claimed to be an experience 
of transcendence. Did the person cured of cancer claim any additional 
experience over and above the learning of the knowledge of the cure? 
Was it`accompanied by an inner intuition? Did the person involved sea 
it as an answer to prayer? Let it be clearly understood that the 
purpose of recording this evidence is not to make an historical 
judgement concerning its validity. It is merely to listen to and 
record the interpretation so that its actual nature, and its relationship 
to what is able to be judged historically, can be understood. 
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The third stage is to check on whether subsequent facts. can in 
any way be said to be supportive of the 'personal' interpretation. 
Does the person who spoke. of the experience of the sunset being a 
transcendent encounter continue to speak, act and think of this event 
as havingshad a , decisive influence upon hisfor her life? Is the 
cancer cure permanent? Could it be seen as a natural interlude in 
the progress of the disease? Does the actual life-style of the person 
change? .. Evidence Qf. this could, either be seen as corroboration of 
the interpretation or, else as a possible indication of an empirical 
explanation of the cure. - It would be natural to_look for. pome 
lasting and thoroughgoing effects, in the light of this interpretation. 
Once, again, of course, such evidence cannot be. said. to be decisive 
either'in"affirming or negating the 'personal', interpretation itself. 
A fourth stage is to enquire as to whether there is a cultural 
or family background which might form the basis for the interpretation. 
It might be that the person comes from a family who nuturally speaks 
in terms of mystical experiences, or is someone steeped in the tradition 
of the romantic nature poets. The person, cured of cancer may have 
had some contact with a tradition of faith healing, or have been brought 
up in, a religious family with a firm belief in the power of prayer. 
. In this sense it might be said that the experience marks a new stage 
in the individual's apprehension of the tradition to which he, or she 
49-heir. This too, then, will be an important fact to record, 
although. in itself such a fact would neither add to or subtract from 
the fundamental interpretation offered.: It would merely help in the 
understanding of it. 
No doubt on further reflection it would be possible to identify 
further stages in the methodology. the historian might use on this basis 
of, the 'neutral agnosticism' I have described, but there is no need to 
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elaborate"further. The pressing question which emerges, now that a 
methodology has been described, concerns the historian's role in 
assessing the evidence and the interpretation which lies at its heart. 
Clearly as that role, according to this argument, presupposes a 
fundamental agnosticism, there is no suggestion that the evidence in 
the end will somehow turn out to be able to validate the interpretation. 
It seems rather that the historian's task is to furnish the reader or 
student with as detailed and detached a picture of the circumstances 
as possible so that he can judge himself whether the interpretation he has 
then offered makes sense, or is true. The neutrality of the historian 
here in'this model will preclude him from either encouraging or 
discouraging either a negative or a positive response. He will see 
his role as being one which recognises the absolute autonomy of the 
student. He will respect the fact that it will be entirely legitimate 
for the reader to accept, reject or remain agnostic with regard to the 
interpretation itself. 
At this point it might be asked why I say that this perspective 
on the role of the historian does not destroy or challenge the 'continuum' 
between the historical and the transcendent that I have tried to 
establish above. My reply would be that the combination of neutrality 
and agnosticism on the part of the historian, provided that the 
philosophical legitimacy of the 'continuum' is recognised, acts as its 
safeguard in that the historian deliberately eschews any adjudication 
on matters concerning the transcendent significance. which it is possible 
to attribute to an event. The role of the historian is to provide the 
evidence as a 'tool' for the person to utilise as he or. she sees fit. 
This model of the role of the historian would seem to be the 
logical outcome of a concept of the historian as primarily and 
fundamentally a scientific and objective observer who seeks to separate 
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fact from'value, and'-even perhaps from meaning. It seems that given 
the presupposition of this'attempt at separation that the model makes 
sense. However the presupposition itself would seem to be capable 
of being challenged. Certainly the way that this study ha3 set forth 
the epistemological problem in torma of knowledge, including history, 
being a'subjective construct of the human mind, raises questions about 
the legitimacy-of such's model. The argument of this study has been 
that a basic ingredient in this subjective construct of human knowledge 
is an°'e priori' element of the 'personal' as value. In this sense 
it is'difficult to see'finally'how human knowledge, partioulerly that 
which deals with persons and events which affect persons, can ever hope 
tö keep the' two separate. 
Does this mean then that an alternative model to be suggested 
must go back on the principle of agnosticism which has been established 
above and was adopted in the previous model? By no meansI The logic 
which precludes the historian from making metaphysical statements 
concerning the origin or causes of events still holds. Indeed it is 
the very same logic based on the principle of the essentially subjective 
nature of human knowledge. 
What I am describing here is the dilemma which has been referred 
to above when the role of the historian was described purely in the 
context of the relationship between the historical and the transcendent. 
However at this point it can be understood the more clearly for it stems 
from the combination of the subjective, nature of human knowledge and 
the 'given' quality of 'personal' value. Now does this insight then 
affect an understanding of the role of the historian when called upon 
to investigate claims that an event or certain events have a transcendent 
origin? Following this logic it would seem appropriate to call the 
second model I shall describe a model of 'engaged agnosticism'. 
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In the first place the methodology described above in connection 
with the model'of 'neutral agnosticism' will be applicable here also. 
However the result of the interpenetration "of fact and value in 
subjective knowledge is almost inevitably a great increase in the 
complexity involved in any understanding of the, role of the historian. 
I propose therefore simply to list considerations which will have a 
bearing. upon his function. First of all it is appropriate to note 
simply the fact of this interpenetration, and to show how fundamentally 
it-permeates the work of the historian. We should not be surprised 
to read in an historical record that 'Caesar was brutally murdered in 
the senate'. , It would be acceptable as an historical judgement. 
Neither, for that matter, would it cause us consternation to come 
across a statement which referred to 'the terrible tragedy of the 
Indian earthquake'. Now it may be that in the case of the former 
statement another historian will challenge the judgement. In this 
case the critic may suggest that it would be a more proper presentation 
of the facts to say that 'Caesar was stabbed to death in the senate'. 
This would be, in his view, a more neutral factual statement which 
avoided the value judgement of the implied condemnation by the use of 
the words 'brutally' and 'murdered'. 
However, even here, it is difficult to escape the interrelationship 
between fact and value. The resulting emendation may be factually more 
correct, and more free of value judgement. However the correction 
itself may be made on the presupposition that value is intrinsically 
attached to historical judgements which are as value free as possible. 
Or`it, may be made in the interests of allowing alternative inter- 
pretations of value to be appropriated. Thus the amended reading of 
the fact 'Caesar was stabbed to death in the senate', will leave room 
for the historian to judge either that it was an act which the historian 
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can legitimately condemn, in the sense that a benevolent and capable 
leader had been killed, or that it was an act which demands a, certain 
sympathy; in that a tyrant and despot was removed from the political 
scene. In this sense whichever one of these reasons initiated the 
emendation, its purpose was not only to clarify the facts of the matter, 
but also to bring the relationship'between fact and value into a more 
appropriate perspective. And indeed it would seem to be perfectly 
legitimate to offer this as a definition of the role of the historian: 
i. e. to strive to grasp the facts with the utmost accuracy so that the 
value judgements might be the-more satisfactorily framed, recognising of 
course that value itself cannot be factually described or known. 
Secondly it is this ultimately ungraspable and unknowable nature 
of the value ingredient in the fact and value 'mix' of the historian's 
work which is the source of the description of this model as 
'engaged agnosticism'. In terms of value the historian must recognise 
that ultimately his historical judgement must remain agnostic. He 
cannot finally claim to know that Caesar was brutally murdered, 
although as a historian he can point in the direction of such a verdict. 
At the same time in as much as he is seeking greater clarification of 
the combination between fact and value he might see his task as being 
'engaged' rather than 'neutral' in the sense that he either, quite 
legitimately, may wish to promote a, particular 'value' perspective, or 
else to seek for the truth as being of value in itself. Thus although 
he cannot claim to know that Caesar was brutally murdered, he can 
legitimately offer the view that granted the fact of Caesar's murder, 
it is open to the interpretation that it was a brutal act, and that 
this is the most. appropriate interpretation of the event. 
In addition, however, it is this ultimately unknowable nature of 
value which leads into the question of transcendence. At the limit, 
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the historian, along with the philosopher, will recognise that 
knowledge has, in some sense, to make way for faith. Now to say this 
is not necessarily to imply that faith is faith in a fully religious 
sense. It might be called faith in any one of four senses. The 
first of these will be the religious sense i. e. that ultimately the 
world and history are under the authority and control of a divine 
being. In this sense it is perfectly proper for the combination of 
fact and value to be seen in the context of providence. In a second 
sense it would be legitimate to speak of the Marxist view that history 
is under the control of an inexorable iron economic law in terms of 
'faith'. In a third sense the verdict may be that value is ultimately 
located simply in subjective sentiment. Here the 'faith' conclusion 
leads to a position of historical relativism. And in a fourth sense 
the verdict may follow the tradition of existentialist thought in that 
the value human beings accord to their lives and their history is a 
tragic absurdity. The value we conceive of, and that we find 
impossible to escape, has no ultimate correlate, yet it nevertheless 
possesses an inalienable sovereignty in that its raison d'htre is 
its self-evident validity. 
At this limit where the nature of value can no longer be known 
the 'engaged agnosticism' of the historian will be on the one hand to 
refrain from the pretence that it is a domain in which it is proper 
for him to claim that his judgement can be known, but at the same time 
to recognise that his task is to record the factual evidence as far as 
is possible so as to enable the most appropriate 'faith' judgement to 
be made. In this sense the 'continuum' between reason and faith, 
and between history and the transcendent will be integrated as a pre- 
supposition into his work. This is not so much to say that an avenue 
to faith in the religious sense is being presupposed, as that an avenue 
to a value judgement which may to a greater or lesser extent be mets- 
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physical has to be left open. 
Finally it is important to recognise that the historian himself 
is not some neutral promoter or enabler of a more sophisticated 
historical perspective on the relationship between fact and value. 
So for consideration has simply been given to the historical material. 
However, the historian himself is q 
'person 
with a 'personal' 
perspective on, -the period of 
history he studies, or on the historical 
value judgements others have made in the course of their study. For 
this reason it will be reasonable for him to see himself as the 
promoter of value judgements that are based on the historical evidence, 
and there'is=little doubt that his own value judgements will affect 
that promotion. Thus it would be possible to see the historian 
researching the'Watergate scandal as operating on the basis of some 
such model. On the evidence of his work he may well feel that it 
is appropriate to endorse the condemnation' of Nixon, 'or alternatively 
perhaps to condemn-the hypocrisy of a political system that allowed 
Nixon to be made the scapegoat. 
Moreover the historian will be asked to argue for his verdicts and 
judgements on the basis of a balance of probability which itself will 
include the inevitable 'mix' of fact and value. In addition he 
may find himself asked in what sense a value judgement which refers to 
the transcendent origin of an event can be understood, and even to 
adjudicate whether, on the balance of probability, it is a more likely 
judgement than alternatives which are offered. In this case the 
'engaged agnosticism' is pressed to the limit, because as a historian 
he cannot make 'an historical judgement which claims to know such a 
thing, but as a promoter of the greater' understanding of the relationship 
in, history between'fact and value, a relationship which leaves room for 
the transcendent, he must leave room for himself as a historian to say 
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that a judgement which incorporates that dimension in the context 
makes sense of the evidence, and even the beat sense of the evidence. 
In this-sense the role of the historian, as described in this model 
of 'engaged agnosticism', is to be a sort of midwife seeking to bring 
to birth not only, the facts, but that value element which is both 
most appropriate to the events under consideration, as well as being 
intrinsic to the way human beings relate to their historical 
experience. This judgement is at its limit open to the perspective 
of faith's assertion of the transcendent. 
This all too brief analysis of the way-in which the interpenetration 
of fact and value affects the work of the historian allows a perspective 
on the question of the relationship between fact and meaning. This 
is not to suggest that the meaning which we may give to the facts or 
deduce from them is the same as the value which can be discovered in 
them. However there will be some correlation between meaning and value, 
for the term 'meaning' may incorporate value although not necessarily 
so. It is possible to identify three dimensions of the relationship 
between fact and meaning. In the first place reference might be made 
to a purely 'analytic' relationship. In other words it is possible to 
deduce a factual moaning based on certain other facts. For example, 
let us suppose that the police discover that a man has committed the 
murder of a young boy. Later they discover that he has murdered another 
young boy. Finally the man confesses to the third murder of a small 
boy. We might say these facts mean that the man is a murderer of 
young boys. 
In the second place there is a 'value' relationship. A historian 
might discover that a politician has deliberately falsified some 
economic statistics so that his party would stand a better chance of 
winning the election. He may also discover that the same politician had 
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deliberately engaged upon a smear campaign of his rivals for the same 
purpose. -; It may also come to light that'he had paid certain newspaper 
reporters not to publish details of some personal scandal in which he 
had been involved. Here the historian might be justified in concluding 
that the underlying meaning of these actions was the ruthless ambition 
of the man. 
Finally there is a 'metaphysical' relationship. As we have seen 
the historian may find in certain cases that he cannot divorce the 
fundamental meaning he sees in life, be it atheistic, theistic, or 
agnostic, from being reflected in his judgement of certain events. 
Thus he may see the event of acme callous genocide in Africa or India 
as being reflective and confirmatory of the metaphysic of meaning of 
which tie is convinced. 
Now that this relationship between the 'personal', the 'historical' 
and the transcendent has been explored it is possible to offer a 
theoretical model of the relationship between salvation, knowledge and 
faith. It is important that the theoretical nature of what is being 
proposed here should be underlined and clearly understood. That is 
to say that what is offered is not yet at the level of theology proper. 
I may have already tentatively crossed the threshold into theology, 
but only still at the level of theory. This chapter has been an 
attempt to justify the legitimacy of an epistemology which leaves room 
for theology. 
thoigist of my argument is that it is legitimate to-use the term 
'event' to refer to that 'personal' transformation or vindication in 
which'the individual either directly or through the tradition claims 
to encounter the transcendent. It would seem to be`a proper even if 
somewhat unusual use of the term. It is of great significance to 
recognise that this is not to seek epistemological justification merely 
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by referring to the validation revelation alone brings. It is the 
historical context in which the claimed salvation occurs which is the 
epistemologicäl-touchstone which is being offered. This, moana that 
neither is the historical evidence itself being used as the justification 
of the knowledge claim. The epistemological touchstone is a coming 
together of revelation, personality and history in the saving event. 
In this sense the 'personal' and the 'historical' are epistemological 
access points to the transcendent. They are points on a 'continuum' 
with the transcendent even if they cannot verify it. They provide a 
back-up of knowledge - what might be called an epistemological context - 
from which faith is invited to take over. This is what I mean when I 
say that history is the 'arena' in which the 'personal' can be said 
to grasp, or perhaps better, -to be grasped by the transcendent. 
I turn now, however, from the construction of a theoretical 
model of the relationship between history, the 'personal' and 
transcendence, to examine the tradition of the resurrection. My 
task, however, as a conclusion to this chapter, will be to ask how 
far, and in what sense, this Christian tradition can be said to fit 
the model I have just described. First of all it is important to be 
clear that it is possible, . in a preliminary sense at 
least, and within 
the limitations already expressed within this study, to distinguish 
between interpretation and fact with regard to the tradition of the 
resurrection. The New Testament does not record the fact of the 
resurrection: i. e. it does not seek to describe the actual event of 
the body leaving the tomb, and it does not refer to any who were 
witnesses to the event. In this sense it is important to notice that 
the claim that 'Jesus rose' or that 'Jesus is risen' is already an 
12 
interpretation, and it might be claimed a theological interpretation, 
12. (c. f. p. 66; U. Wiickens, The Tradition of the Resurrection in 
The S nificance of the Messe e of the Resurrection for Faith in 
"Jesus Christ ed. C. ou o. 
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of two possiblo events or facts. The first 
is the discovery of the 
empty tomb and the second is the 'appearance' of 
Jesus after his death 
to the disciples and others who later became leaders of the Church, 
and-even to a larger group of over fivo hundred. 
Howeverg: although this evidence would suggest that the Christian 
claim concerning the resurrection of Jesus is, at the level most 
accessible to us, primarily interpretative, nevertheless that is not 
to say that there are not certain, more direct 'facts' which are 
claimed by the disciples with regard to the tradition of the resurrection. 
These I have just noted, and they are the claims that the tomb was 
empty, and the Jesus 'appeared' after his death. 
The gospels provide an impressively unanimous testimony to the 
fact of the empty tomb. However, although it is possible that this 
tradition is early, 
13 it is also argued that this is a much later level 
of the tradition, 
14 
and comes from a period when the evidence could no 
longer bet checked. Thus there must remain a question mark over 
whether this is a 'fact' which the historian has to reckon with in an 
attempt to evaluate the tradition of the resurrection. Moreover it 
is difficult to see how, at this stage, the evidence required to 
settle the status of this 'fact' could be forthcoming. If such 
evidence were produced however, and it could be seen as a 'fact' which 
had an important bearing on the evidence, it could be compared to the 
example given earlier of the cancer cure. Certainly it is such that 
it could in principle be checked empirically. However, as in that 
case, while the emptiness of the tomb could be checked, the verdict 
that God was responsible, although, in one sense, a perfectly valid 
conclusion, is not an inevitable verdict, nor even one, as we have 
argued earlier, that is likely to appeal to the historian. 
13. (c. f. p. 56 R. N. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection. Nerratives 
14. (c. f. p. 75 C. F. Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament 
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What, then, of the tradition of the 'appearances' of Josua? 
There is good reason to believe that this is the earliest and most 
primitive layer of the tradition. 
15 floreovor it is difficult to 
avoid the impression that Paul, in I Corinthians 15 is offering the 
evidence for the appearance of Jesus after his death as being 
fundamental and irrefutable, and as having an inalienable objective 
validity. So Pannenburg says, "The proof Paul gave was for his 
time a historical proof, a first-hand proof beyond doubt. "16 This 
evidence of the New Testament would suggest that the appearances of 
Jesus are to be understood as 'transcendent event' as I have defined 
that above, rather than 'an event which takes on a transcendent 
significance'. * However it would be unwise to press the distinction 
too far, because although Paul speaks of himself as a witness to this 
'transcendent. event', he nowhere actually describes it with empirical 
content. 
17 
And yet, although we are offered this dimension of historical 
'proof', there is no doubt that in general what is of greater 
significance is the 'personal' dimension of the tradition. Personal 
faith clearly has a primacy over factual knowledge. The narratives 
of the appearances operate at an essentially 'personal' level. This 
is precisely John's message when the Johannine Jesus says, "Happy 
are those who have not seen, but yet have believed. "18 What the 
resurrection appearances in the gospels underline is that'the 
resurrection is a 'personal' commission to the disciples to go and 
preach the gospel. It validates Christianity as 'persons in community' 
in the eucharist. Indeed the gospel narratives themselves are only 
15. (cf. p. 9 R. H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives 
16. New Testament Issues, ed. R. Qatey, p. 103 
17. (cf. or. 15: al. 1: 12 and 16 
18. John, 20: 29 
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comprehensible in terms of the 'personal' faith of the disciples within 
the community of the early Church. 
Even now however this analy fm not penetrated to the heart of 
the matter. It is of the utmost importance to see the resurrection 
as a 'personal' event which yields transcendent 'knowledge'. The 
N. T. presents the resurrection above all as being a divine act, 
mediated through the 'personal' faith of the believer. It was God 
who raised Jesus from the dead. Here is the key to its interpretation. 
It was because it was such that it could only be grasped truly in faith. 
Thus for Paul the resurrection was not just an historical occurrence, 
but a 'personal' transformation which yielded a wholly new theology. 
Salvation was no longer offered on the basis of the law alone, but on 
the basis of an unambiguous' demonstration of grace. 
Over against Brunner's understanding, however, the Now Testament 
does seem to offer us the resurrection as being historical in the 
sense that it did not take place exclusively within the circle of 
faith. It was indeed an 'event' which made possible a 'personal' 
transformation for those who bore witness to it, whether they had already 
been disciples of Jesus, or whether, like Paul and James, the brother 
of Jesus, they appeared to owe no 'faith' allegiance to him. But most 
of all it yielded directly, through the 'personal' response of faith 
access to the transcendent God simply and purely by dint of his grace. 
Thus it seems that it is legitimate to claim that the Biblical material 
does indeed match the pattern I have described of history being the 
'arena' in which a human 'personal' value grasps, or is grasped by, `the 
transcendent. 
At the same time this model allows the identification, on an 'a 
priori' basis, of how specific interpretations of the resurrection 
might be judged to be unsatisfactory. I have tried to show how an 
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II. -it' epistemology can-be used as a mask to conceal the imposition 
of, a subjective autonomy over against the world and others. Now an 
empiricist thinks quite naturally in terms of the world as a conceptual 
product Which results entirely from our sense experience. The 
illegitimate subjective autonomy appears at the point where the 
conceptual model determines our experience of the world, not just in 
terms of a necessary control and test upon it, ýbut in terms of a pre- 
determined 'control exercised to preserve an 'a priori' value. Thus 
experiences which threaten the security and control over the world 
where I live are either pushed on one aide or denied. 
r- As for so-the resurrection is-concerned this sort of argument could 
be expressed: 'my. experienco tells me. that dead men do not rise, 
therefore Jesus did'not really appear to his disciples. ' Now-while 
it is clear that , wo. must. use our existing experience as a criterion 
to"judge. our ongoing experience, ' and the claims or others with regard 
to their experience, that is not the same as saying that our conceptual 
framework of. the world does. not-allow for the 'new'. It can only 
reject the 'new' 'a priori' on a basis which is quite independent of 
experience itself.; We accommodate the 'new' by a process of testing 
and probing, very probably und naturally against a background of 
scepticism. 
Yet another way of denying the resurrection is to claim that the 
appearance of someone after death not only conflicts with experience 
but with logic itself. If death is the end of life, there can be no 
life beyond death. However, while this logical point can highlight 
the empirical objections, it would be an error to attempt to draw 
historical conclusions simply on the basXa of a logical deduction 
irrespective of the evidenco. Only if the statement 'Jesus appeared 
after his death' was a logical contradiction or made no aensu at all, 
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would auch on argument hold up. ' However, although it is not the 
sort of event which is generally understood as being within our 
experience, nevertheless we can understand something of what such a 
statement might mean. Thus we can see that to declare it a logical 
contradiction is in effect to control history by means of logic. 
And under such circumstances it seems reasonable to ask whether 
reason is being used as a mask for the illegitimate subjective autonomy 
we have spoken of above. 
Now all this is not a subtle and disguised attempt to assert the 
historical truth of the resurrection. What is being said is simply 
that the Christinn claim to the resurrection is one which can be 
investigated historically, provided that we bear in mind the various 
levels which will affect our judgement, and the nature of the results 
which our judgements can achieve. There can be no question, for 
example, of our investigation offering us 'proof of the truth'. Any 
verdict can only'be given in terms of varying degrees of probability. 
Thus'an histocIcal conclusion, if it were to be'positive and supportive 
of the N. T. claims, could not be 'equated with faith. Nevertheless it 
could be said to provide and offer a positive basis for faith; a 
legitimate entry-point into the circle of faith. The historian, 
therefore'may not legitimately offer the conclusion that 'Jesus 
appeared', but he may conclude that the claims of the early Christians 
make sense, and that on the whole they make the best sense of the 
evidence. 
More than this, however, the imposition of an arbitrary and over- 
weening autonomy which rejects out of hand the resurrection 
interpretation is matched by what amounts to a practical declaration 
of autonomy under the guise of a claim to be dependent upon an 'alien' 
and mysterious ontology. The argument might go like this: the 
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resurrection can be offered as security for faith. The fact that 
it offers us knowledge, and knowledge not in normal terms accessible 
to human experience, guarantees that faith has a transcendent oorrelate. 
The mistake hero is to imagine that the transcendent can be reduced to 
a human, concept which can be thought. It is to reduce faith to 
propositions. Where the transcendent is effectively conceived in 
this way it is to subject it to our control. The principle noted 
above in this instance works the opposite way round. If historical 
statements themselves cannot express faith directly, then faith itself 
cannot be reduced to historical statements or propositions. However, 
once again', although the logic of the error is clear, it is quite 
undeniable that a faith which has been reduced to doctrinal propositions 
and ritual observances does offer a longed-for 'personal' security. 
For total dependence upon an authority which is 'alien' in the sense 
that it is self-validating effectively becomes autonomy. 
This means that not only cannot the resurrection by dint of being 
an 'alien' revelatory event prove the truth of Christianity, but 
neither can-, the resurrection of Jesus be held to be an article of faith. 
Faith itself might well proclaim that 'Jesus is risen', but: auch a 
statement can never hope to contain the quintessence of: faith. Also 
it must be said that knowledge claims concerning the person of Jesus 
which resulted from the resurrection claim must be equally suspect. 
Any insistence on the transcendent ontology of Jesus must be 
distinguished from a purely objective knowledge claim. Any attempt 
which seeks to reduce the transcendent to systematic structures and 
doctrines seems likely by nature of the very attempt itself, to mask 
the subjective autonomy I have described above. And this is the very 
antithesis of faith as 'personal' openness to the transcendent. All 
attempts by the believer to make faith his property, something which 
can be protected and ultimately validated by knowledge claims are to 
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be eschewed. 
This enables to be seen in a new light both the Christian claim 
to exclusiveness as well as the traditional presentation of 
Christianity which begins with the Incarnation of the Lagoa. It is 
possible to. ask whether the whole traditional emphasis upon the doctrine 
of the person of Christ can be understood as an attempt to objectivise 
faith, rather than an attempt to explore and explain the 'personal' 
nature. of faith itself. From the sheer logic of the matter it would. 
seem illegitimate to-use the resurrection to confirm specific 
Christological claims for Jesus of Nazareth, when it seems likely that 
such claims only came later in the light, of systematic reflection. 
The resurrection id more likely to be the raw material out of which 
Christology came to be constructed rather than the validation of an 
existing-doctrinal claim. What seems intrinsically more likely is 
that the resurrection was an 'event', in terms of the complex 
interrelationship between event and interpretation, which confirmed 
and validated for those who 'witnessed' it the 'personal' faith which 
Jesus himself hold. Moreover this naturally took place in a context 
of those who know and trusted him or of those who knew something of 
him. Subsequently, when faith became identified with the Christological 
statements then of course it was natural for the resurrection to be 
seen as confirmation of these doctrines. But even here what is being 
confirmed and validated is faith itself rather than the structures of 
knowledge in which it is expressed. 
Thus the category of the 'personal' allows an understanding of the 
drawbacks of scepticism and the dangers of-an excessive confidence in 
the traditional expression of, faith in both the resurrection and the 
Christological foiiulations, But more than this it allows us to see 
that the use of the categories of myth and symbol do not really further 
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the cause of a-contemporary Christian apologetic. 
ßultmenn understands the myths of the N. T. to be objectified 
narratives which demand an existentialist interpretation, and are 
capable of mediating through the proclamation the existential 
transformation of my existence. He says, "Accordingly, therefore, 
also the answer to the question of how revelation is understood in 
the N. T. cannot be understood an a simple communication but only as 
a personal address. "19 In this sense Bultmann's existentialism allows 
him to stress the 'personal' nature of revelation. However, he, like 
Brunner, fails to focus on the 'personal' as it might be known naturally. 
The attention is devoted more to the 'personal' in the sense of the 
'inconceivable' personal change wrought by revelation. While we 
understand death to be the natural boundary of our existence, 
revelation, by contrast, can transform it totally by overcoming death. 
ßultmann says, "Death does concern us and we cannot become lord of it. " 
"Rather what can be called revelation can only be what actually 
abolishes death. " 20 
Theologians-aro very often concerned to stress the technical 
nature of their use of myth. Pyths are not more fiction, but stories 
which are capable of mediating a truth or truths about the nature of 
humanity, and of the human relationship with Cod. In other words, 
according to Bultmann's understanding, they depend for their 'truth' 
element upon their essential revelatory nature. They are not so much 
ordinary stories about men and women. Rather are they infused by some 
'alien' divine power effective in the proclamation which effects the 
transformation of human beings. "It (the Church) says: Cod speaks 
to you here= In his majesty he has chosen this place; we cannot 
19. Existence and Faith, p. 74 
20. ibidog p. 
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question whether this place is the right one; we must lioton to the 
call that summons us. "21 
Moreover Tillichs, understanding of the use of symbols poses 
similar problems. Its analysis is valuable in that it stresses that 
objects in the world can have greater significance than the empirical 
knowledge we can have of them. Thus he claims that secular objects 
such as bread and wino become religious symbols when they participate 
in a reality which transcends the way we apprehend them through our 
sense experience. He says, "Symbols are independent of any empirical 
criticism. "22 In other words it is the inexpressible and 'alien' 
nature of revelation which validates and gives power to the concept of 
the symbol. Ultimately the only way in which this other dimension 
of an object or story or ritual can be understood is in terms of. the 
same 'alien' dimension which is central to Brunner's thought. It 
seems that a direct appeal to revelation as an epistemological principle 
inevitably involves this 'alien' element which has been identified. 
What it is important to know is not that revelation grasps and transforms 
our lives, but how revelation can be said to do this. The 'how' is 
crucial to our being able to claim the 'that'. The suggestion of this 
study is that the bare assertion of revelation is no epistemological 
principle at all, but that it is possible to cluim that revelation 
encounters us through the mediation of 'personal' value in the midst of 
our historical experience. Thus wo can claim to have been encountered 
by revelation in that experience of salvation in which tho 'personal' 
the transcendent and the historical coma together to form the epistemological 
touchstone of our theological language. 
The reaffirmation of the principle of immanence in the context 
21. ibid., p. 199 
22. Theology of Culture, Paul Tillich, p. 65 
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of the 'personal' and 'historical' leaves me with a double purpose. 
First of all it will be important to test out how far it might be said 
that the Christian claim that Jesus rose from the dead is a legitimate 
interpretation of the events surrounding his death on the cross, and 
whether the salvation which the early Christians apprehended through 
faith can be understood to mediate an ontology which in some sense is 
accessible to us. 
My task is to ask about the possible reliability. of the testimony. 
I am not seeking to provide objective proof of historical or 
Christological facts. I am merely asking whether the epistemological 
basis of the claims provides a valid access not only to the 'personal' 
interpretation of the early Christians, but, through that 'personal' 
interpretation, to the transcendent ontology to which their faith 
testifies. 
Thus the final chapters will deal with the relationship between 
faith and knowledge in the specific context of the resurrection. 
However the epistemology of salvation which is being examined in 
necessarily a confirmatory one. The 'personal' relationship between 
faith and knowledge in the historical context of the resurrection of 
Jesus would mean nothing if it were not confirmation in some sense 
of our understanding of what'it means tobe a person. 
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accepted to speak of the resurrection as the mythological way in 
which the early Christians explored the meaning of the cross. 
Certainly this approach was welcomed by theologians like Bultmann 
because it allowed them to stress the existential nature of revelation. 
Moreover it did not trouble Barth and Brunner because the resurrection 
as a divine act was not accessible to historical research, and 
therefore quite impervious to such scepticism. Here was not so 
much a challenge to faith. Rather was faith seen to be placed on 
a firmer footing. In such a context Bultmann could speak happily 
of the "incredibility of a mythical event like the resuscitation of 
a corpse. "2 
However more recently the situation has changed. The question 
has been. reconsidered as to whether such scepticism, supposedly in 
the interests of faith, really does justice to the historical claims 
of the New Testament, and thus can help our understanding of what is 
meant by faith. Just as dultmann'a de-mythologising of the New 
Testament gave rise to the new quest for the historical Jesus, so 
there has followed what might be called the new quest for the 
historical resurrection. Of course I do not mean by that an attempt 
to recover the resurrection as an historical fact in itself, but 
rather to seek after that independent event which gave rise to the 
reaurrection faith. Thus Pannenberg, who has perhaps been the 
boldest in his approach to the problem has said, "The resurrection of 
Jesus is the decisive ground for the proclamation and for faith ... 
It is only by this event that everything else in Jesus' appearing is 
"3 illuminated.. 
2. R. Bultmann, N. T. and Mythology, vol. I ed. Bartsch, p. 39 
quoted in R. F ler, Formation of the Resurrection Narratives p. 1 
3. W. Pannenberg, Did Jesus ýeally ise from the Dead? in New 
Testament Issues ed. R. Batey 
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But Pannenberg is no solitary voice. Ulrich Wilckens says, 
"If the raising of Jesus frornº the dead were not an event valid in 
its own right, Cod's mighty deed carried out on the crucified Jesus, 
then the; Pauline use. of-the expression 'the message of the Cross' 
would have had no force. "4 R. H. Fuller speaks somehwh at hesitantly 
of the appearances of-Jesus as 'objective visions'. lie is hesitant 
because the term 'objective' as used in this instance, has to include 
not just the objective, historical nature of the experience, but also 
the eschatological nature of the divine revelation which cannot 
properly be spoken of in either historical or objective language. 
He says, "The farthest we can get perhaps is to say that the events 
through which the Easter revelations were conveyed were visionary, 
but to describe them as visions, even as 'objective visions' is not 
entirely felicitous. The word 'vision', at best, denotes te this- 
worldly event through which the eschatological event is mediated. 
'Objective'points to the divine act of disclosure mediated by the 
vision, but does not indicate that what was disclosed was eschatological ... 
If we speak of the Easter appearances as visions it must be clear that 
we are speaking only of the this-worldly, historical aspect, of the 
medium of revelation, not of the revelation in its eschatological 
reality. "5 
Willi Marxsen in his controversial book, The Resurrection of 
Jesus of Nazareth, although unwilling to speak directly of the 
appearances of Jesus in historical terms is nevertheless clear that 
it is a legitimate verdict of history to assert that the early 
Christians understood their faith to be based on the 'seeing' of Jesus. 
Marxsen concludes therefore that there was a separate event and 
experience apart from the crucifixion which gave rise to faith. "We 
4. Resurrection, p. 123 
5. he Formation of the Resurrection Narrativ R. H. Fuller, p. 333-4 
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must be clear about the fact this historical enquiry has not brought 
us direct access to the vision of Simon ... The pattern is rather 
as follows: to the questions of what can be established by historical 
investigation, we can only answer - the faith of Simon as constitutive 
of the church, and the assertion of the early church that this faith 
was grounded on the seeing of Jesus. "6 
Norman Perrin puts the matter more simplyi "In some way they 
were granted a vision of Jesus which convinced them that God had 
vindicated Jesus out of his death, and that therefore the death of 
Jesus was by no means the end of the impact of Jesus upon their 
lives and upon the world in which they lived. "7 Even C. F. Evans, 
as extreme in his caution as Pannonborg is in his boldness when it 
comes to drawing historical conclusions about the resurrection, 
speaks unambiguously of Easter as a distinctive event. "Whatever 
{ the Easter event was, it must be supposed to be of such a kind as to 
be responsible for the production of these traditions as its deposit 
at whatever remove. "8 Moltmann too is confident of an'historical 
core. -"They were therefore not mystical transportations into another 
world beyond, nor were they inner illuminations, but a eight and a 
foretaste in the countenance of the crucified Christ of the God who was 
to come. "9 
It seems therefore that in speaking about the historical nature 
of the resurrection of Jesus the validity of our language and our 
question receives the support of an impressive array of both New 
Testament. scholara and systematic theologians. The result of what 
6. The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,, p.. 96, W. flarxsen 
ef. below p. 345ff for discussion of uý01 - he appeared 
7. The Resurrection Narratives, N. Perrin, 'p. 85 
B. Resurrection and the New Testament, C. F. Evans, p. 130 
9. The Crucified God, J. t1o tmann, p. 167-8 
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we have called the now quest for the historical reaurrcction in to 
endorse in a quits surprising way the verdict of thoac, to uoo C. F. D. 
Hloule's expression, who hold "that the resurrection was the cause of 
a , faith-which did not previously exist. ""10 
10. p. 2, C. F. D. Moule in the introduction to The Significance of 
the Messee of the Resurrection for Faith in Jesus Christ 
What I have done here is to underline that tradition in N. T. theology 
which has sought to preserve a creative relationship between the 
historical nature of the tradition of the resurrection and faith. 
I do not wish to imply however that there are not other voices to be 
heard which have contributed to the contemporary debate, and which 
are sceptical of such an emphasis. One example of such a voice 
might be heard from the 'radical' critics of Bultmann, theologians 
such as Buri and Ogden. Ogden, for example, argues that if 
Christian theology wishes to speak of the resurrection as faith's 
response to the gracious transcendence of God it cannot properly be 
spoken of as "yet another historical happening in space and time, 
subsequent to the events of Jesus' life and death. " (p. 217, S. Ogden, 
The Reality of God). For him, -to seek some special historical 
con inuum' between empirical history and transcendence with regard 
to the figure of Jesus, is to deny that we are truly justified by 
grace through faith. Harvey explains the position as follows: "The 
N. T. message will be free from mythical elements only when it is 
recognised to be but one symbolic way of expressing an insight inth 
the nature of authenticity. The entire Christian story is a dramatic 
and concrete drama (a myth) which expresses 'an intense awareness of 
existence na grace', (Burl, Ker ma und Mythos, III0 90) an awareness 
which Christians have, but which is in no sense restricted to them. " (p. 166, V. A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer). Other examples 
are to be found in the work of Maurice Wies. He advises caution 
and scepticism in assessing the historical evidence. He says, rather 
mysteriously, 'It is not an event on all fours withýthe passion and 
crucifixion' (p. 74, M. Wiles, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine). 
Don Cupitt is even more forthright: "the Laster faith was born by 
theological and existential reflection upon the completed life of Jesus. " (p. 509, 
ýTheology 
Oct. 1972; 'The Resurrection: A Disagreement', a 
debate be wýeen C. F. D. Moule and D. Cupitt). Curiously enough, from 
a perspective which has close affinity with empiricist philosophy, 
Cupitt is able to make much the same point as Buri and Ogden, that 
the spiritual authenticity of Christianity has but little to do with 
a barely comprehensible event two thousand years ago. "A dubiously- 
evidenced freak event (or even a strongly-evidenced freak event) two 
thousand years ago is in itselfofno religious interest hhatsoever. " 
(p. 41, D. Cupitt, Taking Leave of God). My problems with the'examples 
of Ogden on the one hand and Cupitt on the other are not so much with 
the theological emphases which they wish to'make, but rather with the 
epistemological justification which they offer for their positions. 
In the one case it is hard to see how revelation alone in some 
transcendent sense can validate specific faith claims of the Christian 
tradition without some reference to the way in which the transcendent 
impinges on history. In the other case it is hard to see how an 
evangelical zeal to promote a specifically Christian spirituality can 
be rooted in a fundamentally empiricist epistemology. 
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Now that-I-have-set this enquiry weinst the background of the 
contemporary New Testament debate there ratsame one further preliminary 
question. I have token pains to establish both here and in the 
previous chapter the legitimacy of my question concerning the 
resurrection, but I have not adequately explained why my argument 
takes us there in the first place. My study has led me to focus on 
the category of salvation for two reasons. In the first place I 
have found difficulty with on 'alien' concept of revelation to solve 
the epiatcmological problem. And at the same time ©runner's emphasis 
on a morel centre to the question has seemed entirely appropriate. 
The humor need does appear to be a moral rather than a purely 
epistemological one. For Brunner the categories of the 'personal' 
and the 'historical' allowed him to tackle the whole issue, and to 
explain the Christian message of salvation, lie set forth how they 
came together`in the incarnation. 
Here, however, the difficulties arose, as has already been. seen, 
because at every point where Brunner began with these categories they 
became subsumed beneath, and taken over by, an 'alien' concept of 
revelation. It seemed, therefore, that the Christian message of 
salvation might be understood more easily and directly if attention 
was focussed on an attempt to expound an epistemology of salvation 
itself. On the basis of continuing to use Brunner's categories it 
would be appropriate to ask about the 'personal' and 'historical' 
experience of salvation. On reflection this seemed to be a more 
obvious entry-point to the subject than that provided by an ontology 
of revelation which offered 'a priori' epistenblogical validity to the 
Christian message. It seemed both natural end reasonable to suppose 
that the theology and doctrine of the New testament, and particularly 
the gospel sccounts themselves, arose out of the experience and conviction 
326 
that-there was salvation to be found in Christ. Ontologically God 
might be thought to be the logical beginning but epistemologically 
it seemed that there was no option but to begin with human experience. 
For this reason in the last chapter I tried to explain how the 
categories of the 'personal' and the 'historical' were related to our 
experience, and how the 'historical', inasmuch as it acted as the 
point of contact between the person and the world, mediated through 
the 'personal' significance which we attached to an historical 
experience, could legitimately raise the question of a transcendent 
ontology, and whether ultimately our personal identity is secure 
only in terms ofa faith relation with the transcendent. In this 
. sense the question of salvation arises naturally and logically out of 
our 'personal' and 'historical' experience. 
I began the study by asking whether it is possible to reconnect 
Christianity with modernity. I have tried to show how Brunner 
attempted to do this, and failed, by speaking of the 'personal' nature 
of revelation. However, by using his categories it has been possible 
to claim that the question of salvation is both logical and 
comprehensible for contemporary culture. At the same time I have also 
argued that the Christian message is primarily a message of salvation 
both in terms of its substance as well as in the reality which it 
offers the believer. If we are to be able to reconnect Christianity 
with the modern world it seems that here, more than anywhere, we are 
likely to be able to establish some point of correlation. The question 
then is whether, and in what sense, the Christian message of salvation 
provides an answer to an 'a priori' and therefore perennial question 
in the light of our continuing cultural and historical experience. 
Once the nature and scope of the enquiry has been established 
there is an obvious place to begin our exploration. That is with the 
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Christian claim for the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. It is an 
obvious point of departure in two senses. First of all, as we have 
already emphasised, Christianity is an historical religion. 
Traditionally the Christian message identifies its offer of salvation 
in a decisive way with the events of the cross and the resurrection. 
It would be difficult to understand the Christian proclamation without 
seeing Easter in some sense at its centre. Even those who interpret 
it symbolically or mythologically still speak of Easter as the 
Christian message. In Protestantism the empty cross is the Christian 
symbol. 
Secondly it would seem justified to claim that the concept of 
resurrection in Christianity is to ©il intents and purposes synonymous 
with salvation. However, the relationship between resurrection and 
salvation is a complex one. Therefore I must pause briefly at least 
to examine it, even though a proper study would need to trace the 
development of the idea of resurrection from the Old Testament, through 
the inter-testamental literature to the New Testament. The theological 
concept of resurrection is one which occurs late in the Old Testament. 
It is not until the book of Daniel that there is an unambiguous expression 
of the belief that the righteous dead will be vindicated by Cod and 
given an eternal relationship with him. In Daniel 12: 2 we read, "Many 
of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will wake, some to 
everlasting life, and some to the reproach of eternal abhorrence. " 
This passage therefore contains the notion of salvation. But quite 
clearly here the two ideas of resurrection and salvation are not 
synonymous. Resurrection is the physical act performed by God prior 
to the divine judgement. The righteous and the rebellious will both 
be raised, the righteous to salvation, the rebellious to damnation. 
This is not the place to discuss how widespread the belief in 
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resurrection was as a symbol of salvation in the inter-testamental 
literature. But there is some evidence to suggest that instead of 
remaining merely a neutral symbol, it did begin to assume the 
symbolism of salvation. Thus in the Apocalypse of Barugh11 we 
read,. "Then all who have fallen asleep in-hopeof Him (The Messiah) 
shall rise again. And it shall come to pass that at that time the 
treasuries will be opened in which is preserved the number of the 
souls of the-righteous, and they shall come forth, and a multitude of 
souls shall be , seen together in one assemblage of one thought, and the 
first shall rejoice and the last shall not be grieved. For they know, 
that the time has come of which it is said, that it is the consummation 
of the times. But the souls of the wicked when they behold all these 
things, shall then waste away the more. For they shall know that their 
torment has come, and their perdition has arrived. " Even though this 
is a perilous topic on which to pronounce Wilckens does state clearly, 
"It is in keeping with this focus of interest, that in most of the 
texts, in which the concept of a resurrection of the dead at the end 
of time appears, there is not a mention of sinners arising for the 
Last Judgement, but only mention of the righteous, who are awakened 
from the dead to receive that life of salvation to which they are 
entitled. "12 
However in the Now Testament the situation is far less ambiguous. 
Nevertheless there are several passages where the Daniel pattern of 
resurrection for judgement is clearly present. In John 5: 29, for 
example, we read, "Do not wonder at this, because the time is coming 
when all who are in the grave shall hear his voice and come, out; those 
who have done right will rise to life; those who have done wrong will 
11.2 Baruch 30: 25 
12. -Resurrection, U. Wilckens, p. 92 
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rise-, to hear their doom. " Similarly in Revelation 20: 13 the writer 
of the-apocalypse says, "The sea gave"üp its dead, and Death end 
Hades gave up'the dead in their keeping; they were judged, each man 
on the record of his deeds`. " In addition, it is possible to see', 
implied in`Matthew 25t31ff, the chapter which contains the so-called 
parables of judgement, the notion that razurrection will take place 
prior to judgement. In that passage there is a vision of the Son of 
man separating all mankind, presumably resurrected before him, into 
the righteous and the cursed. 
However the lasting impression we receive of the concept of 
resurrection here°io that''of its'virtual equation'with the idea of 
salvation. Thus-Jesus, for example when questioned about the doctrine 
of-the resurrection, replies to the Sadducoes, "When they rise from 
the dead, men and women do not marry; they are like angels'in heaven ... 
Cod is'not. the God of the dead but of the living. " (htk. 12: 25-27). 
The implication here is that the resurrection life is a new dimension 
of Ipermanent relationship with God. In that sense we might say 
that-it`ie a life of salvation. 
In the case of the passion sayings which occur on the lips of 
Jesus in the synoptic gospels the matter is even less ambiguous. On 
three occasions in Mark's gospel Jesus speaks of the Son of Man 
enduring great suffering, being put to death, and on the third day 
being raised to life (Mk. 8: 31,9: 31,10: 33). The resurrection here 
is a sign of the divine vindication and thus of salvation. When we 
turn to Paul resurrection is quite clearly and without any ambigu ty 
a symbol of salvation. It is the life of the spiritual body which 
contemplates an eternal existence with God. In I Corinthians he says, 
"Listen) I will unfold a mystery. We shall not all die, but we shall 
allýbe changed 'in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last 
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trumpet call. For the trumpet call will sound and the dead will rise 
immortal; and wo shall be changed. This perishable being must be 
clothed with'tho imporishable, and what is mortal must be clothed with 
immortality. " (I Car. 15: 51ff. ), Resurrection here is not only the 
conqu©ut of death, but elco victory over sin. Thus there could be no 
clearer definition of salvation. 
In John's gospel resurrection is the symbol of the passage from a 
mortal life to the new quality of eternal life. In 5: 25 we read, "In 
truth, in very truth, I tell you, a time is coming, indeed it is 
already here, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of Cod, 
and all who hear shall come to life. " And this new quality of life, 
conferred by the resurrection itself, is described in the previous 
verse, where Jesus says, "In very truth, anyone who gives heed to 
what I 'say and puts his trust in him who sent me has hold of eternal 
life, and does'not come up for judgement, but has already passed from 
deathto life. " In the account of the raising of Lazarus the event 
of resurrection there is a pointer both towards the resurrection of 
Jesus himself, as well as to the salvation which is now available 
through faith in Christ. Raising the dead and giving them life are 
virtually synonymous (5: 21), just as is Jesus' proclamation that ho 
himself is the resurrection and the life (11: 25). Resurrection, eternal 
life and salvation are given identical meaning in the Johannine 
equation, Thus, for the most part at least, when the New Testament 
speaks of resurrection it does so both in terms of God's act to save 
Jesus from death and the tomb, as well as in terms of the salvation 
that is offered to those who believe in him. The faithful too can 
look forward to sharing in the resurrection of Jesus. 
13 
If the qu. esti. n is asked how precisely resurrection, understood in 
13. cf. I Thess 4: 13ff; I Cor. 15: 22 
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Daniel as a sombre and neutral eschatological event, came to 
symbolise salvation in the New Testament the answer is not clear. 
It may be that interteatamental Judaism, so Wilckens suggested, 
itself moved in that direction not so much perhaps as a deliberate 
shift from the idea in Daniel, but more in the sense that often, if 
the resurrection of the just alone was referred to, then in that 
case it could be assumed that resurrection was synonymous with 
eternal life. 
Evans, -however, is more reticent about arriving at a 
judgement 
concerning the doctrine of resurrection in apocryp. 'lal and pacudepi- 
graphical literature. He says, "Its very incoherence could argue 
that resurrection was not a universally held belief and badge of 
orthodoxy, but a subject of considerable speculation and debate. "14 
For him there is a startling discontinuity between this barely 
coherent expectation in Judaism, and the force and centrality of the 
New Testament, proclamation of resurrection. Paradoxically this 
discontinuity is hidden by the way in which the New Testament writers 
explain the resurrection as vindicating already existing hopes and 
beliefs. However once we peel away those layers which are the 
projections back of"the faith experience of the early Christians, the 
uniqueness of the resurrection of Jesus stands out in sharp relief. 
Evans comments, ".... attention is focused'even more fiercely on the 
resurrection, for whatever it may have been as an event it is now 
seen to be the 'Pons at origo' of Christian faith in the lordship 
of Jesus. "15 In this analysis therefore it is supremely the strange 
revelatory event described as the resurrection of Jesus, and interpreted 
as being salvific, which itself more than anything else effects the 
14. C. F. Evans, p. 27, op. cit. 
15, p. 148, C. F. Evans, ibid. 
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transition'' from the Old Testament understanding to the one we find 
in the New with its strong central focus. 
There is'even a third possibility that Jesus himself used the 
concept of resurrection to express hi's-own faith expectation of being 
vindicated by God. It seems to be generally accepted by New Testament 
scholars that the passion sayings of Jesus are 'vaticinia ex eventu'. 
However it is possible to argue that if we are prepared to accept the 
legitimacy of the title of the Son of man as one which Jesus used to 
speak of himself and his role, there is a logical link between the 
suffering and vindication of the Son of man, leading to resurrection 
and eternal life in Daniel, and the suffering and death culminating 
in resurrection which the passion sayings predict. There seems to 
be no logical reason why the historical Jesus should not have 
identified himself with this figure in Daniel, and made the link 
himself. If this were the case then the actual event, the appearance 
of the risen Jesus would merely have confirmed an interpretative 
framework provided by Jesus himself which previously had been scarcely 
comprehensible, because it was more of a personal interpretation held 
in the context of a bewildering complexity of beliefs. 
16 
16. The link between the 'Son of man' sayings in the gospels and the 
'Son of man' sayings in Daniel is one which has a long history. It 
goes back to the early Church Fathers, (cf. Tertullion, Adv Marc. IV 10 
discussing Luke 5: 24, ref. M. Casey, Son of Man) p. 159) and became an 
established principle in earlier British 20th century scholarship of 
Dodd, Manson and Taylor (cf. T. W. Manson, Studies in the Gospels and Epi_ 
_fl. ýt1e 
p. 143; V. Taylor, The Person of Christ in N T. Teaching, p. 5) 
Moreover this continuity has been preserved in a whole new stream of 
modern scholars, many of whom have broken with the association between 
Daniel 7 and the Suffering Servant of Isaiah (cf. M. D. Hooker, Jesus 
and the Servant and The Son of Man in Mark; E. Best, The Temptation 
an the Passgin; D. Hill, The Gospel of Matthew, p. 162-16410 J. Baw or, 
'The So; of Man', J. T. S. vo . xxv ii, p. 19-48) On the other hand the link has been questioned by G. Vermes (cf. Appendix E, M. Black, An 
Aramaic A roach to the Gospels and Acts p. 327-326; A. J. B. Higgins, 
Jesus- and the Son o an, p. 199) and most recently by 14. Casey, Son of 
an; he Interpretation and Influence of Daniel 7. In fact Casey 
inEro uces is book by saying, ' have completed e theory and proposed 
a complete solution to the Son of man problem" (p. 3 ibid. ) He claims 
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that the influence of Daniel 7 on the so-called 'Son of man' material 
in the Gospels is not to be found in the original sayings, but "in 
. the work of early Christian exegetes some time after the death and Resurrection of Jesus, "(p. 228, ibid. He distinguishes between the 
use of the Aramaic IU]? ( l1 and the Greek 4 Lees Tov 44ew, rou . 
The former was an Aramaic circumlocution for 'man', while the Greek 
translation turns it into a title. Thus, while the Creek title has 
its origin in the early Church, the Aramaic usage has its origin in 
the life of Jesus. Casey argues that while the Aramaic sayings 
which deal with the life of the man Jesus and his impending death 
(Mk. -2: 1O; 2: 28; -8: 30; 9s12; 10: 45; 14: 21) are likely to be the 
most authentic, "Hie Resurrection and last judgement also appear, 
but as part of the picture of the last times generally accepted in the 
Judaism of this period. " (p. 237-238) Thus the pattern of the 
obedience, humiliation and vindication, identified by Hooker, could 
still be a pattern which the historical Jesus used to describe his 
own role, irrespective of-whether or not he thought of himself as the 
Danielic Son of man. The idea of the resurrection of the Son of man, 
then, even in the original Aramaic context, could still remain as an 
interpretative framework provided by Jesus himself. 
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However the point as far as this stage of the argument is 
concerned is not so much how the idea of resurrection came to stand 
at the centre of the Christian proclamation of salvation, but rather 
that it did. The question to be examined is twofold. First it is 
important to ask how for the New Testament claim that Jesus was raised 
from the dead can be said to be a legitimate claim, and thus offer us 
an epistemology of salvation. And secondly it is important to ask in 
what sense and in what terms, if such a claim is considered to be 
valid, it provides an answer to the question of human salvation, for I 
have argued that this question has validity in its own right on the 
basis of the 'personal' and 'historical' dimensions of our experience. 
This question, though expressed simply, represents the refinement 
of a complex mass of theological, philosophical and historical material. 
It must not be imagined that in expressing it thus simply it has 
become ä naive question. From. what has been said in the previous 
chapterl am concerned simply to ask a question concerning historical 
probability. It has to do with the likelihood of the legitimacy of 
an interpretation, and is not intended to arrive at any 'proof of the 
truth'. ' This allows me to give the 'personal' dimension of the 
question which is a vital ingredient in the interpretative process its 
true weight and value. Because what is being judged here is not 
just the facts themselves but the 'personal' interpretation and 
significance attached to those 'facts' there is no hope of arriving at 
anything more solid than probability. Thus, the fact that there is 
no attempt to establish an historical 'proof of truth' stresses the 
priority of the 'personal' and of any transcendent validation being 
understood in the context of the 'a priori' nature of our understanding 
of 'personal' worth. The importance of the 'historical' here is 
concerned with the nature of the significance it allows u to attach 
to the 'personal' and whether the language which claims a transcendent 
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correlate can be justified at all on the basis of what historical 
evidence there is to hand. 
As has been aeon in the previous chapter the significance of 
the resurrection is primarily 'personal'. It transformed the value 
which the disciples saw in their own lives. It created a new 
community and a now concept of mission for that community. Indeed 
it was through this dimension of the 'personal' that it became 
possible for resurrection to be identified with salvation. The 
'personal' Weaning which the disciples attributed to the resurrection 
experience not only enabled them to proclaim that in Jesus the saviour 
figure of the Messiah had been and still was in some way present, but 
also added a new urgency to the message of what God's offer of 
salvation meant for the whole world; to Gentile as well as Jew. 
Once we take on board this dimension of the New Testament claim we 
see that it is not just a claim about an event which happened during 
a Passover festival some time during the first half of the first 
century A. D. No see it as an event which contained within it a new 
dimension of future hope transcending the limits of history and time, 
as well as an event which seeks to explore and explain the meaning 
of the tragic death of a man who suffered a criminal's death on a cross. 
It is only this 'personal' dimension of the resurrection-claim which 
can look back to ask about the cosmic transcendent significance of the 
cross, or see, in the event the transcendent blue-print for the future 
of mankind. 
For Paul the ro3urrection of Jesus was not just the Damascus road 
experience we find described in Acts, it was an event which demanded a 
radical re-appraisal of his personal understanding of the whole 
relationship between God and humanity, both in the past as well as in 
the future. It was an evebt which drove him from the expression of 
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hie pious Jewish orthodoxy in Palestine to preach to both Jews and 
Ccntilos alike in settlements scattered throughout the Roman Empire. 
Finally he came to Rome itself proclaiming the message of a cross 
designed to turn upside down existing. valuea, in the light of, and 
under the impact of, the eschatological promise.. A comment by 
tidltmann describes exactly the combination of the 'historical' and 
the 'personal' as they come together in the resurrection. He says, 
... the original significance of the Easter faith is that the eye- 
witnesses perceived the earthly, crucified Jesus of the past in the 
glory of God's coming and drew conclusions from that in their 
"17 experience of a call and mission. 
When we speak of the resurrection we-cannot but attach to it and 
associate with it this whole host of interpretations which the. 
'personal' significance, intrinsically bound up with it, furnishes, 
offers and makes possible. Nevertheless my concern at this point is 
whether that 'personal' significance has a transcendent correlate, and 
it is in connection with the resurrection itself, the appearances of 
Jesus and the empty tomb that the New Testament allows us our nearest 
approach to a comprehension of what, by-virtue of our definition of it 
as transcendent, ` is ultimately incomprehensible from our human 
perspective. Here, embedded in a religious tradition is one of those 
points where the-gap between the finite and the transcendent is 
seemingly bridged, and from our standpoint on the bank of the contingent 
we can strain our eyes and steady our judgement to see if there is any 
sign of the transcendent, and judge whether there is genuine evidence 
left behind of the impact it may have made. 
Now that I have defined the nature and limits of my enquiry, I 
must turn to the evidence itself, both external and internal. What 
17. The Crucified God, J. Moltmann, p. 168 
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is really called for at this point Is come detailed analysis of the 
history of the tradition of the Now Teotomont witness to the resurrection 
of Josue. However such a study Is inappropriate in the context of 
this brief sketch of a possible epistemological framework. I shall 
content myself therefore with asummary statoment, of important aspects 
of the evidence. 
A number of explanations have been offered in face of the claim 
or the New Testament that the tomb where the body of Jesus had been 
laid was later found to be empty, and that after his death Jesus 
appeared to a number of people some of whom hadibeen his closest 
friends, and some of whom obviously only know about him. One 
suggestion is that the disciples themselves stole the body, and 
presumably went on to invent the appearance stories. There is 
evidence in Matthew 26: 12ff. to support this theory. The goepe'l 
writer, of course, offers us evidence both to explain and discredit 
it. Indeed earlier in the account the evangelist has prepared the 
way for the rebuttal of the accusation by describing how Roman soldiers 
were instructed to guard the tomb to prevent any possibility of 
deception or theft by the disciples (21: 64ff. ) Matthew's gospel 
says, "After meeting with the elders and conferring together, the 
chief priests offered the soldiers a substential-bribe, and told 
they to say, "His disciples came by night and stole the body while we 
were still asleep ... This story became widely known and is current 
in Jewish--circles to this day. " (28: l2ff. ) Irrespective then of the 
explanation Matthew offers us, the primary evidence which emerges 
from this interesting material, is that a story did circulate at that 
time that the body had been stolen, implying that there was deception 
behind the proclamation of the'empty tomb and of the resurrection itself. 
Another more modern suggestion is that Jesus was not dead when he 
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woo taken down from the cross. Mark records that the short time it 
took for Jesus to die causes surprise. "Pilate was surprised to 
hear that he was already dead; so he sent for the centurion and asked 
him whether it was long since he died. " (Mk. 15: 44) Thus it has 
been argued that the truth is that Jesus was taken down from the cross 
before he was dead. Some commentators have seen confirmation of this 
in the statement in John's gospel that blood and water flowed from the 
aide of Jesus when the soldier's lance pierced his body. (19: 34) If 
this is what happened then the early Christians themselves would seem 
to have been guilty of a hoax, deliberately proclaiming the wounded 
Jesus as the risen Lord. It is possible that the disciples were 
extremely gullible and Jesus himself perpetrated the fraud. We 
might even speculate that Jesus himself, as a result of this strange 
reprieve, believed, in all honesty, that he had been raised from the 
dead. Even so, such a hypothesis, although it minimises the problem 
of deliberate fraud in one sense, if we follow through its 
implication, it is hard to reconcile with the proclamation of the 
Church in a risen Lord who had been transformed to a new mode of being. 
Perhape'the most acceptable of the theories which offer themselves 
as alternatives to the New Testament account is the psychological 
explanation. We are used to such theories and can readily understand 
how in their grief and despair the disciples might well have imagined 
that Jesus had appeared to them, and was still with them in some sense. 
We can easily see how they might have been the victims of hallucinatory 
experiences. Moreover if a number of the disciples were convinced by 
these purely subjective 'visions' then it is not difficult to cee how 
lator the story of the burial of Jesus and the report of the empty tomb 
could have arisen as confirmation of their beliefs. Indeed if the 
stories of the appearances and the empty tomb were all the evidence 
available to u3 as records in some ancient, long-forgotten tome, it 
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would, I suspect, bo very difficult for us to avoid reaching some ouch 
conclusion., -, 
However, these rational possibilities and explanations must be 
examined not, just in the context of these extraordinary claims them- 
selves, but from the perspective of other'facts also. It is difficult 
to conceive how the disciples could have preached the resurrection if 
the body of Jesus had been retrieved by the authorities to counteract 
their claim. And indeed it, is difficult to-imagine that, the authorities 
would'not have produced the body if they had been able to do so. In 
that schseMatthew's story concerning the guards at the tomb would seem 
to support the view that the tomb was found-to be empty,, and that both 
the Jewish-land Roman authorities were embarrassed. Even so the New 
Testament' commentators are divided over the significance of this 
avidence: i. 'Everything dependo upon how late the tradition of the 
empty tomb is-, and the reliability of the tradition concerning the 
burial of Jesus. The later the tradition the more difficult it would 
be to prove or disprove such a claim. And if in fact the normal 
practice of burying criminals in a common grave was followed in the 
case of Josue, the claim of resurrection would have been almost 
impossible either to verify or falsify. 
Another fact which is frequently allowed to count for the 
probability of the truth of. the resurrection is the actual birth of the 
Church. _ It is argued that it, is more likely that the Christian Church 
could only have come into being. if something like the New Testament 
record of the resurrection is reliable. It is-difficult to. imagine 
that, the Now testament and the Church were born out of a blatant 
deception and hoax. However in itself this evidence cannot be said 
tobe decisive. . It-seems rather dubious to suggest that the strength 
of spiritual conviction is a reliable guide to the truth of . that it 
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asserts. - It would be hard to substantiate the claim that conviction 
and truth are synonymous. 
However it does seem to be reasonable to argue that the birth and 
growth of the Church would scarcely have been possible on the basis of 
a deliberate fraud perpetrated by Jesus himself or his disciples or 
both. In this sense I think it is reasonable to assume that the 
disciples at least were themselves convinced that Jesus had been 
raised and were themselves satisfied by the evidence of their experience. 
They seem to have been aware of the fact that they might be accused of 
having imagined the whole thing. (cf. Luke 24s36ff. ) In this sense 
it-seems safe to say that the external evidence for the' resurrection 
can be-said in general terms to be supportive of the New Testament 
claims,. at least in the sense that those early Christians believed 
the resurrection, and proclaimed their message with conviction and 
power on the basis of it. 
There are in addition two other reasons which support the 
conclusion that their interpretation not only conveyed genuine 
conviction but was in fact a legitimate interpretation. If we argue 
that their testimony carried conviction it could still be objected 
that they might well have believed what they proclaimed but nevertheless 
were the victims of psychological disturbance. The trauma of Jesus' 
death could have temporarily affected their judgement. However two 
factors must be allowed to count against this suggestion. First of 
all, although the Lucan record suggests that the appearances of Jesus 
continued over a. relatively short period of forty days, it seems most 
likely that they extended over a longer time. For one reason Luke's 
account of the relationship between the resurrection, the ascension and 
Pentecost appears to be very much influenced by his own theological 
perspective., And for another, if we look at the Pauline evidence in 
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I Corinthians 15, Paul's own testimony to the resurrection appearances 
of Jesus, for he claims himself tobe a witness, could not have taken 
place within such a limited period. Moreover the theory that the 
resurrection appearances can be explained by the psychological trauma 
the disciples experienced would hardly seem to fit the case of Paul. 
We might want to suggest that there were other psychological reasons 
for Paul's experience, but they would certainly not be the same as 
for the disciples themselves. 
A second factor is just as significant. If it is possible to 
speak in general terms of the New Testament record, it is interesting 
to notice that the central message could not be described as the 
reassurance that the resurrection might be thought to offer either to 
the trauma of despair or to the trauma of guilt. For example one 
might go so for as to argue that in Mark, Paul and Hebrews the 
fundamental theological message centres on the cross. Mark only 
alludes darkly to the resurrection. The climax of the gospel is the 
confession of the Roman centurion at the foot of the cross. (Mk. 15: 39) 
Paul speaks of the gospel as being the gospel of the cross. (I Car. 1: 17), 
and the elaborate symbolism of the Epistle to the Hebrews seeks to 
explain-the once-for-all sacrifice of Jesus on the cross for the 
salvation of mankind. 
There is a certain paradox and tension here. It might be said 
in Paul's case on the one hand that the resurrection is that element 
in the gospel without which it would no longer be a gospel at all. 
(I Core 15t12ff. ) On the other hand its significance seems to be more 
as an access point to the gospel message. It is the gateway to a 
message of salvation centred on the cross. In Mark the Son of man 
came "to surrender his life as a ransom for many. " (Mk. 10: 45) In 
Paul our reconciliation with God is achieved through the death of Jesus. 
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(cf. Romans 8: 31ff. )' And in John the glorification of Jesus is not 
so much the resurrection, but the' crucifixion. (in. ' 13: 31ff. ) 
The question to be asked then is whether such evidence can best 
be accounted for on the basis that the resurrection appearances wore 
simply the illusory wish-fulfilments of either dishonest or deluded 
men, or a personal experience of such objective force that they had to 
come to terms with it as best they might, and which demanded for those 
who had not been disciples of Jesus a profound theological reappraisal 
of God's relation''with human beings and the nature of salvation he 
offered. 
Finally it is necessary to consider the internal evidencef the 
evidence as it is presented in the New Testament. This is by far 
the most difficult area to assess. Many New Testament theologians 
have written extensively on the subject and arrived at a variety of 
conclusions. However, as I have already indicated this is not the 
place for a detailed exposition of the history of the tradition. My 
aim is to provide a brief survey of the evidence and ask if it is 
possible to arrive at any general conclusions. 
The earliest tradition comes in I Corinthians 15. It is generally 
accepted that Paul offers the Corinthians not just 
,a 
personal statement 
concerning the resurrection but something like a credal formula which 
was already part of the tradition. This is a record of the appearances 
of Jesus to disciples, apostles and to a group of five hundred. He 
says, "First and foremost, I handed on to you the facts which had been 
imparted to me: that Christ died for our sins, in accordance with the 
scriptures; that he was buried; that he was raised to life on the 
third day, according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas, 
and afterwards to the Twelve. Then he appeared to over five hundred 
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of our brothers at once, most of whom are still alive, though some 
have died. - Then he. eppeared to James, and afterwards to all the 
apostles. In, tha end he appeared even to me. " (I Cor. 150-8) This 
passage has a double significance. First of all, as has already been 
noted, it is offered by Paul as being the strongest possible historical 
evidence of the reliability of the Christian claim. And secondly we 
have here in Paul most probably the only first-hand eye witness of the 
'appearance' of Jesus in the New Testament. 
We might therefore be led to conclude that the Pauline evidence 
ie, clear-cut, and that it supports in a quite unambiguous way the 
external evidence already examined. However it is when comparison 
is made with the gospel accounts that difficulty is experienced. 
Indeed in making this comparison we find a paradox. While for Paul 
the basic fact of the tradition is that Jesus appeared, for the gospels 
the only unanb, iguous 'fact' which they all bear witness to is that the 
tomb was empty. Thus we discover that the one element that is basic 
for the gospels is missing from Paul, and the clear-cut assertion that 
Jesus appeared in Paul becomes in the gospels a variety of accounts of 
appearances which are striking for the dissimilarity which they display. 
Mark, for example, has no account of any resurrection appearances 
in what is generally agreed to be the original text. The appearances 
are only hinted at. Matthew has an appearance of Janus right at the 
end of the goopel in a context which reflects both peculiarly Matthean 
theological motifs, as well as an indication of the later Trinitarian 
belief. Moreover, while Mark and Matthew clearly reflect a Galilean 
resurrection tradition Luke records the appearances of Jesus in and 
around Jerusalem. Here once more there is evidence to suggest that 
theological presuppositions are reflected in the accounts recorded. 
Jerusalem, for example, is a very important theological theme in Luke's 
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schema'of salvation history. The appearance of Jesus to the disciples 
on the Emmaus road reflects this same theme of salvation history, and 
the recognition of Jesus at the breaking of bread does more than hint 
at a later eucharistic setting. 
John records appearances in both Jerusalem and Galilee. But 
clearly two separate traditions have been brought together for the 
end of chapter twenty of the gospel seems to bring the whole narrative 
to a conclusion. Chapter twenty one appears very much as a postscript. 
Once again theological motifs are uppermost both in the story of Thomas 
and in the appearance of Jesus on the shores of the Sea of Tiberias. 
Thus it seems that the evidence for the resurrection to which the 
gospels bear unaminous witness is missing completely from Paul. And 
the evidence of the appearance which is simple and clear in Paul, is 
not only difficult to correlate with the gospels, but the gospel accounts 
of the appearances are so dissimilar as to diminish significantly the 
credibility of the whole tradition of the appearances. Pannenberg has 
argued that the Jewish belief in resurrection was so clearly conceived 
in terms of a body no longer remaining in the earth that it is 
inconceivable that=Paul could have believed anything other than that 
the tomb was empty. However any argument from silence is notoriously 
difficult. 
With regard to the tradition concerning the empty tomb it is hard 
to give any clear indication as to where the balance of probability might 
lie. On the one hand it is true that if the gospel of the risen Jesus 
was proclaimed in Jerusalem soon after his death, and the whereabouts of 
the body was clearly identifiable, then it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that such a gospel was only plausible on the basis that there 
was no body to be found. On the other hand if the earliest tradition 
concerning the resurrection came from Galilee, and only later came to 
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Jerusalem, it is posuiblc"to imagine how the tradition of the empty 
tomb could have arisen out of that earlier proclamation and at a 
stage when verification was no longer possible. 
However with regard to the tradition of the appearances I think 
it is possible to arrive at a more positive assessment of the evidence. 
I think the key to being able to make this more positive appraisal is 
the ability to recognise that there are different layers of material 
which can be seen to be the sources for different beliefs. In short 
the narratives to do with the appearances are not to be understood 
primarily as historical records. Just as wo may safely infer that 
the message of the resurrection is a theological interpretation, no 
the appearance narratives are 'personal' theological explanations of 
the significance of the resurrection. Thus the story of Thomas is 
concerned with the nature of faith. The breaking of bread on the 
Emmaus road is to do with the presence of Jesus in the Eucharist. The 
end of Matthew's gospel suggests that the resurrection should be seen 
to point to the universal mission of the Church. 
The question to be asked is whether the original interpretation 
that 'Jesus is risen' was a valid one. Thus I return to where I 
started in this survey of the internal evidence. Paul's testimony 
turns out to be at a premium. Pannenberg is right to suggest that 
Paul is keen to stress the factual nature of the assertion that Jesus 
appeared. Here, in the Greek verb, 
4 ¢8y 
, if anywhere, is the 
historical basin of the tradition. 
1$ Clearly Paul understood, as did 
1$. Marxsen says, "... interest has frequently been centred on a term 
which is undoubtedly pre-Pauline (thus very early) and one (among 
others) which is found also in formalised phrases of the traditional 
material (I Cor. 15: 5,6,7,8; Luke 24: 34, cf Acts 13: 31 also Acts 
9: 17; 26: 16). Here the translation already causes certain difficulties. 
bfoy (aorist passive of oegv : to see) can be translated as (Christ) 
was seen (by Peter, etc. the person being in each case in the dative). 
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Out in the passive form ifO a deponent meaning is also possible. 
In that case we might translate it as (Christ) appeared or let himself 
be aeon or showed himself. " (p. 27, W. Marxccn. 'The Resurrection 
of Jesus so a Historical and Theological Problem' in The Significance 
of the Mosna o of the Resurrection for Faith in Jesus Christ od. C. F. D. 
Moue cf. also p. 57 ibid. U. Wilckens, The Tradition of the 
Resurrection', and p. 29 R. H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection 
Narratives. Fuller says, "That Paul intends to cite eye witnesses 
-foreman evidential purpose is clear from his added gloss on the 
appearance to the +500. If you want to check up on those witnesses, 
most of them are still alive and you can ask them. It was in the 
anoearances that both the Jerusalem Preachers and Paul himself received 
the revelation of the death, burial and resurrection as escnatotogicai 
events. " (my underlining) However note also that C. f. tvuns aisagrees 
with my verdict. He says, "... the Pauline evidence hardly produces 
a fixed point from which the rest of the resurrection tradition may be 
assessed. " (p. 56 C. F. Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament. 
Marxscn however believes that from the Pauline use of the term 'and he 
appeared (ki. u'1a) )' we can deduce not just the primitive tradition 
of the appearance of Jesus to those whom Paul cites, but rather that 
the earliest layer of the tradition was an 'appearance' of Jesus to 
Peter. Ito says, "Simon was the first to believe; the reason for his 
having believed-is expressed by saying that Simon saw Jesus. " (p. 96 
W. Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth). 
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the tradition itself, that the appearance of Jesus after his death 
was a fact. 
19 
, 
Evan-though the narratives connected with the 
appearances themselves do not provide a consistent or comprehensible 
historical picture, because it is possible to understand their main 
purpose as being theological rather than historical, once that 
essentially 'personal' interpretative layer has been peeled away, so 
to speak, it is still possible to. see, thanks mainly to Paul, that 
the 'appearance' itself, according. to the New Testament, remains an 
historical event., . 
In spite of-the attempts of recent years to high- 
light. the: unreliability of the New Testament witness to the, 
resurrectlon. and. to,. ask whether originally it occupied the central 
factual place ascribed to it in orthodoxy, the more detailed study of 
many contemporary New Testament scholars has served to underline, if 
not traditional orthodoxy, certainly the view that the resurrection 
is offered to us as an incontrovertible post crucifixion occurrence 
by the New Testament. The existentialist view that the resurrection 
is merely a way of interpreting the crucifixion cannot really be said 
to have stood up to the scrutiny of the historical evidence. There 
is, it seems, in spite of the complex theological interpretation which 
it has received, and which is so closely bound up with it, a detectable 
prior objective event connected with the claim that Jesus 'appeared', 
even though, as Evans suggests, it is difficult to know exactly what 
we are supposed to understand by the term. 
20 
-Thus when we look at both the-internal and the external evidence 
for the resurrection there seems to be a prima facie case for suggesting 
19. Thin is not to say that it is not thought of as a 'divine' event 
oleo. The use of the aorist passive of the verb is one which is trad- 
itionally associated with theophanies and the appearances of angels (cf 
Ex. 3: 2; 6: 3). Nevertheless Paul does intend us to understand that this 
event is both historical as well as divine. 
20. Resurrection and the New Testament, C. F. Evans, p. 130 
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that from 'an objective and historical point of view the claim makes 
sense and it is to be taken seriously. Howover, as I have already 
argued, an objective historical investigation cannot lead to the 
judgement that what happened was a 'transcendent event'. Thu alternative 
explanations already examined underline that fact. It is necessary 
therefore to consider the 'personal' dimension of the material. An 
fact I have already previously examined the nature of the interpretations 
in the context of the gospel narratives, and described the 'personal' 
in terms of the commission to preach the gospel, the community centred 
on the lord's Supper, and the primacy of faith. At this point therefore 
it is appropriate to look more closely at the Pauline evidence, the 
centrality of which we have emphasised. 
There is much more to this than the objective fact of the 
appearance which I-have stressed so far. For Paul that-fact had a 
very specific context., His understanding was thatýthe Jesus who, had 
been judged by the law condenined, according to Jewish belief-, by God 
himself and crucified accordingly, was the inun. who appeared. to him and 
to others after hisideath. 
21 Thus, for Paul the appearance of Jesus 
could be nothing other than the divine vindication of one whoin, God had 
condemned. The fact of the appearance therefore could not foil to 
have the moat profound 'personal' theological significance for Paul. 
It turned upside: down his whole concept of salvation. Salvation was 
no longer something capable of clear definition and guaranteed by 
specific obedience. It was rather a gracious gift which only faith 
could appropriate. 
22 Thus, in Paul's case, somewhat in contrast with 
what we have argued above, in Paul's interpretation of the event, it 
is not so much the question of transcendence which is raised and receives 
21. cf. Gel. 3: 13 
22. cf. Phil. 30-11 
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the answer of the divine reply. Paul already had. a clear sense of 
God. It is rather that the event he describes, for someone with 
Paul's attitude to the law, could not but mean a total transformation 
of his understanding of the nature of God. In Paul's case it was not 
the human question of the transcendent which experienced some 
transcendent correlate. It was a human concept of the transcendent 
which was shattered by the transcendent itself. 
This means that the idea that the resurrection did not in fact 
add a truly 'new' dimension to Paul's 'personal' view of Israel and 
her God, and that it is possible to offer a purely human psychological 
explanation of the interpretation would be difficult to sustain. Thus, 
whatever we made of the purely objective evidence, it seems difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that Paul's 'personal' and theological 
interpretation makes much the better sense in the context of the 
reality of the transcendent correlate which Paul claims. He appears 
to have been encountered much to his surprise and consternation, albeit 
provisionally and partially, by the salvation which he was seeking, and 
which he had believed mistakenly to be within his grasp. Moreover, 
from the pattern of the lives and theological expression of other early 
Christians there is little reason to doubt that something similar was 
their experience also. In this sense the theological interpretation 
that arises out of the resurrection confirms the provisional meaning 
and validity-which we argued for on the basis of a purely objective 
examination of the evidence. 
We might still however claim that, as with the other disciples, 
the experience Paul describes is best explained in purely human 
psychological terms. Two points are worth making in reply to such a 
hypothesis. In the case of the disciples of Jesus the suggestion is 
that the trauma of his death, and the resulting shock and despair could 
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have produced imaginary visions. But such an argument makes no 
sense-in the case of Paul. For him there wore no expectations in 
connection with Jesus, capable of being sublimated by overwhelming 
visions. - His identity was not bound up with Jesus in any way. 
Rather was he confident and secure in his Jewish piety (Gal. 204). 
The resurrection offer of salvation therefore is not a confirmation 
of his own identity and security, but, if anything, a destruction of 
a former inauthentic-identity. Indeed the salvation he hoped for in 
Christ-did not bring security, but-alienation, hostility and death. 
The danger we spoke of earlier of a transcendent ontology being used, 
to provide a false-security which protects, the individual- from the 
personal responsibility of human freedom can in--no way be applied to 
Paul. The transcendent ontology he accorded to Christ is rather the 
way in which he expressed the inauthenticity of the transcendent 
ontology which formerly he had invested in the Jewish law. What Paul 
discovered in Christ was above all the primacy of faith which was 
supremely creative of human freedom and responsibility. Only if we 
read Paul in this sort of context can we make sense of his theology. 
The sceptic however might still not be satisfied. He might claim 
that the resurrection appearance was not so much the sublimation of 
despair but of guilt. Paul's efforts to keep the law may have produced 
u profound feeling of inadequacy. There is perhaps some evidence for 
this if we read Romans 1-2 in a personal context (something which Paul 
does not invite us to do, cf. Rom. 2s1-10). Thus he might be said to 
have used faith in Christ as a means of assuaging his own guilt. Here 
was the salvation he had longed to find, but which mysteriously and 
ultimately eluded him. The solution therefore lay in a massive self- 
deception. Here of course it is not possible to have the final word. 
But it must be said that the evidence Paul offers us, as could well 
351 
be expected, does not invite us to arrive at such a conclusion. 
Moreover in view of the fact that I have argued that the question of 
a transcendent 'personal' salvation is both logical and legitimate, 
it would appear that such a hypothesis which dismisses the possibility 
of a transcendent answer on 'a priori' grounds is morn likely to be 
guilty of self-deception itself. The tortuous nature of the argument 
matched against the integrity of Paul's account of the resurrection, 
his theological exposition, and his life must be said to count against it, 
fbreover even if Paul did feel a profound dissatisfaction with his 
fornar life, and was earnestly seeking salvation, the possibility that 
he gave his own answer of self-deception has to be balanced against 
the possibility that resurrection gave an authentic answer to his 
feelings of guilt. 
Thus. I conclude that on balance it, is more appropriate to see in 
this event the divine transcendence breaking down the illusory security 
which Paul had invested in the low. The dramatic shift in his 
'personal' theological interpretation is best explained with reference 
to the reality of the transcendent which challenged a self-validating 
security, rather than in torrar of an illusory transcendence which offered 
and guaranteed some long sought safety and salvation. Paul's theology, 
his interpretation of the event of the appearance, and his life all come 
together in a context where the 'historical' the 'personal' and the 
'transcendent' are all required to make the most satisfactory sense of 
the evidence we have. 
What conclusions, then, is it legitimate to reach concerning a 
balanced assessment of the evidence as a whole? I shall leave out of 
account the claim concerning the empty tomb because it is difficult to 
be sure how early the tradition is. To begin with I have noted the 
coherence with which Paul's 'personal' theological interpretation of 
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the resurrection links the objective with the transcendent. The 
transcendent, saving interpretation Paul offers us of his experience 
makes sense. And there seems no reason to doubt that the other 
theological interpretations which the Now Testament offers of the 
resurrection are honest and legitimate explanations of the experience 
of those whose witness we no longer have access to at first hand. 
The external evidence, because it is less 'personal', is to that 
extent less clear-cut and reliable. However in this context it is 
difficult to suggest that the rise of--the Church, the spread'of the 
gospel, the conviction with which it was preached, together with the 
fact that the message of, salvation was centred not so much on the 
resurrection as the cross itself were-all nothing but the product of 
a deliberate'daceit or fraud, cri for that matter-the result of a 
merely psychological invention in response to despair, fear or guilt. 
Viewed in. this light, particularly if we accept that the 'personal' 
value which: waýdiscover 'a priori' in human life raises naturally and 
logically the quostion of a transcendent correlate, °the balance of 
probability seems to favour a verdict that the-claim of the New Testament 
that the appearance of Jesus after his death was nothing less than a 
divine-vindication was both reasonable and comprehensible. We might, 
it seems reach a'balanced conclusion if we say that there is in the 
New Testament evidence, and in, the tradition it records, valid reason for 
concluding. that it bears the imprint of transcendence. 
It need not surprise us that the language of empiricism breaks 
down at this point. How can language which can only describe 
experience in terms of finite existence be expected to express the 
actuallreality of, the transcendent? The specifically divine nature of 
the event must surely elude definition. Let it not be ohjected that 
this is simply to speak in riddles. For if it is allowed that it is 
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possible to conceive of there being a reality beyond our experience 
and conceptualisation, then it rust be allowed that such a reality can 
encounter us in our experience without being capable of exhauative 
description in the categories of finite existence which we have to use. 
And yet such a verdict might still seem over-naive and simplistic. 
What if the psychological explanation of the resurrection be taken not 
so much in isolation, but linked with a more fundamental psychological 
explanation of religion itself? The illusion of the resurrection then 
becomes part and parcel of an illusion which is already entrenched in 
religious and cultural tradition, and able in this overall context to 
arouse conviction. Thus we might link the experience of salvation 
realised here with an illusory expectation of salvation in the form of 
the cherished Jewish hope for the coming of the Messiah, and for a 
transcendent vindication by God. 
Moreover is it not necessary to take into account that more recent 
insights into the nature of the knowledge=claims we can make emphasise 
that many of the highly-prized religious beliefs, practices and rituals 
were often little more than superstitions. The fact that the claim 
that a man had been raised from the dead was accepted, understood and 
believed with conviction in culture which was prone to superstition 
and magical beliefs does not make it comprehensible today. The gods, 
it seems, were credited with marvellous and impossible acts. Nowadays 
we find such beliefs less credible for very good reasons. The fact 
that a first-century culture could happily endorse auch a creed and 
proclaim-such an event with conviction is no reason why we should 
entertain the same beliefs. 
At this point we-encounter a question which has been at the 
centre of much recent New Testament study; namely the problem of 
hermeneutics. This question asks how it is possible, and in what terms, 
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to translate first century creeds and myths into a message which is 
comprehensible in the twentieth century without distorting the essential 
meaning and 'truth' of that message. Hore it is possible that this 
argument could be well and truly waylaid. However my concern at this 
point is not so much with hermenoutical questions as with a prior and 
more fundamental theology. I am not so much asking how it is possible 
to demythologise the New Testament claim concerning resurrection, I am 
asking whether the epistemology which the New Testament offers us 
allows legitimate access to a transcendent ontology. Can the New 
Testament claim be said to have a theological significance which makes 
sense as such in a very different cultural and religious atmosphere? 
I am not interested in the meaning and significance of specific stories 
and particular creeds. My focus is on whether the New Testament 
evidence justifies the essential theological claim it makes. I am 
not seeking to say that this particular narrative has this meaning 
when it is translated into contemporary thought forms, but rather that, 
given the New Testament thought forms, the substance of the message is 
trues that is in some sense Jesus' life and death received divine 
vindication. 
Of couroo, in the end, the theological and hermeneutical tasks 
cannot'be separated, and in the lagt two chapters I shall begin to 
look at that problem. The Christian message of salvation, if it 
means anything at all, needs must be translated into terms which relate 
to contemporary ways of thinking. Nevertheless this must not blind us 
from seeing that the basic problem the message has to address is the 
fundamental theological one of the validity and meaning of claims to 
mediate the transcendent. It is easy for questions of interpretation 
to be asked and answered without our being aware that there are 'e priori' 
theological presuppositions which lie behind the hermeneutical process, 
and therefore affect the nature of the interpretation. This means that, 
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;; jn, answer 
to our question whether religion as a whole is not best 
ijnderatood as a-psychological illusion, we must recognise that in 
, whatever cultural climate-we 
find"oursalves we cannot avoid the pre- 
suppositions, of that culture in some sense. We cannot step outside 
to view the evidence from some elevated and neutral standpoint. All 
. we. -can seek 
to do in to be sufficiently aware of the presuppositions 
we bring to our experience'sa as to endeavour to avoid reading them 
into it. The danger is that someone who rejects 'a priori' the 
transcendent dimension will interpret stories of miracles and healings 
according to that presupposition. Just as someone wbo accepts an 
'alien' concept of revelation faces the danger of interpreting 
particular credal formulae in a similar way. This means that it is 
possible for a so-called 'modern' or 'scientific' or 'Biblical' view 
of the world to act as an excuse for reading into particular evidence 
the conclusions which the specific hermeneutical framework demands. 
It is possible to by-pass the question of transcendence which we have 
maintained is both logical and legitimate. Our argument has been 
that the logic and legitimacy of the concept of transcendence is to be 
understood not just in a particular context, but in the general human 
context. 
Wo have argued that the 'personal' nature of the value wo discover 
in our lives raises the question of the transcendent. History is the 
arena in which we apprehend and learn the nature of this value. In 
this context it would seem foolish to deny that persons are not able 
to rocoivo some sort of answer to this question of transcendence, not 
so much in terms of an intellectual reply, but in terms of an encounter 
with and an experience of God. Moreover such encounters and experiences 
clearly will be historically and culturally conditioned. My claim then 
is simply that, because the New Testament represents the memory not just 
of an individual, but of a tradition, we have, there recorded, the 
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memory of just such an experience and encounter. In this sense 
judging the resurrection on purely psychological-grounds, or dismissing 
it as superstitious fantasy is likely to be the result of an 'a priori' 
rejection of transcendence, and can perhaps best be explained in terms 
which we have explored in the previous chapter. It seems therefore 
that only once the prior theological possibility and position has been 
clarified that the hermeneutical task can take place effectively. 
However if we recognise the significance of the 'a priori' pro- 
suppositions which, as noted above, cannot be logically and rationally 
controlled, even the language here which speaks of a balance of 
probability possesses perhaps too much the ring of scientific objectivity 
seeking to prove the truth. My argument is self-defeating if there 
is the suggestion that a conclusion is being imposed upon the evidence 
or upon the reader. What is being described is the threshold of faith 
and not some breakthrough into a new legitimacy for our knowledge of 
the resurrection. What is being offered to the reader is an 
invitation to entertain a sympathetic and positive assessment of the 
evidence. There is no proof of the truth, but an attempt at achieving 
a sympathetic insight into the significance and profundity of the 
'personal' experience which lies embedded in the tradition. 
However, because I have stressed the primacy of faith -a primacy 
which emerges from the New Testament itself -I am not for that reason 
seeking to divorce faith from rational understanding. The argument 
is clear. According to this analysis the New Testament claims make 
better sense if we understand the 'personal' convictions of the early 
Christians as being honest rather than fraudulent. And these honest 
convictions make better sense in the context of their being rooted in 
the transcendent correlate they claim, than as the fantasies of self- 
deluded men. In this sense they can present themselves to the modern 
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mind even in their historical and cultural context as an invitation 
to faith, in much the same way as the New Testament evidence points 
to the resurrection experience being the major gateway to faith for 
the early Christian. This allows the final question which is to 
be answered to come into focus. Having clarified the validity and 
basis of the New Testament proclamation, it is necessary to turn 
briefly to ask about the nature of the divine transcendence which is 
revealed. What is it precisely which receives confirmation in the 
resurrection? What is the ontological basis of the Christian message 
of salvation? 
iý- 
5 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
WHAT DOES THE RESURRECTION CONFIRM? 
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The basic contention of the previous chapter was that it is 
reasonable to see the 'resurrection' as evidence confirming that an 
affirmative answer is provided to the question which asks whether 
'personal' worth is rooted in the transcendent. At this point 
therefore a human epistemology can claim access to a transcendent 
ontology. I have argued that to understand the New Testament 
evidence differently would be to call into question the integrity 
of its interpretation in a quite unjustifiable way. 
However, lent there be any misapprehension of what this means, 
two points of clarification are in order. There is no necessary 
implication in what I have said that this event is to be understood 
as being unique. It is not suggested that God has made himself known 
only in this place. We have access to the transcendence here, we 
might assume, not so much because of the uniqueness of the occurrence, 
but,, rather on-account of the fact that the memory of it is embedded 
in an unusually clear and vivid way in the tradition of the community. 
From this perspective, it seems, that although this analysis has 
strayed far from the theological emphasis Brunner would wish to place 
on the cross and resurrection of Jesus, it is possible. to see that the 
two categories of the 'historical' and the 'personal' which he 
recommended, do actually allow us to speakýof God. 
The question therefore which now emerges ie, if the $resurrection' 
permits access to the divine transcendence, what does it permit us to 
say about the nature of God? What is it that the resurrection can be 
said to confirm? Pannenberg, who has helped to press for a more positive 
re-appraisal of the historical evidence concerning the resurrection, as 
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well as for a more dynamic relation between reason and faith, sees 
it as' confirmation of the ontology of Jesus himself. Thus, for 
pannenbergi the resurrection'establishes the validity of the Christian 
message -of the Incarnation. The only difference between-Pannenberg 
and his neo-orthodox forbears-Is that he offers-us that message, as he 
sees it, 'from below' rather than-'from above': "Jesus possesses 
significance 'for us' only to the extent that this significance is 
inherent in himself, in his history, and in-his person constituted by 
this history. "1 Earlier on he has claimed, "The divinity of Jesus 
remains the presupposition for his saving significance for us. "Z 
In the light of this claim, to which no doubt traditional' 
orthodoxy=would on-the whole lend its. support, it is necessary to 
consider very carefully how it is appropriate to, answer this question, 
and how the evidence we have can be used legitimately. This will, be 
the task of this chapter. ' In, tackling it I-shall examine it under 
two headings; the epistemological and the, historital. 
The first point which requires clarification is the nature of the 
epistemological task that has been embarked upon. Once this is 
established it will then be necessary to ask about the nature of the 
ontological claims which this epistemology will allow. In one sense 
we might say that what the resurrection confirms is the fact that 
'personal' value is validated by a transcendent ontology. Looked at 
in this way the resurrection merely. confirma that the question of 
L 
transcendence prompted by our apprehension as human beings of a 'personal' 
worth receives an answer. But this has already been established anyway 
in the discussion of the previous chapter. The purpose of this chapter 
is to ask about the nature of that transcendent ontology, and what the 
ý. Jesus God and Man, W. Pannenberg, p. 48 
2. ibid, j p. 
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evidence of the resurrection can tell us about it. In this context 
it might be said that the-resurrection confirms a prior notion of God, 
to be discovered in the Old Testament itself, or in the understanding 
Jesus himself had of the concept of God, or even of his relationship 
with God. Thus, when I ask here about what the resurrection confirms 
I am not speaking about the epistemological reconstruction I have 
suggested and its relationship with the resurrection so, much as the 
Biblical ideas themselves which are validated in it and by it. 
However, making clear what is meant by confirmation is only the 
first step. For although the task of this chapter is to oak about 
the ontology which the resurrection confirms in a Biblical context, 
the epistemological structure which has developed along with the 
argument sets its own 'a priori' constraints upon the nature of the 
ontology which can be confirmed. If the evidence of the resurrection 
that has'been studied coheres with the epistemological model I have 
described in confirming transcendence, then the nature of the ontology 
confirmed bythe resurrection must itself cohere with the same model. 
This is not to say that my argument is open to the charge of interpreting 
the New Testament material in the light of a predetermined philosophical 
basis, ý(an age-old criticism-levelled at philosophical theology), but 
rather that I -am examining the Biblical material for evidence of an 
epistemological model which coheres with the one I have described, and 
offers an ontology on that basis. In short, I am not seeking to force 
Biblical material into an alien strait-jacket, rather to see if there 
is an 'echo' of the epistemological model I have described in any 
Biblical material. 
In my analysis of the relationship between the historical and the 
'personal', I have shown that it is difficult to understand how an 
historical claim can mediate the transcendent in a direct way. It does 
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so inasmuch as the person or the community interprets the event as 
having transcendent significance. The historical is the 'arena' in 
which the 'personal' asks about, and apprehends, the transcendent. 
Moreover, because it is the to priori' nature of 'personal' value 
which allows us to apprehend this transcendence, we can only speak 
of its nature in terms of value rather than in terms of fact. There 
is only one qualification that it is appropriate to makeýto that 
statement. The fact that this value is confirmed in some sense in 
human experience allows us to refer to the transcendent itself as 
'fact's but not in terms of facts themselves which are transcendent. 
This means that there aro intrinsic difficulties with using the 
language of traditional dogma and the variety of ontological claims 
to be found in the Bible. The confession of the divinity of Jesus, 
the insistence upon 's once-for-all significance for the Christ event, 
the trinitarian doctrine of Cod, and the attempt to discover a divine 
self-consciousnece behind the mission of Jesus all fall into this 
category. ` If history for us can'only be the'setting in which as 
persons we apprehend the transcendent, but cannot in itself mediate 
it in any direct sense, -then the claim that Christ combines the divine 
and human natures in one person transcends the epistemological constraints 
which have been established. 
In the'same way sttempts to speak of the ontological decisiveness 
of Christ must be ruled out of order. To make a claim that this 
historical event is the one that is decisive for our salvation in a 
transcendent realm is again to seek to give an historical event a 
transcendent significance which it cannot bear. The problem here, 
as in the previous example, is not so much with the theoretical 
possibility in itself but rather the difficulty with establishing how 
such's claim could be said to be known, and validated from a human 
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perspective. On the othor hand it Aa relatively easy to see how this 
person in'hie death and resurrection, could be said to be decisive for 
an apprehension of tho transcendent, and therefore for a 'personal' 
Understanding of salvation. In other words we can understand only 
too well that a person or an event could be said to be epistemologically 
decisive for 'my' salvation i. e. as catalysts for my experience of 
Cod. Thus, it is important to distinguish between an easily 
comprohendod epistemological decisiveness and a virtually meaningless 
ontological uniqueness. 
If therefore it is necessary to discount on an 'a priori' basis 
the traditional understanding of the person of Christ and his saving 
act, then it is also necessary to look askance at the Trinitarian 
dogma. Once again it is easy to see how such a claim might have 
arisen to explain the experience of salvation, and become part of the 
apparatus of a soteriologieal theory. But our understanding remains 
totally bewildered if we seek to offer it as human knowledge of the 
precise ontological construction of the divine transcendence. Thus 
such doctrines must be judged to fracture the epistemological vessels 
in which our knowledge of God must be contained. 
Much-the some applies to the attempts, to establish the divine self- 
consciousness of Jesus. Many liberal' theologians sought to show by 
means of the historical evidence that Jesus had a supernatural 
consciousness of his divinity. T. W. Hanson says, "... the source of 
his authority is to be sought in"tho experience at-Jordan which initiates 
his public activity., But the 'Thou art my Son" makes him more than a 
messenger or, 'a sorvant. The prophetic commission is relative to a 
given historical situation; the'filial relation is independent of 
piece,, tins or circumstances. The descent of the Holy Spirit, too, 
signifies something permanent. It'is not that Jesus receives an 
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Inspired message, but that tho spiritual source of all inspiration 
takes possession of him, so that whon he spoaks it is not that he 
repeats words given to him but that the Spirit of his Father speaks 
in him. "3 
But how could anyone claim to know such a thing; not only those 
who recorded the life of Jesus, but even Jesus himself in his own 
consciousness? If all human knowledge claims are by definition limited 
by the capacity of a human conceptualisation then how can a human 
being claim to know that Jesus is divine in this qualitatively different 
sense? Moreover, if it is claimed that Jesus was human how could he 
conceive of auch a thing in a way which night be said to be epistemolog- 
ically valid? The-point in simply that it is difficult to know what 
sense-it would make for a human being to claim to have knowledge of a 
divine self-consciousness either in himself or in another. 
It is possible however to understand how such a conceptualisation 
and thesis could come to be expressed by the traditional faith in general, 
and by the liberal theologians in particular. If the resurrection 
confirmed not only the personal faith and life of Jesus, but also the 
faith of the disciples in Jesus, it is not difficult to see how he, as 
the source of their salvation, should be accorded divine status. He 
was their 'personal' link with the transcendent, the 'personal' means 
by which their lives had been transformed. He was none other than the 
divinely ordained inauguration of the eschatological reality. His 
resurrection was an act of divine judgement which proleptically brought 
all history to an end. Little wonder then that when this gospel was 
told in terms of the life story of the man, he should be invested with 
divine authority and a divine self-consciousness. And indeed there is 
3. The Teaching of Jesus, T. N. Hanson, p. 107 
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little wonder that those who'have lived within'that tradition, 'and have 
been taught'to relate to Jesus in this uniquely transcendent way 
through their own 'personal' faith, should look back on the New Testament 
and"seek to validate their experience more objectively in terms'of 
the New Testament evidence. It ia-perfectly natural therefore that 
the one in whom people today still experience their salvation as part 
of the on-going New Testament tradition should be thought of as divine, 
and that the witness we have to his life should be read an evidence of 
his divine"Self-consciousness. 
The trouble is that very often a faith concept, which is the result 
of the 'personal' relating to the transcendent, produces knowledge 
claims which cannot be established as such by a valid epistemology. 
The 'factual' character in which'a faith claim is often expressed short- 
circuits a legitimate epistemological basis. Thus my argument is that 
the attempt to establish the divinity of Jesus on the basis of the 
reports of his teaching and his divine self-consciousness by an analysis 
of the historical evidence is epistemologically illegitimate. Even 
so it is possible to understand how such concepts could have arisen 
as an attempt to express the implications of the convictions of the 
early Christians that in Jesus they had found salvation. It is also 
conceivable that Jesus encouraged them to think in this way. Nevertho- 
less this attempt to speak of the divinity of Jesus is fundamentally 
misplaced because it does so in pseudo-factual terms which exclude that 
vital area of the 'personal' which makes it possible, and provides us 
with the clue as to how we can understand the human relation with the 
transcendent. 
There Is, however, another dimension-to the problem as has been 
seen above. It is possible to understand epistemologically how such 
a construction aroso. It is also possible-to understand how the 
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modern awareness of the epistemological problem reveals the danger 
in making factual metaphysical and ontological statements. - In 
addition I have argued that such ontological claims, in masking the 
'personal', dimension which makes them possible, obscure the primacy 
of faith which is the essence and origin of the claims. For it is 
in accord with the human need for security to transform the insecurity 
inherent in the 'personal' need for faith, into knowledge claims which 
have a stolid and comforting ring. In this way 'faith' can offer us 
a false. sense of security which is the very antithesis of faith as a 
fundamental 'personalI need to depend and trust. 
Paradoxically neo-orthodox theologians like Barth and Brunner saw 
that liberal theology tried to use historical research illegitimately 
to mediate a transcendent ontology, and that this illegitimate use 
actually pointed towards the prior moral dimension of the epistemological 
problem. They saw that knowledge claims concerning the person of 
Christ could not be made on the basis of historical research or evidence. 
However, in recognising the problem, they jumped from the frying 
pan into the fire. Brunner saw the solution in terms of an 'alien' 
personal ontology mediated by revelation. itself. Faith knowledge 
replaced objective historical knowledge. However the problem here 
is that inasmuch as faith knowledge is expressed in very similar terms 
to objective knowledge, the sheer lack of epistemological justification 
means that the knowledge status afforded to Christian claims as presented 
by neo-orthodoxy is just as problematical as it was when offered by 
the earlier liberals. In other words the claims made by Christians 
on the basis of revelation are just as likely to be manifestations of 
subjective need turned in on itself as were attempts to prove the truth 
of the claim by an illegitimate historical method. 
In the same way, when we turn from doctrine to the material in 
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the Bible itself, any statements found there which claim knowledge of 
transcendent events or of a transcendent person should be judged 
epistemologically unsound. Neither is it possible to accept these 
claims of a transcendent ontology on the grounds that the Bible is 
authoritative on the basis of a self-validating revelation of God. For 
. this 
is to return to an 'aiien' ontology of revelation which has 
been rejected above in discussion-with Brunner. The question to be 
asked therefore is whether, beneath the complex and varied ontological 
claims that are made in the Bible, it is possible to discover an 
epistemological framework or pattern which coheres with that pattern 
of the 'personal', the 'historical' and the 'transcendent' which I 
have argued can be said to be confirmed in the resurrection. Moreover 
it is possible to enquire after this pattern in two contexts: first 
of all in the Old Testament and New Testament material as a whole, and 
secondly with specific reference to the life and teaching of Jesus. 
It is for these reasons that I would judge Pannenberg's claims that 
the'reaurrection of Jesus confirms his divine status to be insecure 
and unsatisfactory. Thus it is on a basis which can be determined 'a 
priori' according to the limits of human epistemology that it is 
necessary to ask about what the resurrection can be said to confirm. 
From these preliminary epistemological considerations I turn to 
the historical dimension of the enquiry. Before I examine the Biblical 
material in some detail it will be as well to be clear about an 
important facet of'the Christian claim for the divinity of Jesus. If 
the question is about what the resurrection of Jesus can be said to 
confirm, if 'confirmation' is being spoken of in an ordinary historical 
sense, then the question should be directed to that material and 
evidence which is historically prior. Confirmation only makes sense 
in the context of what has already been said and done. However, an 
examination of the relationship between the resurrection and the claims 
Text cut off in original 
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raises the question of the transcendent, and that, through this 
apprehension of 'personal' value, that which is transcendent can 
confirm and uphold our 'personal' worth. Moreover this confirmation 
takes place in the context of an historical situation. Now the 
resurrection of Jesus for the New Testament writers and for the early 
Christians is the experience of that confirmation. I have already 
shown how it is to be understood at this 'personal' level, and how it 
is mediated through the 'personal'. The importance of the resurrection 
is the decisive way in which it is embedded in the tradition of a 
particular community. In this sense our question has already been 
answered in a partial way. It confirms that the 'personal' value we 
apprehend does have a transcendent correlate, or that it is reasonable 
for human beings to think of their'existence in such a context. 
But what of the nature of this transcendence? What can the 
resurrection tell us in the light of the epistemological constraints 
that have been highlighted? The suggestion I shall explore in the 
remainder of this chapter and in our final chapter is that love and 
compassion constitute the essential nature of the transcendent. Once 
again it is. not so much that we can have knowledge that love is the 
ultimate reality, but rather-that human reason can grant a rational 
priority to a dynamic of faith's response to love. In short I suggest 
that a contemporary Christian epistemology of salvation is comprehensible 
on the basis of a gracious transcendence. 
If it be objected that this is a highly simplistic and sentimental 
thesis, and a somewhat banal conclusion to the study, my reply would be 
that simplicity is not necessarily banal. In the context of the 
demand of faith I would argue for its essential profundity. It may be 
objected that a simple message of love and its saving power is likely to 
seem irrelevant to the complexity of a modern social and political 
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the Old Testament or'the New Testament message of Jesus. 
It might however be objected that while the divine status of 
Jesus is not explicitly claimed during his life it is already implicit 
there. In this sense it could be argued that the resurrection allows 
us to make explicit what was already inherent in the historical 
figure. 5 Certainly there is evidence-that Jesus is authoritative 
in his teaching and healing in a special way. He speaks for example 
in terms which suggest that the authority of the law has been 
superseded: "You have learned that they were told ... But What I 
tell you is this. 11 '(Matthew 5: 38) Even so, the matter is not clear- 
cut, ind`the 'a priori' evidence may still be'said in general to 
support''the supposition I have advanced, 
Before I examine the Biblical material it is appropriate to pause 
to take stock and to outline in brief. the direction of the remainder 
of the argument. 
Already it is clear that the ontological claims which the 
Christian faith has traditionally made are no longer epistemologically 
acceptable in a modern context. This means that if sense is to be 
made of the Christian message of salvation for a modern world there 
has to be a fundamental re-appraisal and re-evaluation both of what is 
believed and the way it is expressed. 
This is not to say that the statements of faith which have 
emerged in the history of Christianity were in error in the context 
in which they, were framed. For they were expressions of faith 
conditioned by, and adapted to, the cultural and philosophical thought 
forms of the age in which they were fashioned. The ontological claims 
5ý-' cf. 'R. H. Fuller, op. cit. p. 105 G. Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, p. 68 
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were seen=to be in harmony with the epistemological models with which 
their contemporaries worked. Thus there is no reason to doubt that 
it was possible to express and live out the faith legitimately and 
authentically within the ontological framework which had been erected. 
But now that is no longer possible because the limits of what 
we can claim to know have been impressed upon us with increasing force. 
Traditional Christian ontology is no longer in harmony with modern 
epistemology. We cannot live happily and naturally with metaphysical 
propositions which reflect so clearly that faith and culture are 
manifestly out of step. Of course it is still possible to preserve 
the old structure, but at the expense of isolation from the modern 
world, and at the price of being content with a ghetto-like existence 
for faith. 
The roason why I expreas this point in such a categorical way is 
because the limits of what human beings can claim to know are an 
essential part of what it means to be e human being. Of course that 
is not to any that it will be impossible to ignore them, and that many 
people and groups may find it preferable and more acceptable to do so. 
But that will not change the fact of the matter. If religion and 
theology are concerned with truth then they must accept these limits 
as necessary constraints. 
However, as I have argued throughout the thesis, the acceptance of 
these limits is not incompatible with faith. In fact, paradoxically, 
they highlight thu question of transcendence and the possibility of 
faith. What they preclude is the expression of faith in terms of an 
elaborate systematic transcendent ontology of faith which can be known. 
What then can we say that the resurrection confirms? So far I 
have argued very simply that the human apprehension of the 'personal' 
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enviraninont. ,A critic might argue that inasmuch as Christianity has 
proclaimed such a message for two thousand years it has been conspicuous 
by its failure to trinnform the world, and influence human life through 
its ideal. 
6 My reply to this would be twofold. In the first place 
it is of the very nature of love not to compel or coerce. The only 
correlate of love is a freely offered response. In the second place 
it could be argued that the failure of Christianity to communicate its 
essentially simple message of love, lies not so much in the message 
itself, but rather the ontological structures in which Christianity 
has expressed its message, and which it has equated with the truth of 
faith's activity in love. Too often in the past the Christian polemic 
has served the interests of these ontological structures, whether 
doctrinal or ecclesiastical, rather than the passion of agape itself. 
It may seem that such an hypothesis is totally out of step with a 
Biblical view of salvation. At first sight the message of the Old 
Testament is a message of the election of Israel, and that of the New 
Testament that salvation is uniquely available through faith in the 
person of Christ. Now it has already been argued that a contemporary 
Christian epistemology of salvation need not refer to the Bible as being 
uniquely and decisively authoritative. However, once that preliminary 
reservation has been clearly established it is the argument of this 
study that the Biblical material itself can be seen to be supportive of 
a more limited and 'narrow' epistemology of salvation. This is not to 
say that there is a unity in the Bible with regard to its message of 
salvation. It is rather to any two things. In the first place it is 
possible to detect in the Old Testament a line of thought which speaks of 
salvation in terms of a gracious transcendence. At all events an 
6. This is why Alfredo F ierro speaks of current political theology 
"as a 'deprivatizin ' of the Christian idea of love'(p. 230, A. Fierro, 
The Militant Gospel) 
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essential element is the way it seeks to balance the concepts of God's 
grace with his transcendence. Now this is simply another way of 
saying that the only human response to a transcendent ontology of 
divine love is through faith. Thus it might be argued that there is 
'a priori', before I turn to examine the New Testament evidence, a 
theological epistemology in the Old Testament which is in some sense 
a close correlate with the epistemology I have outlined above. In 
connection with this claim I shall not seek to show that this is a 
definitive interpretation of Old Testament soteriology, nor do I 
even need to argue that it is a conscious interpretation which the 
Old Testament proclaimsin the context of its own scriptural authority. 
All I shall seek to show is that this pattern of salvation, grace, 
repentance and faith does occur as a basic theme in the Old Testament. 
Secondly it is possible to argue that in the New Testament what 
the resurrection confirms is not so much the Christological proclamation 
which the New Testament offers, but the basic message of the 
historical Jesus concerning the kingdom and fatherhood of God which 
itself invites a response of repentance and faith. Although I shall 
argue that epistemologically this accords with the historical 
development of the Now Testament message, once again my argument is 
not dependent on the analysis reflecting the New Testament's own 
understanding of its message, or even Jesus' own view of his own person. 
The prior criterion which affects our verdict of the New Testament 
material is whether or not it is capable of meeting the epistemological 
limits already established. 
Thus the thesis I shall seek to defend in these final chapters 
ie that in place of the later Chriatological ontologies which came to 
dominate the, Christian, traditiong a contemporary Christian message of 
salvation is more comprehensible on the basis of an epistemology of 
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salvation which is implicit in th© Old Tcstoment and that moreover this 
is an ipistornology which xoflectu the main. impetus of the message of 
Jesus, and surfaces from time to time in the theology of John and Paul. 
This analysis of the Biblical evidence will take place under a 
number of headings. I shall look first of all at what might be called 
the 'rapprochment' between the significance of several Old Teatament 
figures and the titles which are used to refer to Jesus. Then in 
succession I shall oxaiaina the sotorioloyical function of those figures 
both in the Old Testament and the New Testament, the soteriological 
nature of the Old Testament doctrine of God, and show its relationship 
with specific passages in the New Tvstwnent. 
At first sight, and according to traditional teachiny, there is 
a qualitative difference between the New Testament figure of Jesus and 
a variety of figures we encounter in the Old Testament. So Edward 
Schweizer says, "Nis refusal to use these titles shows that he fits 
none of these formulas. Repetition of a pro-existing title, assent 
to some definition of Jesus' nature, cannot dispense a man from real 
encounter with him. The way God uses Jesus represents the culmination 
of all the 0, T, hopes concerning the P1essiah, the Son of God, and the 
Servant of God. But Jesus keeps all the possibilities open; he 
refuses to use titles, which of necessity define and delimit, to make 
, 
God's free action an object of human thought, placing it at the disposal 
of the human mind. "7 Christian orthodoxy presents the distinctiveness 
of Jesus in two senses. In the first place the Christian offers worship 
-to tho figure of Christ. In the famous passages in Romans chapter eight 
Paul equates tho spirit of God and the spirit of Christ. Such an 
equation of the divine godhead with a human figure, it is aryued, is 
7. Jesus, E. Schweizer, p. 22 
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blasphemy as far as the Old Testament faith is concerned. It is 
an idolatrous infringement of the first commandment. In the second 
place Christianity sees the message of salvation which it offers as 
being distinctive in that it speaks of God become man; the divine 
taking upon itself human nature in order to accomplish the salvation 
which humanity cannot achieve for itself. The Christian message, we 
might conclude, depends absolutely upon the distinctiveness and the 
divinity which it attributes to the Person of Christ. 
What then is this 'rapprochment' I have spoken of? On a closer 
look at a variety of figures in the Old Testament we see that a number 
of them, while never being equated with the godhead, do perform the 
divine functions. The Messiah, for example, king over Israel, acts 
as the agent of the divine kingship of Yahweh. 
8 The prophet remains 
a human figure, yet becomes the mouthpiece of God through which the 
divine threats and promises are made against, and offered to, Israel. 
9 
In the book of Daniel the Son of man is an eschatological figure who 
exercises the divine prerogative of sovereignty and judgement. Thus, 
while men are never equated with God himself they are capable of 
exercising his authority and power. 
When we turn to the New Testament and to the understanding of the 
person of Jesus two points are worthy of note. The New Testament 
writers never explicitly express the equation that Jesus is God. 
8. Although it is clear that there was controversy over whether Israel 
should be like the other nations and have a King nevertheless there is a 
rich theological tradition which speaks of the King as the ruler God 
himself has installed, and through whom God will rule. Commenting on 
Ps. 2: 6, "I have set my King on Zion, my holy hill, " Weiser says, "The 
O. T. Kingship thereby becomes a function and instrument of the will of 
the divine Ruler. " (p. 113, A. Weiser, The Psalms) 
9. cf. von Rad, The Message of the Prophets (p. 66) says: "The term, 
'the word of Yahwe , occurs 241 times in the Old Testament writings; 
of these no less than 221 (92 percent) relate to a prophetic oracle. 
There can, therefore, be no doubt but this collocation was used as a 
technical term for an oral prophetic revelation. The phrase, 'the word 
of Yahweh came to so and so' 
(123 times), is particularly characteristic, 
because_it_represents the aDoerge tion of the divine word as event ___" 
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Clearly it is implicit in several plncee (e. q. Jn. I; Jn. 26: 29; 
Romans 9: 5) but it is almost as though they shrink from the final 
unambiguous conclusion. Moreover the evidence one might cite which 
speaks in more or less specific terms of the divinity of Jesus comes 
from material which is relatively late in the period covered by the 
Now Testament. Brown comments, "If wo date Now Testament times from 
30 to 100, quite clearly the use of 'God' for Jesus belongs to the 
second half of the period and becomes frequent only toward the end of 
the period. "'() He also suggests that this divine recognition of Jesus 
occurs in a particular context. "We think that the usage of calling 
Jesus Cod was a liturgical usage and had its origin in the worship and 
prayers of the Christian community. "11 It seems therefore that the 
divinity-of Jesus was not such a dominant and all-pervasive concept 
in the New Testament as might be thought. One problem in Christianity 
is that the New Testament tends to be read in the light of the later 
credal formulae of the Church. Certainly if we are to understand the 
original significance of the titles of Jesus in the New Testament these 
should be read more in the light of their Old Testament background than 
from the perspective of later confessions of faith. This then is what 
I mean when I speak of a 'rapprochement' between the Old Testament and 
the New Testament. In the Old Testament various human figures, while 
not themselves invested with divinity, exercise the divine prerogative. 
In the New Testament Jesus himself is spoken of as a direct successor 
to this tradition. And it is only later that the figure of Jesus is 
entirely equated with the divine transcendence itself. The relationship 
between the two testaments with regard to an understanding of the figure 
of Jesus seems beat explained in terms of a gradual development of ideas, 
10, op. cit. R. Brown, p. 31 
11" ibid., p. 34 
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rather than in terms of an imnodiate and total contrast, where the 
distinctiveness of Jesus is clearly and absolutely apparent. 
However one feature stands out above all an characterising both 
sides of the 'gap' which supposedly exists between the two testaments. 
These figures which we have spoken of above, namely the Messiah, the 
prophet end the Son of man, all of which are related to Jesus in the 
Now Teatament, are in some sonso associated with events which Mediate 
the saving purpose of the transcendent. They all have a soteriological 
function. Thus the tlassiah in associated with victory over the enemies 
of Israel, and with the establishment of n kingdom of justice. 
So in Psalm 20: 5, we read: 
"Let us ging aloud in praiso of your victory, 
lot ua do homage to the name of our God! 
Now I know that 
the Lord ties given victory to his anointed King 1"12 
Again in Psalm 72: 12: 
"For he chull rescue the needy fron their rich oppressor, 
the distressed who have no protector. 
May ho have pity on the needy and the poor, 
deliver the poor from death; 
may he redeem them from oppression and violence 
und may their blood be precious in his eyes. " 
It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the function of the king 
is to oversee the saving power of Yahweh himself. 
Psalm 21: 5 
"Thy salvation has brought him great glory, 
X113 thou dost invest him with majesty and honour. 
12. %Ieiser, commenting on Ps. 20: 6, says, "Tha mystery of the presence 
of Gad in public worship and of his dispensation of salvation welds the 
tradition-of the past, the present experience, end the expectation of 
the things to come into one single event which carries with it the immediate 
assurance of all these experiences; again, this mystery first enables 
us to grasp the peculiar sense in which History and ¶Icilsgeschichte' are 
understood in the Old Testament, where we continually encounter it. " 
(p. 200, A. Woisor, op. cit) 
130 Again Weiser says, "Hence it is more than understandable that the 
prayer ... once more enphnsiees the joy which in hic festive hour unites 
the King with his people in the blessed awareness of the presence of God, 
and in the Knowledge of the assurance of his saving will. " (p. 214, ibid. ) 
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The Messiah therefore is not so much a. transcendent figure in himself, 
but-a figure who mediates the transcendent purpose-of God in Israel's 
history. 
In addition to this notion of the king as the actual agent of 
God's salvation in history, which was a theological concept largely 
modelled on the Davidic kingship, there is also the identification 
of the Messiah with a future hope. For Israel looks forward to a 
Messianic figure who will inaugurate the promised age. Thus we read 
in Isaiah 9: 6ff: 
"For' a boy has been-born for us, a-, son given,. to uo 
to bear the symbol of dominion on his shoulder; 
and he shall be called 
in purpose wonderful, in battle God-like, 
1-Father for all time, Prince of peace. 
Great shall the dominion be, 
and boundless the peace 
bestowed on David's throne and on his kingdom, 
to establish it and sustain it 
with justice and righteousness 
from now and for evermore. 
The zeal of the Lord of Moats shall do this. "ýý 
It seems likely that the prophet Zechariah, after the exilo, 
believed that Zerubbabel, the ruler of Israel, would fulfil these 
earlier Messianic prophecies. "I will now bring my servant, the 
Branch. In one day I will wipe sway the guilt, of the land. On 
that day says the Lord of Hosts, you shall all of you invite one another 
to come and sit each. under his vine and his fig-tree. " (Zech. 3: 9-10) 
Moreover there-is no doubt that the Messianic ago-to. coma will be a 
gracious saving act of God. "These are the wards of the Lord of floats: 
Even if it may seem impossible to the survivors of this nation on that 
14. So Otto Kaiser says, "With the coming of this King, the history 
of the human race, characterised by unrest, strife and devastation, 
approaches its conclusion. He will bring to the world an all-embracing 
and never-ending solution, because he and his descendants will exercise 
their office on this earth as the true representatives of God. " 
(p. 130 0. Kaiser, Isaiah 1-12) 
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day, it will also seem impossible to me? This is the very word of the 
Lord of Hostst See, I will rescue my people from the countries of the 
east and the west, and bring them back to live in Jerusalem. They 
shall be my people, and I will be their God, in truth and justice. " 
(Zech. oi6ff) 
However Messianic hope is only one strand, and a diverse one at 
that, both in the Old Testament tradition as well as during the inter- 
testamental period. Another figure who appears in the apocalyptic 
literature is that of the Son of man. Wo meet him in the Old 
Testament as an eschatological figure in the book of Daniel. He will 
exercise the divine function of sovereignty, and will rule in glory 
for ever. This reign will be his once God has destroyed the evil 
power which has threatened the divine authority if such a thing could 
be conceived to be possible. Once again we have a figure associated 
with a. divine act of salvation. This time it is the ultimate act. 
The age which we contemplate is one which lies beyond history. In 
Daniel 703 we read: - 
"I was still watching in the visions of the night and I saw one 
like a man (Son of man) coming with the clouds of heaven; he 
approached the Ancient in Years and was presented to him. Sovereignty 
and glory and kingly power were given to him, so that all people and 
nations of every language should serve him; his sovereignty was to be 
an everlasting sovereignty, which should not pass away, and his kingly 
power such as should never be impaired. " 
However, just as the Messianic hope was modelled on Israel's experience 
of the Davidic kingship, so the apocalyptic hope in Daniel is created 
out of the Jewish experience of domination under the Greeks, and the 
Maccabean revolt. There seems to be a link between the mysterious 
figure of the Son of man and the saints of the Most High, those 
righteous and obedient Jews who have defied the blasphemy of Antiochus 
and suffered for it. So in Daniel 7: 21 we read: "As I still watched, 
that horn was waging war with the saints, and overcoming them until the 
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Ancient in Years came. Then judgement was given. in favour of the 
saints of the Most High, and the time came when the saints gained 
possession of the kingly power. " 
Throughout the Old Testament therefore we might say that 
historical figures mediate the acts of God's salvation. They do so 
throughout the history of Israel and are expected to do so until the 
time of the end. 
Similarly we can see the role of the prophet as the proclaimer of 
the saving purpose of God. For example the whole message of the 
prophecy of Doutero-Isaiah is summarised in the pronouncement of God's 
new act of salvation. So in 3: 16ff we reads 
"Thus says the Lord,, 
who opened a way in the sea 
and a path through mighty waters, 
... 
Cease to dwell on days gone by 
and to brood over past history. 
-Here and now I-will,. do a new thing; 
this moment it will break from the bud. " 
A little later the saving nature, of the 'new thing' is made clears 
"I have swept away your sins like a dissolving mist, 
and your transgressions are dispersed like clouds; 
turn back to me; for I have. ransomed you. 
Shout in triumph, you heavens, for it is the Lord's doing; 
. cry out 
for joy, you lowest depths of the earth; - break into songs of triumph, you mountains, 
you forest and all your trees; -- for the Lord has ransomed Jacob 
and made1srael-his masterpiece. " (44: 22ff). 
In the prohetic writing there is of course the other side of this 
coin of the proclamation of salvation: The divine plan is in some 
sense conditional upon Israel accepting the responsibility which God's 
favour and election involves, Failure to respond must needs involve 
punishment, and in the end repentance. Thus Hosea complains: 
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"May disaster-befell them for rebelling against mal 
I long to deliver them, 
but they tell lies about mo. 
There is'no sincerity in their cry to me. (Nos 7: 13) 
The advice Amos offers the people is clear. Here is no straightforward 
message of Cod's salvation. Yet it'is a message designed for that end 
and purpose. 
15 It is a warning and threat enunciated to produce the 
repentance which must precede the saving reality. 
""Seek yood*end not evil, 
that you may live, 
that`the Lord, the God of Hosts may be firmly on your side, 
as you say he i©. 
Hate evil and love good; 
enthrone justice in the courts; 
it may be that the Lord the God of Hosts 
will be gracious to the survivors of Joseph. " (5: l4ff. ) 
There is no intention here of deriving far-reaching conclusions 
from this evidence. All that I am seeking to establish is that the 
figures of the Messiah, the Son of man and the prophet are in some 
sense mediators of the divine salvation. They are instruments of Cod 
helping Israel to see certain events in their history as being salvific, 
as validating Israel's election by God, and as culminating in some 
ultimate destiny of salvation. 
When we turn to'the New Testament it is'not hard to discover 
that a salvific event is once more at the centre. It is there in the 
initial proclamation of Jesus. The Kingdom of God has dawned, or is 
at the very threshold of its appearance. (Mk. I115). 
16 The 'new' 
saving event proclaimed by Isaiah itself receives 'new' significance 
15. Cf. p. 111, J. Mays, 
16. Wilson says, "Here, 
fully come'. The way hay 
entire history of Israel, 
now the hour has struck. " 
Commentary, ed. M. Black) 
Hosea with reference to previous passage. 
'the time fixed in the counsel of God has 
J been prepared by John, and indeed in the 
as also in the history of the world at large; 
(p. 800, R. ffcl. Wilson, 'Mark', in Pea ke s 
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in the message Jesus proclaimed in the synagogue in Nazareth. 
"The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed ma; 
he has sent me to announce good news to the poor, 
to proclaim release for prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind; 
to let the broken victims go free, 
to proclaim the year of the Lord's favour. " (Lk. 4: 18ff) 
The driving out of demons, the exorcising of evil spirits in Mark 
make it clear what authority Jesus has through the saving nature of the 
events. "He healed many who suffered from various diseases, and drove 
out many d3vila. He would not let the devils speak, because they knew 
who he was. " (Mk. 1: 33ff). 
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The gospels tell us that what the disciples and the contemporaries 
of Jesus are witnessing is an event of divine salvation comparable with 
the salvific acts of God in the Old Testament. It is for this reason, 
and as a'result of this saving experience, that the New Testament draws 
its conclusion concerning the divine ontology of Jesus. And it is 
here that we can-see the beginning of the distinctiveness of the New 
Testament proclamation. For while the Old Testament writers speak of 
certain figures mediating the divine salvation, in the New Testament 
divine salvation experienced through the mediation of Christ attracts 
comparison with Yahweh himself. In Mark 4: 37-41 such comparison with 
the Old Testament is clear: 
"A heavy squall came on and the waves broke over the boat until it 
was all but swamped. Now he was in the stern asleep on a cushion; 
they roused him and said, "Master, we are sinking) Do you not care? 
He awoke, rebuked the wind, and said to the sea, "Hush) Be stillt" 
The wind dropped and there was a dead calm. He said to them, "Why 
are you such cowards? Have-you no faith, even now? "They were 
awestruck and said to one another, "Who can this be? Even the wind 
and sea obey him. " 
It is clear that we are invited to read this story in the light of 
17. Thus Nineham: "A power so great and universally effective as this 
can be no other than the eschatological power of God ... " (p. 82, D. E. 
Nineham, Std k) 
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Psalm 107s28 ff. 
"So they cried to the Lord in their trouble, 
and he brought them out of their distress. 
The otorm sank to a murmur 
and the waves of the sea were stilled. 
.... Lot them thank the Lord for his enduring love 
and for the marvellous things he has done for men. "1S 
For the purposes of this study at the moment the important point-to 
note'is that the central function of both the Old Testament 
representatives of Israel, and the New Testament person of Christ 
is their mediation of divine salvation. Moreover while the New 
Testament goes on to derive unique divine significance for Jesus, it 
never loses eight of the connection between the two. There is always 
a close link between the Christological claims and the claims that the 
divine salvation has been experienced. 
From the point of view of this study this is a matter of some 
significance. It means that while it is possible to see how the 
saving experience led to the divine ontological claim, in the light of 
the argument I have put forward, it is possible to accept the validity 
of the experience without necessarily going on to endorse the validity 
of the-interpretation. For the epistemological framework I have 
outlined above allows us to see how events and persons could be said to 
modiste the transcendent in the context of a saving experience. And 
a cursory glance at the Old Testament and the New Testament evidence 
shows that this is precisely what the Bible itself stresses. Thus it 
is possible to share this insight without having to accept the full 
18. So P1orna Hooker says, "Their reaction to the power of Jesus, 
however, is to be even more afraid: confronted with such authority, 
they are owe-struck. It is God who at aeatim brought order out of 
the watery chaos (Gn. 1), and God alone who controls the raging of the 
sea (Pa. 89.81) (p. 36 Studying the New Testament). 
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Chriatolocjical implications which have become part of the Christian 
tradition. 
Even if wo turn to those examples in the Now Testament where 
there appears to be an explicit proclamation of the divine ontology 
of Christ, we find in all cases except two that it is closely related 
to the saving experience. Brown has identified eight passages which 
might be said to speak of Jesus' divinity. 
In Colossians 1: 13ff. Paul says, "He rescued us from the domain 
of darkness and brought us away into the kingdom of his dear Son, in 
whom our release is secured and our sins forgiven. He is the image 
of the invisible God: his is the primacy over all created things. " 
Here not only does Paul link the divine ontology of Jesus with the 
experience of salvation, but also, although this is not explicitly 
stated, it might reasonably be suggested that it is because of the 
salvation that has been mediated through Ctiriat, that Paul goes an to 
explain that this has been effected because of who Jesus is. Thus 
here, as was seen in the Flarcan cameo, a contemporary epistemology might 
accept the validity of the saving experience, and yet decline to interpret 
it in the way that Paul does, 
In the letter to. Titus in 2: 13ff there is a passage which is 
capable of. a comparable interpretation. We reed, "... looking forward 
to the happy fulfilment of our hope when the splendour of the glory of 
our great God-and-Saviour Jesus Christ will appear. He it is who 
sacrificed himself for us,. to set us free from all wickedness and to 
make us a pure people marked out for his own, eager to do good. "19 
19. There is an alternative translation possible here: thus it would 
be possible to read "... looking forward to the happy fulfilment of our 
hope when the splendour of the glory of the great Cod and our Saviour 
Jesus Christ will appear. " However both J. N. D. Kelly and C. K. Barrett 
support Brown's reading (cf. Kelly, The Postoral Epistles, p. 246-7 
and Barrett, The Pastoral Epistles p: 37-13d as does Ä. J. 8. Higgins, in 
Peake's Commentary, p. 107 
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In this case it is because of the caving-event-that Christians can 
ppeak of the future{hope in terms of a theophany of Christ. Thus, 
here too,, the""divino Christological ontology is intrinsically related 
to the experience of salvation. And here too it is possible to accept 
the validity of the saving experience without endorsing the interpretation 
which sees the future hope in terms of an appearance of Christ as God. 
"One of the most exalted claims for -the person of Jesus occurs in 
the letter to the Hebrews. Speaking of Jesus the-writer says, "Your 
throne, 0. God, is. for ever and over".. i and the righteous sceptre is 
the'sceptre of your kingdom. You have loved justice and hated iniquity; 
therefore, 
_0. 
God, "your God has anointed you with the oil of gladness. " 
(Hebrews"10-9) Again$'even in this most, elevated of-contexts, the 
causal link between-the victory over-injustice and iniquity; -and the 
divine significance of Christ is hinted at. Indeed in an earlier verse 
this relationship has been more explicitly analysed. "But in this 
final. ago he has spoken to us in the Son whom he has made heir to the 
whole universe, and through whom he created all orders of existence: 
the Son who is the effulgence of God's splendour and the stamp of God's 
very being, and-sustains the universe by his word of power. When he 
had brought about the purgation of sins, he took his seat at the-right 
hand of the majesty on high, raised as far above the angels, as the title 
he, has inherited is superior-to theirs. " (Hebrews, 1: 2ff) Here, even 
more explicitly than in the previous verses the saving act of Christ is 
linked to his divine sovereignty and creative power. More than this, 
however, we can see a twofold interpretation. On the one hand there 
is the hint of what may well have been a primitive adoption ist Christology, 
i. e. it was because Jesus conquered sin that he took his seat in glory, 
At the same time the logic of that position is pushed even further to 
suggest that it was only because of who Jesus was, i. e. the effulgence 
of God's splendour who sustains the universe, that he was able to 
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accomplish this saving act. In this example also however it is 
possible for us to detach the saving experience from the ontology of 
divine Christological exaltation. 
Another example occurs in 2Pet. I ff. The writer of the letter 
says, "From Simon Peter, servant and apostle of Jesus Christ, to those 
who through the justice of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ sharp our 
faith and enjoy equal privilege with ourselves. " Brown argues that 
the most acceptable interpretation of the Greek here is to take God 
and Saviour as being used as adjectives to describe the significance 
of Jesus. Thus the very formula used to refer to Jesus links the 
divine ontology with the soteriological function. However in verses 
three and four we are offered an explanation of this description. 
"His divine power has bestowed on us everything that makes for life 
and true religion, enabling us to know the one who has called us by 
his own splendour and might. Through this might and splendour he 
has given us his promises, great beyond all price, and through them you 
may escape the corruption with which lust has infected the world, and 
come to share in the very being of God. " In these verses we might 
reasonably claim that the 'gift of life' and the 'promises' of which the 
writer speaks actually constitute the saving function spoken of above, 
and that it was through this salvation that the Christians came to know 
that the transcendent had been encountered and was actually revealed in 
Christ. 
It is perhaps in the Johannine writings that the most explicit 
equation is made between Jesus and God. Here the pattern we have 
identified and the close connection between the salvation apprehended in 
Christ and the divine ontology attributed to him are not so immediately 
apparent. For this reason we shall look separately at John's gospel. 
However it does seem possible to identify a close relation between 
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soterioloyy and'tho, divino ontology in the first letter of John. In 
I John 5120, we read; "We know that the Son of God has come and given 
us understanding to know him who is real; - indeed we are in him who is 
real; since we are in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, 
this is eternal life. " 
With the Johannine literature we have a very different sort of 
language compared with the passages quoted above. And yet the substance 
of what is said is not very different. We apprehend reality, and 
that reality is eternal life through our knowledge of Jesus. In short 
knowledge of Jesus is the saving experience. At the same time to have 
knowledge of our salvation as eternal life is to have knowledge of God, 
and to have knowledge that Jesus himself is the divine reality. Thus 
here too it is through the apprehension of eternal life as salvation 
that we can claim to know Cod. Once again, while the writer uses the 
realitysof salvation to deduce the ontology of Jesus, it is possible, 
from'our epistemological perspective to see that the experience of Christ 
may'well be seid to mediate a, transcendent reality without claiming that 
Jesus'himself is that reality. 
Before turning to the evidence in John's gospel it is necessary 
to look at the only example where the pattern I have described cannot 
be discovered. In Romans 9: 5 Paul says, "Of their race (i. e. the 
Israelites) is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all, God 
blessed for ever. " Although the actual interpretation of this 
passage is disputed, there seems to be no reason to discount it on 
that basis alone. Brown concludes that "at most one may claim a 
certain probability that this passage refers to Jesus as God. "20 
20. -"' 'op'. cit. R. Brown, p. 22. Barrett', for example, prefers to leave 
the matter unresolved: "leaving open the question whether the doxology 
refers to Christ or to God the Father. " (p. 179, C. K. Barrett, The Ep istle 
to the Romans) Black, however, believes that this should not read as e 
s ra g orward identification of Christ with God: "It is extremely 
doubtful whether Paul would ever apply the name God thus simpliciter to 
Christ. " (p. 130, M. Black, Romans) 
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However., it would be illegitimate to suggest that one passage, irrespective 
of the question of what it means, should be seen to cast a significant 
doubt over the general pattern we have argued for. It is perfectly 
possible for us to understand that, once the saving experience allowed 
the early Christians to come to the conclusion that Jesus possess da 
transcendent ontology in his person, that this Christological confession 
of faith should be expressed independently and claimed to be known in 
its own right. Moreover, as I have already argued, because the New 
Testament writers and the later Church fathers were increasingly led to 
speak in these terms, this is itself no reason why auch an epistemology 
is in any sense incumbent upon us. What is significant from our point 
of view is that in the majority of cases where the New Testament most 
explicitly refers to Jesus as God, it does no in close relationship with 
the claims for his saving power. 
The evidence of John's gospel is however slightly more complex to 
analyse. -Y Two of the passages which Brown cites, which he claims are 
texts where Jesus in clearly called God, occur'here in the New Testament. 
The first is John IiI: "In the beginning was the word; and the Word 
was in God's presence, and the Word was God. " The second is John 20s2B. 
Jesus has appeared to the other disciples when Thomas was 6baont, and 
Thomas refuses to believe the others when they tell him that they have 
seen Jesus. - A week later Jesus appeared again. This time Thomas was 
present. This meeting elicits the following confession of faith. 
"Thomas said, 'My Lord end my Cod! '" ý-The one. text occurs right at}the 
beginning of the gospel, and the other, if not at the, end es we now have 
it, then certainly at'the and of one edition. Thus the whole work is 
set in the frame. of the divine ontology of Jesus. 
21 Moreover this is 
21. -Thus John Marsh says, ! H'ith these words the evangelist has brought 
his gospel full circle. In the beginning the divine Word had been 
proclaimed as God (I')i' now that profound truth is confessod'as the 
only possible word to be uttered about him who had been incarnate and 
humbled, but now is risen and glorified.,., And that word is uttered by 
Thomas: 'My Lord and my God"' (p. 648, J. Marsh Saint John) 
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the gospel which has the simpleot and clearest expression of the 
doctrine of the incarnation. Thus the prologue tells us "The Word 
became flesh. " (I04), and Jesus tells us "My Father and I are one. " 
(10*30) 
In spite of this, if we look a little more closely at the contexts 
in which these isolated sayings occur, we discover that their purpose 
is not so much to establish or proclaim the pure ontological equation, 
but rather to explain the soteriologi'cal significance of the life and 
death'of Jesus. The framework of the gospel, which we have already 
seen begins and ends witha proclamation of Jesus' divinity, illustrates 
this clearly. The very purpose of the Word coming into the world is 
that men and women might "yield him their allegiance. " (I: 12) 
'Yielding allegiance' and 'believing' are the equivalents of 'eternal 
life' and 'salvation'. John 3: 16ff. makes the equation quite explicit. 
"God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son, that everyone 
who has faith in him may not die but have eternal life. It was not 
to judge the world that God sent his Son into the world, but that 
through him the world might be saved. The man who puts his faith in 
me does not come under judgement; but the unbeliever has already been 
judged in that he has not given hie allegiance to God's only Son. " 
Thus we find at the end of the gospel that the confession of Thomas is 
not set in the context of some doctrinal exposition, but in the context 
of his own salvation. "'Be unbelieving no longer, but believe #' 
Thomas said, 'My Lord and My Godl' Jesus: said, 'Because you have been 
me you have found faith. Happy are they who have never seen me and 
yet have found faith. '" (20s27ff) Immediately afterwards what we might 
call the first edition of the gospel ends. Thomas' discovery of 
salvation is offered to the reader, und he is invited to share the came 
confession of faith. "Those (signs) here written have been recorded in 
order that you may hold the faith that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of 
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Cod, and that through this faith you may posaosa life by his name. " 
(20: 31) 
Thus-it, is clear that the setting of John's gospel with its 
transcendent ontology of Jesus, as the Logoa, the eternal Son of God, 
22 is designed specifically to serve a soteriological function. The 
emphasis lies upon the offer of salvation that is available to those 
who believe in him. In fact 'faith in Jes, us', 'eternal life' and 
'salvation' are synonymous. Ibwover it is not so clear in the case 
of John's gospel that it is the experience of salvation which gives 
rise to the claims of a transcendent Christology. It is obviously 
John's view that it is because Jesus has this unique being that he is 
able to offer humanity salvation. Thus it is not so posuible for us 
to separate the soteriological from the ontological here to support the 
epistemological pattern I have suggested. 
Yet there are two interesting points to note. The first is that 
while the divine ontology of Jesus is prior to his saving mission, the 
gospel writer nevertheless does suggest that when the believer apprehends 
the salvation which is eternal life, he or she comes to share in the 
ontology of the Father and the Son. "But it is not for these alone 
that I pray, but for those also who through their words put their faith 
in me; may they all be one; as Thou Father art in me, and I in Thee, 
so also may they be in us, that the world may believe that thou didst 
send me. The glory which thou gayest me I have given to them, that 
they may be one as we are one ... " (17t20ff) In this case the priority 
of the apprehension of salvation over the ontological status is clear. 
23 
22. C. K. Barrett, for example, says, "He is at the same time Saviour 
and Revealer; and the act of salvation is revelation ... Tho revelation 
is given not in metaphysical but in moral terms" (p. 846-847, C. K. Barrett, 
'John' in Peaks's Commentary cd. M. Black 
23. Although u tmann does not speak of the priority of salvation over 
the ontological state of the believer, ho, like, Barrett, describes the 
ontology io moral terms, and in terms of the experience of love -a point 
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I shall coma to later, fie says, "The unity of his own is to be of 
the some kind as that between the Father and Son; i. es therefore 
just as the Son's being is a being for the Father and vice verse so 
the being of the individual believers must be a being for each other 
- in the bond of 4y-or7 "" (p. 513, R. Bultmann, The Gospel of John) 
Brown, however, hints that comprehension of this ontological unity is 
made possible by the experience of salvation. "Similarly the 
Christians are one with one another and with the Father and the Son 
because they received of this life. " (p. 776, R. Brown, The Gospel 
According to John vol. III) 
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Our union with the divine being is mediated through and dependent upon 
the salvation which faith accords. 
The second point is, as I shall try to show later, that the actual 
content of John's Christological ontology is very closely related to 
the Old Testament understanding of the precise nature of God himself 
which initiates and makes possible human salvation in the first place. 
It is not so much that the Johannine Christology totally transcends the 
Old Testament framework of thought, but that it provides a new setting 
for tho Old Testament insights. , 
We might summarise the conclusions I have tried to draw from the 
Biblical material thus far under three headings. First of all the 
distinctiveness of the claims for Jesus is far less clear-cut when we 
compare the New Testament with the Old Testament than we might be led 
to suppose by the traditional Christian teaching. In the Old 
Testament there are a number of figures who act in God's place in his 
plan of salvation. While in the New Testament, as Brown points out, 
we see a progression from a functional to an ontological Christology 
as we move from the first century to the Council of Nicaea. 
24 
In the second place what unites the figures of the Messiah, the 
Son of man and the prophet in the Old Testament with the figure of Jesus 
in the New Testament is that their key significance is the saving 
function which they perform and mediate. Wo might say that the gap 
between the Old Testament belief in Yahweh and the New Testament belief 
in Christ is bridged by the Hebraic notion of the salvation which Cod 
reveals and prepares for his people in history, and as their goal at the 
end of time. And finally this means, that in the light of the previous 
analysis, it is possible to accommodate the Biblical view that specific 
24, op. cit. R. Brown, p. 2 
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ovents can be interproted as having 'personal' unving significance to 
the epistemological framework I have argued for without having to take 
on board the tranacendent ontology of the parson of Christ which is 
the deduction which Christian orthodoxy has made. 
'Thus it has been established that the New Testament figure of Jesus 
Is much closer to some of the Old Testament figures, and the saving 
significance of both is the bond between them. However, if our 'a 
priori' considerations preclude us from accepting the orthodox statements 
with regard to a transcendent Christology, it is necessary now to ask 
what is the nature of the transcendence which those saving experiences 
can be said to mediate. And here my concern is still with the evidence 
of the Old and New Testaments in general rather than with the specific 
evidence of what the resurrection can be said to confirm in the life 
and teaching of Jesus. I am trying to trace a general pattern within 
the epistemological limits I have set. 
The next step, therefore, is to ask two specific questions. Does 
the Old'Teatament speak of God in any specific contexts? What is the 
nature of the Cod of which it speaks? Already it has been argued that 
the primary` function of the Old Testament figures is the saving purpose 
of God which they proclaim and mediate. However we can take the 
argument a stage further. - Not only do the figures like the Messiah 
and the Son of man bring in the salvation God promises, but God himself 
is known in the context of the experience of salvation which Israel has. 
This prompts H. H. Rowley to say, "For the God of the Old Testament is 
the God of experience and not of speculation. "25 A little later he 
elaborates on this idea: 
"It is true that from time immemorial the ancestors of the Israelites, 
like most other peoples in the world, had taken the existence of some god 
25, The Faith of Israel, H. H. Rowley, p. 48 
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or rods for'grcnted. Cut the faith of the Old Teatament in not based 
on'such a thought. It'is based on the belief that God had played a 
part in Israel's history, and had chosen her for himself, and that he 
had declared his will to her. Ho was the postulate of experience 
rather than of thought. "26 
It is not too'lmuch of a leap of logic to see that the experience 
Rowley speaks of is the experience of salvation. Robert Davidson 
clarifies the point. God is known, not to much through reason and 
thought, but through a mighty act of salvation. 
"There is little doubt that the pivotal event in all Hebrew history 
was the escape of certain Hebrews, under the leadership of Moses, from 
enslavement in Egypt. " 27 "To the Old Testament it is an event in 
which God delivorod those slaves ... It is a mighty act of God. " 20 
Thus when God reveals himself to Moses, he reveals himself not so much 
es a speculative transcendent being, but as the one who will save Israel. 
"Instead of being given a character sketch of God, Moses is given a 
promise, 'I am who I am' or 'I will'be who I will be' i. e. I am the Cod 
who is and who will be active in whatever situations you are called to 
face. On the basis of this experience, Moses interpreted to the people 
the evento of the exodus from Egypt as the mighty act of God. " 29 
Rowley elaborates in a very interesting way something which Davidson 
has hinted at. It is not'so much that Israel experienced her escape 
from Egypt and then interpreted it as a divine act, but rather that 
the oppression of the slaves called out for their liberation, and that 
in, that situation Moses glimpsed the divine potential and purpose. 
"Ills personality was vital to the whole experience of Israel in the 
Exodus. It was not that they experienced deliverance, and then 
somehow believed that God had delivered them, and afterwards through 
meditation on that deliverance evolved a theology. The deliverance was 
first promised before it was achieved, and then interpreted by the man 
who had been vindicated in the deliverance. It was history announced 
in advance in the name of tod, and the prophet who then interpreted it in 
26. ibid., H. N. Rowley, p. 48 
27. The Old Testament, R. Davidson, p. 24 
28. U rd., p. 2 
29. ibid., p. 27 
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retrospect had not completed his prophetic work in the prior announce- 
ment. He continued that work by both interpreting the history and 
directing the response to the deliverance. " 30 
-I shall return to, this point later for it bears close similarity 
to the pattern I , have described of the way our apprehension of 'personal' 
value raises the question of a transcendent validation and vindication. 
However for the moment-suffice it to say that the Old Testament speaks 
of its moot. fundamental knowledge of God in the context of the experience 
of salvation. Thus it-is no mere coincidence that Isaiah summons the 
nations. "turn to me and be saved, all the ends of-the earth) For I am 
God and there is no other. " (Is. 45122) 
31 
Thus in answer to the first question we might say that the out- 
standing events of Israel's history, particularly that of the Exodus, 
are seen as mediating an experience of salvation which is decisive for 
Israel's knowledge of God. This leads us to the next question which 
is concerned with the nature of Cod which is mediated through this 
experience. In moving on to this next stage however it is discovered 
that it ia, not just a separate question, but that Israel's description 
of Cod often reflects her experience of salvation. The character of 
God is the character of one who rescues from injustice and saves-from 
disaster. "Israel believed that Yahweh had chosen her to be his people, 
and her pledge of loyalty to him was her response to his election and 
deliverance of her from Egypt. This is fundamental for the understanding 
of the Old Testament, and here are to be found the seeds of all the great 
30. op. cit., H. N. Rowley, p. 57 
31. Westermann says, "The only thing which leads to this goal is 
invitation, free and open access to the salvation for all the nations on 
earth. " (p. 176, C. Westermann, Isaiah 40-66) It is this reality which 
leads to'the "assent-which springýiom conviction, on the part of those 
who have realised that the only true God is the God of Israel. " (p. 176, 
ibid. ) Jones supports this views "the great word has become in 2 
Isaiah's handling of it fundamentally soteriological in fact close in 
meaning to salvation. 'Salvation is so to speak, the clothing, the 
manifestation of Jehovah's righteousness' (A. B. Davidson). "(p. 522, D. R. 
Jones, 'Isaiah - 11 and III' in Peeke's Commentary, ed. M. Black. ) 
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distinctive principles of its teaching. "32 
This is not to say that the Old Testament speaks of God merely as 
a reflection of Israel's experience. Yahweh is clearly depicted as 
the one who takes the initiative. Nevertheless the epistemological 
pattern is clear. Israel describes God and speaks of him in the 
context of her experience. Yet because in that experience she firmly 
believes that she has encountered one who is transcendent, instead of 
speaking of God merely as a reflection of that experience, she describes 
him in terms of the initiative he has taken, and in terms of that 
experience reflecting a prior plan in the mind of God. 
However ' the' important point here is not-so much to understand the 
fact that there'are examples in the Old Testament which confirm the 
epistemological pattern I have traced, but rather to ask about the 
nature of God which this experience enables the writers of the Old 
Testament to affirm. My aim here is to give the briefest sketch of 
what is an important pattern of thought in the Old Testament. This 
is, simply that the saving experience and the compassionate nature of 
Cod are correlative. For the Old Testament it is because Yahweh is 
compassionate that he saves. From our perspective, seeking to understand 
the epistemological development of the pattern, it seems likely that the 
experience of salvation confirms the fact that we can have knowledge of 
Cod as well as allowing us epistemological access to his nature. From 
the point of view of the Old Testament it is the divine ontology of God's 
compassion which purposes the experience of salvation. From our point 
of view it is the experience of salvation which allows us epistemological 
access to the reality of the divine love. 
But this is to jump the gunl Before we seek to draw our epistemological 
32. op. cit., H. H. Rowley, p. 55 
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conclusions we must look carefully at the Old Testament'evidence. Tho 
obvious piece to begin Euch en examination is with the decisive saving 
event in-Israel's history, that of the Exodus. We have already seen 
that Israel came to know God in a distinctive way through the events 
which surround the Exodus. The culmination of this experience occurs 
in Exodus 33 and 34 at the granting of the covenant. Moses asks to 
see the'-very glory of God. But Yahweh' declines to reveal himself as 
he really is.: Nevertheless Moses is permitted to see something of the 
nature of God. He is instructeds "Take your stand on the rock and when 
my glory passea`by, U will put you in a crevice of the rock and cover 
you with'my hand until I have passed by. Then I will take away my 
hand, and you shall see my back, but my face shall not be seen. " 
(Exodus 33t22ff), ' When God appears he describes himself in these 
terms, "''Jehovah, 'the Lord, a, god compassionate and graciousi long- 
sufferingp ever constant and true ... " (Exodus 34: G). A. T. Hanson 
sees this verse as-the writer's enunciation of what can be known of 
God's glory. At the heart of this realityhe believes to be the phrase 
which he translates, "abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness. " 
This isa translation of the Hebrew words 'hexed' and 'emeth'. "Here 
then is a revelation of God's nature, which is what 'glory' means in 
this context; and at the heart of that revelation is a phrase ... 
translated by the R. S. V. ass "abounding in steadfast love and 
faithfulness. " The Hebrew consists of only three words 'rab hesed we 
"33 emeth'. 
It might however be objected that there is no direct link-between 
the description of the saving experience of the Exodus, and Moses' 
receiving of the covenant. -However as early as Exodus 15113 this 
connection is made. "In thy constant love (hexed) thou hest'led the 
33. Grace and Truth, A. T. Hanson, p. 6 
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people whom thou didat ransom. " In Psalms 107 and 44 this same 
connection is clear and straightforward. The writer of Psalm 107 
describing the terrors of a storm at sea announces, "So they cried 
to, the Lord in their trouble and he brought them out of their distress. " 
(107s2U) Ito continues, "Let them thank the lord for his enduring love, 
and for the marvellous things he has done for me. " (107: 31) Once 
again the Hebrew word for 'enduring love in 'hosed'. The event in 
which the"danger has been dissipated and their safety secured is 
understood to be a divine act. Moreover through this event they have 
knowledge that the essential nature of God is his compassion. Psalm 
4026 sees the same relationship, but this time in the context of a 
plea for help. "Arise and come to our helps for they love's (hosed) 
sake set us free. " In this case what enables this plan is the 
knowledge of God's compassionate natura which previous saving experiences 
34 have revealed. Thus it is to his compassion that the Psalmist prays. 
Love and salvation, transcendence and personal vindication are inseparable 
aspects of the some reality as for as the Hebrew mind is concerned. If 
the experience of salvation speaks at all of the transcendent it speaks 
of its essential compassion and loving kindness. 
Even amidst the stark apocalyptic visions and prophecies of the 
book of Daniel this same pattern is discernible. In spite of the 
portents of-calamity and threats of disastor, Daniel announces, 
"Compassion and forgiveness belong to the Lord our God. " (9s9) The 
next verses go on to describe how Israel has deserved the punishment 
which God has meted out. "In all that he has done the Lord our God 
has been right. " (9114) But then in verve 15, as though provioua 
34. Weiser says, "That love of Cod is the hidden pivot of the whole 
psalm round which tho hymn and the lamentation, the divine redemptive 
work in history as well as man's present temptation, revolve. " (p. 359- 
360, A. Weiser, The Psalms) 
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verses have been in. parenthosie, Daniel oxploine how Israel knows that 
God is compassionate. "And now, 0 Lord our God, who didat bring thy 
people out of Egypt by a strong hand, winning for thyself a name that 
lives on to this day, we have sinned, we have done wrong. 0 Lord, 
by all thy saving deeds we beg that thy wrath and anger may depart 
from Jerusalem, thy city, thy holy hill. " (905ff). Thus although 
the writer does not use 'hosed' teere to describe the divine nature, once 
more it is clear that the knowledge of the nature of God is available 
to us through the events in which his saving purpose has been discerned. 
The fact that the Old Testament writers were led to interpret an event 
as a transcendent act of rescue, means that they were also led to 
understand the essential character of God in that context, and therefore 
as being one of compassion, mercy and tenderness. 
The book. of Jonah, reflecting a tradition in Israel which is not 
that of the mainetrearn, uses the same pattern to give its message an 
ironic twist. 35 we read that although Jonah has been called by God 
to preach a message of judgement on Nineveh, nevertheless, once he has 
predicted it, the Ninevites repent and are saved. "God saw what they 
did and how they abandoned their wicked ways, and he repented and did 
not bring upon them the disaster he threatened. " (3: 10) This event 
of salvation leads Jonah, in his anger, to conclude that he might have 
known that his prophecy would not be fulfilled, because the divine 
nature, confirmed in his saving act, is that of compassion and kindness. 
The writer records; "Jonah was greatly displeased and angry, and he 
prayed to the Lord: 'This, 0 Lord, is what I feared when I was in my 
own country, and to forestall it I tried to escape to Tarshishs I 
knew that thou art a god gracious and compassionate, long suffering and 
35. Grace and Truth, A. T. Hanson, p. 8 
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ever constant, and always willing to repent of the diso3tor. " (4 0 ff. ) 
Here too the saving event and God's compaaoionato nature are correlative. 
It'"is through the act of salvation that Jonah has his knowledge of 
God's nature confirmed, and it is because of God's nature that Ninaveh 
has been saved. This is the process by which we have access to the 
transcendent ontology. The irony hero is that Jonah, like Israel, 
having experienced God's salvation, and as a result knowing of his 
compassion, should not understand that God's saving purpose extends 
beyond Israel precisely because of the love which Israel had experienced, 
and which had been decisive for its constitution as a nation. 
There is a further insight into this pattern in the book of Hoses. 
The correlation we have noticed is clearly apparent in II: I: "When 
Israel was a boy I loved him; I called my son out of Egypt. "36 The 
saving act is a manifestation of the divine love. For Hosea, however, 
this act, and the loving relationship are the basis upon which the 
prophet chides the people. The saving compassion of God acts as a 
paradigm of the way in which Israel himself should behave. But the 
nation has been heedless of God's love. They have rebelled against 
him. "I have cared for Ephraim, and I have not neglected Israel; 
but now Ephraim has played the wanton and Israel has defiled himself. " 
(5: 3) What is interesting is the charge which Yahweh brings against 
the people. "There is no good faith, or mutual trust ('emeth' and 
'hexed'), no knowledge of God in the land. " (4: 1) Not only does the 
saving act of God establish the covenant based on God's love, but it 
allows Hosea to equate compassion and kindness with the actual character 
and reälity of God. The saving act allows us to know that compassion 
is God's essential nature and that is expressed essentially in a relation. 
36. cf. James Mays: "Coth the Knowledge of Yahweh and Israel's unique 
relation to him were created in the event of Israel's rescue from Egypt. " (p. 153, James Mays, thsea) Hecpeson, "Exodus, the basic element in 
Israel's credo, is trans ated into a metaphor which clothes the event 
with all the feeling and personal involvement that belong to a father's 
relation to a beloved child. " (p. 153 ibid., ) 
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Later on in chapter 6: 6 the same equation is mad©j "1 deairo steadfast 
love and not'©acrifice, the knowledge of Cod rather than burnt 
offerings. 1137 
These two questions concerning the way the Old Testament speaks of 
God yield two interesting answers. There is a clearly identifiable 
pattern. This is not to claim that it is exclusive, or even dominant. 
However I would suggest that it is important. In the first place the 
Old Testament often speaks about God specifically in a context of his 
saving acts. Secondly it is often through these savipg-acta that it, 
offers us access to human knowledge of the essential reality of God, 
that of his love. Moreover the Hebrew words which have cropped up 
with regular frequency are those of 'hexed' and 'eneth'. 
The divine salvation and the divine love form an important constituent 
in what the Old Testument wishes to tell us about God. However there 
are other aspects of the divine nature whirl are themselves part of the 
pattern I have described. The God who saves Israel can not only be 
known to be essentially loving and compassionate, he is also known to 
be transcendent and the creator of the world. This is illustrated clearly 
in the Exodus passage we quoted. While Yahweh reveals himself to Moses 
as "the Lord, a god compassionate and gracious" (34: 6) at the same time 
37. Maya says, "The knowledge of God is the unqualified response to 
Yahweh as he was revealed in the Exodus and wilderness and the obedience 
which hears and obeys his instruction. It: is, therefore, a knowing 
which becomes a state of boing. Yahweh wants community with Israel 
through loyalty and love instead of sacrificial meals. " (p. 98, James 
Mays, Hosea). lianson, however, goes beyond Maya, for he suggests 
that ti s erminolocgy in Hosea not only expresses the human side of 
the covenant but the actual divine initiative which established the 
covenant. Mays himself says "Hosed denotes the attitude and activity 
which founds and maintains a re ion. " (p. 63, ibid. ) So Hanson 
asserts, "A Weiser well comments: 'God demands a life which is in 
accordance with his own life. " It is very significant that one of 
the first of the groat prophets should single out hesed and emeth as 
sure indications of God's character. " (p. 7, A. T. Hanson, Geace and Truth) 
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Mp3gs is told, "My face you cannot seat for no mortal mori may see me 
end live. ",. (33t20) . God cannot be known by man in the some way as an 
abject in the world. 
This notion is expressed with power in Deutero-Isaiah. The 
prophet asks, "What likeness will you find for God? " (40: 18) The 
God of Israel, we are told, is a transcendent God. tie cannot be 
contained in, or depicted by an image made of costly silver or of 
wood carved by a skilful carpenter. And yet this is the God who has 
saved Israel. This mighty Lord, omnipotent and incomprehensible, has 
chosen Israel as his servant, established a relationship of intimacy 
with the people, and rescued them from their enemies with gentleness. 
"But you, Israel my servant, 
you, Jacob whom I have chosen, 
race of Abraham gay friend, 
I have taken you up, 
have fetched you from the ends of the earth, ... I have called you my servant, 
have chosen you and not cast you off: 
fear nothing for I am with your 
be not afraid, for I am your God. 
I strengthen you, I help you, 
I support you with my victorious right hand. " (Is. 41: ff). 
Thus not, only is love the correlate or salvation, so also is the divine 
transcendence in the Old Testament understanding of God. Isaiah 43: 10 
speaks explicitly in these terms: 
"Before me there was no god fashioned 
nor over shall be after me. 
I am the Lord, I myself, 30 and none but I can deliver# 
In Deutero-Isaiah also the concept of God as creator is linked with 
these same concepts. The transcendent God who saves is the God who 
creates. The God "who opened a way in the sea and a path through the 
38, "God's unique being is not based on theoretical conaidarations, but 
on Israel's actual experience. God has proved himself to be the only 
saviour; and if in the future anyone can help, it can only be he. " 
(p. 124, Westermann, Isaiah 40-66) 
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mighty waters", (43: 16) is he "who created the skies and stretched 
them out, who fashioned the earth and all that grows in it. " (42: 5) 
Here too the knowledge of God as creator does not come through 
rational speculation, nor even, it seems, does it come through direct 
revelation, but rather through the experience of being saved by a 
gracious transcendent God. The ontology of the creative power and 
act of God is mediated through an epistemology of salvation. This 
seems to be the most likely explanation of how Israel came to proclaim 
Yahweh as creator of-the world. , In Psalm 148, for example, which is 
a hymn to the creator God, we find that in the end this transcendent 
creator is none other than the God who has rescued and exalted Israel 
with his powers 
"Praise the Lord from the earth, ... 
all mountaino and hills; ... 
wild beasts and cattle ... 
. 
kings and all earthly rulers ... Let all praise the name of the Lord 
for his name is high above all others, 
and hie majesty above earth and heaven; 
he has exalted his people in the pride of power 
and crowned with praise his loyal servants 
all Israel, the people nearest to him. " (Pa. 148: 7ff. )39 
It seems that here is a central nerve of the Old Testament when we 
speak of Cod in terms of salvation, compassion, transcendence and 
creation. And at the centre of these concepts lies that of salvation. 
The evidence I have cited supports the verdict of H. N. Rowley cited 
above. "Israel believed that Yahweh had chosen her to be his people, 
and her pledge of loyalty to him was her response to his election and 
deliverance of her from Egypt. This is fundamental for the understandiny 
of the Old Testament; and here are to be found the seeds of all the great 
39. Weiser comments, "This tremendous vision of God and of the world 
has found expression in the magnificent architectural structure of the 
psalm: starting with the heaven (vv. 1-6), the call to praise God 
descends to the earth (vv. 7-10), then turns to mankind (vv. 11-13) and 
ends (vv. 13,14) with the community of God's people in whose midst the 
divine salvation which is the cause and the theme of the hymn became 
visible and actual. " (p. 837, A. Weiser, The Psalms) 
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distinctive principles of its teaching* 040 
So for I have merely isolated a pattern of thought in the Old 
Testament which speaks of God and his salvation. The people of Israel 
experience the saving act of Cod when they escape from slavery in Egypt. 
This salvation is the work of a loving and transcendent Cod. It is 
this Cod who made the world. 
But what has this ontology to do with the epistemological model 
which I have attempted to construct? So far I have only hinted at a 
possible answer to this question. The Old Testament message seems 
very remote from the way I have spoken. The pattern I have described 
in earlier chapters begins with the 'a priori' value we discover in 
ourselves and others as 'persons'. This raises the question of whether 
'personal' worth is ultimately grounded in a transcendent reality. For 
it seems that it cannot be satisfactorily explained in the context of a 
world of objects. I have gone on to suggest that for many people 
specific events, whether historical or aesthetic, are capable of 
providing the experience of this 'personal' dimension being validated 
or vindicated. Moreover I have suggested that, at least at first 
sight, the language of the New Testament concerning the resurrection of 
Jesus can be viewed from this perspective. 
The difficulty is that the Old Testament speaks at the level of 
a metaphysical ontology with complete security. The idea of God is 
presupposed with supreme confidence. Our 'modern' apprehension, on 
the other hand, is one of acute epistemological insecurity when we 
speak of Cod. We are. highly sensitive of the fact that such a concept 
may have no grounding in reality, and, that the traditional attempts to 
provide it with such a grounding are for the most part deemed to have 
been unsuccessful. Clearly it is not going to be easy to relate the two 
40. op. cit. H. N. Rowley, p. 55 
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ways of thinking. 
And yet it is possible to see that there is a point of contact. 
Both patterns speak of an experience of salvation. However it might 
be asked how one can be sure that the word 'salvation' can be 
legitimately applied to the different circumstances of each pattern. 
It is not an easy word to handle because it has very specific 
theological and even evangelical connotations. But the use I shall 
make of it does not involve the need to delve into the history of 
the use of the'word. I am understanding it here in a minimal sense. 
Salvation,, according to this use, is the experience of 'personal' 
value being validated. It is the experience which claims that 
'personal worth' receives transcendent vindication. 
Such a manner of speaking, I have argued, makes sense in the 
context of a contemporary epistemology. Moreover this is clearly the 
least that can be said about the experience of the Jews when they 
escaped from slavery in Egypt. 
"The Lord is my refuge and my defence, 
he has shown himself my deliverer. " (Exodus 15: 2) 
The experience of Israel is one of being rescued when their 'personal' 
safety and identity is being threatened. Their honour and worth is 
confirmed and even transformed. 
"But he led out his own people like sheep 
and guided them like a flock in the wilderness. 
Ne led them in safety and they were not afraid. " (Psalm 78: 52) 
They have a sense of security and dignity. Here is'an event which is 
interpreted as an act of God. But it is also understood in terms of 
the upholding and confirming of the value which the community of Israel 
had invested and discovered re-created in itself. It is possible 
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therefore to coo a certain similarity between the experiences of the 
validation of a transcendent ontology which this epistemological 
enquiry sought to establish as a proper question and concept, and 
the experience of Cod as described in the Old Testament story of the 
Exodus. The term 'salvation' is a convenient way to describe the 
experience in both contexts. 
If it is legitimate to argue that there is a point of contact in 
what I have chosen to call the 'saving' experience, then it is possible 
to see that the divine correlate of the experience in the Old Testament 
story is comprehensible not only in its own context, but also in the 
context of a 'modern' asking about the nature of the transcendent 
ontology confirmed in our contemporary experience. However before I 
turn to ask about what can be said about the nature of the transcendent 
on the basis of the experience of 'salvation', it is important to look 
at the quality and character of the experience. The Old Testament 
describes it in terms of the needs of the hungry and thirsty being 
met, the prisoner being brought out of the darkness of hie prison, the 
sailor being saved from the raging see. (Psalm 107) It is an 
experience of having ones life saved, one's identity confirmed, and of 
'personal' worth being discovered, or discovered anew. Thus it is in 
the light of this quality of experience that the Psalmist can ask God 
with confidence to restore him to 'honour', to turn and 'comfort' him. 
(Psalm 71s21). " The Old Testament experience of salvation is one of 
being loved and cared for. Now this pattern is not unique to the 
Psalmist. 1'Ihenever human beings find themselves 'honoured' and 
"comforted' they can speak with legitimacy of compassion and care. 
This is what compassion and caring mean. The Psalmist is describing a 
universal dimension of human experience. 
It seems that in the Old Testament experience of salvation two 
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things coma together: its transcendent nature and its essential quality 
of-love and compassion. ' floreover it seams highly likely that it is 
because of this that in the passages I have quoted, the Old Testament 
writers describe the essential nature of God as his compassion and 
kindness (hesod we'emeth). Thus, even in the'contextlof our 
contemporary scepticism concerning the validity of a metaphysic, if it 
is legitimate to ask whether human worth is ultimately grounded in a 
transcendent reality, then it is equally legitimate to claim, with 
the Psalmist, that when our worth is upheld, and transformed in some 
way, then it is because a transcendence which is ultimately gracious 
has been encountered. In the context of an epistemology which sees 
'personal' worth as providing possible access to the transcendent, it 
is valid to speak of the vindication of that worth in terms of a 
transcendent reality which is characterised by gracious love. In this 
sense it is not unreasonable for someone who has inherited our 
contemporary cultural presuppositions and scepticism to echo the 
exhortation of the Psalmist 'to thank the Lord for his enduring love. ' 
(10718) Thus I conclude that what at first sight might appear to be 
an ontology-which belongs to a different culture, is in fact built 
upon an epistemology of salvation which can not only be understood by 
the sceptic, but is in fact capable of universal apprehension and 
recognition. 
According to this analysis therefore there is an ontological pattern 
in the Old Testament which reflects a notable similarity to the 
epistemological framework this study has tried to build up. However 
a further examination of the Old Testament material already. considered 
allows us to decipher, beneath the ontological exterior, two other 
characteristics which cohere with that framework. Just as, according 
to my previous suggestions, speaking of salvation can make most sense 
in the context of the 'personal' i. e. the question of the origin of 
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'pornonal' worth and the experience of its validation, so in the Old 
Testament, the experience of salvation very often reflects similar 
value questions. 
"I have indeed seen the misery of my people in Egypt. 
1 have heard their outcry against their slave masters. " Exodus 3: 7ýý 
fiere the Old Testament presents us with an ontology of God's perspective 
on Israel's plight. In that sense we have no right to suggest that 
what is really reflected here is Israel's own apprehension of her 
plight. Nevertheless it is possible to argue that Israel could not 
have spoken of her escape as an act of divine salvation, unless there 
was a prior awareness of threat and danger to the 'personal' security 
of the community. From this perspective it is legitimate to conclude 
that what was spoken of as the divine validation emerged from the very 
question of 'personal' worth which I have argued allows us access to 
the divine ontology. This aspect of the epistemological pattern I 
have argued for in surely implicit therefore in the Old Testament 
ontology although it is not spelled out in these terms. 
In the same way, in the book of Daniel belief in a blessed life 
after death (12: 2) is expressed against the background of the question 
of the 'worth' of the lives of those who had been prepared to die in 
obedience to their beliefs. We can also see that it is reflected in 
a different sense in the prophetic warnings. Amos turns on Israel in 
a bitter attack on both its religion and society. 
41. Thus, Stalker, "Just as Moses had gone into action when he saw 
oppression (2: 11-14,16ff), so now it is the 'affliction of his people' 
that moves God to intervene and 'come down'.... flows would thus 
find his own outlook and impulses justified and powerfully reinforced. 
But there is more to it than that. Right at the very creation of the 
national life, and as the reason for the coming into being of: this new 
stage in God's dealings with Israel, and so with mankind, is set the 
concern for justice and the hatred of oppression which runs through 
the whole of the O.. T. " (p. 212, D. M. C. Stalker, Exodus', Peake's 
Commentary, ed. M. Black. ) 
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. "Linton to this, 
you cows of ßashan who live on the hill of Samaria, 
you rho oppress the poor and crush the doatitute. " (4: 1) 
Amos' complaint is that the religion and society of the land does 
not echo the basic values which the saving act of God had vindicated. 
"Listen, Israelites, to these words that the Lord addressee to 
you, to the whole nation which he brought up from Egypt: 
For you alone have I cared 
among all the nations of the world. " (3: 1) 
The correlate of salvation, as has been seen from the previous examples, 
is 'personal' worth. Thus, where that 'worth' is neglected, the whole 
validity of their religion, and their cultural values is undermined. 
42 
The future salvation, which they believe their election guarantees, is 
a dangerous illusion. There can be no salvation where the 'a priori' 
basis of its recognition is denied. My point is simply that while 
the Old Testament does not derive its message of divine salvation from 
human need and values, nevertheless those needs and values are pre- 
supposed in Israel's recognition of what God has done. And in that 
sense the epistemological starting point I have argued for is implicit 
in the Old Testament ontology of divine salvation. 
There is an addition a second characteristic which emerges on further 
. arolysia'of the Old Testament ontology. The examination of the 
salvation experience in the passages quoted has yielded a two-fold 
knowledge of the nature of God. The passage in Exodus 33: 19ff spoke 
of God in terms of his compauuion and his transcendence. However, if 
we look more closely at the concept of transcendence, it is clear that 
42. James Maya, commentating on Hosea 4: 2, underlines this points 
"Social ethics and theological orthodoxy are inextricably interdependent. 
An Israelite was faithless to God in acting against the rights of his 
brother. And in maintaining the fabric of the social order an 
Israelite was showing faithfulness, devotion and the knowledge of God. " 
(p. 65, J. Maya, Hosea) 
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it does not have the name characteristics as other ontological claims. 
To say that God ia-transcendent is not telling us what God in like. 
Rather is it. telling us that our knowledge is not only limited, but 
essentially so. 
43 This means that the Old Testament claim that God 
is both compassionate and essentially transcendent is tantamount to 
saying that the essence of the human relationship with God is one of 
faith, and that faith is a dynamic response to the divine love. 
44 
Seen in this light the Old Testament ontology of the divine 
transcendence is the mirror image of the epistemological limitation 
which it has been claimed here is a necessary element in human language 
about God. 
It is possible therefore to see in the Old Testament, without 
violating the evidence it offers, an ontological pattern of salvation 
which reflects and supports the epistemology sketched in previous 
chapters. . 'Personal' worth and value invite the confirmation of a 
divine-grounding for themselves. When this is apprehended it is only 
possible to speak of lt in terms of a compassion which can be comprehended 
through faith alone. Clearly the Old Testament does not stop at this 
43. Vriezen says, "The Word of God in the Old Testament starts from 
God. God is, as it were, behind that word and is described in His 
activity in history, His desire to man's salvation, His spiritual virtues 
of goodness, righteousness, truth, mercy, grace (c. f. Exod. xxxiv. 6) but 
not in His Being in itself, which remains hidden. " (p. 129, T. C. Vriezen, 
An Outline of Old Testament Theology) 
44. A little earlier Vriezen has said, "This Knowledge of God is 
essentially a communion with Cod, and it is also religious faith. 
It is something altogether different from intellectual Knowledge. " 
(p. 128 ibid. )s he continues "The Knowledge of God does not imply a 
theory about the nature of Cod, it is not ontological, but existential. " 
(p. 129 bid. ) While the first point hero echoes what I have said, clearly 
the second does not. However I think it is illegitimate to suggest 
that an existential Knowledge rules out the question of ontology. After 
all faith is just as much interested in what is or is not the case as is 
intellectual Knowledge, and it must not be assumed that for faith to be 
faith it must not or cannot be intellectually or ontologically justified. 
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point for it telle of God thinking, speaking and acting in the history 
of humanity and through the lives of men and women. Nevertheless 
while it in possible to understand how this came to be it does not 
invalidate the' epistemological pattern I have traced beneath the 
surface. For the same reason it does not invalidate the 'no entry' 
sign I have placed to a contemporary attempt to speak of God's being 
beyond an ontology of faith's activity in love. In short there is 
an-impressive correlation between what I have argued is a legitimate 
contemporary access from human epistemology to a transcendent ontology 
via the 'personal', and the implicit epistemology in a specific pattern 
which the Old Testament uses to describe its apprehension of the 
divine salvation. 
Thus far this analysis of the Biblical concept of salvation has 
revealed two interesting points. First of all, the figure of Jesus 
in the New Testament, although distinctive, is closer than might be 
thought to specific Old Testament figures. And the link is the saving 
function they all perform. Secondly, beneath the Old Testament ontology 
of salvation lies an epistemology which could very easily be adapted 
to satisfy the criteria which a contemporary theological epistemology 
demands. In this sense we might say that there is in the Old 
Testament a ready-made and accessible epistemology of salvation which 
the resurrection of Jesus could be said to confirm. The religious and 
cultural milieu out of which the resurrection claim emerges has the 
'personal' and the 'ealvific' at its centre. 
However it is possible to go a stage further. For there is 
evidence in the New Testament itself to suggest that both John and Paul 
see the resurrection as confirmation of precisely this pattern of 
salvation understood as faith's activity in love. This is surprising 
in the sense that, as has already been seen, the most explicit text 
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expressing the doctrine of the incarnation is to be found in John's 
gospel, where the writer announces, "So the Word became flesh, " 
(1: 14) tiara is not only to be found the classic otatement of the 
incarnation, but the guarantee of the distinctiveness of Christianity. 
Unlike all other religions Christianity proclaims that God became man 
in Jesus Christ, and this event, and only, this event, is decisive for 
our salvation. Without it humanity has no hope. 
45 However in that 
very same verse the writer of John's gospel continues: "he came to 
dwell among us, and we saw his glory, such glory as befits the Father's 
only Son, full of grace and truth. " (1: 14) We have already seen that 
the prologue of John's gospel, while it speaks as explicitly as any New 
Testament text of the divinity of Jesus, does so in the context of the 
salvation which is offered through faith in him. tiara however there 
is a striking correspondence with the Old Teetament material we have 
studied. For the Greek words that are translated 'grace and truth' 
are generally agreed by scholars to echo the Hebrew 'hosed we lemethl 
which occur so often in the Old Testament to describe the compassion 
and loving kindness of God. Commenting on this and subsequent verses 
A. T. Hanson says: 
"We have here a remarkable emphasis on 'grace and truth' as 
rovealed'. in Jesus Christ, a reference to the law given on Sinai 
by the mediation of Moses, and a mysterious insistence that no man 
has ever seen God. There is in the Old Testament one passage where 
all these elements come together, and, as I believe, wo can only 
fully understand what John is saying when we read what he has to 
say in the light of that passage. It is to Exodus 34 that we must 
turn if we are to pursue John's reference. " 46 
45. C. K. Barrett says, "... John's statement is a full, and perhaps 
the most succinct, expression of the paradox of the person of Christ. " 
(p. 133, C. K. Barrett, The Gos el According to St. John), C. tl. Dodd 
says, "The following versa, in which we reach te climax of the 
Prologue with the words ö Aoyoc co ircvcrb takes us beyond the 
range of Jewish ideas and we shall not expoct anything in the way of 
Old Testament documentation, " (p. 271, C. 11. Dodd, The Interpretation of 
the Fourth Gospel), 
46. Grace and Truth, A. T. Hanson, p. 5 
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lie goes on to draw the following conclusion from what he ceea as 
a quite deliberate comparison made by John with this passage in Exodus 
to which we have already made reference. ` 
"At any rate his (the gospel writer's) intention is clear; 
the same God who showed himself to Moses at the giving 
of the law has now manifested himself in Jesus Christ and 
can be recognised as manifesting the same essential 
characteristics grace and truth, or better still love and 
faithfulness. " 47 
It seems therefore that in this text, far from offering a totally 
distinctive Christological ontology, John tells us that the salvation 
that is offered in Christ is possible because the true nature of God 
which was-revealed in the Old Testament has been fully and completely 
demonstrated in terms of compassion and loving kindness. The Old 
Testament epistemology is made perfect in the New Testament. It is 
therefore not a new epistemology. And there would seem to be no 
reason why it should demand new categories in order that it might be 
fully expressed. 
In addition there is yet a further comparison which this text 
invites. The passage in Exodus yielded a twofold knowledge of the 
nature of God: his compassion and his transcendence. Strikingly this 
emphasis on transcendence is reflected in the Johannino prologue also. 
The passage ends with the verse, "No one has ever seen God; but God's 
only Son, he who is nearest to the Father's heart, he has made him 
known. " (1: 18) We are not only told that the significance of Jesus 
is to reveal the divine compassion, but that the Cod whom Jesus reveals 
is transcendent. Here, then, in a passage where the equation between 
47. C. K. Barrett picks up this point but does not underline it or 
elaborate it: "This revelation arises out of the faithfulness of God 
to hin own character, and to his promises, of which it is the 
fulfilment. " (p. 139, C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John) 
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Jesus and God is all but stated, the actual logic of the Johannine 
epistemology points away from that equation specifically in the 
direction of the same ontology we discovered in the Old Testament: 
that of faith's activity in love. It might even be possible to 
speculate that the very last phrase of the prologue actually hinto 
at the conclusion wo have outlined: that the decisiveness of Jesus 
is not to be understood so much in ontological categories, but rather 
seen as an epistemological decisiveness. The significance of Jesus 
is to make God 'known' i. e. he has revealed decisively that salvation 
only comes through faith's activity in love. 
Moreover it is not the case that these few verses are exceptional 
in a gospel which speaks unambiguously of the divinity of Jesus and 
has that claim at the centro of its mesauye. It is true that the 
equation is made not only in the texts referred to above, but also, 
for example, in the It am' sayings where the Creek expression 'ego eimi' 
echoes the divine name in Hebrew. But it is also true that Jesus' 
claims to unity with God are matched by claimo of his dependence on God. 
"I am not myself the source of the words I speak to you: it is the 
Father who dwells in me doing his own work. " (14: 10) Earlier in the 
gospel Jesus has claimed, "In truth, in very truth I tell you, the Son 
can do nothing by himself; he does only what he sees the Father doing: 
what the Father does the Son does. " (5: 19) Indeed it might be said 
that the whole purpose of this extraordinary ontology in John's gospel 
is to point to the ontology of love itself in which Jesus, the Father 
and the believer are bound together in a unity. "As the father has 
loved may so I have loved you. Dwell in my love. If you heed my 
commands you will dwell in my love, as I have heeded my Father's commands 
and dwell in his love. " (15: 9) Here then is further evidence to suggest 
that the function of the Chrirtological ontology in John's gospel is 
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to expreaa the decisiveness of faith's activity in love for human 
salvation. 
48 
It would demand a much more detailed analysis than thero is room 
for in this study to explore the claim that we might draw the same 
conclusion from Paul's letters. Nevertheless there is certainly some 
evidence to support the claim. There is a striking statement in 
Galatians 5: 6 where Paul says, "If we are in union with Christ Jesus 
circumcision makes no difference at all, nor does the want of it; the 
only thing that counts is faith active in love. " Bornkamm, commenting 
on this verse says, "This describes the all-embracing importance of 
faith as entirely determinate of man's whole existence. "49 lie is 
40. Although the commentators do not draw the Christological conclusions 
of this study, it is surprising how clearly they bear witness to (a) 
that what is being described here is a divine ontology of love itself 
and (b) how some go on to spell that ontology out more clearly in terms 
of faith's activity in love. 
So Raymond Brown says, ".... certainly the theme of love is more strongly 
developed in 9ff, than anywhere also in the Gospel, and wo are very 
close to the motives of John. " (p. 680, R. Brown, The Gospel According to 
St. John. He continues, "Dibelius observes that love is not ta question 
of unity of will existing by virtue of an affcctivo relationship but a 
unity of being by virtue of a divine quality. " (p. 681, ibid. ) 
C. H. Dodd moves further and explains the passage. in terms of a dynamic 
ontology of faith's activity in love: "This in turn is construed in 
terms of divine oc c7''1 , which exists eternally in perfect mutuality between rather and 
Son, 
is manifested dynamically towards men in Christ's 
oolf-offering, And is returned by them in trust and obedience towards 
Him and in charity towards one another. " (p. 398, C. H. Dodd, The 
Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel) 
Bu mann too speaks of a similar dynamic ontology: "The believers' 
relationship to the Revealer is analogous to the relationship of the 
latter to the rather: it is indeed grounded in it. And this 
relationship is not a metaphysical communion of substance, nor. is it a 
mystical relationship of love; what makes him the Revealer is the 
being of the rather for him, and his being for the rather is fulfilled 
in his obedient work as the Revealer. So too the believer's obedience 
is to correspond to the service which they have received from him. And 
only then. havo they really received this service, when they "keep his 
commandments", which in foct is only one commandment, the commandment 
of love (v. 12); when his being for them becomes the authoritative 
low of their life. " (p. 541, Bultmann, The Gospel of John) 
49, Paul, Q. Börnkamm, p. 153 
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quick to point out that 'love' here is used by Paul not to refer 
primarily to the human capacity to love, but rather to the transcendent 
nature-of love no revealed in Christ. Elaborating on thin idea in a 
comment on the famous passage in I Corinthians 13, ßornknmm argues 
"It is more than poetic convention that makes Paul speak here of love 
itself and not the loving man as the subject. He conceives love as 
a divine power. Its workings ore net in complete contrast to the 
natural man's acts and go far beyond what he can ever achieve . 1,50 
Of course what has made this possible is the death and resurrection of 
Jesus. Faith's activity in love, and the hymn to love in I 
Corinthians 13 are only comprehensible becauoe of what Jesus has done. 
"Yet faith is based on one thing and one alone, what God did in Christ, 
and what Christa lordship makes available for men. This alone makes 
faith what it is. "51 
Nevertheless, in spite of the transcendent Christological ontology 
which is undoubtedly present in Paul, it is possible to ace at the heart 
of Paul's theology an epistemology of salvation which derives its 
distinctive character from the contrast between salvation through 
strict obedience to the law as conceived by the contemporary Judaism 
which he had embraced with such devotion, and thu salvation which he had 
experienced through faith whose sole correlate was grace. In this 
sense we might argue that the moot fundamental ontology of all, even 
for Paul, is faith's activity in love. "The only thing that counts 
is faith-active in love. " 
It may be that Bornkamm, because of theological presuppositions we 
shall explore below, stresses unnecessarily the contrast between the 
divine love and human love. Perhaps the logic of his comments more 
5Q, ibid., G. E3ornkamm, p. 2113 
51. ibid., G. Bornkemm, p. 154 
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properly loads hiw to the conclusion that fcr Paul the ultimate reality 
is Codle love, and the figure of Christ is decisive not so rauch in the 
tolal distinctiveness of the quality of hin love, but rather in the 
fact that the evento of'the cross and resurrection provide us with 
-Odeeiuivet access to thin love. Thus in a pausage like Romane 13: 39 
(".. ': 'nothing in all creation can separate us from the love of God in 
Christ Jesus our Lord. ") the love of God is the substantive reality, 
and, the figure of Christ is edverbiel in the sense that it tells us 
how we an have knowled(le of Cods love. 
52 Of course this is not to 
say that Paul would have understood the distinction we are seeking to 
make: It-is rather to suggest that in a context where a revised 
epistemology of salvation is called for, it would not be illegitimate 
to use the Pauline material in this way. In short the epistemological 
pattern argued for is not as alien to Paul's thought as it might at 
first sight appear. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of'thu model in tha New 
Te3tuticnt occurs in I John 40f f. 
mother, ' because love is from Gad. 
"Dear friends, let us love one 
Everyonewho loves is u child or 
God and knows'God, but the, unloving know nothing of Cod, for Cod is 
love; and his love was disclosed to us in this, that he sent his only 
on into the world to brirul us lire. The love I speak of iss not nur 
love, fur God, but the'love he slowed to us in'senditqhis Son as the 
remedy for the defilement of our sines... Though God has never been 
seen by any man, God himself dwells in us if we love one another; his 
love is brought to perfection within us. " 
Indeed this passage could well be described on, a blue-print for 
the pattern of the- oaving relation of God to humanity which I have tried 
52. So Barrett, "In Christ Jesus, God is for us; and it is in Christ 
Jesus that we know him and trust him. " (p. 1 . K. Barrett, The 
Epistle to the Romans) 
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to trace in both the Old and New Testaments. We have the event and 
experience of salvation. Christ was 'sent into the world to bring us 
lifeq.. This event provides us with knowledge of the essential nature 
of God. It discloses his love.. At the same time this cove is not 
simply a human quality or characteristic. It comes from God and is 
essentially transcendent. There is an almost uncanny echo of John 1: 18 
in verse 12 when the writer asserts "... Cod has never been seen by any 
man... " Thus the disclosure of Christ provides us with knowledge of 
the ultimate ontology, faith's activity in love. Through faith we 
do have knowledge of God, and by loving others we actually participate 
in the divine reality. 
It might be argued from this evidence that it is possible to 
discover in the New Testament an ontology of salvation which echoes and 
represents a pattern of thought which I have traced in the Old Testament. 
Moreover it has already been seen that beneath this Old Testament message 
of salvation there lies an epistemological framework which bears close 
resemblance to the model I have described earlier which operates on an 
axis of 'personal' worth which experiences transcendent saving validation. 
Thus it might. be said that the New Testament message of salvation can 
best communicate-itself today in the way it reflects this Old Testament 
framework, i. e.. the Christ event provides us with access to an ontology 
of faith's response to the divine love. In short this Old Testament 
ontology is in fact a more profound insight into the Easter experience 
than the orthodox ontology of the Incarnation and the two natures of 
Christ. 
However such an interpretation of the Christian message of salvation 
clearly distorts totally the New Testament's own way of understanding 
itself and its message. The essence of the New Testament claim is 
that it fulfils and supersedes the Old Testament. However although 
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that'fact is irrelevant in terms of the criteria for a contemporary 
epistemology 'of salvation sat out at the beginning of this chapter, 
it is possible, using our epistemological insights, to see why the New 
Testament saw itself in such a way, without seeking to return to its 
own'moro limited and intrinsically unacceptable ontology. 
In the Old testament the axis of 'personal' worth and divine 
transcendence is seen in the context of the saving event. The Exodus, 
the return from exile and the victory of the Maccabees are all seen as 
transcendent history. What is different in the New Testament is that 
the transcendent event has become a 'person'. It is true that the 
life death and resurrection of Jesus are seen as part of the divine 
activity, ýbut they are more than this, for in Jesus God is believed to 
have expressed himself 'without remainder'. What is interesting is 
that in the terms of the epistemological pattern I have argued for a 
short circuit has occurred. For here 'personal' worth discovers its 
correlate in a 'person'. Moreover we can see how this occurs for 
example in John 14: lff. It is appropriate to quote the section in full: 
"Set your troubled hearts at rest. Trust in God always; trust 
also in me. There are many dwelling-places in my Father's house; 
if it were not so I should have told you; for I am going there 
-on, purpoae-to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare 
a place for you, I shall come again and receive you to myself, 
"so, that where I am you may be also; and my way there is known 
to you. Thomas said, 'Lord, we do not know where you are going, 
so how can we know the way? ' Jesus replied, 'I am the way; I 
am the truth and I am the life; no one comes to the Father except 
by me. " 
'If you knew me you would know my Father too. From now on you 
do know him; you have seen him. ' Philip said to him, 'Lord, show 
us the Father and we ask no more. ' Jesus answered, 'Have I been 
all this time with you, Philip, and you still do not know me? 
Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father. "' 
Needless to say our analysis of this passage and any conclusions 
we draw from it do not presuppose any literal historical reliability. 
Nevertheless the passage does have both a historical and a dramatic 
setting. The scene is the night of the betrayal and the arrest of Jesus. 
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Its context-is the anxiety of spirit which overwhelms the disciples. 
The figure of Jesus therefore begins by reassuring them. Clearly in 
the minds of the disciples is the anticipation of some event. The 
drama has reached its climax, and it is not clearwhat is to happen. 
Will-Cad intervene, and establish the authority of Jesus as his Messiah? 
Peter has already offered to die, if necessary, for the cause. Jesus 
seeks-to assuage their anxiety, and tells them that he is going to 
prepare a place for them, -and they know the way. Thomas does not 
understand; and expresses his disquiet. He asks to be shown the way. 
At this point the transcendent event which they are anticipating 
becomes 'person'. "I am the way", replies Jesus. 
In the next verse Jesus assures them that because they have seen 
him they have seen the Father. The divine event they are anticipating 
has already presented itself to them. In this case it is Philip who 
does not understand. He says, 'Show us the Father. ' This prompts 
the reply of Jesus, 'Anyone who has seen me, has seen the Father. ' 
The saving event which the disciples look and long for has become a 
saving 'person'. The 'personal' anxieties which seek a transcendent 
event as their resolution are offered that resolution in the form of a 
person. The disclosure is presented by the writer in such a way that 
when the 'personal' quest receives this 'personal# answer the decisive 
access to faith which has hitherto not yet been fully revealed is made 
crystal and transparently clear. 
, 
At this point it is possible to distinguish between the ontological 
claims of the New Testament, and the epistemological point I have been 
seeking to establish. It may be that the epistemological insight I 
am arguing for is more explicitly presented, and more consciously offered 
than is generally understood. However it is not the purpose of this 
study to enquire how far that is the case. Two points however require 
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clarification. The fact is that the New Testament does make the 
jump from divine 'event' to divine 'person'. Perhaps the nearest the 
Old Testament comes to fusing leaving' event with 'saving' person is 
the figure of the Servant in those passages in Detitero-Isaiah which 
are often referred to as the Servant Songs. Certainly this figure 
had an enormous importance for the New Testament writers for a number 
of them identify Jesus with the Servant. 
53 It may even have influenced 
Jesus' own understanding of his role. 
54 However in the Old Testament 
context alone the Servant remains a mysterious and shadowy figure. 
His identity is not established. Ne is certainly not a transcendent 
figure in the New Testament sense, and his 'personal' significance is 
overshadowed by the 'new' event of Cod's rescue of Israel. However 
in the New Testament the act of God, it seems, does progressively become 
the 'person' of God in the figure of Jesus. This is a concept which 
is developed and worked out in increasing detail and complexity throughout 
the history of the Early Church, beginning with the New Testament 
material itself. 
At the same time the epistemological pattern of 'personal' value 
being confirmed and validated in an ontology of 'faith's activity in 
love' is implicit in the New Testament material examined here. Moreover 
in the example I have just quoted from John's gospel it might justifiably 
be argued that this epistemological insight is of greater significance 
53. cf. Acts 8,1 Peter 
54. Reference might be made to the 'popular' view: Marna Hooker, 
quoting F. C. Burkitt, says, "The popular answer is that He identified 
Himself with the Suffering Servant of the Lord depicted by the 
Prophets, in other words that He derived it from a study of Isa. 53. " (p. 1, M. D. Hooker, Jesus and the Servant). More recently this 
'special' identification "Jesus made between his role and that of the 
Servant has been challenged. Marna Hooker's work Jesus and the Servant 
is an example of this more recent emphasis. However Hooker does not 
deny that the figure of the Servant may well have had some influence 
on the thought of Jesus. 
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than the Johannine expression of a transcendent Christology. The 
implicit insight is that through the dimension of the 'personal' we 
have access to the reality of faith founded upon the lnvo of a 
transcendent God. The 'person' of Jesus acts as's symbol both of 
the access the 'personal' provides from our knowledge of human worth 
to the question of a transcendent ontology, and of the saving 
experience when that 'personal' worth is vindicated and upheld. In 
this sense the 'person' of Jesus is a symbol which points to the 
'personal' category being the channel by which humanity can seek God, 
and through which God can make himself known. Already in both the 
Old and New Testaments, it seems that the epistemological significance 
of the 'personal' in mediating the transcendent is latent. We might 
even speculate that what is 'new' in the New Testament is the way in 
which the 'personal' is brought to the fore. 
Although clearly neither the Old Testament nor the New Testament 
differentiates between epistemological insights and ontological claims, 
wo might see in chapters 14 to 16 of John's gospel evidence that this 
differentiation is implicit in that the main theme of the chapters is 
the ontology of God's love. This is of far greater significance than 
any ontological claim Jesus makes for himself in this final discourse. 
"As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you. Dwell in my 
love. If you heed my commandments you will dwell in my love, 
as I have heeded my Father's commands and dwell in hie love. "(15: 10) 55 
55. It is possible to point to the instances which might be seen as 
examples of this same pattern and emphasis. In these passages salvation 
stands at the centre, the very heart of the gospel according to John's 
interpretation. The key to understanding that salvation - or perhaps better, receiving it as a gift - is faith's response to the divine 
grace or love. In this sense the role of Jesus is very much dynamic 
rather than substantive. He is the catalyst - the medium - who as a 
result attracts to himself confessions of ontological substance. It 
is clear in both these cases that the central factor is the salvation 
which faith's response to grace, or faith's activity in love makes 
possible. 
So in Jn. 3: 1-18 what Nicodemus fails to understand is quite simply the 
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o. T., message of grace. Jesus sayo, "The wind blows where it willst 
you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or 
where it is going... Whatl Is this famous teacher of Israel 
ignorant of such things. " This leads onto the famous saying of Jesus 
(16-18) that God's gracious love has the sole purpose of human 
salvation. The key words in this passage are 'love', 'faith' and 
'salvation' ('God loved the world' - 'faith in him' (Christ) - might 
be saved'). The salvation is wrought rou h him'. 
There is a similar pattern in in. 9: 13-29. Here salvation is seen 
in the context of Jesus giving eight to the man born blind. - Once 
more it is an act of grace which requires the response of faith. 
In this example, the concern over the status of Jesus is expressed 
by the Jews. (This fellow is no man of God - 'What have you to say 
about him? ' - 'We know this fellow is a sinner') They believe him 
to be a sinner for healing on the Sabbath. However, the man, cured 
by Jesus, puts the matter clearly. He is not concerned with who 
Jesus xis, , sinner or prophet - not at this, stage anyway. "All 
I know 
is this: once I was blind, now I can see" (v. 25) Thus it is 
salvation itself which bears witness to the divine grace and creates 
the possibility of faith ("If that man had not come from God he could 
have done nothing. " (v. 33), not so much some preconceived notion of 
the divine nature and the divine law. In this sense the ontology of 
both the Law of Moses and the Person of Christ stand in a symbolic 
relation to the solvific reality to which they bear witness. Indeed 
this insight provides us with a clue to interpreting in. 6: 25-47, where 
Jesus says, "Do not imagine that I shall be your accuser at the 
Father's tribunal. Your accuser is Moses, the very Moses. on whom 
you have set your hope. If you believed Moses you would believe 
what I tell you, for it was about we that he wrote. " (v. 46) Here 
too the 'ontology' of the law obscures and hinders the apprehension 
by faith of. the divipe salvific event, the cure of the cripple. 
3-ý' 
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Looked , at, from the perspective of this epistornologieal insight, rather 
than from that of thv traditional ontology of orthodoxy, both the Old 
Testament and the New Testament point towards their own transcending, 
in that they contain within them a pattern of thought which allows us 
to see that neither an event nor a person can actually express the 
divine tranacendenco, and that both can only be the means of expressing 
an ontology of the divine lovo, which because God is transcendent can 
only be 'understood' in faith. 
In conclusion, therefore, let me draw together the various strands 
of this chapter in summary form. My preliminary enquiry concerning 
the nature of the transcendent ontology which the resurrection might 
be claimed to confirm highlights two main points. First it is 
important"to, recognise that there are epistemological constraints upon 
attempts to speak of a transcendent ontology. Even though. I have 
argued for the validity and integrity of the New Testament interpretation 
of the resurrection, that does not mean that it can be said to confirm 
the transcendent Christological ontology which in many places is to be 
discovered there. Secondly, in both the Old and New Testaments it 
is possible to delineate an epistemological pattern which does correspond 
to the suggestions made in this study, and which, as u consequence 
falls within the constraints which have been set. That is to any, 
beneath the Old Testament ontology of salvation there is an 
epistemological framework capable of functioning as a contemporary 
apologetic. Moreover it is also clear that this framework is 
discernible in significant passages in the New Testament. In this 
sense there is implicit in the Bible a comprehensible and valid 
epistemology which is capable of speaking to the needs of the modern 
theologian even though it must be distinguished from the explicit 
ontology which the Bible itself offers for our understanding. It is 
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an epistemology rooted in the saving experience which validates 
$personal* worth. - 
However there is an important critical question which raises 
itself at this point. Does this emphasis upon the centrality of the 
concept of salvation expose the argument I have put forward to the 
criticism that I am deriving the idea of God merely from the fact of 
human need? Is it possible to be sure that when we speak of salvation 
we are actually speaking of the divine validation, rather than merely 
expressing an element in the human psyche which has been successfully 
sublimated? Pannenberg makes the point when he says, "Jesus 
possesses significance 'for us' only to the extent that this 
significance is inherent in himself, in his history, and in his person 
constituted by this history. Only when this can be shown may we be 
sure that we are not merely attaching our questions, wishes, and 
thoughts to his figure. "56 
My reply to this is quite simply that we have nowhere else to begin 
but with human need and the claims of religion to meet that need in the 
offers of salvation which it makes. We can only ask about the 
validity of the claims and the interpretation they offer in terms of 
weighing the evidence according to the balance of probability, and 
judging how far they resonate with our experience of what it means to 
be a person. This is the nature of the human- situation. To claim 
some transcendent ontology which does not recognise or respect these 
limits seems likely only to reinforce what truth there may be in the 
suggestion that what is offered is merely the projection of a human 
phenomenon. This is not to say that the resurrection cannot be 
thought to offer us access to a transcendent ontology. My point is 
56. Jesus, God and Man, W. Pannenberg, p. 40 
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simply that it, is illegitimate to speak of the divine transcendence 
as an historical person; to equate a person with the transcendent. 
There is all the difference between claiming that Jesus is transcendent 
and divine in some qualitatively different way in his own being, and 
suggesting that somehow the divine transcendence was revealed through 
his person. For we can readily understand what it means to speak of 
a person mediating the divine, in terms of an experience of 'salvation' 
or a vindication of 'personal' worth. This means that when we seek to 
speak of the actual nature of the transcendent we must surely describe 
it in other than 'personal' and 'historical' terms. 
From this perspective the focus of this study upon the concept 
of salvation is not so much a weakness as an advantage. Pannenberg 
has argued-. that only the divine ontology of Jesus can protect the 
Christian faith and its claim to offer salvation from subjectivity 
and the criticism that it is merely the projection of human need. 
My contention is that the opposite is the truth. I have already 
tried to show how the Old. Testament ontology of transcendence matches 
our epistemological scepticism. Both are-safeguards for the primacy 
of faith. jr iithis sense the desire to express faith ontologically, 
as I have argued above, could be said to reflect the desire for 
security with regard to faith which is its very antithesis. 
There is therefore a certain irony in Pannenberg's desire to 
protect Christianity from subjectivity. For, in effect, if this 
argument is right, the primacy of faith can only be recognised if 
human need is accepted as the starting point for our knowledge of God. 
Indeed Pannenberg elsewhere has expressed this insight over against 
feuerbach's anthropocentric understanding of religion. "The-question 
that is really at issue hero is not whether the idea of Cod is s' 
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product of the human mind, but whether it is an unessential product 
of the human mind ... "57 However what Pannenborg seems to have 
failed to understand is that over-confident ontological claims may very 
well be interpreted with legitimacy as projections of the human need 
for security. The only way of replying to reuerbach's criticism is 
to recognise that it contains a large element of truth, and therefore 
to proceed to walk the tightrope of attempting to distinguish the 
authentic human need, reflecting an intrinsic 'personal' worth, which 
can be conceived of being encountered by a gracious transcendence, 
from the need for security, reflecting an inauthentic subjectivism, 
which may project that need quite illegitimately in terms of some 
transcendent claim. 
My contention is that an ontology of faith's activity in love 
succeeds in walking this tightrope. Paradoxically both the 
traditional claims of religion and the epistemologies which deny 
access to the transcendent fail to match up to this criterion; the 
one because the... ontological claims are insupportable, the other 
because the value which we discover in human life prompts the question 
of transcendence with impeccable logic. 
There is a sense therefore in which the argument of this study is 
at an end. I have established that it is possible to trace an 
implicit epistemology of salvation rooted in both an individual and 
community sense of 'personal' value in the Old and New Testaments alike, 
Moreover it is possible to isolate this from the complex variety of 
ontological claims to be discovered in the Bible. In addition I have 
also sought to establish, inasmuch as an argument based on the balance 
of probability can hope to do soy that the claims for the resurrection 
57. Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 3, W. Pannenberg, p. 06-87 
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of Jaauu'do have about them an authenticity and an integrity in the 
context of doscriptiona of the saving exporioncoo of the disciples 
and the early Christians. In this nonso, in a contemporary context 
which requires a rigorous distinction between epistemology and 
ontology, we might go on to say, without further ado, that what the 
resurrection confirm is the 's priori' epistemological pattern I 
have traced. For not only is this epistemology discernible in the 
Old Testament, but it is used in the New Testament to describe and 
explain the significance of Jesus. 
Looked at in this way the historical evidence furnished by the 
life and teachings of Jesus cannot jeopardise our conclusions. The 
actual figure of Jesus, apart from the events of the cross and 
resurrection which confirm the validity of the ontology of faith's 
activity in love is, in an ultimate ontological sense, irrelevant. 
His words and deeds, or what we can recover of them, and his own 
estimate of his person, cannot change or add to the message of salvation 
I have described. For once the legitimacy of the epistemology has 
boon established in and through the historical events and the 
experience, then the actual meusage of Jesus can only confirm, it. 
It cannot supersede or challenge it. Thus any transcendent ontological 
claims made by Jesus, or on his behalf, must be seen as symbolic of 
the ontology I have described rather than being used to replace it. 
The epistemology of salvation traced hero is speaking about human 
experience in general and cannot be limited to a specific historical 
context or parson. The message of salvation is a universal one about 
human nature being vindicated by a loving God on the basis of faith alone. 
And yet while it is right to underline that it is illegitimate to 
claim a transcendent ontology for the person of Jesus, nevertheless to 
leave the matter there would be to fail to make clear hie epistemological 
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significance. I have argued that what wo can cluiru to know about 
Cod through Jesus is to be understood in the following way: the death 
und resurrection of Jesus provide us with access to the transcendent 
through the 'personal' apprehension of salvation. This is what the 
traditional ontology of the person of Jesue eymboliacs. Thus it 
would be ironic, if, in order to safeguard the ontological principle 
wo have described, we wore to deny this 'personal' figure his 
epistemological importance. For it wan through what Jesus taught 
and did that the transcendent ontology was discovered anew. Indeed 
as fur as the Chriutian tradition is concerned this transcendent 
ontology was decisively discovered here. In short, once the divine 
aura and sanctity which was identified with the person of Jesus in 
traditional orthodoxy and devotion hm been seen'to be both potentially 
misleading as well as having positive religious value, it is possible 
to return to the historical, figure and seek again what remains of his 
message and life behind the teaching and the deeds as recorded in the 
New Testament. It is for this reason, to clarify what wo might call 
the specific quality of the epistemological access he allows us to 
Cod's nature, that in my final chapter I shall turn to examine the 
historical evidence in the New Testament as to what in the teaching 
of Jesus the resurrection might be said to confirm. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
I THE MESSAGE OF JESUS 
It has been argued in this study that the evidence in the New 
Testament concerning the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth provides 
access to a transcendent ontology, albeit on the seemingly insubstantial 
basis of historical probability. It does so via the 'personal' 
experience of salvation claimed by the early disciples. The final task 
to be undertaken is therefore to ask about the nature of that ontology 
in the specific context of the life and teaching of Jesus. 
In the previous chapter I exam fined the 'a priori' limitations on 
the nature of the knowledge of the transcendent we can claim and it was 
discovered that there is in the Bible, beneath a complex ontological 
fagade, an epistemological framework that bears a surprisingly close 
comparison to the model projected earlier in this study based on the 
access the 'historical' and the 'personal' provide to salvation in a 
context of faith. 
And yet this pattern has nothing specifically to do with Jesus. 
However. it-was out of the disciples' experience of the, resurrection of 
Jesus that the Christian message of. salvation came into being. Thus 
it is important to ask what it-is about the life and teaching of this 
man which is vindicated in the resurrection. It is his person that 
became central to'the Christian message. Thus any enquiry, concerning 
what it is that 'the resurrection tells us about the nature of God, 
must first of all see it in some sense asconfirmation of what Jesus 
taught-and what he stood for. 
Nevertheless it is important to see this question within a certain 
framework. First of all it, must be made clear that my concern here is 
not, as was the case in the previous chapter, with a Biblical ontology 
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constructed on the basis of 'a priori' epistemological insights. I 
am concerned with the historical message of Jesus of Nazareth. But 
secondly it is my purpose to ask whether that historical message can 
be understood within the ontological limits imposed by these 
epistemological constraints. Indeed this framework allows the question 
tobe sharpened. I am asking whether it is legitimate to interpret 
the message of Jesus in its historical context without the Christological 
ontology accorded to him by the early community, or whether such an 
ontology is in fact implicit in his message, so that it is impossible 
to-separate person from proclamation. 
I cannot hope to do justice to this topic in the space available 
to me in this final chapter. I can only sketch in the last stage of 
my argument in outline, and as an hypothesis. If we ask about the 
message of the historical Jesus there are three crucial questions which 
New Testament scholars have struggled with. Perhaps the most basic 
is that which asks how for and in what ways the New Testament evidence 
provides us with access to reliable historical information concerning 
Jesus; what he taught and what he did. It has become an axiom of 
New Testament scholarship that the gospels reflect back into his life 
the faith confession of the early Christians which was elicited after 
the resurrection. Thus the Jesus we encounter in the gospel stories 
is already mediated through the Christ he had become in the faith of the 
Early Church. The whole question of the relationship between the Jesus 
of history and the Christ of faith is one which is fraught with 
difficulty. ' 
1. As an example Cf. G. Bornkamms "The early Christians were not really 
concerned with the bare sequence of historical facts at all-, nor with describing the earthly work and fate of Jesus himself. Their concern 
with Jesus and his history was realty a concern with an event of 
ultimate and saving significance that was transpiring therein between 
God and the world. " (p. 6-7, G. Bornkamm, The New Testaments A Guide 
to its Writings). Ne continues, "It is no secret that our historical 
knowledge o Jesus is sketchy in the extreme. " (p. 9, ibid. ) 
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Even if wo seek to move beyond the complexity of those initial 
problems by identifying the concepts of the kingdom and the fatherhood 
of God as belonging to the original massage of the historical Jesus 
here too all is not plain sailing. It seems that there are almost 
as many interpretations of the kingdom teaching of Jesus as there 
are interpreters. In the thought of Ritachl the kingdom in the New 
Testament reflects the ethical emphasis of his theology. Schweitzer 
saw the essential message as having its origin in an apocalyptic 
eschatology which he believed to have very little relevance to the 
20th century. 
2 C. H. Dodd stressed the realised eschatology implicit 
in the kingdom sayings. 
3 The essential message of Jesus was that the 
future hope of Judaism had been realised in his ministry. Bultmann's 
programme for de-mythologising the New Testament allowed him to see in 
Jesus' proclamation of the imminence of the kingdom the existentialist 
demand for decision and authenticity. 
4 More recently Now Testament 
scholars who speak of the 'new hermeneutic' explain the parables of 
the kingdom as 'word event' or 'language event'. They mediate the 
divine revelation through story and language. 
5 
Nevertheless I propose to work on the basis of certain specific 
presuppositions. First of all it seems reasonable to assume that 
there is continuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of 
faith. It appears that those scholars who stressed discontinuity between 
faith and history in fact fly in the fact of the New Testament evidence. 
Moreover in general terms New Testament scholars can be said to agree 
that there is an essential relation between the two in spite of the 
strange way in which Jesus as proclaimer of the good news becomes himself 
2. The Quest of the Historical Jesus, A. Schweitzer 
3. he Parables of the Kingdom, C. H. Dodd 
4. csus Chr s and Mythology, R. Pultmann 
5. Jesus an the Language of the Kingdom, N. Perrin 
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the content of the proclamation. Elornkamm therefore ccn assort, 
"Quite clearly what the gospels report concerning the message, the 
deeds and the history of Jesus is still distinguished by an authenticity, 
a freshness, and a distinctiveness not in any way effaced by the 
Church's Eaoter faith. These features point us directly to the 
earthly figure of Jesus. "6 On this ßornkamm feels confident enough 
to assert, "Understood in this way, the primitive tradition of Jesus 
is brim full of history. "' 
7 
T 
Innaddition there is no question of doubt that the historical 
Jesus proclaimed a message of the coming of God's kingdom, and thought 
in terms of the fatherhood of God. Thus James Dunn in his book 
Unity and Diversity in the New Testament asserts unequivocally`, 
"'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent 
and believe in the gospel. ' (Mk. 1*15) In bhis one sentence the main 
features of Jesus' kerygma are encapsulated. "ß And Jeremias, examining 
the teaching of Jesus concerning the fatherhood of God, Aaya, "Jesus 
dared to use 'Abbe' as a form of address to God. This 'Abbe' is the 
ipsisaima vox Jesu. "9 Whatever the different interpretations that 
are put on the use of this term, it is generally agreed that Jesus 
did use it, and that in some way this form of address reflected his own 
concept of God and his relationship with God. 
In the light of this evidence that the substantial content of 
Jesus' message had to do with Cod as king and father, it is generally 
concluded that, while Jesus himself figured in the kerygma of the early 
Church, his own proclamation did not invite belief in himself. Dunn 
again says, "Jesus saw himself as the instrument of this end-time rule, 
6. Jesus of Nazareth, G. Bornkamm, p. 24 
7. d., p, 26 
8. Unit and Diversit in the New Testament, J. Dunn, p. 13 
9. Testament Theology, vol. 1, eremias, p. 67 
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but he did not put himself forward an the content of hin kerygma. ""10 
ßultnann too, prefiguring Dunn's conclusion, distinguishes between 
tho ineonage of Jeuuu and the message of the Church. "Yet the 
historical Jesus of the synoptica does not, like the Jchannino Jesus, 
cummon men to acknowledge or 'believe 3n' his person. He does not 
proclaim himself as the Messiah, i. e. the king of the time of salvation, 
but he points ahead to the Son of Man as another than himself. "" 
In spite of the problematic nature, of the task I have set it seems 
that the New Testament scholars will allow access to the teaching of the 
historical Jesus, yet, at the same time are clear that the Christological 
kerygma of the Church is not' a feature of that teaching. Thus, in 
principle at least, the way is open to attempt to'describo what it is 
about the massage of Jesus which the resurrection can be said to 
'confirm and to do so within the epistemological constraints I have laid 
down. Indeed it might be argued that in spite of the hermeneutical 
problems there is a, certein irreducible theological minimum in the 
teaching of Jesus which is graspable through the concepts of the father- 
hood and the kingdom of God, and that'this is all that is necessary for 
the purpose of this study. In other words it might be possible to 
suggest that Jesus taught that God is like a compassionate father, and 
that he is sovereign over humanity rather like a king, albeit a 
transcendent one, and that this is the basic reality which the resurrection 
confirms. Moreover if that were the case it would bear direct comparison 
with that passage in Exodus 33 which spoke of God in terms of his 
compassion and transcendence. 
However the matter is not as straightforward as that. The 
conclusion drawn by distinguished New Testament scholars is rather that 
1Q. op. cit. P. 16 
11. Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, R. Bultmann, p. 9 
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although Jesus does not explicitly summon men and women to believe in 
himself as a transcendent being, nevertheless the divine authority is 
implicit'in what he says-and does. In this sense the verdict of 
scholarship goes against this hypothesis that the historical Jesus did 
not think-`of his person primarily in terms of a transcendent ontology. 
Thus Vincent Taylor says, "From the evidence as a whole we are 
entitled to conclude that His consciousness of divine Sonship is the 
key to the presentation of Jesus we find in all the gospels. His 
divine consciousness is expressed in words and in deeds. " 
12 Moreover 
while Taylor sees the divinity of Jesus as the transparent truth which 
shines through his life and teaching, Bornksmm, while not expressing 
himself with such directness, nevertheless reiterates the substance of 
this claim. He leaves us to draw the conclusion which is implicit in 
his assertions. " No categories are capable of expressing who Jesus is. 
We'are left to deduce that this is because he is divine. "No customary 
or current conception, no title or office which Jewish tradition and 
expectation held in readiness serves to authenticate his mission or 
exhausts the secret of his being. It is impossible to solve this 
mystery with the logic of whatever type, of any preceding doctrinal 
system. We thus learn to understand that the secret of his being could 
only reveal itself to his disciples in his resurrection. 1,13 
Jeremias too speaks in a way which implies, if not a direct 
equation of Jesus with the divine being in his own message, then 
certainly a transcendent and unique ontology. "If he himself was 
conscious that he himself was the bringer of salvation, it follows that 
H14 testimony to himself was part of the good news he proclaimed . 
1a 
12. The Person of Christ in New Testament Teachin , V. Taylor, p. 169 
13. op. cit. born amm, p. 178 
14. op. cit. J. Jeremias, p. 25 
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Indeed without embarking on an exhaustive survey of the evidence it is 
interesting to note the unanimity with which recent New Testament 
ocholerahip'endorses such a view. Thus ©ultmann, in spite of his 
verdict that Jesus did not summon men to believe in himself, can and 
does assert that "He in his own person is the 'sign of the time'. "15 
More recently Norman Perrin in his book Jesus and the Language of the 
Kingdom speaking of Fuchs' exposition of the teaching of Jesus says, 
"Fuchs is interested in Jesus as the supreme revelation of God to man, 
and hence as the one who actualised the possibility of faith in his 
own experience, and who verbalised the possibility of faith for his 
hearers in his parables . "16 
It seems then that in spite of the earlier distinction we drew 
between the message of Jesus and the message of the Church, the verdict 
of New Testament scholars is that message and messenger in the actual 
teaching of Jesus are inseparable. And if that is the case then this 
thesis might be said to ran at the last hurdle. For the Christological 
ontology which I have eschewed, in fact proves to be intrinsic in the 
witness of Jesus himself to his own authority, as well. aa in the 
doctrinal conclusion of the early Church. 
However there are a number of points to be made in reply to this 
seemingly overwhelming onslaught on the line of argument I have taken. 
To begin with, in the previous chapter I suggested that the resurrection 
of Jesus might be said to confirm an ontology of faith's activity in 
love. If that is the case then the validity of the ontology stands 
independently of the Christological claim of Jesus. For such an 
epistemology of salvation is in no way dependent upon the figure of Jesus 
being inerrant in his knowledge claims, or right about anything except 
his trust in God's love. 
15. op. cit. R. Bultmann, p. 9 
16. Jesus and the Languageof the Kingdom, N. Perrin, p. 131 
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, Secondly, if the verdict mentioned above is accepted, it is to 
abandon the hypothesis I have offered-before looking at the way-the 
Now Testament scholars arrive at their conclusions. It is the view 
of this study that the deduction of an implicit transcendent Christology 
in the teaching of Jesus is just as likely to be the result of an 
epistemology that is either not satisfactory in itself, and thus lacks 
the consistency of a fully coherent explanation, or is not satisfactory 
in its historical assessment of the New Testament evidence of the 
resurrection. In other words I would argue two things. First of 
all it is possible to see at the heart of the message of Jesus a trust 
and a hope in God that does not require a Christological ontology for a 
contemporary understanding of the Christian message. Secondly it is 
likely that the Christologieal ontology is just as much the result of 
theological presuppositions which are imparted into the material. 
In', order, to illustrate this point I'shall look briefly at the way 
in which Vincent Taylor and-Gunther Bornkamm arrive at their conclusions. 
Taylor's-analysis seems to me'to be deficient on both counts. It is 
not logically consistent and it ignores the centrality and the 
historical significance of the resurrection. On. the one hand he 
maintains that the gospels are to be seen as reliable sources for our 
knowledge of Jesus. His argument takes the following steps. We can 
trust the gospel records because they go back to eye-witnesses: "we 
possess in the Gospels material which ultimately rests on the testimony 
of eye-witnesses. 017 Moreover what these eye-witnesses tell us is that 
Jesus makes claims which are divine claims. "Outstanding in the early 
sources are the sayings which speak of the divine Sonship of Jesus. "18 
And indeed the events of his life and deeds confirm the truth of these 
17. op. cit. V. Taylor, p. 157 
10. ibid., V. Taylor, p. 157 
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claims. "Jesus accomplished mighty works, to which adequate parallels 
have not been foundg'with an ease and certainty which bespeaks a 
consciousness transcending the ordinary powers of human personality. "19 
Thus we might conclude that, if only we choose to look at the evidence 
aright it can lead directly to a confession of faith in Jesus as none 
other than God Incarnate. 
Yet at the conclusion of his work Taylor seems to withdraw this 
route which he has offered us to faith - or, perhaps, having established 
it as a logically possible route to faith, proceeds to indicate that as 
far as Christian experience and life is concerned it is less than 
satisfactory on its own. "We do not first discover who Christ is 
and then believe in Him; we believe in Him and then discover who He 
is. "20 Faith, it seems, is not accessible to an historical study'of 
the New Testament in quite the way we might have thought. It is 
produced in some other way. It is rather the result of a 'personal' 
revelation. He tells us that "a personal response to the challenge 
with which God confronts us in Christ is necessary. "21 
Thus although Taylor has emphasised the importance and soundness 
of the New Testament record as'a reliable witness to the divinity of 
Jesus, at the same time he makes it quite clear that revelation and 
faith are prior essentials. "In addition to the study of the New 
Testament teaching a personal response to'the revelation is necessary. 
The encounter is a'challenge to faith. Faith alone knows who Jesus is. "22 
The upshot of this discussion is that we are taken very little further 
forward in our understanding of the relationship between faith and 
history. 
19. ibid., p. 161-162 
20. ibid., p. 305 
21. ibid., p. 305 
22, ibid., p. 306 
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At the same time Taylor's argument that the New Testament witness 
can be a reliable source for our knowledge of Jesus' divine consciousness 
would seem, from the perspective of the verdict of modern New Testament 
scholarship, to be somewhat naive. If the gospels themselves are 
accounts of the life of Jesus written in the light of faith in the 
resurrection (and Taylor does not dispute this) it would appear to be 
an extremely hazardous business to seek to trace the divine consciousness 
in the mind of Jesus himself. The New Testament provides us with 
access to the minds of those who believed Jesus to be divine in some 
sense. But it is difficult to argue that through their understanding 
there lies a direct route to the realisation of divinity in the mind of 
Jesus. For the gospel writers are intent on telling the story of 
Jesus in order to infuse it with the 'truth' they have discovered 
about him in the resurrection. Jesus' self-understanding, and the 
precise nature of the relationship between Jesus' view of himself and 
the conception of those who believed in him lies hidden behind the 
screen of their faith. However accurately the early Christians reflect 
his words and deeds, the Jesus they reveal is the Jesus whose 
consciousness reflects and is mediated through their faith. Their 
faith is a testimony at once to the continuity between the Jesus of 
history and the Christ of faith, but at the same time a barrier to an 
understanding of the psyche of Jesus in the specific context of an 
understanding of his divine being.. It is of the very nature of the 
Gospel-for the disciples' consciousness of the divine authority of the 
Christ to be stamped upon the mind of Jesus when the good news is 
related. Thus the continuity we can trace at other points between the 
Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, between his life and the faith 
of the Church, is at this crucial point of the divine consciousness 
hidden from us. In this sense Taylor's analysis is limited on both 
the counts I have suggested. His epistemology is incomplete and not 
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fully cbherent inItself. Neither does it reflect the insights of 
historical criticism of the flow Testament. 
In the case of Bornkamm the difficulties are not quite so clear- 
cut. With Taylor's exposition it was not possible to be sure whether 
history or revelation was being offered as the basis of a theological 
epistemology. For Bornkamm there is no doubt that whet is proposed 
is an epistemology that is based on revelation. In this sense it is 
important to recognise that his work, along with that of colleagues 
like-Kasemann, reflect the impact of both Bultmann and Barth. 
According to this view the New Testament writers do not see the life 
and teaching of Jesus as offering some historical pathway to faith. 
Here we find-that it is Taylor's concluding views on the relationship 
between revelation, -and faith which take the centre of the stage. Cod 
reveals himself in Jesus to the eyes of those who believe. The words 
and the work of-thin man are the medium of the divine revelation. 
Bornkamm says, My-this they show that they took Jesus himself, in all 
his words-and even apart from them as the Word of God in the world.... 
Jesus himself prior to and in all the stories the decisive and final 
history of God in the world. "23 
There is clearly no logical inconsistency here in this epistemology. 
It is God himself who in his revelation provides us with knowledge of 
himself to the eyes of, faith. What is more this view that God has 
revealed himself in some decisive way in Jesus is clearly there to be 
read and seen in the New Testament. However, there remains the 
suspicion that Bornkamm has imposed an epistemology of revelation upon 
the material. He says, "The vital point is that no title or name, 
from all that have come down to us from Judaism or been taken over from 
23. op. cit. G. Bornkamm, p. 189 
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the religious language of Hellenism, retaino its meaning unchanged. 
Whenever such names become titles of honour for this Jesus of 
Nazareth, the crucified and resurrected, they take on the mystery of 
his person and history, and acquire a new sense , 
24 What we see in 
Jesus as Messiah is not so much the Old Testament hope as a new 
dimension of revelation. Thus Bornkamm emphasises the discontinuity 
between the Old Testament hope and the New Testament message. 
I find tiwo difficulties with this view. In the first place this 
clear emphasis upon discontinuity between the old revelation and the 
new reminds us of the 'alien' quality of Brunner's epistemology of 
revelation. It is so easy, and, I have argued, unsatisfactory, to 
a contemporary understanding of Christianity, to read this 'alien' 
self-validating revelation into the New Testament. In the second 
place I do not believe that it is a satisfactory historical interpretation 
of the gospel message. Although Bornkamm offers us clear evidence of 
the 'new' in the New Testament message about Jesus, nevertheless that is 
not the some as total discontinuity. The fact remains that the New 
Testament message of Jesus is quite specifically presented in terms of 
the titles which originate in the Old Testament, and have continuity 
with it. The New Testament offers itself as much as a fulfilment of 
the Old Testament as well as a radical departure from it. 
What is interesting here, and confirms my criticism of both these 
types of theological epistemology is that neither of them is able to 
give a satisfactory weight to-the resurrection itself. Taylor, in 
his book on the person of Christ in the New Testament, nowhere stresses 
the central significance which the resurrection has for our understanding 
of the person of Christ. Bornkamm however does stress the centrality, 
but is not consistent-in his historical analysis of it. For him it is 
24. ibid., p. 190 
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simply the means of arriving at a Christology which is the cipher for 
a self-validating revelation. 
Implicit in Vincent Taylor's argument is the deduction that the 
resurrection need have very little special significance for our 
understanding of Jesus. If Jesus the man reveals his own consciousness 
of being divine, and it is possible to recognise him as such through 
his words and deeds, then the resurrection is not a decisive event 
for our knowledge of God. It is merely a culmination of a series of 
divine events and deeds. Of course for Taylor the cross and 
resurrection are of decisive significance In that they reveal the once- 
for-all sacrifice made by Jesus on behalf of humanity. But it could 
be argued that the decisive event for our knowledge of salvation is 
not so much the sacrifice of Jesus itself, but rather the incarnation 
which it presupposes. Now according to Taylor the incarnation is 
reflected in Jesus' consciousness and is revealed in his life and 
teaching. Thus we might still conclude that the resurrection is 
still only the culmination of a series of divine words and deeds. 
With 8ornkamm again the matter is not quite so clear. He does 
give the resurrection a central emphasis for our knowledge of who 
Jesus is. "We thus learn to understand that the secret of his being 
could only reveal itself to his disciples in his resurrection. "25 In 
this sense Bornkamm does emphasise the resurrection as being decisive 
for faith, and that faith has a historical dimension. And yet in the 
end he denies history access to faith. "The event of Christ's 
resurrection from the dead, his life and his eternal reign are things 
removed from. historical scholarship. "26 The resurrection speaks of 
that which human beings can no longer understand because it is a divine 
25. ibid., p. 178 
26, ibid., p. 184 
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event. uThe men and women who encounter the risen Christ in the 
Easter stories, have come to an end of their wisdom. 1,27 This means 
that the 'historical' significance of the resurrection is in fact the 
Christological ontology which is revealed. "Past and present find 
their unity only-in the person of Jesus himself. 1,28 
Moreover once it is clear that the significance of the resurrection 
is its revelatory nature, and specifically its Chriatological centre, 
that makes it possible to speak of God revealing himself in the life 
and deeds and works of Jesus. Thus the significance of the life and 
teaching of Jesus is precisely its function as revelation. Jesus 
becomes the cipher by means of which the divine revelation can be 
recognised. "The Messianic character of his being is contained in 
his words and deeds, and in the unmediatedness of his historic 
appearance. "29 The resurrection is merely the gateway to a transcendent 
Christology, which in its groundlessness validates our knowledge of God. 
Now it is quite true that in the New Testament the resurrection of 
Jesus does provide us with access to a Christological ontology. But 
it does not do so in quite the way Bornkamm suggests to us. For here 
is not the 'alien' ontology of revelation which he has described. The 
'person' of Christ is not totally discontinuous with the Old Testament 
Messiah, or for that matter with the figure of Jesus as he was known 
to his disciples. The historical message of the resurrection, although 
it is conceived of as a divine event is also spoken of in historically 
recognisable terms. This is the significance of the appearance stories. 
In these narratives the resurrection is given an historical setting 
and function. They describe the process of recognition, and the 
significance that this recognition has in terms of the community life, 
27. ibid., p. 184 
28* ibid., p. 185 
29. ibid., p. 178 
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mission and worship of the early Christian community. Bornknmm is 
surely wrong to say that "The men and women who encounter the risen 
1130 Christ in the Easter stories, have come to sn and of their wisdom. 
It is true that they are speaking of a divine event, but they are 
speaking of it in the context of the Jesus they know, and the context 
of their beliefs as first century Jews, their beliefs about Jesus 
himself, and the significance of these beliefs for their future. In 
this sense Kornkamm, while stressing the central significance of the 
resurrection for Christian faith does so by making it merely the gateway 
to a Chrietologicel ontology which is the cipher for his understanding 
of revelation, rather than as the central historical reality out of 
which the New Testament faith grew and developed. 
My contention is therefore that it is unsatisfactory to see the 
resurrection simply as either an historical proof of the truth of the 
divinity of Jesus, or a scarcely comprehensible cipher of the divine 
revelation. Neither history nor revelation as interpretative 
principles in themselves can allow us to grasp the significance of the 
New Testament account of the resurrection. Although the historical 
record with regard to the detailed appearances of Jesus is not in 
itself to be understood as trustworthy in a literal historical or 
empirical sense, it does focus our attention upon the way the 'personal' 
hopes and values of the disciples found to this event some transcendent 
correlate. In other words the historical ontology of the appearance 
stories can beat be understood in terms of the 'personal' community 
values of the early Christians which they embody. For they reflect, 
and are nothing without, the sense of mission and community and worship. 
If we are to understand the resurrection as either history or revelation 
then some concept of 'personal' value and the experience of salvation 
is required to make the picture coherent. That is to say only out of 
30, ibid., p. 184 
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an experience with such a dynamic and polarity can tho historical and 
the revelatory come together to offer some explanation of resurrection. 
Bornkamm actually comes near to this when he says, "Past and 
present find their unity only in the person of Jesus himself. ""31 
However on closer analysis we see that 'person' is used here, as in 
Brunner's case, to relate to the 'alien' transcendent Christology, 
rather than to the process by which the divine. transcendence is mediated. 
Already it. has become merely a theological code for that 'alien' 
revelatory reality. Moreover if we are to understand this 'personal' 
dimension reflected in the appearance stories, the dimension which 
mediates the divine in human history, we must surely seek its source 
in. the impact of. -the man Jesus of Nazareth. We must think in terms 
of the beliefs and theology of the historical Jesus, and the response 
he elicited from his contemporaries. To see the resurrection as the: 
confirmation of the divine ontology of Jesus is merely to emphasise and 
focus upon revelation as the sole epistemological principle, and for that 
reason to underline its 'alien' nature: It is not to understand the 
way it mediates the transcendent. 
What I am suggesting is that the New Testament evidence itself 
concerning the resurrection is not only capable of being understood in 
terms of the category, of the 'personal', but actually requires to be 
understood in some such, terms once we recognise that neither history 
nor revelation can do full justice to the evidence as it is recorded. 
If I am right in this it allows us to see that one of the contemporary 
concerns of New Testament scholarship, namely the search for a 
hermeneutic, can be somewhat misleading. This. is the search for a way 
of communicating the truth that has been revealed through first century 
31. ibid., p. 185 
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concepts in,; a twentieth century conceptual framework so that the 
reality-of the revelation Is not lost. This means that the search 
for a hermeneutic depends upon a prior theological epistemology, 
task is so to express the tradition that the reality of the divine 
mediated through the old tradition can be encountered in the new 
expression. 
The 
The problem here however is that the hermeneutic can only be as 
good as the. theological epistemology upon which it is built. And if 
it is-presupposed that it is revelation pure and simple which 'can be 
said-to validate our knowledge of God, then the difficulty inherent 
in a self-validating epistemology of revelation remains, and the 
contemporary"aearch cannotlong conceal this. In fact it might even 
be suggested that the whole emphasis on hermeneutics might be seen to 
be an effective means of concealing the inadequacy of this theological 
epistemology. Thus in the light of a more satisfactory suggestion as 
to how we can claim knowledge of God we might see that hermeneutics 
has a different and more radical significance. 
The argument of this study has proposed a knowledge of God based 
simply upon faith's activity in love. I have eschewed an elaborate 
historical. and metaphysical. ontology. Such an epistemology does not 
so much require an interpreting, a translating and a de-mythologising 
of the-Bible and the doctrines of Christianity so that modern man can 
be encountered by God, but rather a much more radical re-thinking of the 
tradition of Christianity-in particular and of religion in'general. 
An epistemology of revelation can rest content with the hermeneutical 
task because it presupposes that God makes himself knownýin his revelation 
without explaining of justifying its claim. Thus the old structures can 
remain. But an epistemology of salvation based on faith's activity in 
love demands nothing short of a demolition of the old structures. A 
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theology which concentrates on the furnishing of a now hermeneutic can 
only perpetuate an inadequate epistemology. Whereas if wo begin with 
a new epistemology, while the initial result may be drastic and 
traumatic, in the long run it may be the only hope of reconnecting 
Christianity in particular and religion in general with modernity. 
The dilemma is clear. An ontology of faith's activity in love 
preserves the dimension of the transcendent by means of the 'personal'. 
In this sense'the community dimension of religion is vital in order 
that-personal worth as a religious reality be preserved. And we speak 
of-'personal' worth not just in an individual sense, but also in a 
social and political context. However, the Christian tradition, and 
indeed all religious traditions, faces the problem that this vital 
community dimension is expressed in ontological formulations that are 
so often neither credible nor acceptable. And in the end they can only 
detract from the 'personal' core, and put in question the whole validity 
of religion as a human activity. 
What is the significance then of this attempt not to by-pass the 
historical evidence of the resurrection? It is not really satisfactory 
to suggest that the historical Jesbs himself was recognised in his life 
and teaching as the transcendent Christ, the divine figure of- 
ecclesiastical orthodoxy. Historically the Christian message arose 
out of the events of the death and resurrection. At the same time it 
is not satisfactory to interpret the resurrection as being simply the 
access point to the groundless principle of revelation itself. r If we 
are-correct in suggesting that the resurrection is to be understood as 
an historical event which mediates a transcendent correlate, then it 
does so on the basis of providing in history an experience of salvation 
grounded in the 'personal' faith of Jesus himself, a faith which he 
shared in some sense with his disciples. The significance of the 
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resurrection is that it confirms this faith. 
I return therefore, having come full circle, to my original 
suggestion that it is legitimate to see the faith of Jesus expressed 
in terms of the concepts of the kingdom and the fatherhood of God. 
There is a great advantage in examining these concepts in the context 
of the quest for a theological epistemology, as opposed to analysing 
them from the point of view of a search for a hermeneutic. For we 
can consider their basic theological meaning instead of being over 
concerned with the very specific way in which they can be seen as 
mediators of the divine revelation. The hermeneutical search concerns 
itself with the precise nature of the apocalyptic imagery, and how far 
the man Jesus expected the imminent arrival of the kingdom. The 
theological search concerns itself with these basic terms as ways of 
speaking about God and what meaning they can be said to convey. 
The-kin<l', dom-and fatherhood of God are above all theological concepts 
which have their roots in the Old Testament, roots which have already 
been examined in terms of the sovereignty and love of God. Thus 
there are direct links between our 'a priori' consideration of the Old 
and New Testaments which allowed the discovery of an epistemology of 
faith's activity in love as a theological framework beneath the more 
complex ontological constructions. Even now however, I am not 
presupposing that these concepts do not contain within them an implicit 
Chriatological ontology. All I am saying is that it is possible that 
the later explicit Christology may have been read into the New Testament 
message of Jesus on the basis of an epistemology which does not do full 
justice to the resurrection as the historical fulcrum of the Christian 
message. 
There is one further point to note before I examine the New 
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Testament material itself. It has become fashionable in the context 
of the hermeneutical question to speak of the Now Testament language 
in terms of-myths and symbols. As we have Been above scholars 
recently have spoken of'the parables in terms of 'word-event' or 
'language-event', By that they mean that the stories Jesus told are 
capable themselves of confronting the hearer with the divine demand. 
What accompanies this insight is very often a shift away from an 
understanding of the parables of the kingdom as theological concepts. 
The value of this way of interpreting the message of Jesus is that it 
stresses its immediacy. It allows the stories to come alive. They 
do not have to be mediated through a more complex theological structure 
or framework. However there is a problem here. For it is all too 
easy following the reasons I have given above, for the symbolic 
understanding of the parables to conceal once more the self-validating 
assertion that God reveals himself in these stories. It is possible 
to ignore the more fundamental theological justification that is 
required. 
For this reason it is unwise to draw a neat distinction between 
the kingdom as concept and the kingdom as symbol. For to continue to 
think of the kingdom as a concept faces us with the question as to 
whether God is sovereign or not, and on what basis we can make such 
assertions. Now this is not to deny the insights concerning the 
symbolic nature of the kingdom. It is merely to question whether it 
can bear. the epistemological significance which is implied. 
In addition it seems absurd to week to deny that Jesus did not 
have a concept of God both as king and father, even though at the 
oamo time he believed that God's transcendence and freedom were in no 
way limited by that concept. For example on the one hand he could 
teach the impossibility of the rich entering the kingdom of God, and 
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yet at the same time recognise the absoluteness of God's creative 
power to achieve the impossible. (Mk. 10) Thus I claim that it is 
more reasonable to see the conceptual and symbolic significance of 
the kingdom to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. For 
this reason I offer a different epistemological principles that the 
resurrection can be said to confirm the underlying concepts of God as 
father and king which are present in the teaching of Jesus. In that 
sense we, can claim to offer an epistemological access to an ontology 
of faith itself, which for that reason preserves faith's primacy. 
But what is the concept of God which Jesus has which the 
resurrection confirms? We shall need to consider three aspects of 
the teaching of Jesus. First of all there is God's sovereignty 
which, in the simplest terms, expresses the concept of God's being in 
control of the world and human destiny. Secondly there is God's 
fatherhood, -which, again expressed at the level of the lowest common 
denominator, speaks of God's love and. compassion. And thirdly there 
is the question of the relationship between the two concepts. 
It is of course in Jesus' teaching about the kingdom that many 
commentators have seen to be implicit a transcendent Christology. 
32 
Clearly there are many places where he sees the response to himself 
being decisive for salvation. We can cite the example of Zacchaeus. 
(Lk. 191lff. ) We can interpret the summons of Jesus in Mark 10 to the 
32. Dodd says, "In some way the Kingdom of God has come with Jesus 
Himself ... Jesus is 'sent' by the Father, who in sending Him, causes His Kingdom to coma. " (p. 43, C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kin dom) 
See also A. M. Hunter, "In some decisive sense the eýgn of Cod has come 
in the person and work of Jesus. " (p. 74, The Work and Word of Jesus) 
and T. W. Manson, who, speaking of Peter's con ession at aesarea Philippi, 
says, "To the deference due from the disciple to the teacher was added 
a new thing - the loyalty and devotion of a subject to a King. And no 
mere earthly potentate, but one divinely anointed. It was in fact the 
recognition of the Kingdom in the person of Jesus: and with that 
recognition the Kingdom could be said to have come. " (p. 130, T. W. 
Manson, The Teaching of-Jesus) 
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rich young ruler to-Cell`all and follow him, as being the divine 
imperative, and the demand that indecisive for. the young mango 
salvation. , It is clear also that in certain acts which Jesus 
performs he claims to reveal the sovereignty of Cod cf. Mk. 3: 27; 1: 33. 
And yet this is surely not the whole or even the major part of the 
story. It is important to recognise that the prima facie evidence 
is that Josua' message has to do with God as king and father, and not 
no much with himself. 
Clearly the concept of the kingdom incorporates the ideas of power 
and judgement. Now in that context faith is best understood in terms 
of the demand for repentance. Thus it can be seen how in the parables 
of the kingdom the reader is brought to the point of repentance, and of 
the recognition of the need for faith. It is an inevitable outcome 
of the story of the sower that we should see ourselves as the seed 
that fails to grow, or the seed that withers or the seed that is choked. 
In the story of the wise and foolish virgins we cannot but feel our 
own unpreparedness. Like the rich young ruler we are unable to give 
all we have. We must own ourselves as adulterers if the criterion 
for adultery; is allowing ourselves a lingering glance-at a pretty girl 
or a handsome man. We can scarcely bear to think of the awaful 
significance that is implicit in the concept of God's sovereignty. 
33 
In, this'aense-the parables of the kingdom present anew for each 
generation the starkness of the venture of faith. 
At the same time we must set the parables in the context of the 
ministry of Jesus, and particularly in the context of his attack on 
the legalism of contemporary Judaism. One of the basic concerns of 
Jesus' ministry is to disabuse those who believed that the law mediates 
33, cf. p. 128-129, N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom 
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salvation in a way that the pious can take for granted. (Lk. 1800-14) 
Thus it would seem that there is some connection between Jesus' stark 
summons to repentance, and an interpretation of Judaism which saw the 
relationship between man and God on the basis of some legal transaction. 
Out Jesus does not just use the concept of the kingdom to reveal 
the need for repentance in face of God's sovereignty, and the inadequacy 
of the law. God is not simply a tyrant who confronts men and women 
with their inadequacies and judges them accordingly. This theme of 
repentance and judgement has to be seen in a wider context. 
The kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus is not just a 
sovereign demand by God. It is first of all a gift. It is the 
treasure, a pearl of great price graciously offered (Matthew 13: 44ff. ) 
where mere. acceptance and the necessary steps to appropriate it are 
all that is required. In the case of the unjust servant (Matthew 
18t23ff. ) the remission of the debt is the gracious gift of a generous 
overlord, which actually sets new standards for justice in the caso of 
the one who is forgiven. 
Now there are two facets of this observation concerning the 
relationship between judgement and grace. And here we can begin to 
see something of an overlap between the teaching of the kingdom and 
the teaching about the father. The first is that the judgement cast 
by God's sovereign authority is not so much offered directly by God. 
It is rather our own behaviour which is our judge in the light of the 
grace we have received. It is perhaps in John's gospel where this 
idea is most clearly expressed (cf. John 3118-21). 
34 But it is 
implicit in the story of the talents for example. The generosity of 
34. "The perishing of the unbeliever is not a punishment for unbelief 
inflicted by"a ruthless Cod; it is the self-determined end of the man 
who does not believe, " John Marsh, Saint John, p. 1U4. 
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grace requires more than'a well-meaning cautiousness as a response. 
It is implicit above all in the cross itself. The judgement and 
crucifixion of Jesus are themselves a judgement upon those who 
condemned and crucified him. The cross in a symbol of judgement 
precisely because it is at the same time a symbol of God's reconciling 
love. The judges are to be judged because they have not understood 
that it is God's grace that saves, and that the law on its own can 
only condemn. Thus sovereignty, power and judgement only make sense 
in the light of grace and love. 
This leads me to the second facet I spoke of. It seems reasonable 
to suggest that if I am right about the concept of judgement depending 
upon some concept of grace, then in some sense the concept of fatherhood 
of God lies behind the concept of the kingdom. Jeremias supports this 
hypothesis by implication in his discussion of the meaning and use of 
the term 'abbe' in the teaching of Jesus. Many scholars have argued 
that, the Aramaic 'Abbe' was the distinctive way in which Jesus spoke 
about God as father. Jeremias says, ", 'Abbe' as a form of address to 
God expresses the ultimate mystery of the mission of Jesus. "35 A 
little earlier he has claimed that 'Abba'uexpresses the heart of 
Jesus' relationship to God. "36 However he distinguishes between 
God as father and God as king in Jesus' teaching by suggesting that 
while the fatherhood of God lies at the heart of Jesus' own faith, and 
expressed his fundamental understanding of the nature of God, the 
concept of the kingdom was the central theme in the public proclamation. 
tie says, "Our starting point is the fact that the central theme of the 
"37 public proclamation of Jesus was the kingly reign of God. For this 
35. op. cit. Jeremias, p. 68 
36, ibid., p. 67 
37. ibid., p. 96 
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reason we might sucjent that the concept of the kingdom 
is derived from 
that of the fatherhood, in that it stands for the response Jesus seeks 
to elicit from Israel on the basis of the fatherly grace which they have 
been shown throughout the history of the nation. 
The point is a simple one. It seems legitimate to interpret the 
relationship between the father and the kingdom in Jesus' teaching in 
something like this way. At the heart of Jesus' understanding of God 
lies the experience from which the concept of fatherhood is derived, a 
concept which is most intensely expressed perhaps in the Lord's prayer. 
When we turn to the kingdom, again speaking in general terms, the 
parables invite men and women to judge themselves and respond to God 
not in the light of their obedience to the letter of the law, but in 
the light of the law as a symbol of God's fatherly love. So, in the 
parable of-the workers in the vineyard, the owner of the vineyard repays 
the workers not according to same legal agreement between servant and 
master, but as a father would repay his children. Moreover, 
paradoxically, men and women will judge themselves more severely 
according to this criterion (cf. Sermon on the Mount), but their hope 
of salvation will also be more securely founded because it will root 
itself in God's love. 
How then are we to understand the teaching of Jesus about God as 
father? Here too the same problem is faced as that confronted in the 
teaching of the kingdom. Just as there is often an implicit Christology 
in the way the kingdom teaching is presented, so many commentators see 
in Jesus! language about the father and his own sonship evidence of his 
divine personal ontology. Jesus' experience of God as father is not so 
much the experience human nature has of fatherhood, but it is rather the 
experience the Son has of the Father within the Trinity. 
So Wainwright in his book on the Trinity in the New Testament 
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speaks of the "uniqueness of his Sonship". As is often the case 
Wainwright's use of capital letters to refer to Jesus as Son indicates 
that he pees evidence for a divine ontology in Jesus' language about 
the father. He says, "Jesus teaches that men can become God's sons, 
but Jesus himself is already God's Son.. 138 
In Jeremias we find a hint of the same idea. Jesus' unique use 
of 'Abba' to refer to God indicates a unique consciousness of God as 
father. So he says, "Abba' as a form of addreos to God expresses the 
ultimate mystery of the mission of Jesus. He was conscious of being 
authorised to communicate God'a revelation, because God had made himself 
known to him as Father. "39 However Jeremias is careful to avoid 
reading into this evidence a later Chriatology. "The fact that the 
address 'Abbe' expreodss a consciousness of oonship should not mislead 
us into ascribing to Jesus himself in detail the 'Son of God' Christology 
e. g. the idea of pre-existence, which developed very early in the 
primitive church*" 
40 Even so Jeremias does seem to imply that 
something like a Christology is latent and implicit in Jesus' consciousness. 
If this is a correct interpretation of Jesus' teaching then 
Pannenberg was right to see the resurrection as epistemological 
confirmation of a'Chrietological ontology. However it is debatable 
whether the evidence in the New Testament will support this thesis. 
The major problem is that it involves making a clear-cut distinction 
between Jesus' relationship with God, and the relationship that God 
has with the rest of creation. Thio Wainwright is willing to grant. 
"In his own sayings Jesus claims to be different from other man ... it 
is through the title "Son of God" that he expresses most clearly his 
relationship to God. "a1 It is possible to distinguish between the 
38. The Trinity in the New Testament A. W. Wainwright, p. 178 
39, op. cit. Jeremias, p. 68 
40. ibid., p. 67-68 
41. op. cit. A. W. Wainwright, p. 175 
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quality of the relationship God has with the Son, and tho quality of 
relationship he has with the rest of his creatures. "Jesus teaches 
that men can become God's sons, but Jesus himself is already God's Son. "42 
Now no doubt there are very important theological reasons for 
making such a distinction, not least the basic need that sinful humanity 
has for a divine act of salvation which only God can perform. On the 
other hand there are two factors which make such an interpretation 
problematic. In the first place it seems clear that Jesus uses the 
term "father" to express more than his own relationship to God. Indeed 
fatherhood in the teaching of Jesus is used as a symbol of God's 
compassion and care. The whole of creation, birds and flowers alike 
(Matthew 600ff. ) bear witness to this compassion. God's fatherhood 
is used to symbolise the nature of the care. Similarly just as the 
needs of a son are recognised and met by a father's compassion, so God 
in a similar, but infinitely more sensitive way will respond to our 
needs. "Is there a man among you who will offer his eon a stone when 
he asks for bread, or a snake when he asks for fish? If you then, bad 
as you are, know how to give your children what is good for them, how 
much more will your heavenly rather give good things to those who ask 
him? (Matthew 7: 9ff. ) Indeed such is the compassion of God, that like 
a father, he does not care according to the deserts of his creatures. 
He "makes his sun rise on good and bad alike. " (Mttw. 5: 45) Thus 
there is something intrinsically contradictory with the notion that God's 
care for 'his Son' and his relationship with him should be different 
from his relationship with all other creatures. Indeed the fundamental 
characteristic of compassion and care is that they are extended to those 
who reject and deny them. Thus love is defined by its outreach to the 
enemy. 
42. ibid., p. 178 
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In tho second place, while it ie true that tho goz3polo do record 
a distinction Jcaud nakoa between 'my father' und 'your father', it is 
doubtful whether a Christological ontology can bo built upon it. 
Rather does Jesus seem to invite his contemporaries to share his 
understanding of the nature of Cod's fatherhood, and by implication 
his relationship with Cod. He teaches his disciples to pray to God 
as 'our Father'. (Matthew 6: 9ff. ) His own use of the term 'Abbe' 
might be interpreted as an awareness rather of his radical dependence 
than of his unique sonship. His words about children inheriting the 
kingdom could be cited in support of such a view (Lk. 18: 16) 
Thus my suggestion is that it is possible to interpret Jesus' 
teaching about God na father simply in terms of the compassion of the 
creator for his creation. The analogy is with the father who 'creates' 
his son. , In this sense therefore the resurrection could be said to 
confirm not so much the divine sonship of Jesus as the faith in the 
historical Jesus of the compassion of God, and by implication the 
ultimate ontological reality of that compassion is the origin of the 
universe. 
In addition it is possible to take this argument a stage further. 
For juxt as when Jcsuo speaks of God not just as his father in some 
special sense, but rather of God as father in the sense of his fatherly 
care for the whole of creation, so the love of the earthly father is 
not just analogous with the love of Cod, rather does it actually express 
God's love. Because the basic relationship between creator and 
creature is that of love, then the love the creature offers in return 
is itself that same creative love. Thus Jesus teaches his disciples 
to forgive thoao who sin against them as God forgives them. (Matthew 6: 12). 
The servcnt, forgiven by the king is expected to forgive as the king has 
forgiven. (ttatthew 18: 23ff. ). The requirement of divine love ie the 
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achievement of its own creative perfection. "You must therefore be 
all goodness, just as your heavenly Father is all good. " (Matthew 5: 48). 
Thus not only is it possible to argue that Jesus' teaching about the 
fatherhood of God, at least in the Synoptic record, contains no basic 
tenet concerning his own ontological uniqueness and is rather to be seen 
as symbolic of God's own compassion, but also there is implicit in 
Jesus' teaching the idea that the love with which we love is the same 
love with which God loves. 
James Mackey seems to be expressing something approaching this view. 
Describing the faith of Jesus ho. sayss 
"It was a faith that had its deepest roots in the most ordinary 
experience of everyday life. The man Jesus ... had no more 'information' 
about God than could be gleaned from the birds of the air, the farmers 
in their fields, kings in their castles, and merchants in the market- 
place. For this very reason, because it had its roots in the most 
ordinary experience of everyday life, his faith was extraordinarily 
radical. Most faiths, most religions, have some places more sacred 
than others, some days holier than others, some actions more religious 
than others, some vocations in life more perfect than others, some 
meats, even, cleaner than others. Religious faith, then, has to do 
principally with these and it is, in consequence, too easily restricted 
to these. As for as Jesus was concerned, though, the Sabbath was made 
for man, man was not made for the Sabbath. The holiday, with its 
special buildings and personnel, its special ritual and food, is there 
simply to symbolise and thus to serve the faith which is-itself a 
lived conviction that all times and places, all people and practices, 
and all things great and small, are equally close to God as his cherished 
gift to all of us. " 43 
It is important however, even in such a brief survey, for it to 
be seen that evidence detrimental to the argument has not been merely 
ignored. Wainwright's case, and the orthodox Christological perspective 
on Jesus' relationship with the father ought not to be dismissed in such 
a cavalier manner. One of the key texts which Wainwright cites does 
seem to present itself as an enormous stumbling block to our argument. 
In Matthew 11: 27 we read, "All things have been delivered unto me by 
43. - Jesus, The Man and the Myth, James Mackey, p. 171 
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my Father; and no one knows who the Son is save the Father; and who 
the Father is save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son wills to 
reveal him. " Wainwright comments, "the saying speaks of Jesus as one 
who has a unique and intimate knowledge of the Father. 1144 
It is true that many scholars have questioned whether such a 
statement can be seen to be an authentic word of Jesus. Many have 
pointed out its similarity to the Johannine teaching concerning the 
father and son, and questioned its authenticity on the grounds that the 
Johannine Jesus is unlikely to be historically as authentic as the 
synoptic figure. However more recently scholars have been prepared 
to argue that it is not impossible that the historical Jesus spoke in 
this way. 
45 
If it is an authentic word of Jesus then on the surface at least 
it supports the view that Jesus thought of his role and his relationship 
with the father in something like the Christological formulation of the 
early Christians. However there are certain indications even here 
which may point not so much to an exclusive ontology, as can be spelled 
out in the doctrine of the Trinity, but rather a relational ontology of 
love which unites God with all those who acknowledge their radical 
dependence upon him. 
We have already observed that in John's gospel, in Jesus' teaching 
there about the fattier and the son, we find a paradoxical combination of 
unity and authority on the one hand, and total dependence on the other. 
'44. op. cit. A. W. Wainwright, p. 178 
45. David Hill says, "The authenticity of the saying has been assailed 
on the grounds that it has a distinctly Johannine ring (cf. Jn. 3: 35;. 
10: 15). But is it a legitimate canon of criticism that any Synoptic 
saying which has a parallel in John must ipso facto be spurious? In 
fact, it can be argued with Joremias (Prayers, p. 48) that the saying is 
not precisely paralleled in John but represents a stage on the way to 
Johannine thought; and that without. such points of departure in the 
Synoptic tradition it would be an eternal puzzle how Johannine theolo y 
could have originated at all; " (p. 205, D. Hill, Thpel of Matthew). 
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So Jesus says, "If you know no you would know my Father too" (Jn. 14: 7) 
and again, "Anyone who has seen no has seen the Father. " (14: 9-10). 
At the same time Jesus owns that the "Father is greater than I" (14: 28) 
and that, "I am not myself the source of the words I speak to you"" 
(14: 10) The Son "can do nothing by himself. " (5: 19) Here it seems 
is not so much an exclusive Chriatological ontology. Rather are we 
offered an ontology very similar to that which Paul offers in Galatians 
5: 6, and which was the subject of the previous chapter. And this 
simply means that it is by owning his dependence upon God that Jesus 
discovers that the very nature of his relationship originates in God's 
love, and that this is the very source of his unity with God, and the 
source of his divine authority because love is the very nature of God's 
fatherhood. Thus it is not so much because of who He is that Jesus 
has authority, but rather because God's nature is love, and ultimately 
because of the nature of love itself. 
Thus the whole notion of an exclusive Christological ontology in 
the ways in which orthodoxy frequently speaks of it is not as obvious 
as at first sight it might appear in John's gospel. The ontology 
which unites Christ with the father is an ontology which through faith 
can unite all humanity with the father. Thus the Johannine Jesus says, 
"The glory which thou gayest me I have given to them, that they may be 
one, as we are one; I in them and thou in me, may be perfectly one. 
Then the world will learn that thou didst send me, that thou didst love 
them as thou didst me. " (17: 23) The ontology of the incarnation is 
nothing other than the ontology of the creator's relation with the 
creation. God's love for Jesus is the some as his love for all humanity. 
And the relation of faith and obedience which Jesus has with the father 
is a relation which God's love makes available to all. 
46 
46. It is interesting to note that many commentators make reference to 
the dynamic and organic unity of God with humanity made possible and 
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acceoaiblo through Christ (faith's activity in love as I call it), 
but they do so within the limits of ecclesiastical and ohristological 
orthodoxy. Thus R. Brown Days, "Some types ! of vital,. ortlanic unity 
seems to be demanded by the fact that the relationship of Father and 
Son io hold up na the model of unity ... Similarly the Christians 
are one with one another and with the Father and the Son because they 
have received of this life. " (p. 776, R. Brown, The Appel According to 
St. John); cf. also C. K. Barrett: "It may be 8aicýi-wi h equnl truth 
That Christ in in the Father and tho Fatter in Christ, and the relation 
between the disciples and the Godhead in of a similar reciprocal kind. " 
(p. 420, C. K. Barrett, The Gos nI Accordin to St. John) Ily point is 
that it enhances our understanding of the dynamic a' the relationship 
between God and humanity if the epistemological, as opposed to the 
ontological, oigntficance of Christ is alressad. It also allows the 
radical nature of the primacy of faith to be highlighted. 
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flow this Johannino nexus of idcns can also be soon to be latent 
in the passage from Matthew which we cited above. In Matthew 11: 25, 
the verse which immediately precedes the one which Wainwright cites, 
J33u3 nays, "I thank thee, rather, Lord of heaven and earth for hiding 
these things from the learned and the wise, and revealing them to the 
simple. " It is the 'simple' or the 'childlike' then who know the 
relationship between Jesus and his father. At the sa, ýac time the 
suggestion might be permitted that the childlike are also those who 
own their radical dependence upon God. The wise und the learned on 
the other hand, by implication depend upon their knowledge and wisdom. 
Thus it is the childlike who share the secret of the relation between 
Jesus and his father. 
Thus although in these two versos the two themes of dependence 
and authority are not worked out in terms of their unity in the reality 
of love a3 in John's gospel, they do, surprisingly, exist aide by side 
here. It might even he suggested that what they point to is that then 
only secret in the relationship between Jesus and the father is the 
secret of simple trust. While the statement in Matthew 11: 27 undoubtedly 
points forward to the later Christological confessions of the Church, 
howovor when wo sae it in its context, somewhat strangely, it also can 
be uarmoniued with a view of Josue as the child figure, the one whose 
role is that of trusting his father. 
In the same wary, in two other piccea in the Synoptic gospels those 
who are dependent; the child in Lk. 9: 48, and the needy in Matthew 25: 40 
are expressly referred to an being Christ figures. Thus the dependent 
on of the fourth gospel io mirrored in these images of the child, the 
hungry, the nick and the prisoner. We might say that whenever those 
who recognise their dependence in faith, and whenever the need of those 
who are dependent is net by love, there the relationship between Jesus 
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and hic father is made real. 
Thus even in those passages which seem to reflect the highest 
implicit Christology of the gospels we find that that Chrietology itself 
symbolises-an ontology of the creature's faith in the love of the 
creator. Moreover because the creature's faith is moat appropriately 
expressed by loving in the way that the creator loves, then human love 
itself is capable of mediating the truth about the human condition, 
and affecting the salvation human beings long for. And that is so not 
simply because it is human love, but because human love itself is rooted 
in and is expressive of the divine love. "Though Cod has never been 
ueen by any man, God himself dwells in us if we love one another; his 
love in brought to perfection within us. " (I. in. 4: 12). 
It is my contention therefore that the theoretical epistemology 
of salvation based on an ontology of faith's activity in love which we 
discovered beneath the surface of some of the complex ontological 
structures of both the Old and New Testaments is there in the message 
of Jesus. It forms the theological framework of the concepts of the 
fatherhood and kingdom of Cod, and as these terms were often the 
substance of the message of the historical Jesus, it lies at the heart 
of his own message. In this sense it is irrelevant to a modern 
epistemology of salvation whether the New Testament offers us in addition 
a Christological ontology, or whether indeed Jesus himself did. What 
is important in that while the Christologicol ontology itself is 
epistemologically no longer acceptable, the epistemology of salvation 
based upon faith's activity in love is comprehensible when understood 
in the light of the dimension of the 'personal'. 
My thesis is that the resurrection validates the faith of Jesus, 
and that this validation is comprehensible to rational argument and 
authorised by the historical evidence. This is not to say that it 
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achieves the status of proof. It is merely to say that it is not 
contrary to logical argument, and that it rests on the balance of 
historical probability. 
This means that the significance of Jesus remains at the level 
of human knowledge. That is to say he provides us with access to 
faith. In that sense, according to this study, it is necessary to 
relinquish the claims of divine ontology which have been located in 
orthodox Christology. On the surface this may seem to be an unacceptable 
price to pay. But it does have the great advantage of providing 
Christian faith with an epistemology which does not deny the primacy 
of faith. Indeed it places faith's primacy on an even firmer 
foundation. The disadvantage of Natural Theology was that in seeking 
a rational foundation for faith by means of a proof of the truth, it 
was unable to assert this primacy. Only the primacy of reason could 
be re-stated. On the othor hand the theology which justified itsolf 
by the category of revelation, by dint of the epistemological principle 
it employed allowed faith to be self-validating. By contrast we have 
argued that the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth provides us with a 
legitimate historical signpost within the Christian tradition via a 
natural and rational 'personal' openness to the transcendent, to love's 
creative being. Christ is thus a living symbol of faith. He is not 
the dead letter of an increasingly incredible ontology which relegates 
faith to assent. 
Paradoxically this analysis allows us to re-state the power of the 
insight expressed in the Chalcedonian definition of the Person of Christ. 
Within the Christian tradition the figure of Jesus is epistemologically 
constitutive for our knowledge of God. In this sense the decisiveness 
of Jesus is an epistemological category rather than an ontological reality. 
Ontologically the importance of Jesus lies not so much in his own 
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significance as in the significance which he allows faith to give to 
love. The love with which we are free to love one another is at the 
same time the divine love. It is here that faith sees the secret of 
human salvation. For love, as glimpsed and lived out by faith, is 
at once both a human and a divine reality. From the perspective of 
the Christian epistemology of salvation as wo have explained it there 
are two fundamental characteristics of love as faith apprehends it. In 
the first place it is transcendent and sovereign. In the second place 
it is unconditional in the freedom it bestows. Here is the divinity 
and humanity of Christ. They are the necessary ontological projections 
of faith's response to the experience of salvation, that is the validation 
and vindication of personal worth. Moreover they cannot be reconciled 
into any rational theological system. For they constitute the 
boundaries of faith's dynamic. 
Love, as apprehonded by faith, is all powerful. It is the 
ultimate eschatological reality. It can overcome all. But at the 
same time it is helpless, in that it offers unconditional freedom to 
the other 'person' whom it encounters. Thus love is divine in its 
vision of victory and it is human in its helpless exposure to defeat, 
and to an unconditional rejection at the hands of the other 'person'. 
Faith sees love as this paradox, epistemologically irreconcilable 
except through the activity of faith itself. It is the paradox of the 
sovereignty of the transcendent potential love glimpses, and of the 
total vulnerability to suffering to which it is exposed. So John 
asserts that the sovereignty and glory of God is revealed in the 
humiliation of the cross. 
47 
By the same token human freedom is to be 
47. See John 3: 14 and 12: 32: Barrett commenting on ü%? ePv (to lift 
up) sayer "... the word is ambiguous and was chosen by John for that 
reason. Jesus was lifted up in execution upon the cross and thereby 
exalted in glory. " (p. 356, C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. 
John). 
465 
most perfectly seen in the faithful acknowledgement that we are loved, 
an acknowledgement that confers upon us the power to love, as well as 
in the awful blasphemy of the rejection end denial of lovo. This is 
the essence of the ethical evangelical mosoago of Christianity which 
we apprehend through our 'personal' oeurch for and response to the 
transcendent. It is in thie direction that Brunner's own twin focus 
on the categories of salvation and the 'personal' has led us, rather, 
I believe, than in the direction which Brunner himself took. 
i 
r_ 
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APPENDIX 
BRUNNER'S. THESIS THAT ONLY A UNIQUE HISTORICAL REVELATION 
CAN CLAIM SAVING SIGNIFICANCE 
This appendix is by way of being a brief commentary on a comment 
of Brunner quoted in chapter one. He says, "where revelations are 
frequent, there can be no valid revelation in the ultimate sense of 
the word. In each of these revelations what was said to have 
happened did not take place; for if it had actually taken place it 
could not have happened repeatedly. "' 
Now this is a very strange 'ontological' view of revelation. It 
is as though unless God's saving purpose for mankind has been grasped 
fully as it is in itself, then we have no right to speak of revelation 
at all. This view, however would seem to by-pass two important 
notions, namely the transcendence of God, and the limited nature of 
the individual's understanding. Can it ever be legitimate for human 
beings to limit God's freedom to reveal himself? How can one revelation 
ever fulfil the criteria that Brunner demands that it satisfy? No 
revelation has actually brought history to an end. Surely the human 
grasp of revelation must always be limited, if we are to speak in such 
terms as grasping the saving revelation as it is in itself. Thus it 
is difficult to understand what Brunner means when he says, "By revelation 
we mean that historical event which is at the same time the end of 
history .... in other words that in fulfilling the purpose of history 
it ends it. "2 
-- However it is possible to grasp what he is getting at. In fact 
the point of the argument is epistemological and not ontological. 
1. The Mediator, p. 27 
2. ibid. 0 p. 27 
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He invites us first of all to accept a basic principle. We can 
discriminate between one revelation and another by applying something 
like the basic principle which the textual critic uses for deciding 
which version of a text is more likely to be more authentic. He is 
advised that the more difficult reading is likely to be the more 
reliable. Here Brunner offers us, in principle, the incredible claim 
of the uniqueness and the decisiveness of the historical revelation of 
Christ as being the more authentic revelation, compared with those 
which are associated with the natural cycle or are repeated within 
history. Thus we have an 'a priori' method of deciding about the 
likely legitimacy of revelation. But this is surely a most add way 
of attempting to discriminate between the truth or falsity of historical 
and cultural phenomena. We are offered a principle which adjudicates 
without even examining their claims in detail. Thus it would seem to 
be an extremely dubious epistemological principle. 
However, this 'a priori' principle is not really the heart of 
Brunner's argument. He wants to say that it is because the Christian 
claim to a unique and decisive saving revelation lies beyond the grasp 
of human reason, and cannot be comprehended as a result of reason's 
understanding of nature and history that it is for that reason authentic. 
Here is the epistemological basis and validation that it is a divine 
revelation. Thus it is not so much the ontological uniqueness of the 
history of Jesus that is so important, but rather the epistemological 
validity of a principle which exceeds reason's grasp which is important. 
And this exceeding of reason's grasp is important because of the 
fundamentally sinful nature of human reason. The uniqueness of the 
event is symbolic of the fact that it is beyond reason, but not a 
contradiction of it. For in faith reason can recognise its limitation. 
At this point we can see however why Brunner expresses it in terms 
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of what we have chosen to call an ontology of revelation. For him the 
significance of the epistemological insight is ontological. For what 
the event of Jesus mediates is the reality of God. Thus while we find 
the argument unacceptable as an argument, it is possible to understand 
the reason why Brunner arrives at such a conclusion. 
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